2. Defining the Orient: A Nineteenth-Century Russo-Tatar Polemic over Identity and Cultural Representation

Edward J. Lazzerini

The Europeans are the most civilized people of our time. Their teachers were Muslims.—Ismail Bey Gasprinskii

Many write in the newspapers of the Polish question, the German question, and the Finnish question, but no one wants to recognize the birth of a Tatar question.—M. Mashanov

At the turn of the final decade of the twentieth century, events in the Soviet Union dramatically suggest the utter failure of Communist Party (as of Imperial Russian) policy to achieve one of its longstanding goals: the shaping of a single identity for all Soviet peoples. Complex ethnic realities rooted in history have revealed their extraordinary resistance to seventy years of gross political manipulations and miscalculations; moreover, they threaten, by virtue of a rediscovered and increasingly assertive popular imagination, to destroy the integrity of the “nation” whose pretense is now patent. All along the periphery of the Soviet Union’s Russian heartland—and, to a lesser degree, even within its midst—one ethnic group after another has demonstrated varying degrees of impatience with the status quo, taken steps to broaden its economic, cultural, and political autonomy from the center, and insisted in some cases on outright independence.

Much of what is manifest today, however, is reminiscent of, perhaps even a delayed conclusion to, trends unfolding a century ago during the twilight of the czarist era, when cultural awakening under early conditions of modernization began transforming many of the empire’s ethnic minorities and creating the bases for separate national consciousnesses. Looming large then and now among the country’s inhabitants
were the so-called Islamic peoples, overwhelmingly Turkic linguistically and Muslim by religion and historic culture, but gradually defining their identities by more localized considerations.

In the nineteenth century, Russians distinguished the Turkic peoples poorly one from the other, except for the obvious differences separating those settled into agricultural pursuits and in some numbers urbanized, and those continuing to follow the life patterns of herdsmen. Names were frequently misapplied (Kirghiz for Kazakh is a well-known example), or extended more broadly than they ought to have been (the term Tatar ascribed to Azerbaijansis, for instance), thereby attesting a linguistic sloppiness that reflected ethnographic ignorance to be sure, but also something of the limited respect held for these people by the Russians, who considered themselves more civilized. Of greater significance for the long-term relations between the Empire and its Turkic subjects was the overriding emphasis (with minor exceptions) placed upon the latter’s attachment to Islam. However the Turkic peoples might have wished to identify themselves, most would have comfortably acceded to the central importance of Islam in their lives and would have gladly answered to the name “Muslim,” even as they would have responded to other identifiers. The question of identity, however, became a subject of growing conflict between Russia and its “Orient” beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, a conflict that produced a voluminous literature and shifting positions in a struggle for authority over colonial reality.

Sparked in large measure by his bold and provocative essays gathered under the title Orientalism, a substantial and often angry debate has flourished recently in reaction to Edward Said’s insistence that a “whole network of European [Western] interests” has since the eighteenth century been brought to bear on the definition of “the Orient.” For Said, the importance of Orientalism—that combination of academic pursuit, a style of thought, and a discourse—rests on its creation of a “body of theory and practice,” a “system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness.” It is, following the Italian political activist, Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), an episode of cultural hegemony at work in the wake of Western military, political, and economic domination, hegemony that presumptively authorizes the Orientalist to represent other peoples both to Westerners and to those “others” themselves.

The intention here is not to engage Said over the merits of his position [one, in fact, that is quite stimulating and sufficiently useful to bring to bear on the theme of this chapter], but to address two limitations to his treatment of a subject at once marvelously complex and fascinating. The
first he readily acknowledges early, and that is reliance for historical and cultural reasons on British and French sources. As he insists,

there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative difference between the Franco-British involvement in the Orient and . . . the involvement of every other European and Atlantic power. To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such disparate realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the Biblical texts and the Biblical lands, the spice trade, colonial armies and a long tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable scholarly corpus, innumerable Oriental "experts" and "hands," an Oriental professorate, a complex array of "Oriental" ideas [Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality], many Eastern sects, philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local European use—the list can be extended more or less indefinitely. My point is that Orientalism derives from a particular closeness experienced between Britain and France and the Orient, which until the early nineteenth century had really meant only India and the Bible lands.  

