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EASC Newsletter: May 2005

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FROM THE EDITOR...

Susan W. Furukawa

As the academic year comes to a close, the Center looks forward to more change as we bid farewell to Associate Director Jacques Fuqua. Jacques has accepted a position as Director of International Engagement and Protocol at the University of Illinois. In his five-year association with EASC, Jacques has led the Center in a number of exciting new ventures involving teachers and the study of East Asia. Under his direction, the Center received several major grants and hosted many big conferences such as the Midwestern Conference on Asian Affairs and the third annual Symposium on Asia in the Curriculum. Patrick O’Meara, the Dean of International Programs, comments, “Jacques’ knowledge of Japan and Korea, his organizational ability and social skills have been invaluable for the East Asian Studies Center.  He has been a pleasure for all of us to work with.” Indeed, Jacques’ military background and expertise in diplomacy were instrumental in developing a vision for the study of East Asia in the world that considered issues of security and diplomacy as well as education. Jacques’ leadership and vision will be missed, but we wish him all the best in his new position.

Because the East Asian Studies Center stays extremely busy during the summer months, this issue of the newsletter includes a new page appropriately titled “Summer at the Center.” As always, we hope you enjoy the newsletter and look forward to your comments, which can be sent to easc@indiana.edu.

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SPOTLIGHT ON...

 

Hot Topics in East Asia...

A Shrimp among Whales: The Nexus of the North Korean Nuclear Issue

by Jacques Fuqua

Introduction

The Bush Administration has tended toward an overly simplistic treatment of North Korea and its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program. Vitriolic characterizations of Kim Jong-il and the North Korean regime, such as President Bush’s reference to Kim as a “pygmy,” do little to create or advance a constructive policy that offers a means for reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. Imprecise measures of “good and evil” or “moral and immoral” do little to assist in understanding the integrated nature of North Korea’s WMD program or the role nuclear weapons play in its foreign and defense policies. The nuclear weapons and associated technology Kim brandishes as a part of his missile diplomacy are a means to a greater end, not necessarily the North Korean endgame. In its present incarnation, the North’s nuclear weapons program functions as a tool of diplomacy and foreign policy, helping to ensure survival of the regime. While North Korea is undoubtedly dangerous, the threat it poses is not as imminent as the Bush administration has purported in the past: the US operates with a lack of understanding of North Korean “intent.” Ambassador Donald P. Gregg, former US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) describes the current administration’s position as “an attitude toward North Korea rather than a policy.” As a consequence, the US has missed opportunities to move dialogue forward with North Korea, either bilaterally with its South Korean ally or multilaterally, through the Six-Party Talks.

The first half of this paper will define the elements of the North Korean WMD threat, its intent, and the perceived threats against which it seeks to defend itself. The second half of the paper will address how and what steps the US might take to put discussions with North Korea back on track.

The Nature of the North Korean Threat

As with a growing number of military forces around the world, North Korea maintains both a conventional force structure (army, air force, navy) and an unconventional one, the most immediate threat from which is its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program. Maintaining the effectiveness of its conventional military forces has proved problematic over the past several decades for two important reasons: an inability to undertake force modernization because of a lack of research and development resources and the absence of foreign exchange to maintain its existing force structure and weapons systems, important contributing factors to its pursuit of a viable nuclear weapons program. Consequently, while North Korea enjoys numerical force superiority vis-à-vis the US-South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) security alliance in terms of military end strength and numbers of weapons systems on the peninsula (Table 1), this advantage is mitigated by the technological superiority and high state of unit readiness of US and ROK units. Central to this disparity in technology and unit readiness is North Korea’s economic crisis, which has taken its toll on all sectors of the economy, but presently forces the military sector to operate at about 64% of its pre-1992 levels. An immediate impact of a shrinking military budget has been the effect on the research and development dollars necessary to upgrade conventional armaments in order to maintain the readiness of North Korean conventional forces. This, coupled with the difficulty of ensuring regular maintenance and availability of repair parts for its large inventory of existing weapons systems, has led North Korea to seek more cost-effective means of creating and maintaining a credible threat against the US-ROK alliance and ensuring its own survival—a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and more specifically, a nuclear program.

