Heidegger and Practical Philosophy

Edited by
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I will argue in this chapter that *Being and Time* provides, in several essential respects, the appropriate philosophical basis for a contemporary, postmodern understanding of ethical relationships and political community. This formulation of a new basis for community that does not erase the singularity and alterity of those who participate is further developed and radicalized in Heidegger's later work, *Contributions to Philosophy*, inasmuch as in this work Heidegger eradicates the last vestiges of a fusion model of community found in his earlier analysis of horizon and world and develops instead a model of community that also, even more strongly, decenters subjectivity while at the same time emphasizing difference, cleavage, and nonreciprocity at the heart of the community of singular beings. My primary contention is that death as understood in Heidegger's analysis, which indeed is the constitutive existential mark of Da-sein, is the precondition for a philosophy of community that remains faithful to the utter singularity and finitude of each of the members of the human community.

The claim that being-toward-death is the site of Heidegger's more radical conception of community is of course ironic, since Heidegger appears to insist, contrary to the overwhelming emphasis on Da-sein's situatedness in the rest of the text, that in the end Da-sein remains inescapably caught in its projection back onto itself. Death, Heidegger claims, is the "ownmost non-relational possibility not to be bypassed" (*SZ*, 250). But this apparent denial that death forms the basis for community is only apparent. Heidegger's account of being-toward-death does argue against the notion of community based on a fusion theory that cedes the separateness of the other's being from one's own for the sake of unity and togetherness. But Heidegger's claim that "no one can take the other's dying away from him" (*SZ*, 240) shows being-toward-death as the limit condition that prevents the co-optation and appropriation of the being of another. In other words, the analysis of being-toward-death provides a basis
for a conception of being together and friendship that has as its condition the acknowledgment of the otherness of the other.

Yet precisely this unshareability and aloneness of death have led many critics to accuse Heidegger's ontology of being unable to give a strong account of either alterity or community. In the view of these critics, Heidegger's account of being-toward-death leaves no room for an existentially rich encounter between Da-seins. For this reason, Heidegger's ontological account of alterity, they say, ends up reducing the other to an aspect of the being of the ontologically isolated individual, or otherwise, in one's search for an understanding of Heidegger's sense of community, one must rely on Division I of Being and Time, where one finds an ontic, tool-centered encounter with other beings in the world of concern.

For example, Jacques Taminiaux argues in Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology that implicit in Being and Time is a Platonic bias that leads Heidegger to read Aristotelian praxis as though it were an intellectual praxis. He claims: "This is why in fundamental ontology transcendence prevents us from conceiving praxis in connection with a common realm of shared deeds and words, as did the Greek city and its Aristotelian account.”1 In Taminiaux's reading, Being and Time is fundamentally solipsistic, offering a concept of world that, he says, is empty of things and people. The only contact Da-sein has with others, in Taminiaux's analysis, is through the inauthentic life of fallen Da-sein, who allows its being to be determined by the tool-world in which it is involved. To state Taminiaux's position, as I understand it, in the strongest terms authentic Da-sein is a being unto itself, self-enclosed in a way that fundamentally isolates it from any genuine access to the other. In contrast, inauthentic Da-sein is mired in the everyday world of concernful absorption in others and suffers a concomitant loss of self. The retrieval of authentic selfhood is possible only because Da-sein does not truly belong with others. I hope to show that this reading, which is feasible only if one relies on a bifurcation of the theoretical and practical life, misses an important aspect of Heidegger's treatment of Da-sein's own-most, authentic being-itself, namely, that relationality also is at the basis of the authentic experience of self analyzed in Division II of Being and Time. Were this acknowledged, then authentic, resolute Da-sein would be seen to be at the same time both the moment of existential solitude and the ecstatic openness to the other as other.

Taminiaux's reading that ascribes praxis and Da-sein's involvement with beings other than itself to Division I of Being and Time resembles, ironically, the reading of Hubert Dreyfus in his book Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time," Division I.2 Both Dreyfus and Taminiaux share a similar assumption, namely, that there is a dichotomy between existence and facticity in the structure of Being and Time, a dichotomy that parallels a distinction between transcendence and entanglement. Both fail to see the centrality of Heidegger's treatment of the movement between facticity and existence, a "movement" that opens up the space of being in the world. As a result, each reads Heidegger in such a way as to collapse the distinction between the two. Taminiaux sees Heidegger's fundamental category as existence and therefore accuses Heidegger of a philosophy of transcendence that shares with Plato a disdain for involvement. Dreyfus, on the other hand, reads Being and Time primarily as a treatise on factical life, and he subsumes Heidegger's treatment of authentic existence into the world of everyday concern by positing the thesis that authenticity for Heidegger amounts to the realization that one's existence is a nullity, and thus as Da-sein one's being is nothing other than what one does.