To deny the thrust of this passage insofar as it catalogs the extent of the cultural enterprise, the project that Said calls Orientalism, would be foolish; but equally unacceptable is the place he unequivocally reserves for Franco-British involvement in most of its manifestations. That France and Britain were two principal, extraordinarily active participants in the Western effort to "possess" the Orient almost goes without saying, but do not the claims for these two threaten to produce a monolithic treatment that begs for some balance, even corrective, by investigation of the Orientalism of other countries? Is there not at least one national tradition of Orientalism easily rivaling that of France and Britain in "coming to terms with the Orient . . . based on the Orient's special place in . . . [its] experience?" Many would argue that there is: the Russian, with its own "particular closeness," to borrow Said's phrase, to eastern peoples and cultures. Not a few in the nineteenth century would have accepted this judgment, and might have echoed Mirza Kazem-Bek, the Russified Azerbaijani orientalist, in asking "What European state has such intimate and inherent ties with Asia and Asiatics as does Russia?" If only for comparative purposes, then, the history of Russian Orientalism deserves careful synchronic and diachronic analysis going beyond the classic work of a V. V. Bartol'd.

The monolithism some have detected in Said's Orientalism has, more-
over, a second limiting feature of which he seems insufficiently aware. To be sure, his focus is on Western representations of the Orient, and he ought not to be required to write a different book, nevertheless, those representations have never operated in a vacuum or only within Western contexts, but have influenced the very cultures they claimed to describe and analyze, and not only negatively. Most significantly, they contributed typically to the emergence in many “oriental” societies of modernist movements: complex nativist efforts to come to grips with the military, political, socio-economic, and cultural consequences of Western hegemony and, in the process, confront the pleasures and discomfits of ontological and epistemological transformation. So substantial has the influence been in some countries that David Kopf, a historian of modern India, has declared flatly that “British Orientalism gave birth to the Bengal Renaissance.”

Whether scholars can make the same extreme claim for Russian Orientalism remains to be seen, but evidence suggests that Russian Orientalism was a major factor in the development of modern identities for various Islamic peoples within the Russian Empire. From the mid-eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, the intellectual, academic, and practical work of Russian scholars, educators, missionaries, and officials (among them, military officers), including persons sympathetic as well as antipathetic to Islamic culture, combined to help create an environment that presented an enormous challenge to Tatars, Azerbaijanis, and subsequently Kazakh, Uzbek, and other Central Asian peoples. Out of that momentous challenge, whose genealogy is exceedingly complex, emerged several generations of Russianized Muslims who collectively established the foundations of the modernist discourse in their native cultural milieu. The list of key actors in this development is long, but the names of Abbas Kuli Aga Bakihanov (1794–1848), Mirza Fetali Ahundov (1812–1878), Chokan Valihanov (1835–1865), Mirza Kazem-Bek (1802–1870), Shihabeddin Merjani (1818–1889), Abdülqayyum Nasiri (1825–1902), Hasan Bey Zerdabi (1837–1907), and Ismail Bey Gaspinskii (1852–1914), figure prominently. Wrestling with questions of history and culture consumed much of their attention, but as readers shall see in the following pages, it was attention focused to a large extent by the need to respond to Russian representations of their societies and cultures.

For the Russian Empire, 1881 was a fateful year. The month of March witnessed the assassination of Czar Alexander II (1855–1881) and the subsequent ascent of his son, Alexander III, to the throne of “all the Russias.” For the length of the latter’s reign (1881–1894), much official and semiofficial effort was devoted to undermining some of the accomplish-
ments of the Great Reforms and restoring to the empire the unchallenged unity, centralized authority, and social stability that had seemingly characterized it prior to the reign of the Czar Liberator. Although not all that successful—restorations never really are—the effort was consequential for the illusions it provided some and the disillusionment it generated in many more.

