- Beth Holcombe, STIP Project Coordinator
September 21, 2007
David N. Livingstone--Landscapes of
Science:
Thoughts on the
Historical Geographies of Scientific Culture
Livingstone
began his talk by establishing his premise that science is
indelibly marked by the physical and geographical space it
occupies. He then laid out three methods for mapping
scientific space.
Mapping Scientific Space
1)
production, consumption, circulation
2)
site, region, state
3)
experimentation, exhibition, expedition
All three of these methods involved the
study how science occurs, who receives it, or benefits from
it, how does that knowledge travel, and how is it presented.
Livingstone proceeded to discuss what he saw as recurrent
signals in the creation of science. The first was
polarities. He spoke of natural and social opposition, in
the sense that the natural is “stage managed by human
artifice”. For instance, labels were forced on nature by
society. He spoke of local and global polemics and asked
the question of how to achieve universality, as well as
scientific and political polarities. Livingstone also sees
materialities as a recurrent signal. Scientific knowledge
is rooted in material entities, i.e. bodies, buildings, and
objects.
After this introduction
into the topic, Livingstone spoke on four factors that have
affected the production and distribution of knowledge. He
first spoke of landscape agency. The agency of nature needs
to be liberated from human captivity. He mentioned
Darwinian landscapes. Darwin’s research was heavily
impacted by the abundance of the tropical landscape in which
he was surrounded. It was the lushness and diversity of
that particular landscape that served as catalyst for his
theories. Livingstone contrasts Darwin’s landscape with
that of scientists in the Russian Arctic and the Canadian
North. These environments did not display plentitude, and
where Darwin saw struggle, “we see mutual aid.”—Kropotkin
Livingstone then spoke on
political ecology, touching on nature as read from a
political perspective. He briefly discussed Russian
ideology and Canadian nationalism, but his more compelling
example came from Scotland and America on the topic of human
origins. Kames, a scientist in Edinborough, discussed
climate’s role in human history. He believed that climate
did not create human variety. He believed diversity was
primitive, not derived. Therefore, humanity was
fundamentally diversified. Smith, an American researcher,
objected to Kames’ assertions. He declared Kames’ findings
a denial of human unity. A lack of global human sameness
impaired the foundation of human morality. In a country
that was founded on the very idea of universal equality,
Smith could not accept Kames’ standpoint.
Print culture and the
social morphology of lending libraries were next on
Livingstone’s list. The geography of reading can change its
meaning as a result of location. Livingstone used slavery
and scripture in antebellum America as an example.
Southerners reading the Bible saw endless Old Testament
precedents for slavery and used it to justify their own
behavior. Northerners read the same stories and saw nothing
but a Biblical decree for abolition. Livingstone
superimposed this idea on global scientific knowledge.
Translation created boundaries in the geographies of
knowledge as well. He cited The Origin of Species as
an example. At the time Darwin’s work was making its impact
felt, Arabic had no words for species, race, or evolution.
How do you translate the idea when the words simply do not
exist?
Finally, Livingstone
touched in speech space. Scientific discussion can take
place anywhere: in a laboratory, in a kitchen, at a
coffeehouse, during a cricket match. Not only that, what
can or cannot be discussed changes with the location. What
is deemed unseemly in the tea room is perfectly acceptable
in a pub. There is also the matter of private versus public
space. What one feels free discussing at the office changes
upon returning home. At what point do people automatically
censor themselves?
Livingstone wrapped up his
lecture by responding to questions from the audience. He
revealed that he has been operating with a very loose
definition of scientific knowledge in the belief that any
definition he employed would inherently have social and
political implications. In order to avoid that bias, he has
not attempted to define science or scientific knowledge.
