The Names of Rectification: Notes on the Conceptual Domains of CCP Ideology in the Yan'an Rectification Movement

One of the main words being studied in our keywords project is, of course, revolution (geming).⁽¹⁾ This paper attempts to apply the methods of political culture analysis and Begriffsgeschichte (history of concepts) to the social history of the concept revolution in one context--among top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres and theorists during the 1942-44 Yan'an Rectification movement. The goal is to understand the meaning of revolution for key actors and, thus, better understand how they perceived and made sense of their world and their place in it.

The core texts analyzed here come from speakers for the CCP concerned with the Rectification movement (zhengfeng yundong) in which the Party endeavored to set its ideology and organization straight under Mao Zedong. The contest over the meaning of revolution had devolved into a contest over the meaning of rectification. The contest included a power struggle among the top leadership (particularly between Mao and Wang Ming for preeminence) and a related fight over who had the best way to carry out the Revolution. The public form of this contest was a long period of cadre education and investigation, beginning in 1938 but entering a new and intense stage in the spring of 1942. Central Party announcements for this new form of revolution--rectification--elicited contesting definitions of rectification from literary and theoretical specialists at central institutions in Yan'an. Specifically, writers like Ding Ling, Liu Xuewei, and Ai Qing, and Party theorists like Wang Shiwei offered alternate visions of rectification and thus of revolution.⁽²⁾ The present paper looks more carefully at the language and writing of those who attacked these loose cannons in the Central Research Institute (CRI) and Lu Xun Academy for Arts and Literature and who set up the orthodoxy that then appeared to resolve the contest.

The three texts reflect a hierarchy in the communication channels of the CCP: the first is a public document based on a speech at the CRI; the second an article in a restricted Party journal also based on a speech given to an elite audience in the rectification movement; and the third a speech to top cadres which has never been published in China.⁽³⁾ The texts purport to describe the same thing: how rectification overcame the errors and threats of Wang Shiwei, saved the Revolution from setbacks or outright failure, and provided a model for future revolution. We will see important differences related to the hierarchical position of each audience. We will also see the outlines of three domains of Party activity, each with their own voice, that are not rigidly linked to this hierarchy.

There has been a healthy movement in China studies toward focusing on the whole of society rather than just elites or prominent thinkers. Even though this working paper explores the ways that techniques associated with social history and the "new cultural history" can help us to understand the language of the Chinese Revolution, its approach is best described as a top-down and elite-centered one, since its main concern is with the ideas expressed by CCP cadres. This focus seems justified because before we can test what the reception of revolutionary ideologies was among various strata and types of social actors, we need to have an articulated understanding of what those who generated the messages were trying to get across to their audiences. It is also important to remember that elites, even within the notoriously regimented CCP, are never homogeneous; they comprise socially and culturally defined groups with both shared traits and internal fissures. We need an approach that is sensitive to the ways in which meanings are contested and evolve over time.

In developing the interpretive strategy outlined below, I draw most heavily upon two types of studies. The first are recent works on revolutionary political culture, a term that in these studies (particularly those on France) refers to the complex inter-relationships between the realms of politics and culture rather than to a set of psychoanalytically derived national traits (as it has sometimes been used in Chinese studies).⁽⁴⁾ Taking many methodological cues from these works, in the first section of this paper, I seek to identify and explicate the keywords and rhetorical strategies employed in three important texts from the Rectification movement and, from there, to draw general conclusions about the meanings of these pieces. In particular, this analysis will attempt to identify the hegemonic concepts shared by all participants in contemporary contests for power, concepts which not only had influence then but appear to have shaped public language and politics in China over broader periods of time.

The other approach I draw upon below is known as Begriffsgeschichte. More particularly, I rely upon Reinhart Koselleck's distinction between "concepts" and "ideas," which stresses the key role of concepts in social history. "Without common concepts there is no society," he claims, "and above all, no political field of action."⁽⁵⁾ Concepts are an important category of analysis for historical knowledge because

social and political conflicts of the past must be interpreted and opened up via the medium of their contemporary conceptual limits and in terms of the mutually understood, past linguistic usage of participating agents.⁽⁶⁾

The core analytical category here, concept, is defined by Koselleck as a word representing an idea that is both powerful enough in a certain discourse to direct thought and ambiguous enough to hold within it a range of meanings. One example he gives is that of "democracy," which carries meanings from a Greek definition of the constitution of a polis, to the rules of eighteenth-century European states, to the expectations of industrialized society--all different but related meanings--and which is able to encompass persistence, change, and novelty within itself. He concludes, "Each concept establishes a particular horizon for potential experience and conceivable theory, and in this way sets a limit."⁽⁷⁾ It is these horizons and limits, and the power they give in return, that I seek in Yan'an's history of rectification.

Names and Concepts: Revolution, Rectification and Yan'an

Our main subject is the contested meaning of the concept revolution at this critical juncture of the broader Chinese Revolution, yet we will not be dealing directly with the word geming in this analysis because these core revolutionary texts do not. This raises a fundamental methodological issue in the study of the language of revolution (or any other social movement), the distinction between terms and concepts. This analysis of the concept of revolution is already informed by the social history of the revolution in Yan'an. The CCP itself and virtually all scholars agree that the CCP developed successful ways to prosecute the Revolution--militarily, socially, ideologically--during the Rectification movement (1942-44).⁽⁸⁾ Rectification is, thus, a way to carry out the Revolution.

This identification of rectification with revolution is so basic that it is simply taken for granted in the Yan'an texts. If we read texts from the period closely, we can see three kinds of identifications between rectification and revolution being established. First, there are passing explicit references in the texts. Zhang Ruxin, author of the first text to be analyzed here, writes, "This rectification campaign is, of course, not the same . . . for it is an ideological revolution for the entire Party."⁽⁹⁾ Revolution also appears in all three texts in its negative form, as in continual references to the "counterrevolutionary" acts of Wang Shiwei and other objects of criticism.

Second, rectification's ability to produce revolutionary discontinuity is implicitly acknowledged in many texts. This is one of the criteria of revolution used by scholars of language in the French Revolution. Zhang notes that the first six months of rectification were "comparable to a few years in terms of its content and effect on our comrades" (115). He stresses the great difference between the earlier time and "today's point of view" (116 and 120).

Third, the transformational nature of rectification as a language, or discourse, has attracted recent scholarly analysis. David Apter and Tony Saich conclude in their study of the political culture of Yan'an that "it was the point during the Chinese Revolution when the discourse community was reformed and generated sufficient power to change the course of China's history."⁽¹⁰⁾

The contest was most openly between the forces around Mao, his competitors at the top among the Soviet-trained "Internationalist faction" around former Party leader Wang Ming, and the loose cannons in the theory and literary institutions of Yan'an, most notably (but by no means limited to) Wang Shiwei. Yet we find that even within the victorious Maoist party there are at least three identifiable domains of discourse in which the concept of revolution--rectification of the Party--has significantly different meaning. These are the ideological domain, the organizational domain, and the inquisitional domain: propaganda, Party building, and the hunt for spies. We will also see three concepts emerging from these domains of activity attached to the broader concept of revolution: mobilization, hierarchy, and sentiment. These domains are part of a broader discourse of revolution in Yan'an and thus share some truly fundamental concepts: attitudinal fundamentalism (that attitudes are the prime mover of behavior) and epistemological elitism (that legitimate knowledge can only be provided by a special elite).

I will argue that the last two concepts are hegemonic, what Koselleck calls true concepts, that shape, empower, and limit human conceptions of reality at a given time. The meaning of these concepts, however, can only be deduced in the context of social history--of how actors used these concepts, under what conditions, and for what purposes. These five concepts help us better understand what revolution meant in this phase of the Chinese Revolution and direct our attention to aspects of the social history of Yan'an and the broader history which we may not have considered carefully before. These concepts are capacious enough to hold mutually conflicting ideas both within each concept and between them. It is this tension that appears to give these mental forms their life and power. Thus, concepts, even hegemonic concepts, are not deterministic structures directing agency; they are tools used by actors whose actions are shaped, however, by the characteristics of those tools.

Although the three key documents whose close reading form the core data of this paper reflect a hierarchy of power and access in the Party--from a public "handbook" for cadres in theory and propaganda work on how to run ideological remolding, to a more restricted organizational lesson for leading cadres on how to run ideological struggle, to a secret speech for high cadres on the tactics of dealing with spies in political struggle--the domains which each text addresses cut through the CCP from top to bottom. These texts are thus scripts for the social drama that is rectification. They tell actors what to do in each domain of the revolution. From what we know of the history of Yan'an (and later periods of CCP rule), all three scripts were, indeed, acted out.⁽¹¹⁾ Cadres high and low involved in ideological mobilization used texts like Zhang Ruxin's glowing summary of the successes of rectification and the smashing of "Wang Shiwei's Trotskyite Five-Person Anti-Party Gang." Those working to maintain the CCP as an effective channel to guide and direct those mobilized by the ideology used texts like Yang Shangkun's summary of the organizational aspects of rectification, and those interested in finding (or creating) spies and enemies of the Revolution adopted the cunning of Kang Sheng as revealed in his speech of 1943.