The North Korean WMD threat can itself be divided into two categories: conventional and unconventional weapons. A conventional WMD capability I describe as one that employs the use of conventional weapons systems against high value, high concentration targets, such as cities, in such mass that their potential lethality generally approximates the effect of unconventional WMD like tactical nuclear weapons. For example, the North Korean Army has forward deployed in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which is located roughly 50km from Seoul, approximately 12,000 field artillery tubes capable of producing a sustained rate of fire of up to 500,000 rounds per hour. When one considers such a potential barrage on a concentrated area like Seoul, with its population of 11 million, the aggregate effect would be much like an unconventional WMD. Another important point to consider is that conventional artillery shells can be replaced with tactical nuclear artillery shells, increasing their lethality.

It is North Korea’s unconventional WMD program, however, that is of immediate concern to the region and larger global community of nations. Comprised of a growing nuclear program, along with biological and chemical (NBC) programs, North Korea’s NBC capability is a potentially devastating one. Additionally, its ballistic missiles, which serve as delivery systems for its NBC capability, are also considered WMD. US intelligence estimates that North Korea likely has some limited amount of biological toxins such as yellow fever, anthrax and small pox, but a much more potent chemical weapons capability, having stockpiled somewhere between 250-5,000 tons of chemical agents such as nerve, blister, blood and choking agents; it presently continues development of this class of WMD. As a practical matter, biological toxins are extremely difficult to weaponize; the same is not true of chemical agents.

Most lethal is North Korea’s growing nuclear program, both uranium and plutonium derived. While it has since denied the existence of a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program, backing away from initial admission of its existence in October 2002, the countries of East Asia and the United States remain skeptical. Estimates are that North Korea’s uranium mines could produce approximately four million tons of uranium. Under an HEU program, it could eventually produce enough uranium for one nuclear weapon annually. Plutonium presents a more pressing problem. Current estimates are that the North already possesses somewhere between 7-80 kilograms of plutonium. To put this into perspective, the bomb at Nagasaki carried about 7 kilograms. In this context, the expulsion of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from North Korea, removal of the 8,000 spent plutonium fuel rods from the Yongbyon facility and subsequent North Korean claims that it has reprocessed the fuel rods into weapons grade plutonium (something not yet independently confirmed) all serve to heighten global concern. The plutonium present in the 8,000 spent fuel rods could yield 4-5 nuclear weapons.

Nuclearized “Madman” or Sly as a Fox? North Korea’s Calculated Gamble

While the US and other nations of East Asia have successfully defined the threat North Korea poses to the region, they have had less success in understanding the intent behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and even less success in creating workable solutions for dealing with it. Understanding intent is key to any discussion of how best to proceed in diffusing tensions over the North’s nuclear program. In this case, intent can be summed up in two words: regime survival, although the simplicity of the definition belies its complexity.

Ensuring survival of the state is the single basic function of any government regardless of the political philosophy and principles upon which it is based. The North Korean regime, through a confluence of factors, has come to regard development of a viable nuclear deterrent as necessary to ensuring its own survival. But against what perceived threat? And why has it selected the option of nuclear deterrence? Furthermore, why flaunt the potential development and use of these weapons?

Fundamentally, the greatest perceived threat confronting North Korea is the US-ROK alliance, but more specifically, the US itself; this is not an insignificant distinction and underscores the different approaches Washington and Seoul are taking to address the rising nuclear tensions on the peninsula. The Bush Administration remains critical of past efforts to negotiate with North Korea, most specifically the 1994 Agreed Framework, which has come to symbolize for Bush the folly of trying to negotiate with the Kim regime. Washington seeks to force North Korean compliance via a different tact: complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, with no promise of additional rewards until such compliance is forthcoming. Despite continued North Korean demands, the US eschews any direct bilateral discussions with North Korea, preferring multilateral engagement through the Six-Party Talks.

Since 1998, when former President Kim introduced his “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea, which sought constructive engagement with the North through commerce while avoiding contentious political issues, Seoul’s approach has been characterized by continued economic outreach. For example, Hyundai Asan’s Kawsong Industrial Park program; reconnection of inter-Korean roads and railways; and the opening of a South Korean rail line to the North’s Mt. Kumgang tourist resort in October 2004 are more recent examples of inter-Korean rapprochement efforts. Seoul has also been successful in lobbying other Asian nations to take a soft approach to North Korea. Seoul, along with Tokyo and Beijing, seeks further engagement through discussion and extension of additional economic perks, or at least no further imposition of economic sanctions. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, for example, recently indicated Japan had reservations about the effectiveness of additional economic sanctions and preferred to “work with patience to get North Korea to respond sincerely.” These are fundamental differences and lie at the root of the lack of success via the Six Party Talks.

