What Ever Happened to the Problem of Induction?

The problem of induction (in particular, the problem of how induction
is possible in the first place) has in the past been explicitly at the
heart of epistemology and/or its historical ancestors.  Witness Plato,
Aristotle, or Hume. Each of these philosophers explicitly considered
how (or whether) it is possible to infer the general from the
specific, and their approaches to central epistemological issues were
intertwined with their answers to this question.  On the other hand,
in contemporary epistemology, the problem is rarely discussed as such.
Instead, it has shown up in a number of areas in rather more specific
forms. Within reliabilism, naturalism, Bayesianism, and so on, there
are discussions that can be seen as the natural descendants of the
problem of induction---sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly.

In this class, we will investigate these descendants in some detail.
We will begin by getting clear on just what the problem of induction
is, and then we will turn our attention to the many areas in which it
turns up in contemporary philosophy of science and epistemology.

We intend this class to be of broad interest to philosophers, and we
will not be presupposing knowledge of philosophy of science or
epistemology.  Anybody with interests in contemporary philosophy of
science or epistemology should find this course worthwhile.

The course will be run seminar-style, with some lecture but with an
emphasis on discussion. Students will be expected to come to class
prepared to discuss the readings and issues related to the readings in
detail. Grades will be determined by participation in class and by a
final paper.