The scripts for revolution which these texts provide include host of names--names defining actors, actions, goals, processes, and the whole representation of the revolutionary project. It is for this reason that I have adopted the title echoing, in inverted form, the Confucian dictum on the rectification of names. Confucius held that if names were not correct and realities did not conform to correct names, then the moral state would be an impossibility. The CCP exhibits a faith in the power of names similar to that attributed to Confucius. We shall see that the texts under analysis here strive mightily to establish legitimate names for the CCP's revolutionary project and to wrest contested names away from competitors (see particularly the "Rhetorical Strategies" section below). Rectification in Yan'an is not just about names or language. If we develop a more sophisticated appreciation of the names of rectification, we can approach the rhetoric, representations, and the realities of revolution as it was experienced then and there.

This paper thus attempts to bring to light the variation and tensions between three domains of Party activity--ideological education (remolding) for mobilization, organizational discipline for control, and inquisitional testing and purging for security--over the meaning of revolution and rectification. I suggest that even within the CCP orthodox ideology in Yan'an there were at least three distinct voices that overlapped and partially conflicted with each other in the minds and actions of individual agents. The message sent to society was thus a mixed one. On the level of conceptual relations--the subcode that made "intuitive sense" to the participants--we can see three distinct logics: (1) the reasonableness (li) of the motivational powers of right doctrine, reminiscent of the Confucian faith in moral education; (2) the predictability of hierarchy based on written regulations and procedures (fa) to ensure organizational compliance, calling to mind the actual Confucian adjustment to Imperial needs and Legalist ideas; and (3) the emotive power of personal feelings (qing) of hatred, revenge, and the personal manipulation of such basic feelings through cunning, often represented in the popular culture (and private lives of the elite) and so well portrayed in the Chinese martial novels. Rectification is revolution, but one that emphasizes moral education and cultivation, predictable hierarchy, and satisfying emotional release.

The three texts also reflect the process of rectification. They represent a chronology in actual time (speeches from September 1942, October 1942, and August 1943) and process: first, the identification and demonstration of a negative model; second, its use for ideological education, then for Party building; and, finally, its use for inquisition.

Furthermore, we shall see that the ideas in each domain, as well as their codes or conceptual logic, contradict each other. The key idea for mobilization was egalitarianism, yet the key idea of organization was discipline and obedience to superiors, while the search for security rested on emotional manipulation that utterly contradicted the reasonableness and predictability of the first two conceptual domains. We will have to turn from text to context in a later paper to explore more fully how these tensions worked out in practice.

Reading Strategy for the History of Concepts

The present analysis adopts the following strategies. First we begin with the surface meaning of the texts. As Benjamin Schwartz cautions us, "Begin with what the text appears to say." Second, we apply a bricolage of linguistic and rhetorical analyses to uncover the central terms, rhetorical moves, and concepts, in order to identify the underlying meaning of each text. Third, we make a foray back from text to context to see what real issues of the day the texts appear to be addressing, to see what light the text and context together can produce. Fourth, we attempt to use this information to describe the structure of hegemonic discourse--to show the use and meaning of the key concepts in practice. Finally, we consider what, if any, new understanding this approach and example has for our project by relating the identified hegemonic discourse to social structure and events.

Zhang Ruxin and Mobilization

The first of the three texts is Zhang Ruxin's summary of ideological remolding (sixiang gaizao) in the first six months of the rectification movement as of September 1942. Given as a speech at the CRI, Zhang's summation was published in the Liberation Daily (the official propaganda newspaper of the CCP at the time) on 31 October and 1 November 1942. The text is explicitly a guide for cadres involved in ideological work, a handbook for running an ideological remolding campaign.

What is Zhang saying in this summary? CCP propaganda is nothing if not clear and direct about its purposes. It has long been argued by scholars and participants inside and outside of China that there are no "mistakes" in central CCP propaganda--every word counts.⁽¹²⁾ Thus, we find in Zhang's title and first paragraph a sensible outline of the text:

Since rectification began this year on March 18 in this Institute, it has gone on for exactly half a year. In the initial stage, erroneous tendencies [pianxiang] appeared and we exposed Wang Shiwei's anti-party activities. Afterward, the erroneous tendencies were corrected. This period . . . has provided us with much valuable experience and has taught us many lessons. These experiences and lessons need to be carefully summarized to guide our future practice (115).

Zhang organizes this summary guide in three sections: A) an explanation (and definition) of the "erroneous tendencies" which were "exposed" at the beginning of rectification (roughly February to April); B) the policies and methods used to correct erroneous tendencies (roughly March to September); and C) a list of lessons to draw from this summary of ideological remolding.

In the first section Zhang sets out to define "erroneous tendencies" and to explain their origin and development during the early months of rectification. He gives three explanations for the origins and content of these "erroneous tendencies": 1) lack of understanding and insufficient attention on the part of "the majority of cadres" in the CRI concerning the proper aims and goals of rectification--specifically, they mistakenly thought rectification was meant to criticize top leaders; 2) this attitude (that it was permissible to criticize top leaders) produced behavior, extreme democratization (jiduan minzhuhua), which amounted to criticizing leaders within the CRI and not submitting to the usual Party practice of appointed committee leaders and instead calling for majority vote elections; and 3) the "attitude of liberalism" (ziyouzhuyi) in dealing with these incorrect attitudes--now called by Zhang "Wang Shiwei's Trotskyite thoughts and his anti-Party activities"--exacerbated the original problem and was an "erroneous tendency" itself. In short, "our comrades lacked political and ideological awareness" which "offered space for Wang's thoughts to penetrate." The problem is ideological and so too are the solutions.

Zhang concludes that the basic nature of these erroneous tendencies is "petty bourgeois" in contrast to the proper "proletarian point of view." He then offers two reasons for this basic nature. First, most of the CRI's Party members were new to the Party and young--they lacked "cultivation of ideological consciousness, organization, or discipline." Furthermore, most came from a petty bourgeois background and thus acted like petty bourgeoisie--stressing "individualism, individual prominence, considering oneself always right, and arrogance." Second, Wang Shiwei's "anti-Party propaganda" had effect. It preyed on the youth and inexperience of these bourgeois intellectuals (the term "intellectual" slips into Zhang's analysis in ways we will find interesting below). The publication of the CRI's wall newspaper, Light Cavalry (in which Wang published), "acted as a model to comrades" to do what Wang had done. Finally, senior leaders in the CRI failed to act quickly to counteract the impact of this model--they failed to carry out correct ideological education and remolding, the subject of section B) of Zhang's summary.

In the second major section of his summary, Zhang describes how Party leaders in the CRI carried out the successful "correction of erroneous tendencies." This section provided a guide to other cadres who needed to run ideological remolding movements. Zhang outlines the policy, methods, and the process of ideological remolding in the CRI for the entire six months. The policy of ideological remolding, writes Zhang, "was nothing but the rectification policy stated by Chairman Mao, `Learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and cure the illness to save the patient.'" "To learn" meant to expose cadres' errors, "analyze and criticize them scientifically" and find ways "to save the wrongdoers." It required a cautious approach on the part of authorities and frank honesty and confessions on the part of "wrongdoers." It nonetheless assumed "wrongdoers" were mostly good people amenable to education and transformation. Zhang declares in the end, "This proved to be true."

Zhang then offers four points regarding methods employed in ideological remolding as outlined in the 3 April decision of the Propaganda Department concerning Rectification. First, the CRI extended the study period and put it under the guidance of a "senior study group" (which later became the formal Examination Committee). Second, the core documents prepared by the Party (including writings by Mao, Liu Shaoqi, and other CCP leaders and a few Lenin and Stalin selections which were later collected as the twenty-two rectification documents) were linked to personal life histories. "The most important part in studying documents is to remold our attitude toward study and learning methods," writes Zhang. He cites the 3 April decision, "Read, make notes and discuss each item or group of items intensively in small groups. Everybody ought to think deeply and examine his work, his ideology, and his entire life." Third, a repetition of points one and two, the methods should intensify ideological leadership and link documents with "remolding each person's ideological consciousness." And, finally, persuasion should be used and reasonable steps taken to achieve points one through three. Zhang stresses that leaders adopted a "cautious and responsible attitude" in handling the struggle against Wang Shiwei:

Coercion should not be used. . . . We solved problems one by one . . . in accordance with the principle of seeking truths from facts and in line with the essence of central documents. . . . The focus is on substance not people. . . . [We] began with major cadres first, then involved ordinary comrades . . . so as to promote the development of the movement in the entire Institute.⁽¹³⁾

Zhang concludes the review of methods by noting that they were not flawlessly implemented but were basically successful.