Several other factors have led to North Korea’s fear for survival of its regime. First, are the implications of broader US foreign policy objectives characterized by greater unilateralism, segued by the Bush administration’s lukewarm reception to former President Kim’s Sunshine policy. This was followed by a lengthy review of US policy toward North Korea during which no meaningful dialogue was undertaken with the reclusive nation. President Bush’s oft cited “axis of evil” designation of North Korea, Iraq and Iran delivered in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union address, coupled with the administration’s declaration of its right to strike preemptively against nations it perceives as potential threats, followed by the US-led war against Iraq have all likely sown seeds of distrust. As Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov described it: “How should a small country feel when it is told that it is all but part of forces of evil of biblical proportions and should be fought against until total annihilation? There is no use expecting countries included in the‘axis of evil’ to remain passive.” Less publicized, but likely equally provocative from the North Korean viewpoint are US plans to develop a new class of tactical nuclear weapons, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, designed to destroy hardened underground targets; the implications this presents for the US “no first use” policy with regard to nuclear weapons are enormous. Similarly, continued US refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) might further contribute to mistrust of its motives.

Second, is North Korea’s obsolete conventional force structure, hence its quest to seek a more cost-effective means of ensuring its own survival through development of a nuclear capability and delivery systems.

Third, North Korea may see US-led actions through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as antagonistic, particularly US decisions to halt shipments of heavy fuel oil to the North in November 2002 and suspension of construction of two light water nuclear reactors in November 2003, both of which were important elements of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Finally, demands to halt development of its ballistic missile program might be considered both an economic and national security threat as development and sale of ballistic missiles impact North Korea’s bottom line, providing much needed foreign exchange. North Korea has sold missiles and technology to Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Iran and other countries. Additionally, an indirect benefit of missile technology sales is the potential for North Korea to re-import improvements made by other countries to the original technology sold by North Korea.

While this helps to define intent and factors underlying its motivations, it does not address the question of what North Korea feels it has to gain through its brinksmanship approach with the countries of East Asia and the United States. The principal reasons are pragmatic—North Korean unpredictability should not be dismissed as “lunacy.” One cannot disregard the value as a bargaining tool the fear a nuclearized North Korea provides. Consider the extent to which the North Korean government has gone to present itself as a nuclear menace. In August 1998 it test-fired a missile that over flew Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean, demonstrating the capabilities of its ballistic missile program. In January 2004, in an effort to convince the world it had already re-processed 8,000 spent plutonium fuel rods necessary to develop nuclear weapons, the regime permitted a group of private citizens, among who was Ambassador Jack Pritchard and Dr. Sig Hecker, former Director of Los Alamos, to inspect its nuclear facilities and confirm that the spent fuel rods had been removed. Development of a nuclear capability, or even the threat of its development, has and continues to serve as a powerful bargaining tool at the negotiating table, ensuring: 1) that the North has the means to keep a stronger US and its allies off balance; 2) a continued source of economic aid from the international community by linking possible cessation of its nuclear activities to continued or increased economic assistance; 3) countries in the region engage with it and on its terms.

The North Korean regime benefits by the status quo. Kim understands the benefit of creating an air of a menacing North Korean threat and the sensitivities of the US and its regional allies to such a threat. The ability to create uncertainty about the state of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its willingness to either use them or share technology remains a potent bargaining tool. Actually using its nuclear weapons technology, however, would bring about a catastrophic response from the US and its allies, leading to the destruction of the regime and undermining the fundamental objective: its own survival. Understanding intent is fundamental.

The question then becomes how can a better understanding of North Korean intent contribute to creating a workable solution to diffuse the North Korean nuclear issue?

Moving Beyond the Traditional Paradigm: The Road toward Stability Requires Flexible Responses

There exist a limited range of options available to achieving dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. While the status quo is clearly not ideal and must be resolved as quickly as possible, when weighed against the alternative of armed conflict, it is a reasonable starting point. There is no silver bullet that will resolve the nuclear issue quickly; negotiations with North Korea are typically slow and arduous and require a great deal of patience. Ambassador Jack Pritchard, arguably one of the foremost North Korean experts in the United States, describes it as a “one step forward, two steps back” process that requires the US to seize windows of opportunity as they present themselves. That there exists a venue for dialogue through the Six-Party Talks should be considered an important achievement.

