Why did the United States get involved in Vietnam, and why did it
stay in the war long after U.S. leaders knew we could not win?  Why
did the Soviets invade Afghanistan when they well knew that others’
attempts to conquer that country had repeatedly failed?  Why did
Hitler attack the Soviet Union despite the fact that no outside
power since the 15th century had succeeded in subduing Russia?
History—and contemporary international relations—are replete with
examples of the risks, costs and difficulty of attacking and
invading other states and intervening militarily in the politics and
conflicts of others.  This course will explore the question why
nations go to war when survival is not at stake.  There will be many
case studies, but the focus will be on theories that help us
understand this puzzling behavior on the part of states and those
who determine or influence national policy.  A role-playing exercise
at the end of the semester will give students an opportunity to
simulate national decision-makers confronting the question of
whether or not to use force.
The course requirements will be two exams (short answer and essay
questions), two short papers and participation in class.