Dreyfus is largely responsible for what seems to me to be an overemphasis on Division I of Being and Time, and the assumption that it is in Division I that one can find Heidegger's sense of community. Thus Dreyfus writes: "Heidegger seeks to show that the shared public world is the only world there is or can be.”3 Dreyfus argues that Division II of Being and Time makes explicit the primacy of Division I by demonstrating that Da-sein has no other self than the one that it finds when it encounters itself as immersed in everydayness. "Anxiety reveals that the self has no possibility of its own, and so Da-sein's response to anxiety cannot be to find some resource in itself... there is no human potential.” Dreyfus goes on to claim that, "Heidegger holds that (1) all for the sake-of-whichs are provided by the culture and for anyone, and (2) Da-sein can never take over these impersonal public possibilities in a way that would make them its own and so give it an identity.”4

Dreyfus wants to accomplish something for Heidegger, which I also want to argue, namely, that in Being and Time Heidegger overcomes the modern concept of isolated subjectivity and provides a basis for understanding the fundamentally communal and relational character of Da-sein. But the overcoming of modern subjectivity does not require one to deny the main point of Division II of Being and Time, which is to show that the possibility of being whole and of being a self, far from being destroyed by the destruction of subjectivity, for the first time authentically comes to the fore. Moreover, Heidegger's sense of human community is not bound to his analysis of the world of equipmentality, outlined in Division I. Indeed, this world belongs to inauthentic Da-sein, precisely the Da-sein that tends to take itself as a subject and who encounters other Da-sein only through the public realm of shared economies and enterprises. Genuine community is founded not out of this public realm of the "they," a realm in which other existential Da-sein are never authentically encountered, but rather on the basis of a way of being together that itself creates the possibility for a kind of public sharing of oneself that is authentic and existentiell. I believe this is what Heidegger means when he emphasizes in Division II that "only on the basis of the ecstatic and horizontal temporality is it possible for Da-sein to break into space" (SZ, 369), the space of circumstantial taking care (Besorgen). If even the world of concernful involvement, the work world and this way of connecting to others, is founded upon Da-sein's own potentiality of being (Seinkönnen), then this does not indicate that significance-relationships belong to a worldless subject, but rather that Da-sein is not a worldless subject at all.5

In a discussion of death that occurs in Heidegger's 1922 "Introduction to Aristotle" essay, one finds the following statement: "Existence becomes understandable
in itself only through the making questionable of facticity, that is, in the concrete destruction of facticity." I call attention to this point in order to highlight the close connection Heidegger draws between existence and facticity (fallenness). Existence is described in this essay as a counter-movement against the tendency toward falling; existence, he says, occurs precisely in the concrete movement of dealings and concern. Though co-primordial with facticity in the being of Da-sein, existence always arises out of a recovery from one's absorption in the they-self, thus existence is founded in a way of being together with others that it resists. The question, then, is whether existence, which puts facticity entirely at risk and makes Da-sein's factual life entirely questionable, whether this imminent possibility of not-being that moves against concrete factual being, destroys Da-sein's fundamental way of being related to others or transforms it and makes the relationality that essentially belongs to Da-sein utterly unique. Heidegger emphasizes that "the counter-movement against the tendency towards falling must not be interpreted as flight from the world" (PIA, 11). Existence does not constitute Da-sein's being as outside the world or as in any way isolated, by its authentic being, from belonging with others. In Being and Time, Heidegger says: "[E]xisting is always factual. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity (SZ, 192). If one severs the relationship between Division I and Division II of Being and Time and fails to pay attention to the middle-voiced character of the movement of repetition between existence and facticity that binds the two divisions together, then any discussion of Da-sein and community will inevitably miss the radical dimension of Heidegger's thought. On the one hand, one understands being-with-others only in terms of specific factual ways of being thrown together. The concept of community that inevitably grows out of this is based on my being the same as the others I encounter, in other words, it is a community based on the they-self, a community based on actualized, concrete relations in which Da-sein finds itself and to which it gives itself over. It is a community that remains bound by an economy of exchange. The tendency to allow oneself to be defined by what is outside oneself is at the heart of the modern concept of community, the community of those who are the same.

