Political Science | Formal Models of Information and Learning (3 Cr.)
Y673 | 3408 | Monroe

This seminar is focused on the formal modeling of social (political /
economic) situations involving incomplete information and learning.  We will
spend a few weeks reviewing / establishing some basic concepts in modeling
games of incomplete information (Bayesian Nash equilibrium, perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, etc.; signaling, principle-agent
problems, adverse selection, moral hazard, etc.).  The remainder of the
semester will examine current research on information transmission /
aggregation and learning, and discussing student research.  Likely readings
include Fudenberg and Levine's The Theory of Learning in Games and Aumann
and Maschler's Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, although readings
will be primarily from economics and political science journals and cover
both technical issues and applications.  If there is interest, we will also
examine formal approaches to related issues in psychology and cognitive
science.  This is a research seminar; the focus of the seminar will be the
development and discussion of models for use in participants' own research.

Grades for the course will be based on participation and a research paper.
A prerequisite for the seminar is Y573 (Introduction to Formal Political
Theory, Political Science), E626 (Game Theory, Economics), or an equivalent.