About 1881, however, even more was fateful, although at the time scarcely anyone noticed. Two essays appeared in print that year, both moderate in tone yet principled, both aimed at Russian audiences yet from the pens of Tatars. One, by a certain Devlet-Kildeev, about whom researchers know virtually nothing save his Volga Tatar ethnic roots, was published in the imperial capital of St. Petersburg; the other, by the soon-to-be influential advocate of Islamic modernism, the Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, came off a press in the provincial town of Simferopol, once a Tatar settlement with a Tatar name (Akmescit), but by now very Russian. The one offered a justification of the Qur’ān and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad; the other, a defense of Islam as a culture and a civilizing force. Devlet-Kildeev’s *Magomet kak pro-
rok* [Muhammad as Prophet] imparts a religious perspective and focus (its author may very well have been a mullah); Gasprinskii’s *Russkoe
musul’manstvo* [Russian Islam] captures the ruminations of a largely secular mind. Nevertheless, and however unintended, together they propose an Islamic world and experience decidedly different—and consciously so—from the representations insisted upon by a variety of Russian [or Russified] proponents of imperialism and colonialism. Together they respond to those representations and the colonial interests that nurtured them; together they reflect a Tatar desire for self-representation. Here is what is new and important about these essays. With their appearance a cross-cultural polemic ensued for four decades over the identity and destiny of various *inorodtsy* (“others”) on the eastern borderlands of the Russian Empire, over the relationship of the Tatars to those other *inorodtsy*, and over the policies the Russian state ought to pursue to ensure not only its imperial integrity but also its own identity. In the midst of it all burned a “Tatar question.” It is on the initial development of the polemic that this chapter will focus.10

For decades leading up to 1881, Russians had been busily constructing the southern and eastern borderlands of their empire, the edges of their own civilization inhabited mostly by Turkic peoples influenced to varying degrees by the teachings of the prophet Muhammad. A key premise—largely drawn from the imperatives of religion—of the self-
reflective, and hence comforting, fiction that this construction produced
was that the peoples of the world were sharply divided between the saved and the damned, the good and the bad, the civilized and the savage. The longstanding concerns of the Russian Orthodox Church for the soul of the Russian Empire were heightened by the growing secularization of society and the tide of anticlericalism and irreligion sweeping it, by the national and religious friction—in part stimulated by the glasnost' [openness] and perestroika [restructuring] of the Great Reform Era—tearing at the empire’s unity, and, all through the first half of the nineteenth century, by the apparent failure of missionaries to follow successfully in the footsteps of the Czar’s troops.

In earlier centuries, conversions by armed force and administrative persuasion seemed to have won for the empire not just new subjects but new Christians as well, a development particularly true for Volga Tatars. Much to the chagrin of Russian churchmen and lay supporters, however, mass outbreaks of apostasy occurred in 1801–03, 1810, the 1820s, 1840s, 1850s, and finally in 1862–63 and 1865–66, as thousands of krestchen-nye tatory [Christianized Tatars] returned to Islam. To counter this shocking trend, elements within the Church sought to brace its proselytizing arm by establishing specialized missionary organizations [e.g., the Brotherhood of St. Guri, with headquarters in Kazan], devising a new pedagogy for state-sponsored schools serving eastern inorodtsy [quickly known as the “II’minskii system,” after its founder, N. I. Il’minski], and creating publications [e.g., Protivo-musul’manski sbornik [Anti-Muslim Review]] dedicated to promulgating and disseminating the “correct” interpretation of Islam. By the mid-1870s these three projects were conjoined in pursuit of a set of tasks neatly summed up in the charter of the Brotherhood of St. Guri: (1) to support and strengthen Orthodox converts by educating their children, publishing books in their native languages, and constructing churches; (2) to promote Christianity among Muslims and pagans; (3) to stem apostasy and error among the Orthodox; and (4) to care for the needs of the Orthodox dwelling among the inorodtsy.

Crucial to all of this was an appropriate representation of Islam: of its teachings, its founder, and its adherents. The starting point, however, was a critique of magometanstvo in its mid-nineteenth-century circumstances. That the major missionary writers, who were in the forefront of this effort, focused on this theme was natural since doing so allowed them to move from evidence of specific problems, weaknesses, and inadequacies in contemporary Islam, let alone of distasteful behavior, to generalizations about the foundations of the faith and culture. Looking over the Islamic scene, they found a culture dominated by fanatical mul-
lahs—fanaticism is by far the most common attribute they associated with Islam—who, like the blind leading the blind, fostered a view of the world so circumscribed as to encourage fatalism, intolerance, and contentment with the irrational and the crudely sensual. In the hands of such teachers, Muslims proved more inclined to ritualize their faith than study and live it (although living a religion that is represented as fundamentally flawed would hardly alter the consequences as perceived by Orthodox critics). The result is a condition, under the changing circumstances of the modern age, of backwardness in which neither philosophy nor science can flourish, in which education is reduced to the study "of that which was done long ago" and to "scholastic nicety and contrivance," in which the believer is either passively contemplative or fanatically militant, and in which the possibilities of progress are nil.