Fundamentally it also is the same tendency that is at work when one understands Da-sein's being as existential to the exclusion of facticity. Heidegger's emphasis on the existential as being toward a possibility is then seen as tearing Da-sein away from every actuality and from any genuine involvement with practical life. In such a reading, Da-sein's mineness and radical individuation are interpreted as a fundamental solipsism, a return to the notion of Da-sein as an isolated subject devoid of any substantive connection to an objective world. In this reading, the nonrelational character of Da-sein's existential being makes any notion of community implausible, especially a notion of community and being-with that is intrinsic to the very being of Da-sein. A community of radically subjective beings can only be established from outside, by a principle of universal law and divine authority.

Both of these accounts of Da-sein's community cloak a theological bias that insists on the need to have the human being defined by a principle outside of its own being in order for the human being to encounter that which is radically other than itself. But in his 1922 "Introduction to Aristotle" essay, Heidegger specifically criticizes this theological bias and declares that any authentic, philosophical understanding of Da-sein must be fundamentally atheistic and draw its understanding of human life from that life itself (PIA, 14). This is especially significant in that in this essay Heidegger defines philosophy as a way of standing within the movement of existential facticity (PIA, 14). The phenomenological commitment to the facticity of human life provides Heidegger with both the structure of human involvement and world and the singularity of the existential moment. In the space of this double movement of facticity and existence, a space of repetition marked by Heidegger through his emphasis on the je in Gemeinigkeit, in this repetition that individualizes, I believe, can be found an argument for plurality in human community, a plurality of utterly singular individuals, defined by their relationships to death. This "between" opens up the space of community, a community of differing beings.

I now will turn to an explication of certain passages from Heidegger's analysis of Being-toward-death in Being and Time in an attempt to outline a basis one may find there for an authentic, existential community of possible beings, a community that in a fundamental sense can never be completely actualized but is not for this reason either otherworldly or utopian but rather fundamentally mortal.

The entire analysis of death is governed by the question of whether Da-sein can in any sense have its being as a whole. Heidegger shows that Da-sein's way of being is in some sense fundamentally not accessible and ungraspable. This inability to be held in a grasp is essential to an understanding of the problem of human community. This basic point demonstrates that the kind of community to which Da-sein would belong cannot be one based on appropriation and ownership. The Gemeinigkeit (mineness) and Eigenlichkeit (properness) that belongs to Da-sein in being-toward-death are at the same time the impossibility of ownership and appropriation. Da-sein's being cannot be had or owned, not even for itself, disowning is Da-sein's own-most way of being itself. Also implied in these statements on Da-sein's death, and made explicit elsewhere, is the fact that were ownership to be taken as Da-sein's authentic way of being itself and being toward others, this would presuppose that Da-sein is a subject that takes what it encounters as objects and enowns them. Surely this way of establishing community can be instituted, and often is, but it is not, according to Heidegger, an authentic basis for human community. Only a lack of imagination would lead us to draw the conclusion from this that therefore no authentic community is possible. But we can conclude that any such genuine human community would have to be premised on an understanding of relationality that does not presuppose taking over the other or the place of the other. It would have to be a community where the other remains other, in this sense, a community of singular beings. One can imagine such a community in a culture that did not require assimilation. One can imagine a principle of negotiation that acknowledged the other as stranger and saw a breakdown in negotiation as the beginning of communication. One can imagine personal
relationships that celebrate the other as necessarily different from oneself. But what are the philosophical indications in Heidegger's thinking that would find there support for such an imagined community?

Heidegger argues that one Dasein cannot in any fundamental sense represent or take the place of another, an analysis that also may be read as a critique of representational democracy. Heidegger writes: "This possibility of representing gets completely stranded when it is a matter of representing that possibility of being that constitutes the coming-to-an-end of Dasein, and gives it its wholeness as such" (SZ, 240). The fact that one Dasein cannot substitute for another, and is fundamentally not like any other, places demands on our understanding of being together, especially if we are trying to develop an understanding of a community of those who stand in relation to each other as a whole, who recognize each other in the whole of their being—an existential community, so to speak. When Heidegger says "No one can take the other's dying away from him" (SZ, 240), this does not mean that being-toward-death makes community impossible. It means rather that Dasein's being cannot be appropriated, and that the possibility of exchange and expenditure between such beings cannot be thought in these terms.