There are two roads the US and its allies might take to compel North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program: armed conflict or constructive engagement. Let’s first consider the armed conflict scenario, which would likely prove catastrophic for both the peninsula and the region for several reasons. First, I return to the theme of North Korean intent. The regime stands to lose a great deal if it ever employed a “first-use” policy for nuclear weapons, as the response of the US and its regional allies would be both swift and deadly. While North Korea may be unpredictable it has yet to prove itself suicidal. Conversely, if the North Korean regime’s own existence is ever threatened there would be little motivation for it to constrain its use of nuclear weapons in an effort to inflict maximum damage on the US and its allies, particularly South Korea and Japan. Second, if the North Korean regime is toppled, so too will the command and control structure for the North Korean military and its WMD programs. Imagine North Korean military units with access to nuclear and other WMD weapons, acting in isolation in defense of the country; there would be no formal apparatus for controlling their actions or through which to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The entire region could potentially be held hostage. Third, any move by the US toward armed conflict against North Korea would fracture regional alliances and exacerbate differences with regional competitors like China. China would view unfavorably any scenario in which the US undertakes military action so close to its own borders. Additionally, such a scenario would likely lead to an influx of large numbers of North Korean refugees crossing into China, an issue the Chinese already grapple with as a result of the North’s poor economic conditions. Despite our mutual agreements with the Government of Japan, like the Mutual Security Treaty and the Defense Guidelines, Japan’s Diet and citizens remain sensitive to the idea that Japan could be pulled into armed conflict as a result of US actions in the region. Imagine the response of the Japanese public if Japan suddenly became a target because the US was using bases in Japan to stage attacks against North Korea. Imagine the domestic response in the US if Japan refused to allow the US to use its bases for such operations. The Republic of Korea, however, has the most immediate at stake as its citizens, 11 million of whom live in Seoul, would experience any armed conflict first hand. This is more than a mere talking point for the government of South Korea. In a speech delivered to the Foreign Affairs Council of Los Angeles on November 12, President Roh Moo-hyun, offered his most strongly worded remarks to date regarding the direction the Bush Administration might take negotiations with North Korea. Warning that taking a hard-line approach could lead to “grave” consequences, he followed up by saying, “Koreans, who haven’t gotten over the trauma of the Korean War half a century ago, do not want another war on the peninsula.”At the heart of Roh’s concerns is the fear that the new administration will be staffed by “neocons” supporting a hard-line military resolution to the nuclear issue. The armed conflict scenario presents a host of problems and no solutions; constructive engagement provides the only viable way forward.

Constructive engagement requires some combination of dialogue, reciprocal CBMs and verifiable milestones. There are at present four possible venues through which to undertake constructive engagement: bilateral discussions between the US and North Korea; discussions between North Korea and the US-South Korea alliance; the Six-Party Talks; or some combination of these. The greatest potential for success in serving long-term US interests is to develop a two-track dialogue process that allows the US and South Korea to jointly undertake direct discussions with North Korea within the broader framework of the Six Party Talks.

The Six-Party Talks serve as an important venue for advancing discussion of the nuclear issue with North Korea. Involving the countries most immediately impacted by the North’s nuclear programs (US, China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and Japan), it provides the best potential for ultimately reaching a solution all parties might live with. Additionally, any decision ultimately reached through this venue will have additional credibility as it will be representative of the entire region.

The Bush administration has flatly dismissed any suggestion of establishing direct discussions with the North Koreans, insisting discussions take place through the Six Party Talks. This, despite the fact that each of the other nations participating in the Talks has established direct channels of discussion with North Korea: Japan, China, South Korea and Russia. There are two problems with the intractable position the US maintains. First, the US has come to be seen as an obstruction to progress rather than helping it, winding up at odds with other participants and giving the appearance that rifts exist between it and other participants. Imposition of further economic sanctions is an important example with Japan, South Korea, China and Russia opposing such action and only the US seeing it as a viable option. Whether there is merit to the claim that the US is obstructionist is immaterial: US actions shift attention away from the nuclear issue and make US policy the “issue.” Second, the present course runs the risk of allowing sidebar negotiations between North Korea and other Six Party Talk participants to potentially shape the direction and outcome of discussions, possibly to the detriment of US national interests. Ambassador Pritchard suggests that in order to avoid having the outcome shaped for the US it should pursue dialogue directly with North Korea within the broader framework of the Six-Party Talks.