This grim appraisal of contemporary Islam in Russia and elsewhere, however, served largely as a means for the Russian critic to engage the religion's foundations—the Qur'an and the prophet Muhammad—and subject them to sweeping examination and interpretation. The result of what became a sort of cottage industry was an extensive literature that consistently viewed the Qur'an as a guide not along the path to wisdom but to ignorance, a source not of spiritual elevation but of decadence, and an inspiration not for amicable human relations but for hostility toward others. As a treasury of superstition, the Qur'an could offer nothing that is civilizing except to those so savage that anything is a blessing. As for Muhammad, he was this text's pitiable prophet.

And yet, Islam was considered also dangerous because of its devilish attractiveness and the untempered fanaticism it bore as a primary, dominant, and eternal characteristic. It was seen as a threat to Russia as a spiritual competitor for the allegiances of those in the southern and eastern borderlands, even as it also obstructed the "legitimate" imperial efforts to bring enlightenment and civilization to those same areas. It appeared even more threatening owing to the central role played by Tatars who, through their mullahs, ishans, and merchants, had been actively propagandizing the worst features of Islamic teachings among the long settled or still nomadic peoples of Central Asia. Viewed as impudent (derznyi), harmful (vrednyi), and cunning (khitryi), these Tatars had for decades pursued agendas that aimed not only at winning converts to their faith but establishing and solidifying their preeminence in a vast territory stretching from Kazan to the borders of China in the east and those of Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and northwest India in the south. Against the integrity of the Russian Empire the Tatars were accused of promoting separatism with the larger goal of achieving a Pan-Islamic
ideal. For Russian critics the evidence supporting this charge abounded, and included the reluctance of Tatars to perform imperial military service as well as their inadequate respect for the emperor, allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan in his role as Caliph, inordinate desire for their own schools, and the scattered episodes of mass emigration.\textsuperscript{15}

Mullahs, ishans, and merchants may have been a nuisance for a long time, but from the Russian Islamophobic perspective what now rendered the situation more ominous and menacing was the existence of a growing cadre of Muslims who, as has been described elsewhere, were “educated in Russian [and even European] schools, conversant with the Russian language, [and] privileged by the imperial context.”\textsuperscript{16} They posed a qualitatively different challenge as cultural crossovers, as men who bore a certain ambiguity for being “foreign yet familiar, distant yet near, self yet other”,\textsuperscript{17} who as partial insiders knew how to turn the dominant discourse against itself, or, as N. P. Ostromoukh put it more bluntly, used “all the advantages of Russian culture to defend their own nationality.”\textsuperscript{18} By knowing Russian, they were not limited to speaking only to their Islamic brethren, but could, using their own and Russian presses, address Russian society directly, insinuating within it their own representation of Islam and its relationship to modern life. In this regard, they were accused of trying “to present Islam as the purest religion in the world and as promoting progress in all spheres of human endeavor.”\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, they desired to “transfer European education to the Tatars, but by no means through Russia. . . . The plan is shaped cleverly and thoroughly. . . . Drawing a curtain over Russian eyes with sham rationalism and liberalism, the Tatar intelligentsia has intensified [its effort] to create a Muslim cultural center in Russia.”\textsuperscript{20}

Beginning with the essays of Devlet-Kildeev and Gasprinskii, Tatar spokesmen strove to counter the various charges that together were seen increasingly as comprising a “Tatar problem.” Like their opponents, they too began with an effort to assess the contemporary circumstances in which Islamic peoples found themselves. And like their opponents, they uncovered much with which to be dismayed and of which to be sharply critical. The more one of these men was imbued with a modernist spirit, in fact, the firmer his stance in favor of reform so fundamental as effectively to require an ontological and epistemological break with the traditional mentalité. Be that as it may, public admission of social, economic, political, and even moral difficulties was seldom combined with a sweeping renunciation of Islamic history or a rejection of Islam’s ethical foundations. On the contrary, characteristic of Tatar polemics was a careful distinction between theory and practice (divinely inspired
teaching and human application), as well as an emphasis upon Islam's historical contributions to humanity and continued relevance in the modern age. Characteristic too were appeals to reason, logical argumentation, liberal criteria for analysis and judgment (including a defense of cultural pluralism), and pleas for objectivity, all of which drew upon and played to the sensibilities and predispositions of the intellectually sympathetic within the Russian camp, while unnerving and frustrating the hostile.²¹