If we were to look back from Heidegger's analysis of being-toward-death to his earlier treatment of solicitude and care, we would find collaboration for the argument that the unshareability that defines human being not only does not preclude community but is the foundation for any truly human being together. According to Heidegger, the analysis of care shows that for Dasein its being is for it at issue, that is, its being is always ecstatic, ahead of itself, uncapturable. Then Heidegger says: "Being-ahead-of-itself does not mean anything like an isolated tendency in a worldless 'subject,' but characterizes being-in-the-world" (SZ, 192). Care is said to be "the existential and ontological condition of the possibility of being free for authentic existentiell possibilities" (SZ, 193). Because Dasein's being is always possible and not actualizable in its whiteness, because Dasein is always in the throes of death, its being is free in its relations with others, in what Heidegger calls its existentiell possibilities. Death constitutes the possibility of free beings.

Heidegger's analysis of truth as disclosedness rather than as embedded in the language of assertion, where truth is the predication of properties as owned by a subject, also confirms that Heidegger's thought in Being and Time is after a new sense of community. Heidegger says: "Disclosure in general belongs essentially to the constitution of the being of Dasein" (SZ, 221). The "in general" here does not indicate that there is no content, but rather that the disclosedness is of the sort that comes in advance and does not take over the being of what is there.

The language of existential community is more primordial than the language of shared properties and common interests. It is fundamentally the language of the unsayable, if by language is meant the predicative language of subjects in relationship to objects. Existential language establishes a community of beings whose speaking acknowledges a fundamental untranslatability as the basis for human conversation.

This kind of disclosive relationality also is at work in Heidegger's analysis of solicitude (Fiuursorge), where he says it is not a matter of leaping in for the other but of leaping ahead and returning (giving back) to the other for the first time its care, its free possibility (SZ, 122). The peculiar character of the exchange that occurs here needs to be appreciated. How can one give something back, and yet also give it for the first time? What kind of exchange is this that gives the other what it already is—its being as possibility?

Heidegger offers us a similar paradox in his discussion of the understanding of death as something still outstanding in Section 46 of Being and Time. Here it is more clear that the notion of possibility is transformed by death and cannot be understood as simply saying that our being is not yet actualized and present at hand for us. Ausstehen, we are told, usually refers to a debt that has only partially been paid and is still outstanding, but indebtedness belongs to our very being. This means we owe our being; we never own it, and it, can never be owned. There is something always to be settled, and no closure is possible. The community of such beings is one that does not aspire to closure and one in which there is always a lack of totality. The Dasein community is never without a relationship to what is outside, to otherness. But Heidegger quickly translates this discussion into one of the impending character of death and says in being-toward-death: "Any being-with the others fails when one's ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake" (SZ, 263). Death is nonrelational and thus loosens the grip that others have on our being and that we have on others, letting each be the being it is. In this sense, being-toward-death is the basis for the possibility of a community of singular beings. Being with others in the sense of the "they" and the "we" fails us in being-toward-death, and death, Heidegger says, "individualizes Dasein down to itself" (SZ, 243). Dasein must be on its own. Dasein is free from the tyranny of the they. Heidegger says: "Being towards this possibility, as a being which exists, is brought face to face with the absolute impossibility of existence" (SZ, 262). The community of possible beings stands face to face with the impossibility of all community.

In the sections of Being and Time on being-toward-death that seem more and more to me to speak of mortal community, the passages on anticipation (Vorlaufende) are particularly telling. Heidegger says: "Anticipation discloses to existence that its utmost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has already reached" (SZ, 264). Being-toward-death teaches us not to hold onto ourselves. But in doing so, Heidegger says, it also frees us from the grasp of others and frees others from our grasp. Thus Heidegger continues: "As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes—but only, as the possibility not-to-be-bypassed, in order to make Dasein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of the others" (ibid.).

