Topic:  Skepticism and Virtue Epistemology

	Epistemology concerns the definition, standards, sources,
and value of knowledge, justified belief, rational belief,
confirmation, verification, evidence, intellectual virtue, and the
like. Philosophers have approached these matters from many angles.
The study of skepticism is one such angle, perhaps the most
important historically. Epistemologists have offered many arguments
designed to call into question human cognitive achievement and
establish that we know much less than we think we do. These
arguments are of interest both for their pessimistic conclusions and
for the insight they offer into the nature and principles of
knowledge. Philosophers have also offered many responses in defense
of our claims to knowledge. These too reveal the nature of
knowledge. We will sample a few important kinds of skepticism and
consider major responses in defense of knowledge. These will include
both attempts to refute skepticism and attempts to dismiss the
skeptic or to change the topic. We look at responses by G. E. Moore,
the logical positivists, J. L. Austin, and W. V. Quine. We also
consider some theories of knowledge deliberately contrived to
prevent skeptical challenges from being raised--e.g., coherence
theories and reliabilist theories of knowledge. After discussing
these, we will devote the remainder of the course to virtue
epistemology, which tries to understand human cognitive achievement
in terms of intellectual character rather than evidence or methods
for forming beliefs. Virtue epistemology has roots in the
Aristotelian tradition; its recent revival was inspired by the
popularity of reliabilist and naturalist approaches to epistemology.
Texts will include Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical
Scepticism and Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind.