Navy of the Rising Sun
Introduction
The history
of the Japanese Navy, in particular post Meiji restoration to the eve of WW2,
is a very long, complex, and in many ways intriguing story. Unfortunately
there is just not enough time to address all issues regarding the development
of the Japanese Navy. Instead, this website will give solid information about
why the Japanese emphasized naval strength, how they went about building up
a modern navy, and their strategic plans for its use including specific naval
operations.
The Need For a Navy
With the expansion of western empires into the orient,
many nations faced the challenge of dealing with them and Japan, unlike its
neighbors, determined that industrialization and imperialistic goals suited
them. Part of this is the need for a modern navy. The need for naval strength
has its roots in the Meiji restoration. The revolution not only tried to
modernize Japan industrially and socially, but militarily. The development
of infrastructure, industry, and growth of cities required huge amounts of
natural resources that the island of Japan just didn’t have, it had to look
outward. This need for land and raw material set the Japanese mind on the
surrounding lands of East Asia.
Beginning with Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and China, the
Japanese Military grew and so did the public view of the need for imperialism.
And with Japan being an island, it’s quite obvious the only road to becoming
an empire lay with a strong navy. However, early in the 1900’s, after war
with China over influence in Korea, the Japanese people viewed the navy as
a tool for defense. In fact, one naval officer named Sato Tetsutaro came
to realize “the advantage of an ocean oriented (offensive) defense over a
static island offense” (Evans 137). His study of the world power at the time,
also an island nation, the United Kingdom led him to conclude that a navy
was the key to imperialism, expansion, power, and defense. To defend herself
from western influence, Japan needed a strong world empire fed by a strong
economy that was fueled by resources attained through an empire. Another
need driving the development of a navy was the needs of the navy itself.
With the switch from coal to oil in the army and navy, Japan needed a solution
to its dependence on foreign oil, and this would come from the abundant lands
of Southeast Asia. In fact, the south was “so vital to the navy… because
operations there must necessarily be maritime and the navy depends on oil”
(Beasley 224).
The core of imperialism in Japan was domestic; the alliance
of the ruling classes to keep power and international; the need to survive
in the harsh capitalistic and imperialist world as suggested by historian
Shigeru Yoshido (35). Lastly, the desire to help the other nations in Asia
in a brotherly like way against the arm of western imperialism led to the
need for a navy. With a strong navy, Japan could protect its neighbors as
many Japanese believed their duty was. A navy would allow Japan to provide
regional security and prosperity, but at the heart would still protect the
economic interests and development of export markets for Japan. As events
unfolded from the late 1800’s to the 1930’s and 40’s the Japanese had realized
that they needed a navy to survive, that their dependence on other nations
made them weak and a navy could provide strength.
Industrialization and expansion of infrastructure like
this railway, required resources
from abroad
Construction of the Imperial Japanese Navy
Now that Japan had realized its need for a navy, and
the value in naval superiority, it needed to find a way to construct the
ships necessary for a strong force. At the same time China was squandering
funds meant for a modern navy, the Japanese were using the wealth and facilities
that had sprung up with the Meiji restoration and birth of the zaibatsu to
create a modern ironclad navy. With easy success against the Chinese in 1895
the next clear threat to influence in Korea and Manchuria was Russia. Despite
having fewer ships when it fought Russia in 1904, victory came quickly and
by 1905 Japan had humiliated a western naval power. The triumph over Russia,
as Evans puts it “cemented naval tradition, cast a spell on naval leaders”
(94) and Japan attained world power status overnight. The period leading
up to and around WW1 signified expansion for the Japanese Navy into a diversified
force. With the development of new submersible technology, advances in aviation,
and the introduction of the Dreadnaught class battleships around the world,
the Japanese Navy expanded into uncharted waters it would spend the next
20 years exploring.
With the world entering into financial ruins and the once
powerful Japanese industries taking heavy losses, it would seem unlikely
for large shipbuilding projects to be started. However, fueled by the defeat
Japan felt it suffered at the Washington naval conference where it was limited
to 3 capitol ships for every 5 or the US and the UK, the Japanese government
funded more naval development that helped get the country out of depression.
In the presence of cheap labor, a large labor force looking for work, and
the infrastructure created in the previous decades, the Japanese economy
boomed as it produced more and more ships, (Evans 199). Initially attention
was paid to submarines, because of their effectiveness against the Russians.
The submersible was seen as an excellent tool for attrition against a larger
naval force. However, because of the restrictions from the London naval conference,
tonnage was limited on capitol ships and the Japanese view of the importance
of naval aviation changed (Evans 249). The Japanese made several attempts
from the 20’s right up to 1941 to make the perfect aircraft carrier. This
was absolutely necessary as aircraft technology boomed. Japan also began
converting merchant ships and various others for military use. But as the
30’s progressed and more radical militarists came into power, Japan in 1937
began ignoring the tonnage limits set in previous decades and began the “Circle
3 plan which called for two super-battleships the Yamato and Musashi, 2 new
carriers and 65 other warships.” (Evans 357). Also included were the retrofitting
of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and support ships that included
upgrading the bore of guns onboard, and adding almost 2000 planes for the
navy.