Throughout the Beiträge, Heidegger attempts to relate his discussion of Dasein and the enowning event of the truth of being to the issue of Dasein's selfhood and community. It becomes clear early on in the text that this work attempts to enact an
even more radical separation from metaphysics than occurs in *Being and Time*. "In the domain of the other beginning there is neither 'ontology' nor anything at all like 'metaphysics.' No 'ontology,' because the guiding question no longer sets the standard or determines the range. No 'metaphysics,' because one does not proceed at all from beings as extant or from object as known (Idealism), in order then to *step over to something else*" (GA 65, 59). In the *Beiträge*, Heidegger declares that "in *Being and Time* Da-sein still stands in the shadow of the 'anthropological,' the 'subjectivistic,' and the 'individualistic,' etc." (GA 65, 295). Nevertheless, the direction of *Being and Time* is transitional, from the guiding question toward a transformation of this question into the grounding question of being. The turning from metaphysics that is accomplished in *Being and Time* here is radicalized in the direction of another beginning. Heidegger now says that, "Da-sein is the *crisis* between the first beginning (the whole history of metaphysics) and the other beginning" (ibid.). Da-sein then is no longer the human subject per se, but the one that holds itself steadfastly in reservedness at the moment of the decision that imparts and thereby also shelters the truth of the enowning event (Ereignis) of being (GA 65, 96).

But then, who are these Da-seins? How are we to understand Da-sein in its non-subjectivistic selfhood? And is this decision a solitary one, or one that is shared in a community of those who stand resolutely in the opening of the between that founds truth (GA 65, 101)? Heidegger first of all clarifies the sense in which Da-sein is yet to come, indicating a futural character that is never overcome in the completion of its being; Da-sein is fundamentally ecstatic, outside itself, exposed in its being, and thus inherently transitional and apart from itself, the site of a tense that, though finite, is not determined by closure. This tear in the being of Da-sein is thematized over and over again in this text, and becomes finally, as we will see, a way of understanding being-to-death in the *Beiträge*.

Contributions to Philosophy clarifies Heidegger's thought on the kind of being together that might exist among Da-seins who are open to the truth of being. Heidegger calls Da-sein, precisely on the basis of Da-sein's singularity, the "ground for a people" (GA 65, 98). A people first becomes a people when those who are its most singular ones (Einzigen) arrive and begin to intimate (ahnen) (GA 65, 43). The community of Heidegger's later thought, the community of those to come, is one of singular beings. Its people are historical in the sense that they resist the uprootedness of the technological age and thus return to the originary, founding experience, but they also simultaneously herald an opening to a new site for enduring the strife of earth and world (GA 65, 62). Among the characteristics of Da-sein in its singularity, as Heidegger depicts them in the *Beiträge*, are reticence, reservedness, and the solitude that attends Da-sein's stillness in the face of the withdrawal of being. Keeping in mind that Da-sein is no longer thought in terms of ontology and existence in this text, an examination of these traits will help one understand the peculiar character of Da-sein's way of being related to the other. This holding back and keeping still and holding in reserve its being, this drawing back in a way that constitutes selfhood, also is the condition for a communication and community that is founded upon the leaving open of a space for what is other, the opening up of the between.

Sorge is the fundamental ontological characteristic in *Being and Time* for Da-sein's being, and the unity of Da-sein's existentiality and facticity. In the *Beiträge*, Heidegger says, "Reservedness (Verhaltenheit) is the ground of care" (GA 65, 35), that is, the ground of Da-sein's being with and concern for others. In reservedness, Heidegger says, the words fail; it is the source of the temporality of the deep stillness. Yet precisely in the failure of language, Da-sein's poetic openness to the withdrawal of the other, and thus to the possibility of the leap at the heart of communication, is sustained. "Reticence (Erschweigung) in silence stems from the essential origin of language itself" (GA 65, 79). The two key terms to Heidegger's sense of community in the *Beiträge* are sheltering and withdrawal. In an even deeper sense, Da-sein is now conceived of as a questioner, because seeking and holding in question is Da-sein's way of gathering and being together with what is other than itself.

The community of singular beings is grounded in its attunement to the play between this granting and refusal of being. Heidegger names the togetherness of sheltering and withdrawing a jointure (Fügung). A jointure both unites and holds apart what it gathers. The coming community that Heidegger envisions sustains its being in common precisely by holding in question the closure of its own unity and holding its unity out toward and open to what has remained unsaid in its history. "Reservedness attunes each grounding moment of a sheltering of truth in the future Dasein of man. This history, grounded in Da-sein, is a hidden history of deep stillness. In this stillness alone there can still be a people" (GA 65, 34). This formation of a people that is here grounded in reticence and reservedness is a far cry from the idle chatter and commodification of reality that Heidegger bemoans in his description of machination and calculative thinking. At the heart of this community is a strife and an experience of lack and negation, but the negation is no longer conceived of in negative terms as what is in need of sublation and dialectical overcoming. The negation and lack belong to the fullness of possibility of this coming community. It is the very condition of holding back and keeping silence that makes possible the sovereignty (Herrschaft) of the singular beings Heidegger describes as the future Da-seins.