I agree the US should engage in a second track of dialogue within the broader framework of the Talks, however, I believe any second-tier discussions should be undertaken via the traditional US-ROK alliance. There are several reasons I make this distinction. First, Six-Party Talk participants have defined the parameters of their discussions with North Korea to include only the nuclear weapons issue. Consequently, this leaves North Korea’s other WMD components and conventional military threat unaddressed. In the event resolution is achieved on the nuclear weapons issue, it will be the US-ROK alliance that must resolve the remaining threat. Thus, any settlement should be one both countries can live with and that further their efforts in future discussions with the North. Second, several unilateral US actions have contributed to undermining South Korean confidence in the US-ROK alliance and special efforts should be made to demonstrate our resolve in working jointly to reduce the North Korean threat on the peninsula. For example, the US announcement to remove an entire division from its forward position near the DMZ to a position south of Seoul, followed by the decision to downsize the US presence on the peninsula by 12,500 troops (1/3 of its present troop strength) were surprising revelations to South Korea. Underscoring the growing lack of confidence in its US partner are the recent strongly worded remarks by South Korea’s President Roh and South Korea’s dispatch of a bipartisan group of lawmakers to the US to try to determine future US intentions with regard to its North Korea policy.

Of CBMs and Verifiable Milestones: Constructive Engagement is the Only Road Forward

The US has framed its demands of North Korea in rather clear “black-and-white” terms: no offer of further economic, fuel oil or other inducements until North Korea achieves CVID with respect to its nuclear weapons program. Although this approach states the US position in unequivocal terms, it lacks sophistication and fails to take into account Ambassador Pritchard’s “take advantage of windows of opportunity” approach. In effect, what the US demands is unilateral nuclear disarmament on the part of North Korea with little in return but the promise of future aid. Unilateral disarmament is, of course, the desired end state, but demanding it hasn’t proven a particularly effective approach.

The US has, in fact, missed several opportunities to move discussions forward because of its recent unilateral approach to peninsula-related issues. Had the US, for example, used its decisions to move troops from the vicinity of the DMZ and to downsize its presence on the peninsula as CBMs with the North, it might have been able to extract concessions from the regime in return. As it is, the US presented these decisions as fait accompli to the South Korean government, leaving it in the position of trying to minimize damage with our allies instead of extracting concessions from our adversary.

If we return to the basic concept of North Korean intent, consideration of one of North Korea’s primary demands merits discussion: a security guarantee from the US against attack. With appropriate language to safeguard against potentially provocative North Korean activities, and offered through the framework of the Six Party Talks, this seems a positive first step to take: the US has sought to downplay any notion of a preemptive strike on North Korea over the past year, so this would seem to support its stated policy. Another important step is to lay out a gradual, but specific, schedule of inducements the North Korean regime can expect in exchange for action to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. With the onset of winter, one of the more important items would be resumption of heavy fuel oil shipments; in exchange the US might demand a return to the previous status quo of shutting down nuclear reactors and re-admitting IAEA inspectors to monitor North Korea’s activities. Full disclosure of its HEU program and steps to dismantle it might be tied to resuming work on the two light water nuclear reactors. As a further inducement, the US might seek to ratify the CTBT and in the process eliminate any testing under its new tactical nuclear weapons program. At some point, this administration must recognize that there is a connection between its own policies and how other countries react.

Only US government officials will have the necessary information to develop a detailed schedule of required action, inducements and appropriate CBMs. The important points are: by developing such a document, it becomes the focus of discussion and not US intractability; that such a schedule should be jointly developed by the US and South Korea within the broader framework of the Six Party Talks to ensure the long-term interests of both countries are met; and it recognizes the concerns of other nations that are party to the Six Party Talks.