Zhang then turns to "the process of correcting erroneous tendencies," dividing it into four phases. First was the exposure phase from 18 March to 7 April. Exposure meant here the airing of views, such as Wang Shiwei's. Zhang says, "this phase was analyzed above." The second phase ran from the 7 April Propaganda Department meeting of CRI personnel until mid-May. Kai Feng (a top leader) spoke at that meeting and set the agenda; naming the previous criticisms (by Wang and others) as erroneous and setting the goal of correcting them. The Party's version of the correct relationship between leadership and democracy and of how to make correct criticisms was introduced. Still, Zhang characterizes this period as a preparation phase in which the minority who supported the correct view were given signals of support from the leadership and mobilized to criticize Wang and his way of doing rectification. Much work was still to be done. The third phase ran from early May [sic] through to the famous public forum criticizing Wang Shiwei which ended in mid-June. It began with serious discussion of the rectification documents and specific documents by and about Wang Shiwei. "The characteristic of this phase is that the majority of comrades gradually mastered the ideological weapon through the study of documents and participated in the struggle" against Wang. Central to this process were two things: key documents--the 3 April decision of the Propaganda Department and rectification essays such as Mao's "Combat Liberalism" and "On Egalitarianism" and Liu Shaoqi's "On the Self-Cultivation of Party Members," and personal self-examination, generally in public. Zhang cites one participant, "After reading the documents, I felt that each item in the document was pointing at my heart like a needle." The key idea to be internalized was the Party's alternative to Wang's version of rectification, democratic centralism. This phase culminated in the huge public meeting to denounce Wang Shiwei.⁽¹⁴⁾ The fourth phase ran from mid-June until early September when the meetings to summarize changes in Party workstyle were held (and at which Zhang gave this summation). The findings of the anti-Wang meeting became templates for cadres to re-examine themselves. Discussions based in each department of the CRI were held for a week. Individuals wrote intellectual biographies in which they criticized themselves. These biographies were discussed for another ten days, and there was self- and mutual-criticism. The goal was to "deepen the struggle against erroneous tendencies and bring about more concrete individual examinations" of each person's life and thought. This produced "a major shift in the standpoint of the majority of the comrades towards the Party."

Zhang concludes the section on methods and process by noting that things did not go smoothly nor were they handled perfectly, but the movement has been a success. Comrades will hold on to erroneous ideas for quite a while, the tide flows in the direction of error, then back to truth. "This twisted process is the general principle of ideological remolding," concludes Zhang, especially for "young Party members from an intellectual background."

The third and final major section of Zhang's summary raises three important lessons (with several sub-points) from the CRI's ideological remolding efforts. First, the ideological remolding movement has proven "the Central Committee's policy of carrying out this rectification is absolutely necessary and correct." He goes on to restate the definition of rectification and notes that "rectification is peaceful and not bloody; however, it is a serious ideological revolution." The CRI, as "the place where cadres specializing in theoretical work (lilun gongzuo ganbu) are cultivated," needs to continue, says Zhang, to strengthen its Party character (Dang xing) and Communist viewpoint. This will require an endless series of future rectifications, a "process of long-term ideological remolding and practice." Second, the six months of struggle have provided valuable lessons in "the methods of leading ideological struggle." He clearly distinguishes rectification from the bloody purges the CCP carried out in the 1930s. Mao is cited as the reason for the shift to persuasion and reason away from previous "organizational enforcement" and violence.

Under the second lesson, for leading ideological struggle, Zhang adds five additional points: 1) "leadership of ideological struggle is a science" which needs careful and technical handling, particularly "scientific investigation and research"; 2) successful ideological struggle requires extensive ideological preparation by theory workers and leaders--plan for it to take "quite a while"; 3) the task of "progressive people" is to stick to their guns at the start and slowly persuade their deluded comrades through the process--"the aim of the ideological struggle is to remold everyone's ideology"; 4) flexibility in methods must complement "right principles"; and 5) first unite senior cadres and activists, raise their consciousness, organize them to influence others, and promote self-criticism. Zhang warns that readers should not mechanically apply these methods to other situations, but rather apply their basic spirit.

The third lesson Zhang raises is that "Marxist theory has great instructive function" in ideological remolding. Through the experience of ideological struggle our understanding of Marxism in the twenty-two rectification documents has been transformed, declares Zhang, and "our comrades mastered the theoretical weapon of Marxism. This mastery "turned the documents into a material force" which destroyed Wang Shiwei's erroneous thought and anti-Party activities. Zhang concludes the entire summation this way: "We can say that rectification itself is an experiment in practicing these new teachings and learning methods on a large scale. These initial experiences are worth further study and development."

My redaction of Zhang's long report is, of course, my own representation. I have tried, however, to reflect his approach and minimize commentary. Scholars not familiar with the jargon of CCP writings may have tripped over some of the terms or rhetorical strategies used by Zhang. Thus, we now turn to the words he uses in the report. We will identify all of the common or seemingly important terms (special names, usually nouns) and words (general ones that point to categories and processes) and seek to construct pragmatic definitions for them from their usage within the text.

The most important terms appear in Zhang's title: general summary, ideological remolding, rectification, and, of course, Party. If we look again at the initial paragraph (quoted in full above), we find: erroneous tendencies, Wang Shiwei's anti-Party activities, and [to] correct (jiuzheng). The report quickly introduces further terms: the struggle over ideological remolding, self-examination, the basic spirit of rectification, Party cadres, Bolshevizes, ideological mobilization, extreme democratization, organizational principles, centralism, Party discipline, liberalism, Trotskyite ideas, petty bourgeois, proletarian, individualism, subjectivity, ideological methodology, dogmatism, scientific, cadres, comrades, family background, political level, nature of erroneous tendency, ideology, ideological leadership, ideological consciousness, subjective consciousness, self-criticism, central documents, movement, standpoint, ideological weapon, democracy, democratic centralism, leaders, liberal tendencies, ideological preparation, ideological cultivation, reactionary thoughts, mutual-criticism, factionalism, intellectuals, old society, ideological revolution, masses, theoretical work, Party spirit, ideological struggle, inner-Party struggles, organizational enforcement, progressive people, middle people, passive elements, right principle, sectarianism, Marxist theory, theoretical weapons, material force, sinified Marxism, enlightenment, and self-realization.

This is an intimidating list of words. We may proceed by taking them in order of appearance or try to orient ourselves by first attending to the words which seem most important to Zhang in this text. We will follow the latter strategy, though we will return to consider many more words, in part because ideas and assumptions key to hegemonic concepts are often peripheral or implicit in a text precisely because they are hegemonic, common sense to the author and likely to the intended audience. The pragmatic meaning of these terms can be determined by locating explicit or implicit definitions of them in the text, by seeing what other words or images are associated with them, and by seeing which form paired opposites. This hunt will expose a number of other special terms as well as more ordinary words which have special meanings in this context (which I underline in the passages below not as emphasis but to identify the terms and words for later consideration).

The overarching term is "rectification." We shall see that it is a movement for mobilizing ideological remolding and that this is a key task of the Revolution. Rectification is variously defined by Zhang as "a serious ideological revolution" (128), "a struggle" (128), and "a new method of ideological study" (133), indeed "an experiment" in doing all this (134). Zhang says rectification

"aims at remolding the ideology and workstyle of Party cadres . . . [and] further Bolshevizes our Party. . . . [I]t is also a general ideological mobilization of the entire Party that strives for victory in the anti-Japanese struggle [116]. . . . [Rectification] is a great remolding of the entire Party's thought and workstyle. . . . [R]ectification is a struggle between destroying the old and establishing the new [127]. . . . It is a great debate between proletarian and bourgeois thought . . . [and] a battle to topple the ancient backwardness and to establish the new brightness[128]! . . . Rectification study indeed serves as a conscious process of realization and enlightenment [qimeng] which developed the remolding of our ideological workstyle [134].

Related definitions appear, clarifying aspects of rectification: "the basic spirit of rectification in ideological and organizational terms" is "accurate criticisms within the organization . . . in a principled way" (117; this is given in direct contrast to Zhang's depiction of how Wang Shiwei carried out his version of rectification, [for further discussion, see below under rhetorical strategies]). The principles upon which rectification are based, for Zhang, are "nothing but the rectification policy [fangzhen] stated by Chairman Mao in his rectification report [baogao]" (120). The "concrete methods" (juti banfa) of rectification are defined as the instructions outlined in the 3 April 1942 Propaganda Department decision (jueding) (121). Rectification is not identical to ideological remolding, for Zhang says: "the fruits of ideological remolding would not have been so great if rectification had not been carried out" (127). "The form of this rectification is peaceful and not bloody; however it is a serious ideological revolution" (128). And, "[t]he ideological revolution is a long-term revolution." Its techniques will have to be refined and internalized "in future rectifications and work on a long-term basis" (128). Rectification is not only not bloody, it is contrasted explicitly with a key issue of the day for CCP cadres, "This rectification movement is, of course, not the same as the struggle against Zhang Guotao for it is an ideological revolution for the entire Party" (129). Rectification is based on Marxism and the use of the Central Committee's twenty-two rectification study documents, "The twenty-two [rectification] documents are moving and concrete examples of Marxist theories." The documents are "theoretical weapons" (lilun wuji) with which "our comrades corrected [jiuzheng] their own erroneous tendencies [pianxiang] and eliminated [jiechu] Wang Shiwei's influence." Through rectification study, "our comrades mastered the theoretical weapon of Marxism. This mastery turned the documents into a material force [wuzhi liliang]. Relying on this force, we cleared the erroneous tendencies and criticized Wang Shiwei's erroneous thought." This is not "the dogmatic way [of studying] adopted in the past" [i.e., under Mao's ideological competitor, Wang Ming]; it is a "new study method" aimed at "educating cadres and Party members" with the methods of applying the content of the twenty-two documents to one's own life as outlined in the 3 April decision. The content of the documents is based on "sinified Marxism" (Zhongguohuade Ma-Liezhuyi) and on basic international experiences (for instance, the conclusion of the [Stalinist] party history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the twelve points of Bolshevism).⁽¹⁵⁾ This is in contrast to previous Party education drives which were based on "the original works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin" (134). Finally, rectification is a process and an experiment: "Rectification study indeed serves as a conscious process [guocheng] of realization [renshi] and enlightenment [qimeng] which developed the remolding of our ideology and workstyle" (134). "[R]ectification itself is an experiment [changshi] in practicing these new teaching and learning methods on a large scale" (134).