In the section of the *Beiträge* entitled "The Leap," Heidegger declares that "sovereignty is the necessity of the free to be free" (GA 65, 282). It is the complete opposite, he says, from a concept of power that is rooted in coercion and the co-appointment of the space of the other. Coercion breaks into things, is powerless to leap, and has no relationship to possibility (ibid.). Coercion operates as force and brings about change by forcing itself onto its objects. Sovereignty is neither coercion nor the power to resist coercion, that is, neither the community founded in tyranny nor the community founded in the social contract is the community to come. Neither of these forms of community power is truly originary. These formations of power among people are of course altogether important to the health of a community, but Heidegger is attempting to think something different in his notion of sovereignty. The mastery at
work here is not power over beings. Rather, Heidegger says, it is the bequest of empowerment (Vermächtnis): "It is not itself bequeathed (vermach) but rather bequeaths the continuing originariness" (GA 65, 281). Sovereignty is not self-promotion; it is the gift (outside of the economy of exchange) of empowerment that recognizes the originary power of the other. This is why Heidegger associates mastery with the fixture, which he says is characteristic of the coming community and why the leap is required. "Splitting this cleft and thus parting it in togetherness as mastery, that is the origin that leaps forth" (ibid.). The ones to come, the sovereign ones, belong to this togetherness that parts and imparts the space of singularity.

In many crucial ways, the thinking of the Beiträge on community and the formation of a people situates itself beyond that of Being and Time, although, as I have tried to show, Being and Time is itself an advance in the direction of the Beiträge's notion of community in comparison to the traditional metaphysical theories rooted in subjectivity and a notion of community as fusion. In both texts, however, the analysis of being-toward-death is crucial to understanding Heidegger's notion of a community of finite beings. In both texts, Da-sein forms a community of those who are going to die.

Heidegger indicates in his treatment of being-toward-death in the Beiträge that this notion, and its relationship to anticipatory resoluteness, which must be thought together, is the connecting point between the thinking in the Beiträge and in Sein und Zeit. He says: "What is sheltered here is the essential belongingness of the not to being as such (to the truth of being, he says later)" (GA 65, 282). Being-toward-death does not, he says, negate being and hold itself only in relationship to a nullity, but is "the utmost corroboration of being" (GA 65, 284). In being-toward-death, Heidegger argues that we recover an essential relationship to time-space, "not in order to negate 'being' but in order to install the ground of its full and essential affirmative" (ibid.). Being-toward-death is the most affirmative concept in Being and Time. It is the utmost affirmation of being. Those who accomplish and take up this relationship toward their being as being-toward-death are the sovereign ones who are prepared for the coming community (GA 65, 285).

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 301.
4. Ibid., p. 305.
5. This is not to deny the importance of a further analysis of Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world and the extent to which worldliness needs to be put into question as the basis for a community of those who are going to die. It seems to me that Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy provides an account of the relationship of being-toward-death and community that does not rely on a horizontal understanding of Da-sein's relationality.
7. "To care belongs not only being-in-the-world, but being together with innerworldly beings. The being of Da-sein and its disclosedness belong equiprimordially to the discoveredness of innerworldly beings" (SZ, 221).
8. "Intimating (as grounding attunement of another beginning) does not at all aim only at what is futural, what stands before—as does the intimating that is generally thought in a calculative way. Rather, it traverses and thoroughly takes stock of the whole of temporality; the free-play of the time-space of the 'there.'" (GA 65, 22). This presentiment of the other beginning is an indication of the community of Daseins who stand decisively in the transition between "the no longer of the first history and the not—yet of the fulfillment of the other beginning" (GA 65, 23). The community of singular Da-seins is therefore radically transitional and indeterminate and never constituted by the fixed horizon or closure in which it dwells.
9. Here I think one can invoke the work of Georges Bataille and Giorgio Agamben who, in their own way, have developed this notion of sovereignty as the very condition of community in the postmodern age.
10. This passage seems to go against the interpretation of being-toward-death offered by Dreyfus.