Philosophy | Theory of Knowledge
P562 | 3224 | Leite


We all believe things about the world.  Some of these beliefs are better
than others from an epistemic point of view.  Some, we say, are
"justified."  What is involved in - or required for - having a justified
belief?

This course will cover contemporary work in the theory of empirical
justification.  We will read representative foundationalist, coherentist,
reliabilist, and contextualist views.  We will also consider the nature of
epistemic evaluation (e.g., is it best understood in deontological terms,
as a matter of responsibility, rights, and duties?) and the related
controversy between epistemological externalists and internalists.
Finally, we will consider the nature of the epistemic basing relation (the
relation of holding a belief for a reason) as the key to a correct
understanding of epistemic justification.  This investigation will bring
our epistemological concerns into close relation with issues in the
philosophy of mind.

Readings will include papers by: Laurence Bonjour, William Alston, Michael
Williams, Roderick Firth, Robert Audi, Keith Lehrer, Gilbert Harman, Alvin
Plantinga, Alvin Goldman, Roderick Chisholm, Susan Haack, Ernest Sosa, and
others.