Pragmatically, Zhang's definition of rectification asserts the following. Rectification is an ideological revolution. This is a struggle (in this case between destroying the old and establishing the new, a contest between ancient backwardness and new brightness). This equals "a great debate between proletarian and petty bourgeois thought."

Rectification, for Zhang, is an experimental method of study. This study corrects doctrine and practice as well as attitude and perspective in each person. It integrates perspective (ideology) and action (workstyle). It proceeds from policy by the supreme leader (Mao), with methods prescribed by the relevant Party committee (here, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee), and enters a new cycle--of Mao's mass-line methodology of "from the masses, to the masses"--when the application of these policies and methods in the current study/struggle are summed up in an authoritative report (here, Zhang's text). The study is based on Marxism-Leninism as translated appropriately for local conditions by its sinification and by use of the experiences of the CPSU under Stalin. This living material is read and psychologically incorporated by individuals through intensive study and self- and mutual-criticism in small groups over weeks and months. This is contrasted with previous study of the classics of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, which is called dogmatic study. Zhang contrasts rectification with "erroneous tendencies" incipient in the petty bourgeois thought and standpoint of young and intellectual cadres, exemplified by Wang Shiwei's public criticism of leaders. These erroneous versions of rectification are labeled "liberalism" (ziyouzhuyi). Proper rectification criticism is to be reasoned (according to tenets of Mao's sinification of Marxism and his current policy statements, as well as current Party decisions on methods of study) and within the organization. Zhang makes clear that to criticize leaders in any substantive way is absolute egalitarianism and that public criticism or resisting efforts of Party representatives to orchestrate rectification study is Trotskyite subversion of unity of purpose, i.e., anti-Party activity.

Rectification thus produces remolding of both thought (sixiang, sometimes translated as "ideology") and practice with the larger goal of mobilization to achieve the current goals of the Party: the creation of unified thinking along proletarian lines, the maintenance of Party discipline, and successful application of Party policy. Here we find the core ideals of revolution as usually conceived distant indeed, because Zhang's text is a script for how to not what. The "what" of revolution--its social and political goals--was all too obvious to his audience in Yan'an. Bolshevizing the Party is mentioned in passing as a goal/result of rectification, but Zhang does not dwell on it. It is, however, a pointer to the organizational voice we will see in Yang Shangkun's text.

We can summarize the dichotomies Zhang sets up to define rectification in the following table:

Chart 1: Contested Meanings of "Rectification" in Zhang's Text \

	CORRECT	INCORRECT
Ideology	Party Rectification Proletarian correct	Wang Ming's dogmatism	Wang Shiwei's Petty bourgeois erroneous tendencies liberalism
Workstyle	leadership centralism self-criticism	bloody purges	Trotskyite attacks on the Party factionalism anti-Party activities

The contrasts which Zhang sets up between the "good" version of rectification as supported by the Party under Mao and the "bad" versions of Wang Ming and Wang Shiwei give specificity to Zhang's model. This contrast, of course, reflects a more profound assumption in this text: that even Party members need guidance. Either due to petty bourgeois background or having been "steeped in the influence of the old society" (146), cadres have incipient, erroneous tendencies which make them prey to the depredations of heterodox teachings or poor leadership. The revolution will surely fail if it is left up to the unguided actions not only of the masses but also of CCP cadres. Legitimacy cannot come from "one man, one vote" among such benighted souls. Only the creative refinements and summations of Mao and a handful of designated leaders (and selected experiences of similar leaders in the CPSU) can guide everyone else by a method that creates correct attitudes and habits. Left profoundly begging in this text, because it is a fundamental assumption, is why this is so and how someone (in this case, Mao and those around him) can be uniquely qualified to provide this guidance.

Even this partial focus on explicit keywords and terms has pointed to some underlying assumptions: that attitudes produce action, that even CCP cadres need external guidance, and that Mao can provide that. All of this suggests why ideological mobilization is important and how to do it.

Let us return to the longer list of words and terms from Zhang's text and try to summarize the pragmatic meanings of at least some of them.

general summary (zongjie); core word summation (jielun): organizes the lessons of revolutionary experience to guide future practice (115). This is an act reserved for legitimate authorities, since it is a form of leadership.

ideological remolding (sixiang gaizao): the appearance and correction of erroneous tendencies (116). This is attitude modification. Methods for this are outlined as: extended small-group study of Party documents in which their spirit is applied to the thought and life of the individual through extensive reading notes, examination of one's work, and an ideological autobiography. Lessons are achieved through self- and mutual-criticism in these sessions under Party guidance (121 and 127).

rectification (zhengfeng): a study movement (yundong) under proper guidance with proper methods to remold thinking and practice of individual CCP cadres and, hence, the Party as a whole in order to carry out the revolution which here is defined essentially as survival and fighting Japan.

Party (dang) [here assumed and not explicitly defined]: members of the CCP, its leadership; made up of leaders and comrades (distinguished from "cadres" [ganbu] who are responsible for administration but not necessarily Party members).

erroneous tendencies (pianxiang): an attitude (taidu) which includes incorrect understanding of the basic spirit of rectification and criticizing leaders publicly (equated with "extreme democratization" below) as exemplified in (and exacerbated by) Wang Shiwei's erroneous thought and anti-Party activities. Erroneous tendencies are not the result of villains such as Wang Shiwei; they are inherent in CCP cadres due either to petty bourgeois background or having lived in the "old society." The metaphorical image of the word is significant. "Leaning to one side" and "partial to" indicate unreasonable preference that is not balanced, in contrast with zheng "orthodox," "correct," and "balanced-centered." Pian more broadly suggests personal bias (si) versus the Party's evenhanded public-mindedness (gong). Pian sets a root metaphor of "excessive" as the delegitimizing epithet applied to contested meanings of rectification. Thus, Wang Shiwei is guilty of "absolute egalitarianism," a distortion of the egalitarianism that is a core value of Zhang's version of mobilization being contested. What is proper egalitarianism? Zhang claims Wang's was excessive and not public-minded. Equally, Wang Ming's earlier Party education methods are "dogmatic," excessively textually based and not balanced with experience. The language here resonates with the conceptual logic of mobilization, reasonableness. The Party around Mao is reasonable; others are not.

anti-Party activities (fandang huodong): public criticism of CCP leaders and not submitting to Party instructions to stop it in favor of self-criticism under Party guidance. Public criticism equals "tormenting" (zheng--colloquial use of one half of zhengfeng) leaders (118); organizing to express divergent conceptions of rectification equals factionalism (127); Wang uses sentiment (qing) to induce inattentive cadres to stray down his path. The failure to criticize Wang, or even defend him, is liberalism which is, however, a lesser crime if admitted and followed by obedience to Party leadership.

correct (jiuzheng): the term here has important overtones not in the English equivalent. This modern Chinese binome uses a pair of very orthodox classical Chinese words. Jiu is what Zhu Xi and all good neo-Confucians did in self-cultivation, reined in their thoughts and emotions to conform to the Way. Zheng (not the zheng in zhengfeng, however) is upright, orthodox, and correct (cognate contrast with pian in "erroneous tendencies" above), something only a legitimate authority can do. Zheng brings the heterodox (xie, "slanted" and related to pian) into proper orientation to make it upright and correct. The binome thus takes the high ground of morality and authority for the speaker.

struggle (douzheng): literally to fight. A key term in describing the nature and process of rectification. The entire process is depicted as a Manichean fight between old and new, dark and bright, bourgeois and proletarian, truth and falsehood. The implied result of struggle is the defeat and expulsion of error and the cultivation of the correct in the remolding of the individual.

self-examination (fanxing): sometimes translated as "realization" (134), the intended result of self-examination; critical examination for moral fault. Pragmatically this is self-criticism of all aspects of one's life and personal history according to Party guidelines for traces of erroneous thought or improper action. Fanxing is linked with qingsuan (expunge, purge) (116, line 8, where regrettably the translation does not fully render "fanxing yu qingsuan"; it should read: "self-examination and purging"). This term points to the inquisitional voice represented in Kang Shang's speech.

basic spirit (jiben jingshen) (116): correct purposes and goals of rectification according to the Maoist version. Note "spirit" (jingshen) is, as in English, a psychological term related to attitude as well as a component of motivation.