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EASC EVENTS

EASC Funds the First EALC/Business Trip to China

With support from the Freeman Foundation, EASC helped sponsor the first EALC/Business Study Tour to China during spring break. The ten day trip took place from March 10-19, 2005 in Shanghai and two surrounding cities. Over 70 students applied for the program. Twenty students were selected to use Freeman funds, seven LAMP (Liberal Arts and Management) students were funded by LAMP Scholarships, and two students self-paid. The three-credit, semester-long course on Chinese Business and Culture was team taught by Rick Harbaugh of Business Economics and William Travis Selmier in Political Science, both of whom are Chinese speakers. In addition to the 29 students, Rick, and Travis, the group also consisted of the Chair of the Business Undergraduate Program, Professor Marc Dollinger, Business School Advisor Gail Fairfield (who participated in last year’s trip to Tokyo, due to her experience growing up in Asia), and Tammy Orahood, the trip administrator. The make-up of the students was as follows: 18 business students, 7 LAMP, and 5 College of Arts and Sciences. Seven of the students were conversant in Chinese.

Students met weekly during the semester for class in which they focused on Chinese Economic history, recent economic growth and basic Chinese language. Students were put into groups and asked to take on the role of investment banker and evaluate several of the up and coming industries in China. Upon return from the trip students worked on a 20-page paper on a topic developed during the trip.

Some highlights of the tour included side trips to the historical cities of Hangzhou and Suzhou, company visits to Citibank, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Intel China, AC Neilson, and ILX Mandarin Group (an entrepreneurial magazine distribution company), and cultural trips around Shanghai, including the famous Shanghai Art Museum, Old Town, the Jade Buddha Temple, and the Chinese acrobats. The I.U. delegation also attended a reception hosted by I.U. Alumni currently living in Shanghai.

Student participants were thrilled to have the opportunity to use part of the world as their classroom. Nikolai Jenkins (BUS) explains, “The trip allowed me to see the part of China that textbooks and coursework can never reveal. My preconceived notions of China were nothing like the realities we witnessed. Like a picture is worth a thousand words, visiting China was like reading a thousand books.” Scott Tidwell (BUS) was happy to have the opportunity to get a look at the Chinese economy first-hand. He says, “The study tour left me with an understanding of how China’s unprecedented economic expansion will influence this nation’s and the world’s culture, politics, and business throughout my lifetime.   Kelley School classes frequently touch on the significant impact China is expected to have in each of these areas, but no text or lecture could ever provide the perspective I have gained from experiencing China firsthand.  I regard the study tour as one of the most noteworthy and valuable experiences of my Kelley School of Business education.” Amy Oekten (LAMP) adds, “I really enjoyed meeting with the companies, such as Citigroup and Nielsen, because they gave us some great insights into how business is run in  China and where it is going in the future.  As a business major, it is such a great opportunity to meet with these companies because China is becoming such a major player in so many markets.  Another event that I really liked was the I.U. alumni networking dinner.  This was so advantageous because all business majors know how beneficial networking is.  All of the alumni were very open about their experiences in China and were more than willing to give us their contact information for future use.”

Trip administrator, Tammy Orahood concurs, “The overall feedback for the trip was very positive. The students had their eyes opened regarding the economic potential of China, and learned some background on its formidable history and culture. I am sure that this trip and class was just the beginning of the students’ interest in China!”

Globalizing East Asian Studies Workshop a Success

On Monday, April 4, 2005 from 12:00 to 3:45 pm, the East Asian Studies Center held a public workshop in the Indiana Memorial Union Oak Room entitled “Globalizing East Asian Studies.” With two lunch presentations and two panel sessions, the workshop focused on strategies and ideas for integrating discussion of China, Japan, and Korea into undergraduate classes and for placing the experiences of these countries into the broadest possible international context.

Topics covered included historical connections between East Asia and the Philippines; uses of maps in the classroom to present alternative viewpoints; international law as a reflection of Western cultural ideas and how East Asia has been effected globally due to conflicting attitudes and ideologies; global history from an East Asian perspective; European versus U.S. classroom approaches towards teaching about East Asia in general and China in particular; and the effects of popular culture on breaking down borders between individual East Asian countries as well as East Asia and the West.

Guest presenters were Martin Lewis (Stanford University), Kären Wigen (Stanford University), Adam McKeown (Columbia University), and Rana Mitter (Oxford University). Presentations were also given by I.U. East Asianists Lynn Struve (History) and Anne Prescott (EASC). Heidi Ross (Education) and Rick Wilk (Anthropology) graciously served as moderators for the panels. Over thirty people were in attendance including East Asian faculty and staff, faculty from other area studies, and graduate and undergraduate students.

Several other events were held in conjunction with this workshop.

The Center for Law, Society, and Culture co-sponsored with EASC a mini-symposium on Immigration Law on Monday, April 4, from 4:00 to 6:00 pm in the Moot Court. Adam McKeown was the featured speaker.

On Tuesday, April 5, a follow-up meeting for further discussion on integrating East Asia into the undergraduate curriculum was held for I.U. faculty members from 9:00 to 11:00 am in the Distinguished Alumni Room at the Indiana Memorial Union. The workshop concluded Tuesday, April 5 at 11:00 am with a reception in the Faculty Room of the University Club. During the reception, attendees drank a special toast to Lynn Struve, honoring the fact that she achieved the unusual feat of having two books she edited appear in print simultaneously.

This workshop was generously funded by the Undergraduate Initiative grant from the Freeman Foundation.

Human Rights in Asia Symposium Held at I.U.B.

The Committee on Asian Security presented a symposium on human rights in Asia on April 22, 2005 on the Bloomington campus. Students, faculty, and other interested individuals heard keynote remarks from Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director for Human Rights Watch. Malinowski highlighted some countries of concern in Asia, including North Korea, Burma, and Nepal. Asia’s influence, he said, is growing in all areas. We hear less of an argument now about “Asian values” being different from those in the West. The rise of grassroots organizations in many Asian countries is creating internal pressure on governments. Malinowski also noted the importance of China. While there has been progress in the protection of human rights in recent years, the country’s future direction will depend on how the Chinese people define their national greatness. Malinowski urged the United States and others to continue to engage both the Chinese government and its people.

Two panels of experts then examined the status of human rights in several countries in Asia. The first panel looked at civil and political rights in China, including Tibet, Korea, and Southeast Asia. A second panel explored the ways that gender affects the enjoyment of human rights in China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and India.

The Office of the Vice President for Research, the Office of International Programs, the Center for the Study of Global Change, and the College of Arts and Sciences provided generous support for this event. Audio files and panelists’ abstracts from the symposium are available on the EASC website.

EASC Welcomes Shamisen Duo

On Wednesday, April 27th, the father-son shamisen duo, Nitta Oyako performed at the first Christian Church in Bloomington as part of the Lotus Blossoms outreach program. From Japan, this duo of Hiroshi and Masahiro plays in a style called Tsugaru shamisen, in which a larger sound compliments the delicate sensibility of classic shamisen. It is “Wabi and Sabi”--the expression of quiet passion. Their Lotus concert is part of their first American tour. On Friday, April 29th, they offered a free lecture demonstration which was open to the public.

EASC to Help Sponsor Business Symposium

EASC is co-sponsoring with the Kelley School of Business and CIBER, the Executive Symposium on Business in Emerging Markets: BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) on June 24 at IUPUI.  Keynote speakers include:  Richard A. Smith, President, Eli Lilly Asia Limited, Hong Kong and Changqi Wu, Associate Dean, Guanghua Management School, Peking University. Please look for more about this event in the October issue of the newsletter.

Naoko Kojima Gives Special Lecture

On March 9th, 2005, Rikkyo University Professor Naoko Kojima gave an informal talk called “Sexuality, Reproduction and the Imperial Dynasty in Japan.” Professor Kojima completed her Ph.D. at Tokyo University, and her research specializes in Japanese courtly literature and Japanese cultural history. She is one of the best known and most prolific gender critics in the field of Japanese literature. Her publications include Critiquing the Tale of Genji, Imagining Princess Kaguya, Sexuality and Gender at the Japanese Court, and Sexuality and Reproduction “Genji Tales:” A Treatise on Heian Court Literature. The lecture, which was given in Japanese with English summaries, was well-attended and followed by a lively discussion. Members of Professor Edith Sarra’s Classical Japanese Literature course and Professor Sumie Jones’ comparative literature course Sexuality and Arts were very much inspired by Professor Kojima’s ability to draw connections between Japan’s ancient past and today.

Motion Pictures and Motion in Pictures: The 2005 High School Honors Seminar

This year’s High School Honors Seminar, held on April 22, was a great success! The topic was Motion Pictures and Motion in Pictures with over 40 teachers and students from Indianapolis, Terre Haute, and Franklin, Indiana in attendance. In the first session, students learned about issues concerning contemporary Japanese film from Dr. Greg Waller. Graduate student Lori Hitchcock then took over and imparted her wisdom about martial arts in Cantonese and Mandarin cinema.

In the afternoon, students were split into two groups. The first group learned traditional tai chi techniques from Brenna Dwyer and Brent Hatfield, both members of I.U.’s Tai Chi Club. The second group learned about Korean national identity from Yoonhee Chang, a graduate student in Ethnomusicology and Jinsob Choi, a graduate student in Education. The students had a wonderful time learning “Chindo Arirang,” a traditional Korean folksong. The students then switched groups so that each had an opportunity to learn about both Chinese martial arts and Korean national identity. Overall, the seminar seems to have been a big hit!

The National Clearinghouse for U.S.-Japan Studies Offers New Publication

The National Clearinghouse for U.S.-Japan Studies has a new publication--a Japan Bibliography entitled “Resources on Japanese Art.” It presents annoations of lesson plans and teacher’s guides, books and other bibliographies, Interent sites, and museum online collections concerning Japanese art.

The Clearinghouse is also introducing its popular Teaching about Japan Information Packet on CD. The CD contains all the information in the print version, except the catalog of the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education and the newsletter of the Asian Educational Media Service.

EASC Staff Tours Kinsey Institute

On March 25, staff members of EASC toured the renowned Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction. Besides learning about Alfred Kinsey, founder of the Institute, the staff members were walked through the history of the Institute, past studies, and current research projects. A visit to the Institute’s Reading Room and art gallery were also part of the tour.

The Kinsey Institute houses several archival collections one of the most extensive being the James W. Edwards Asian Collection. While mostly comprised of Edwards’ personal collection of over 3,000 books, papers, and research files, the collection also contains various artifacts and artworks such as 19th-Century Japanese pillow books and Chinese scrolls. Liana Zhou, head of the Kinsey library and affiliate of the East Asian Studies Center, compared Edwards’ collection to that of Alfred Kinsey’s, stating that “[b]oth sought to be as inclusive and wide-ranging as possible and saw the ultimate purpose of their collection as that of redefining Western views of sexuality. For Edwards, however, this goal did not end in the West; it extended to Asian cultures as well.”

The most prominent feature of the Asian Collection is the material documenting the social and cultural change in China from the 1970s to the 1990s. Edwards’ paper and research focused on East Asian sexuality in regards to homosexuality, prostitution, and AIDS/STDs in China. Articles from scholarly Chinese medical journals, Far Eastern Economic Review, and major newspapers like China Daily are included among his research files.

EASC is proud to count the Kinsey Institute’s James W. Edwards Asian Collection as part of the growing list of East Asian resources available at Indiana University. For a listing of the Asian holdings at the Institute or to view the special collection, please contact the Kinsey Institute at Morrison Hall 420, Bloomington, Indiana, 47405, by phone at 812-855-3078 or 812-855-7686, or by email at libknsy@indiana.edu. The Institute is open Monday through Friday from 9:00 am to 12:00 Noon and from 1:00 to 5:00 pm.

(Information on the Asian Collection obtained from the Kinsey Institute website, www.indiana.edu/~kinsey.)

From Confucius to Chopsticks: EASC to Offer Lifelong Learning Chinese Culture Course

EASC will sponsor the second East Asia related Lifelong Learning Course in the fall. The class will meet once a week and run from September 26 until October 31. The class, which will be taught by I.U.B. East Asian librarian Wen-ling Liu, aims to familiarize students with China particularly as a ll the world will be focused on Beijing for the Olympics in 2008. The course will explore the great diversity of China through its geography, languages, holidays, food, and much more. Students will view images, listen to stories, try new Chinese food, and master a Chinese greeting. This class is great for teachers who teach Chinese New Year or have Chinese students.

Spring Colloquium Series Comes to a Close

With the end of the school year comes the end of another successful colloquium series. With the large number of new hires during the last two years, many of the colloquium lectures from this past year were given by new faculty and were an excellent opportunity to introduce the I.U. community to the work of our new colleagues. As we look forward to the next academic year, we are excited about the opportunity to introduce even more new faculty.