The fair appraisal of contemporary failings meant for Tatar polemics a view [representation] of Islam fuller than merely picking verses of the Qurʾān out of context, as they charged their opponents with, could provide. Fanaticism admittedly characterized some Muslims, and it certainly played a role from time to time in the history of Islam, particularly in the early years when the excitement generated by religious birth ran high. But no religion has been immune to fanatical behavior on the part of its adherents. Anyone glancing at the history of humanity, argued one contributor to the debate, "will soon be convinced that fanaticism is far from being unique to Islam."²² Neither was it fundamental, as would be revealed by a thorough reading of the Qurʾān and hadiths [traditions relating to what the Prophet Muhammad said and did].

Tatar polemics likewise admitted that ignorance, reflected in the narrow range of general knowledge and the shallow depth of understanding about their own traditions, currently described many Muslims. Such ignorance was of grave concern because it impeded individual and social progress and confused not only outsiders but Muslims themselves as to the values established and promoted by the Qurʾān. These included an unequivocal commitment to education, to the study of the natural order, to scientific investigation, and to philosophical speculation. Rather than being inimical to learning, Islam had from the very beginning been supportive of its quest. The evidence to affirm this claim seemed ample, particularly the remarkable intellectual fluorescence of the ninth through twelfth centuries, a "Golden Age" during which countless scholars salvaged much of ancient Greek learning, commented and elaborated upon it, and presented the new corpus of knowledge to a Western Europe struggling to break out of its own long Dark Age.

What has hurt Islamic societies has been the failure to sustain the successes of earlier generations, owing to a kind of creeping conservatism that increasingly narrowed the scope of education to religious affairs and, even within that, to rote memorization of those dogma calculated to respect the status quo. This is not Islam's fault, Gasprinskii and others asserted, but that of shortsighted, self-centered men. The task facing
true Muslims was thus to resurrect the spirit of the “Golden Age,” reform education, and rejoin the international community. In this way, with the help of their generous Russian brothers, Muslims could once again become contributing members of the human family.

Education to be sure, but also sblizhenie (rapprochement). Far from desiring to separate themselves from the Russian Empire, the Tatars at this early stage wanted to be more active and productive subjects of the Czar, far from planning to establish some Pan-Islamic utopia independent of the empire, they hoped only to use the inspiration of a reexamined Islam to rally Muslims to the cause of progress and a better society. For the moment at least, pragmatism, if not conviction, triumphed over unbridled imagination.

In the representations of these early Tatar polemicists, a culture—vital, creative, and inspiring—had flourished beyond the oriental edges of the Russian Empire in past centuries. Rooted in the ethical precepts of the Qur’an, in the practice of its positive teachings, and in an openness to Western secular learning, such a culture, they were convinced, could thrive once again. Having a thousand years before taught Europe and assisted Christendom in escaping its own historic limitations, Muslims could legitimately expect Europeans to teach them now, to take their turn as “elder brothers,” and to help dispel the suffocating ignorance engulfing the Islamic world.

Speaking from the perspective of their own budding ethnic consciousness as well as from that of a larger Islamic one, a small group of Tatar intellectuals, some bound to traditional modes of analysis, others to modernist assumptions, engaged defenders of a unitary Russian and, Orthodox Christian Empire in a debate over identity that began around the middle of the nineteenth century. That debate would continue through the revolutionary events of 1917, shifting over the intervening decades to ever-hardening positions that made demands for independence all but inevitable not only by Tatars, but also by Bashkirs, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, and other Turkic peoples. In 1917 the overthrow of the Czar and the Bolshevik seizure of power seemed to hold out the promise of settling ethnic grievances, one way or another, in favor of the empire’s minorities. However, antipathy toward nationalism harbored by the Marxist-Leninist ideology that undergirded the Soviet experiment proved, ultimately, to be the insurmountable obstacle preventing the further organic development of ethnic consciousness. In the name of internationalism and the friendship of peoples, natural inclinations were ignored or repressed until the dramatic weakening of political restraints in the 1980s allowed the public expression of latent ethnic sentiment
once again. Under the impetus generated by proclamations of glasnost' and perestroika, the Tatars, like other non-Russian citizens of the USSR, are struggling to reestablish links to a disrupted past that, once restored, may well carry them along paths they should have trekked seventy years ago.