Bolshevizes [here assumed and not explicitly defined]: refers to the strict Leninist organization of the CPSU and implicitly to its success in gaining and retaining revolutionary power. The term points to the organizational discourse of discipline and hierarchy.

ideological mobilization (sixiang shang dongyuan): used as "general ideological mobilization (sixiang shang zong dongyuan) (116); what rectification achieves. "Mobilization" is a more concrete term indicating organizing people to act and here is applied to thought. Mobilization is what a Bolshevik party tries to do and is a key process of revolution.

extreme democratization (jiduan minzhuhua): an erroneous tendency (see discussion of "one-sidedness" and "excessiveness" above) in which one "torments" leaders while weakening Party unity and avoiding the rectification goal of self-transformation (116). Wang Shiwei is charged with "taking democracy to the vulgar extreme" (ba minzhu yuxianghua jueduihua le) (117). The term also refers to the failure to obey the Party hierarchy.

organizational principles (zuzhi yuanze): the hierarchy of Party leadership; obedience to superiors in the Party (116).

centralism (jizhongzhuyi): the opposite of extreme democracy; proper, predictable, and correct leadership.

Party discipline/Party spirit (dang xing): synonymous with centralism; obedience to Party rules; points to organizational discourse.

liberalism (ziyouzhuyi): an attitude in dealing with the Party and attacks by Wang Shiwei on the Party which fails to combat such attacks and heed orders from leaders. It includes both the failure to resist similar assaults on centralism and the failure to report similar actions or ideas to Party superiors (points to the inquisitional discourse). Like erroneous tendencies, liberalism is inherent in cadres and must be rectified. Left uncorrected (i.e., not restrained and made orthodox--see jiuzheng above) it can produce anti-Party errors.

Trotskyite ideas: insubordination, pessimism, presuming to act outside direct Party supervision; noting anything good about the Soviet or Chinese Trotskyites or anything bad about Stalin.

science (kexue): describes the leadership of ideological struggle which needs to be carried out technically (130). "[S]cientific investigation and research" are the firm and correct policy under the leading organs, are flexible and appropriate methods, involve meticulous investigation at all stages of rectification struggle, and are used with care to distinguish activists, middle characters, and laggards (130). This is a pragmatic science only a Bolshevik party can do correctly.

attitude (taidu) [related terms: standpoint (lichang) and standpoint (guandian); not explicitly defined]: a fundamental category indicating the way a person views the world and interprets signals from it. The basic nature of the erroneous tendency is a "view and attitude toward the basic spirit of rectification" (118); "liberalism" is an attitude (117).

Rhetorical Strategies. Let us pause at this point to consider some of the rhetorical strategies used by Zhang both to achieve his pragmatic goals and to define his terms. In the process of adapting a history of concepts reading strategy, the researcher must shift back and forth in a dialectical fashion not only between text and context, but also between analytical categories of words and rhetorical strategies.

Zhang defines his core idea of rectification by way of illustrative contrasts: the negative models of thinking, study, and practice embodied in Wang Ming and Wang Shiwei. Zhang uses other contrasts or paired opposites to make his points. He also makes rhetorical identifications (usually bold assertions) to appeal to underlying values or concerns of his readers. Some of the paired opposites and rhetorical identities attempt to make pragmatic points beyond the text. That is, having declared X as bad, then link X to some Y in Yan'an.

The revolutionary nature of rectification is implied by Zhang in the time sense of radical change (noted by Western historians in the language of the French Revolution). Zhang notes that the six months of rectification, so far, "is comparable to a few years in terms of its content and effect on our comrades" (115). This also implies a disjunctive break between the (recent) past attitudes and habits and "today's point of view" (120). "Now" everyone knows that rectification Bolshevizes the Party, etc., "But back then [six months ago] the majority of our comrades did not understand the significance of rectification" (116).

Zhang's version of rectification is identified with popular acceptance in the text through phrases such as, "Everybody knows...." (dajia dou zhidao) (116) and "unanimously acknowledged" (127). The incorrect understanding, that is, public criticism of leaders, is rhetorically invalidated by being termed "to torment" (zheng) leading cadres. Actually, the term zheng is part of zhengfeng (rectification), but alone stands as the unprincipled and vindictive version of proper correction.

At the root, Zhang assumes an attitude produces action and correction of the attitude will promote the desired behavior. "The above-mentioned thought [that rectification was intended to `torment' leaders, i.e., public criticism by subordinates] caused the erroneous tendency toward extreme democratization" (116-17). This negative depiction of "leading comrades" in the hands of "ordinary comrades" is then paired as an opposite to the correct form of leadership, centralism. Trotskyism, a key sin, is defined by bold assertions describing Wang Shiwei's ideas and activities as such. Wang's call for public criticism, says Zhang, "strained comradely relations," thus weakening the Party. This argument makes a claim not only to the value of discipline, but to harmony, a noted value in Chinese society in general but not usually associated with CCP ideology.

Wang's activities are further denigrated by pejorative language or, as we will call it below, pejorative labeling. Wang "used any opportunity" (liyong jihui), a phrase suggesting instrumental and selfish motives. He played with the emotions of readers in "Wild Lilies" which "aroused a sympathetic response" among colleagues and further enflamed their latent "egalitarianism" (pingjunzhuyi) [not translated on p. 118; xinzhong pingjunzhuyi de qingxu should be translated as "sentiment of egalitarianism in their hearts"]. Further, we have seen the naming of Wang's thinking and actions as "partial/one-sided" (pian), "excessive," and "absolute."

Proletarian and petty-bourgeois are mutually defined as polar opposites, and proletarian is simply identified as "the only accurate standpoint" (118). The definition of petty-bourgeois, however, includes a sleight of hand; it is identified with youth and inexperience. Zhang gives data on just how new current Party members are (74% joined since 1937) and how young (79% are twenty to thirty years old), and he adds a third category--intellectuals (82% of the new and young Party members are intellectuals) (119). Petty-bourgeois becomes a pejorative term for intellectuals and a tag for uncooperative intellectuals.

Wang Ming's leadership of previous Party education efforts comes under attack as "the vicious influence of the past dogmatic education policy in Yan'an's schools," a further origin of "erroneous tendencies." In line with Zhang's root assumption about the power of attitude (taidu), he assumes that Wang Shiwei's "anti-Party propaganda . . . promoted the development of erroneous tendencies."

Another rhetorical move Zhang makes to promote a sense of reasonableness is to raise other, far more pressing, issues of the day in passing: international pressure from the Soviet Union, economic difficulties in Yan'an, and errors by leaders. However, he never deals with these issues.

Mao is simply asserted as the obvious font of correct policy as is the Propaganda Department, assumed by Zhang to be the proper legislator of this personally transformative education. Descriptions of both policy and methods for rectification use a laden word for mid-century Chinese, science.⁽¹⁶⁾ Zhang defines this word as a conscientious and rational application of rectification research and study. It includes "save the patient," an approach welcomed by cadres who had survived early, bloody intra-Party purges. Later, Zhang rhetorically identifies "independence from authority" with "factionalism" (127). The reverse, submission to Party rectification goals, is similarly identified as "turning themselves in the right direction." Rectification is a "powerful truth" which "corrects" error.

Rectification is built up in a series of contrasts and identifications: it is new, not old; bright, not backward; proletarian, not petty-bourgeois (127-28). It protects the truth and combats erroneous thought. It makes the Party stronger and is contrasted explicitly with the bloody Party purges of the 1930s (128-29).

Finally, Zhang rhetorically identifies rectification not only with Marxism as a science of society but also with the successes of the CPSU in carrying out and maintaining revolution in Russia. Closer to home, Zhang appropriates one of the key values of the May Fourth movement, "Rectification study indeed serves as a conscious process of realization and enlightenment (qimeng)" (134).⁽¹⁷⁾

Underlying Values. A good way to picture the underlying values in this text is to map out the three zones of value suggested by Jeffrey Wasserstrom: the legitimating core, the neutral buffer zone, and the delegitimizing periphery. Wasserstrom suggests that core ideas and images in a political debate can be conceptualized as those that are recognized by all sides of the debate as unequivocally positive, those which are equally negative, and those for which "the meaning is up for grabs."⁽¹⁸⁾ While he suggested this model to conceptualize mudslinging strategies in the press of the 1920s, I find it equally useful for analyzing rhetorical moves in ideological debates. The purpose, however, is not just to give a static picture of legitimate, contested, and illegitimate ideas and images. This model can help us look at rhetorical strategies played upon this field. Wasserstrom suggests four strategies: counterattack (calling your opponent the name they have just called you); ignoring (I will not dignify that comment with a response); dodging (what you have called me may or may not be a bad thing, but I am certainly not one); and redefining (yes, I am what you say I am, but I am proud of it). To this we might add a fifth strategy: pejorative-valorizing labeling or using descriptive terms or modifiers laden with images or values directly pointing to either the delegitimizing periphery or the legitimating core. The goal of rhetoric is to identify oneself with the legitimate terms and to identify one's enemy with the delegitimizing terms. In the event that a term with which you are associated is "up for grabs," your task is to drag it into the core by whatever rhetorical strategy is available. Terms in the neutral zone are, in fact, the key contested terms of the day: rectification, criticism, study, and democratic centralism.