As the 40’s neared, the Japanese war machine
kept producing ships at an amazing rate. The Japanese now focused construction
on surpassing American naval air power and attempting to maintain a 70% ratio
of ships to the Americans. Before 1941, the Japanese had amassed a
navy worth of praise full of massive battleships, heavily armored support
craft, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and a growing carrier group and
aircraft. Japan mobilized its industry and met the need for a modern navy
realized decades earlier.
The aircraft carrier Akagi after being commisioned.
Long Term Regional Strategy and Implementations
The Japanese Navy through its development as a world fighting
power would be useless without a strategy. As seen in the purpose for its
construction, the security of the nation was first. The first priority of
the navy was to establish hold over the provinces in China and Korea and
transport goods and materials between the two. Additionally, the navy needed
to expand to resource rich lands in Southeast Asia. The navy would need to
expand its hold to these islands to expand strategic ports, gain access to
oil to run its fleet, and shipping to transport goods like rubber and tin.
The economic needs for a strong Japan led to this strategy to essentially
conquer a huge part of Asia. The plan was later referred to as the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and would protect the natives of other countries
from oppressive westerners. Naval man Ishiwara Kanji noted that the protection
of Asia and its values would “require a series of wars first against Russia,
then against Britain, finally against the United States” (Beasley 182)
Japanese strategy was to secure its holdings, expand to
other Asian countries to build strength in preparation for a war it saw coming
against the western nations. In fact, Japan had foreseen the United States
as an enemy since the early 1900’s and developed naval strategy around fighting
a nation like the US. Since the US and other western nations were a threat,
this expansion into other Parts of Asia was seen as brotherly and a help
to those nations while providing the power for Japan to preserve itself and
its interests.
Original strategy was focused on decisive victory with
big guns, use of attrition against numerically superior forces, quality over
quantity, and the use of nighttime and torpedo attacks (Evans 94). As time
passed and America became the clear enemy and with advances in aircraft technology,
strategy changed. Japan now had a plan to fight the United States in three
steps. The first was to “seek and destroy weak American forces in the south
pacific,” next would be attrition against the main US battle fleet as it
made its way from the west coast to Japan, and last to have a decisive victory
against the remnants of the US fleet as they neared Japan. (Evans 464-465).
Two major problems with this strategy was that the Japanese never tested
their combined fleet’s capabilities before the war and the US Navy moved
its pacific fleet to Hawaii. Overall, Japanese strategy was to expand to
its neighbors in Asia, build up its fleet and resources, and prepare for
a war with the western world.
Map of Colonization in the Pacific
in 1939
Tactics for implementation of overall strategy were in
part discussed in the last paragraph. Now to discuss the specific types of
craft planned on being used, a discussion of Admiral Yamamato in brief and
a final note. The Japanese learned from the west and from battle in WW1 that
the battleship was king of the sea. The naval leaders therefore valued big
battleships as a key to defeat of any enemy. The
Japanese felt that the super-battleship would be a final component
to the navy and overemphasized battleships in general because they were restricted
by treaties (Evans 293) . Additionally, the use of submarines was viewed
as crucial to help the attrition of the predicted US Navy. With stealth and
surprise, they would eat away at enemy capitol ships. Also, support craft
like destroyers and cruisers were supposed to serve a protective role of
carriers and take out weaker forces on their own. The only problem here was
the overwhelming reliance on large slow battleships. Admiral Yamamoto (seen right), was one of three key naval officers
in the pre-war and war period believed in the superiority of naval air power
and saw the end of the battleship (Evans 461). Yamamoto had graduated from
the naval institute and served as captain of several ships before commanding
the naval air wing before planning the attack on Pearl Harbor. After his death
he was elevated to the position Admiral of the Fleet (Evans 537). He was
a moderate voice in a time or crazed militarism and stressed airpower, which
the coming war would prove to be far more crucial than slow lumbering battleships.
Overall, the Japanese Navy expected to implement its naval
strategy through operations that involved several types of ships and their
roles throughout the pacific. And through all this, several admirals like
Yamamoto felt that the naval power of Japan was being constructed for war,
not to prevent it. On a final note, the development of a modern navy in Japan
had a useful purpose, was achieved through the industrial powers of the day,
was meant for good and prosperity, but in the end the execution of operations
and a few crazed military men corrupted this great empire.
Sources:
- Beasley, W.G. Japanese Imperialism. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun:
Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941.
Anapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
- Yoshida, Shigeru. Japan's Decisive Century:
1867-1967. New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1967
Image Credits:
Imperial Japanese Flag: from clipart
directory for the university of south florida,
http://etc.usf.edu/clipart/2000/2071/jp-flag_2_lg.gif
Image 2: railway technical institute of japan, http://www.rtri.or.jp/japanrail/GIF/tsubame.gif
Image 3: polish site of history
of warships, www.warship.get.net.pl
Image 4: wordiq.com and property of us navy,
http://www.wordiq.com/knowledge/images/thumb/d/d4/721px-Yamatotrials.jpg
Image 5: United States Military Academy,
WW2 in the Pacifiic, history section. www.usma.edu/history
Image 6: Website for the Hoover Digest,1998. www.hooverdigest.org
Author: Sean Ducko, 2005