Notes

1. Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, “Znanie,” Tercüman/Perevodchik, no. 42 (October 5, 1886): 87.
4. Ibid., p. 4.
5. Ibid., p. 1.
6. Mirza Kazem Bek, “O poiaavlennii i uspekhakh sostochennoi slovesnosti v Evrope i upadke ee v Azii,” Zurnal ministerstva narodnago prosveshchenia, pt. 2 (1836): 348. Note as well the central place this notion holds in many of the writings of Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, the Crimean Tatar reformer, particularly in his Russkoe musul'manstvo: Mysli, zameoki i nabiluennia musul'manina [Simferopol, 1881].
10. The relevant Tatar texts for this task include: Devlet-Kildeev, Magomet kak prorok [St. Petersburg, 1881]; Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, Russkoe musul'mansko; “Sud'by magometanstva,” Tercüman/Perevodchik, no. 8 (June 10, 1883); 16, “Islam i tsivilizatsiia,” Tercüman/Perevodchik, no. 16 (September 16, 1883): 31–32; “Musul'manskaia tsivilizatsiia,” Tercüman/Perevodchik, no. 22 (June 17, 1884), no. 23 (June 25, 1884), no. 24 (July 1, 1884), no. 27 (July 30, 1884), no. 30 (September 17, 1884), no. 35 (October 16, 1884), no. 40 (November 11, 1884), and no. 45 (December 18, 1884); Mirza-Alim, “Islam i magometanstvo,” Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti, nos. 188, 224, 229, 239, 244, 285 (1881); Ataullah Baiazitov, Vozrazhenie na rech' Ernesta Renana [St. Petersburg: Tip. A. S. Suvorina, 1883]; Idem, Otrosheeniia Islamu k nauke i inovertsam [St. Petersburg: Tip. “Nur,” 1887], Islam i progress [St. Petersburg: Tip. A. S. Suvorina, 1898]; Iskander Mirza, “Russkiiia shkoly dla musul'man v Turkestane,” Vostochnoe obozrenie, nos. 36 and 38 (1883); and Musul'manin, “Musul'manstvo i rationsalizm,” Vostochnoe obozrenie, no. 24 (1885).

11. Since dichotomies are seldom absolute for long, it is not surprising to find arguments made about “good savages,” at least in the sense of their being childlike and hence in need of protection from the influence of fanatical Islam. See as an example, V. V. Grigoriev, Rossiia i Vostoek [St. Petersburg, 1876], passim.

12. For information on these defections, see E. N. Voronets, Otpadenie inorodets'v-xristian v mokkamedanstvo [Orel, 1876].

13. The word magometanstvo [Muhammedanism], widely used in Russian polemics against Islam and its adherents, is not merely incorrect in its identification of the religion with Muhammad (a la Christianity and Christ), but is symptomatic of the deeper Russian/Western desire to control its Oriental nemesis by reducing it to comprehensible, if distorting, terms.


15. In order to buttress the charge of Islam's present and future danger to the entire Christian world, Islamophobic literature stressed that unlike Christianity, Islam was both a religious doctrine and a state system. Islam presents, therefore, not just a religious but a political problem. As M. Mashanov frankly put it, “the history of Islam becomes not so much of scientific as of practical interest.” See his Istoriccheskoe i sovremennoe znachenie khristianskago missionerstva sredi musul'man, p. 51.


21. "Among the Russian intelligentsia one notes a certain wavering with regard to the *inorodtsy* question," wrote Mirov in *O položenii russkikh inorodtsev*, p. 52. Here is a decided understatement of a persistent complaint leveled not just against some members of the intelligentsia but also against officials who have proved unable to develop a consistent, firm, and "correct" policy vis-à-vis the *inorodtsy* and, as Ill’inškii more bitterly expressed it, "fell[ed] to see the consequences of coddling and spoiling the Tatars." [See "Izvlechenii iz pisem' N. I. Ill’inškago," p. 52.]

22. From an article appearing in *Vostochnoe obozrenie*, no. 10 (1885), as cited in M. A. Mirov, *O položenii*, p. 46.