Although in this working paper we have not looked at the competitors (the texts by Wang Shiwei, for example), echoes of this debate are clearly evident in Zhang's text as he sets out to attack Wang in the contest over the meaning of rectification and democracy. Looking over the materials I have presented on Zhang's language, we can see the breakdown of his terminology as presented in Chart 2. From my reading of Wang Shiwei's writings,⁽¹⁹⁾ I can confirm that Wang, too, accepts most of the terms in the core-periphery that Zhang assumes, with the important exception of "individualism" which is not a delegitimizing term for Wang (though he must contend with the term's generally suspect status in both general Chinese culture and its explicitly negative sense in Party discourse).

Chart 2: Fields of Underlying Values

The two poles, the contrast between the delegitimizing periphery and the the legitimating core, include dichotomies central to three different strains of thinking in Yan'an. From May Fourth discourse come: "enlightenment" language that stressed new over old, progressive over backward, bright over dark, science over sentiment, as well as enlightenment and democracy. Liberalism is part of the complex May Fourth heritage (and accepted in part by Wang); it is not accepted by Zhang and the Party. It's meaning is contested in Yan'an as Zhang endeavors to place it into the delegitimizing periphery (where it stays for Party discourse well into the 1990s, so I place it in the outer circle, not among the disputed terms). From Marxist-Leninist discourse come: unity over divisiveness, centralism over factionalism, and mobilization over non-mobilization. A third discourse is more hidden: traditional social assumptions of order over chaos, harmony over infighting, and gongping (fair distribution of wealth, not exactly egalitarianism) over bu gongping (unfair distribution).

In Zhang's text we have seen him associate his views with the legitimating core by dint of paired opposites, rhetorical identification, and by pejorative/valorizing labeling (the last case being the pian versus jiuzheng language). His goal is to drag his version of "rectification," "criticism," and "study" (alternatives all posited by Wang Shiwei) into the realm of the ideas and images which his audience perceives as legitimating. Equally, Zhang employs a new term, "democratic centralism," to re-define "democracy" minus "individualism." This goal is achieved, in part, by trying to depict Wang's ideas as equivalent to the ideas and images in the delegitimizing periphery.

In a full version of this paper, we will want to construct similar fields for the organizational and inquisitional texts, as well as for Wang Shiwei's key texts from the rectification movement. Such models should facilitate more precise comparison of the use of language and rhetorical strategies in different contexts of the broader Chinese Revolution.

Hegemonic Concepts in Zhang's Text. Wasserstrom's model also aids us in identifying hegemonic concepts, those ideas which especially act to shape, direct, and limit conception of the world and how it works. These concepts are not necessarily in the legitimating core, but rather are employed in the process of debate as neutral categories in the sense of being functional. Their role is most clear when we analyze the strategies employed upon the field of values in the contest over underlying values (therefore, hegemonic concepts are structurally underneath key ideas or values--a sort of DOS or operating system for those programs, to use a computer metaphor).

The fundamental assumptions or hegemonic concepts that breathe life into Zhang's rhetoric are: 1) that attitudes (taidu) [also represented as "standpoint" (lichang) and "viewpoint" (guandian)] produce action and that action is best modified at this fundamental level; 2) that ideological mobilization can best modify attitudes to produce revolutionary action; and 3) that the correct attitude/standpoint and method of mobilization ("study"; xuexi) do not come from up the masses or any ordinary individual, but come only down from a recognized leader--proper CCP organs or the Charismatic leader, Mao.

I see the first and third as hegemonic underlying Zhang's discourse of mobilization. Mobilization, the second concept, is also key for Zhang, and has the qualities of a hegemonic concept. At present, nonetheless, it seems to me to be on a less fundamental level, since it lives in tension with the concepts of organization and security in related Party discourses while the hegemony of attitudinal fundamentalism is shared across the three. If we turn very briefly to the broader context in Yan'an and to Wang Shiwei's actual assertions, we will find the attitudinal concept unchallenged; Wang contests only the content of mobilization through attitudinal modification and the locus of authority to direct it. Wang felt the individual artists among CCP members(those with "relatively high cultural levels") could by their sensitivity to the human soul devise proper methods of attitudinal reform and revolutionary mobilization.⁽²⁰⁾

We will have to leave the next important stage of this analysis the consideration of text in context hanging with these brief remarks until a later stage of research and a final version of this paper. In the time and space left for this draft, I will turn to briefer analyses of the other two core texts (collapsing the laborious analysis of terms and rhetoric for the moment) and conclude with some comparative comments.

Yang Shangkun and Organization

The second text to be analyzed is a speech presented by Yang Shangkun to a joint forum of the Central Research Institute (CRI) and the Political Research Department (PRD), the two key institutions in which the 1942 phase of rectification was conducted in Yan'an. The text was published in the restricted circulation journal, Party Life (Dangde shenghuo) which was intended for CCP members and not the public.⁽²¹⁾ Yang's purpose was to apply the negative example of Wang Shiwei's "anti-Party gang" to the strengthening of the Party, in particular to raise the "political consciousness and awareness" of Party members and to increase "their ability to discriminate between correct and erroneous thought as advocated by Comrade Mao Zedong in his report on rectification of the three kinds of workstyle" (135).

Yang takes the Trotskyite thought and anti-Party activities of Wang Shiwei as a given. He also names many more names than Zhang Ruxin and introduces the "five member anti-Party gang" (fandang wuren jituan) made up of Wang, Pan Fang, Zong Zheng, Cheng Quan, and Wang Li. Zhang concentrates on the organizational side of Wang Shiwei's "sins" that Zhang did not raise in his mobilizational discourse. To the chart of Zhang's "Contested Meanings of Rectification" (Chart 1, above), we would have to add a new category (in addition to "ideology" and "workstyle"): organizational form. Wang's is a non-Party sanctioned and, therefore in Yang's view, an anti-Party form of organization. Regular members need to be aware of it so as to avoid it and to report any cases of it they run across. Yang is particularly concerned with "liberalism," an attitude which both promotes heterodox political associations and protects them from Party correction and eradication. Comrades are to study how to overcome liberalism and strengthen Party spirit (dang xing) in the two institutions: "study and self analysis of their learning style" in the CRI and study of the "Party's workstyle" at the PRD (136). Yang's speech offers supplementary points to previous speeches at this October forum by Fan Wenlan and Chen Boda (both active leaders on Mao's side in the rectification campaign). The rest of Yang's speech is organized into four such points.

First, the "five-member anti-Party gang" was destructive to the Party; it was led by "Wang Shiwei, the Trotskyite," and based on a shared ideology among its members who exhibited similar (negative) political behaviors. The "gang" was a "political combination," "formed and organized voluntarily" and produced the offending articles, such as "Wild Lilies." Its members "adopted a two-faced means to coax the Party" by using "close relationships" and sentiment to mobilize "those whose standpoint was unsteady and who were dissatisfied, plus those who did not feel emotionally well due to certain illnesses" (136). The gang also made use of "those who lagged behind politically" to act as rumor mongers (literally: "small megaphones," xiao guangbo) to spread its influence. Yang concludes that this is Trotskyism in thought and deed aimed "to destroy the Party." Yang admits that there are differences among the five--Cheng and Wang Li voluntarily confessed--but all share the same guilt and "should try to find the causes of their faults in their own ideological consciousness." (156)

Second, Yang sees the October forum which exposed "this small-scale organized Trotskyite anti-party gang" as a continuation of the rectification mobilization held at the CRI in June. "From this," continues Yang, "we can see that the rectification movement contains two kinds of struggle": inner-Party struggle over ideology (proletarian versus petty-bourgeois) and the struggle to expose and oppose those who would destroy the Party. By simple rhetorical identification the gang is declared to have tried to destroy the Party by "using this [rectification] movement" (138). They did this, he says, by "attempting to alienate party members from the organization." Yang notes that these are just the two kinds of struggle in Party life pointed out by Chairman Mao.

For Yang this struggle against the enemies of the Party is loyalty test. For the lesser members of the gang, the rectification movement has been "a test to determine whether they still wish to be a party member and be loyal to the party. It provides them a chance to turn over a new leaf" (138). Indeed, the forum and rectification more broadly is a test for all Party members. "Comrades," Yang continues, "a party member should consider the Party's interests above everything else." Thus, each Party member must "stand up to speak for the party" when "our party is in danger. . . . This forum is a test to all the comrades present."

Yang concludes his second point by citing Liu Shaoqi's summation on inner-Party struggle (one of the twenty-two rectification study documents) and by reflecting on comments raised at the forum which suggested the attacks on Wang Shiwei had gone far beyond the constraints on struggle laid down by Liu. Yang explains that the attacks have been warranted: "this is a struggle outside the party" and is not subject to the protection of Liu's rules (139).

Third, Yang asks rhetorical questions which must have been raised by others at the forum: why wasn't this anti-Party gang exposed earlier? How could they have gotten so far? Yang answers, "I think it's because of the weakness in our inner-Party life, mainly the pervasive liberalism (a lack of political awareness, a political flu [shangfeng], and a lack of steadfast standpoint on principle)!" (139). Yang adopts a disease metaphor for the problem, a disease which can only be cured by a strict regimen of ideological study and political obedience. Untreated, this political flu (which Yang defines in terms similar to Zhang Ruxin's--as based on petty-bourgeois background--to which Yang adds peasant background, soft-heartedness, and lack of awareness) will poison a person. Yang likewise sees attitude and thinking as key, "[T]o undermine a Party ideologically is certainly the most vicious counterrevolutionary ploy." Wang's ideas are "ideological poison." Fighting this poison "fits Comrade Mao Zedong's admonition of improving political awareness at the beginning of the movement" (139).

"The liberalism disease" (ziyouzhuyide maobing), according to Yang, affects older cadres, too (particularly, he notes, as a result of the "ambiance of the United Front," which required the CCP to cooperate with non-Party elites). Yang's medicine is to "strengthen inner-Party life, consolidate the standpoint of principles, intensify Party spirit, and firmly oppose liberalism" (140). The CRI has a real problem, according to Yang, because it is full of "intellectuals with petty-bourgeois backgrounds." Yang evokes the military image, "[Y]ou are a party member and a revolutionary soldier!" Criticizing the Party in public thus becomes telling secrets and rumor mongering; it is an act of insubordination (141).

Yang, like Zhang, cites Mao for authority. Yang quotes Mao's three rectification goals of "correcting subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism," but stresses the putative goals: "to intensify unity," to create "the same morality and heart," "to protect the party," and "to intensify the party's power" (141). Unity and Party strength are contrasted with the effects of the "gang," especially Wang Shiwei's "Wild Lilies" and Cheng Quan's letter of criticism to Mao, "[T]hey aimed at eliminating the relationship between our comrades, creating factions, opposing leadership, and undermining and destroying the party."

Yang returns to why the gang could get so far in attempting this. Party members failed to resist them and failed to report them to the authorities; they even "attempted to hide them from the Party." Yang fulminates, "This is sheer rotten liberalism!" (147). Having stigmatized doubt about and criticism of the Party in this fashion, Yang suggests others may still harbor such errors in their hearts, "It is my hope that these comrades undergo a thorough self-examination" (142).

The core treatment of the disease is "self-examination, to expose faults in our own ideology." Yang, of course, achieves a valuable goal with this casting of rectification; he distracts criticism not only of current errors and shortcomings in Yan'an but even of the Party's handling of the struggle against Wang Shiwei. If cadres are busy remolding their ideologies and self-examining their hearts and activities, then there is no time to raise the sorts of issues Wang Shiwei raised. Clearly there is an element of intimidation here (which is explicit in Kang Sheng's speech), but the question for the social history side of this research is: how much was voluntary compliance by cadres in rectification and how much was fear-induced? To the degree that the sub-discourses of rectification held sway, that is, were hegemonic, it would seem that, at that time and place, Party members bought this line and voluntarily shut off the alternate version of rectification (and hence of politics) offered by Wang Shiwei.⁽²²⁾

Yang returns to quote Mao at length on the ideal characteristics of a Party member: upright, honest, loyal, and highly motivated, putting the Party first. This quote is immediately followed by the contrasting example, those who take care of themselves at the expense of the Party (a common enough complaint, indeed, a core criticism by Wang Shiwei). This, too, "is the worst kind of liberalism." However, it is quickly linked to the "friendship" of the five members among the gang. Thus, while attending to the content of Wang's criticism about bureaucrats who care nothing for the masses,⁽²³⁾ Yang tries to separate Wang Shiwei from the solution and instead place the contested meaning of "friendship" into the delegitimizing periphery of values associated with "selfishness" and "factionalism." Naturally, Yang describes proper friendship as "class love, comradely love, and the great love of collectivism" (143).

Finally, Yang stresses the subtlety and care needed to pursue ideological struggle. He recounts the process of this struggle in the current forum: the summation of the learning style in the PRD, the examination of some leaders, the investigation of Cheng Quan who confessed, and an examination of Pan and Zhong. In all, this took seventy-two days (144). (The details of this "examination" are given by Kang Sheng in the next text--none of the ideal "Party style" Yang draws from this struggle will be evident there.)

Yang concludes by laying out the lessons, "[I]deological struggles must have preparation, organization, and leadership" (144-45). It is essential to identify the active members, incorporate the middle elements, and isolate the enemy. And at the end, somewhat as a nonsequitor, "Never separate from the masses."

Yang's domain is Party organization, and his text reflects an organizational voice in which many of the same ideas and concepts in Zhang Ruxin's mobilization voice are tramsformed to suit Yang's purpose. Rectification in this domain divides into education inside the Party and attack on the outside. Key terms such as "liberalism" take on behavioral aspects not found in Zhang's definition. For Yang, liberalism is insubordination in thought and deed. His remedies, which include harsh criticism and reporting activities to the authorities, point to the inquisitional voice we will see in Kang Sheng's text.

Yang is at pains to distinguish conscious, premeditated or voluntary error of the enemy from unconscious, sentimental, or inattentively selfish sources of inner-Party error. Rectification becomes for him a test of loyalty to the Party and the desire of individuals to reform by confession and submission to Party guidance (and this, too, is the test for "inner/outer" status).

If light (awareness, realization) is a root metaphor for Zhang Ruxin's mobilization, then disease in the Party is Yang's root metaphor. Thus, primarily discipline and not education is called for. As far as Yang is concerned, this is rectification a more harsh and Manichaean struggle between laxness and military discipline. Correct thought is obedient thought.

Kang Sheng's text is a report to a training class which is not identified, but probably was an elite group of senior cadres or cadres involved in security matters. Delivered in August 1943, the text also includes a heading, "February 10th" (148). Thus, this text may be a conflation of texts. The text we have is in a type-script style common to internally circulated and "unpublished" reference material used in the PRC.⁽²⁴⁾ I know of no published version of the text (neibu or gongkai) by which to test its authenticity. I rely on the reputation of Dai Qing whose other documents I have been able to corroborate from other sources. That this text has not been published in the PRC indicates that it is too sensitive, probably in light of its shocking parallels with the inquisitional methods of the Red Guards and Gang of Four in the Cultural Revolution.⁽²⁵⁾

Kang's text is a case study on strategy in handling the threat of spies. He sets out to explain how through rectification (he calls it "exposure" most of the time) he and his subordinates managed to trick anti-Party elements into exposing themselves. There is no question of remolding here; it is a battle of cunning based on basic and base human instincts for self-preservation. Yet, Kang Sheng claims all of this to be "rectification" based on "Chairman Mao's" guidelines for carrying out ideological struggle (155).

Kang's speech treats rectification as "the exposure campaign" beginning from March 1942 through the June anti-Wang meetings, to the November end of the Seventy-two-day Forum (from which Yang Shangkun's talk, above, comes), to the apprehension of spies in November and then April 1943. Rectification itself is not mentioned until nearly half-way through the text where it is mentioned in passing as the goal which is well-served by deeper exposure of counter-revolutionary ideas (149).

Kang's version of the rectification chronology hits the same reference points as Zhang Ruxin's and Yang Shangkun's--the 3 April 1942 decision of the Propaganda Department, the June struggle meetings at CRI, the fall Seventy-two-day Forum--but focuses on the struggle to expose and catch irredeemable enemies. Remolding does not play a role and receives only cursory treatment. His goal is to expose "party members with half a heart" (pro-Party, but in error) and "counterrevolutionaries with two hearts." His focus, however, is on the latter.

Like Yang Shangkun's text, Kang's presents more specific detail than Zhang Ruxin's public article and includes yet more names. In this case, Kang "reveals" a broader conspiracy underneath the "five member anti-Party gang." Now it is six people! Furthermore, new faces appear: Yu Bingran, Luo Jiming, and Wu Xiru. Indeed, personalities are central to Kang's analysis, "Ideological rectification was already associated with individual organs, individual persons, with examining cadres and with antispy issues" (150). The two core assumptions in Kang Sheng's discourse of inquisition, are that rectification is an anti-spy hunt at root and that individual personalities and the foibles of (spies') human nature are the key to rooting out spies.

Kang's detail incidentally provides corroboration of the extent of the contestation over the meaning of rectification at the time. He names several more Party publications guilty of printing criticisms and alternate views of rectification. Newly identified transgressors include Northwest Wind (published by the CCP's Northwest Bureau; this paper apparently criticized the top leader, Gao Gang, see p. 148), Camel Bell (by Three Frontiers), XX (Suide), and New Malan (Guangzhong) (146). Kang gives an extended (and shamelessly twisted with no reliance on "reasonableness" of mobilization here) analysis of Cheng Quan's critical letter to Mao (149-50). (Yang Shangkun had mentioned it in passing.) For Kang, the letter was a vile piece of villainy spreading hatred and division among the ranks of the Party. Kang also notes "after the publication of Wang Shiwei's 'Wild Lilies', 95% of the people at CRI favored that article" (151).

Kang's detail is part of a theme of secrecy and privileged access to damning information under his control, no idle threat considering his position as head of the secret police. At the start he ominously says, "Here I will not reveal more about specific cases" (146). The implication: but I can. He introduces the Cheng Quan letter to Mao with "One thing you don't know about is . . ." (146).

Kang polarizes his language in a manner even more extreme than in the other two texts. "Comrades on the front line would be frightened to death," he says, by the "hatred" Wang Shiwei and his lot have shown toward the party in their "counterrevolutionary ideological poison" (146). Kang repeatedly describes their criticisms are described by Kang as "vicious."

But the heart of Kang's report is a gleeful account of "the Leninist strategy of winning over the majority and attacking the minority so as to destroy them one by one" (150). It is clear, from studies by Chen Yung-fa and others, that Kang Sheng was not boasting idly. He ruined hundreds of lives among Party members just in the 1942-44 period. As Kang presents rectification, it is a battle of wits between himself and various individuals who ultimately reveal themselves as spies. Pan Fang, an older German-trained intellectual, and Yu Bingran, a hapless fool, dominate this story of rectification, not Wang Shiwei. In fact, Kang declares that the real head of the "Trotskyite Wang Shiwei five-member anti-Party gang" was Pan Fang (151-52)!

Kang describes mobilization in the inquistional domain. He "mobilized" Yu Bingran to get at Wang Shiwei, that is, to generate evidence that Wang was a spy. Yu had committed ideological errors to which he confessed. Kang then urged Yu to induce two other suspects and future members of the gang, Cheng Quan and Wang Li, to confess to being Trotskyites (a charge Kang freely admits later in the speech is untrue, see p. 155; Mao also apologized to Cheng and Wang Li in 1945 for all bogus charges, see p. 188). "In order to protect himself" and "to show his sincerity," says Kang, Yu did it. Cheng and Wang eventually caved-in to the false charges (see below). Next, Kang started mobilization (i.e., public struggle sessions) at PRD by putting Chen Boda, an enemy of Wang Shiwei and stalwart of the Maoist group, on the hot seat. The "masses" (rank and file) loved it; Chen was harshly criticized. Kang's devious goal, however, ws soon achieved when Cheng and Wang Li joined the fray and exposed their views on human nature (a subject of dispute in theoretical circles in Yan'an since at least 1940) which were suspiciously close to Wang Shiwei's. He had them! "Criticism aimed at Cheng then diminished considerably," concludes Kang; his role as decoy was complete. Yu Bingran did his job and gave a speech "verifying" that Cheng and Wang Li had Trotskyite thoughts (152-53). The masses turned on their new victims. Kang generalizes this success by saying that, in order to achieve mobilization toward exposing Wang Shiwei as a spy, "we exploited the contradictions between Yu and Cheng and Wang." In this midst of this intrigue we discover, in passing, that we are at the same Seventy-two-day Forum which Yang Shangkun depicts as Party-building and Zhang Ruxin represents as ideological remolding (153).

And so Kang proceeds. Using Yu's weaknesses in which Yu relied on "attacking others to promote himself," Kang "exploited contradictions" among other hapless suspects until the case for Wang Shiwei as spy could be built from such confessions. "They all exposed themselves one by one" (153). Yu was not included in the five-member anti-Party gang because criticism of him was not finished at another unit. That process ended, after some cunning twists by Yu and Kang, with Yu's utter demise and arrest in the big spy round up of 1 April 1943 (155).⁽²⁶⁾

All this, for Kang, follows the rectification bench marks of congruence with Mao's sayings (155) and the methods for ideological struggle in the 3 April 1942 Propaganda Department decision (149). Here the continuity and contrast between the three domains and voices of rectification can be seen. For Zhang Ruxin, Mao provides the policy and the 3 April decision provides the methods for ideological remolding; for Yang Shangkun, they provide standards for proper Party spirit and discipline; for Kang Sheng, they provide the rationale and methods for inquisition.

Although the formal linguistic analysis of the three documents, in terms of the history of concepts, could be extended and the requisite step of assessing their relationship to the social history of rectification in Yan'an has only been suggested, a few concluding remarks on their context and what this line of analysis promises are in order to suggest how my research is proceeding.

Both the attention to words and the exploration of rhetorical strategies have identified important aspects of revolutionary discourse in Yan'an. The underlying values of balance and the claim of the moral high ground to offer corrections became clear only in a careful reading of pianxiang versus jiuzheng in their rhetorical context. The hegemonic concepts shared by all sides in the contest (including Wang Shiwei, the putative dissident)--attitudinal fundamentalism, the attitudinal basis of action and epistemological elitism, the need for a source outside the masses to dictate proper policy and method to achieve revolutionary mobilization--became clear in the mapping out of the fields of underlying values and the rhetorical moves employed by actors on that field of debate. Finally, a comparison of the use of words and rhetorical strategies in the three CCP rectification texts revealed different logics within the Maoist rectification discourse of revolution: attitudinal mobilization, organizational discipline and inquisitional cunning. Whether they were hegemonic in the same sense as the attitudinal fundamentalism or not, these three concepts organized and prioritized expression in each domain of activity that allowed for partially contradictory ideas and internal logics of rectification to coincide in the broader field of political language in Yan'an. A revised and refined version of this analysis will, I hope, confirm or correct these impressions and add more.

The hegemonic concepts I have identified fall into two categories: uncontested and contested. As I see it, we cannot count a concept as hegemonic until we see its role in social history, in how people acted and represented their worlds. The privileged place of attitude or standpoint (and thus of "thought;" sixiang, which is also translated in some contexts as "ideology") as both the key explanatory variable of behavior and the root object of revolutionary change is one such hegemonic concept in the Chinese Revolution. It is most weakly represented in Kang Sheng's text, where attitude rigidifies into "evil nature" which can only be exposed and expunged, not remolded.

What are some of the implications of this initial foray into the history of concepts analysis of Yan'an and the Chinese Revolution? First, to criticize the CCP in Yan'an for not living up to the ideals of Zhang Ruxin's mobilizational portrayal of rectification is not helpful, since it does not take into account the full picture which the Party presented of its efforts. The full picture includes Yang Shangkun's organizational concerns and Kang Sheng's inquistional fears. They sanction hierarchy and witch-hunting. I do not mean to reject moral criticism of what was an ugly and capricious purge of innocent victims, but I am arguing for a sound historical knowledge that can maintain the ambiguous whole in which Zhang's idealism, Yang's status consciousness and Kang's demons all made sense to the people of that time and place. Until we can explain that, we have not succeeded in creating a sound historical description that helps us understand the past.

Clearly, context is key here. Under the conditions of civil war between the Guomindang (GMD) and CCP and a brutal invasion and occupation of much of China by the Imperial Japanese army, a history of bloody repression by the GMD and warlord troops against CCP members and bloodier still intra-Party struggles, the reality of spies, the need for iron discipline, and the willingness "to break a few eggs" to get things done, the contradictions between mobilization and organization/inquisition could well have been much less problematic for individuals in 1942 than in later years.

We must maintain this ambiguous and internally contradictory multi-vocal image of rectification and revolution if we are to make sense of the wild swings of ideology and politics in the later PRC. We can suggest that the Cultural Revolution reflected a new context for this unstable isotope in which in the 1960s a new generation of political "outs" (younger folk who could not get good jobs in the Party until senior cadres died or were pushed out) latched on to the witch-hunting side of rectification as an astute career move to open jobs in the higher ranks. This, combined with a desire at the top (in Mao) to "purify" the Party, made for a deadly combination. Add the organizational discourse which required Party members not to resist orders from above, and you have critical mass for disaster.

More broadly, we have the question of why the Yan'an rectification version of revolution held sway there and to some degree later in the PRC. The attendant values of unity, discipline, and intolerance of dissent, all under an activist unlimited state, are not hard-wired values in Chinese culture. There are strains of this approach to power and politics in the political heritage of the Qing dynasty, but there are others. As Lin Man-houng has shown for pre-Opium War economic debates among "establishment intellectuals" in the Qing regime in the 1820s and 1830s, a strong strain of economic liberalism and a sense of the need to limit state power enjoyed legitimate expression (in the Huangchao jingshi wenbian edited by Wei Yuan, for example).⁽²⁷⁾ I am inclined to agree with her larger supposition: historical context inclines actors to select statist, radical, laissez faire, or other options in politics and power from among the rich and contradictory cultural tools available in Chinese politics (as well items proffered from foreign models). Thus, rectification under the harsh conditions of World War II described above made it make sense to actors then. A change of context, however, as in the relative peace of the early-mid 1950s in the PRC, must have changed the perception of the appeals of rectification and the weight an actor might give to its three voices (Deng Tuo, editor of People's Daily, for example, leaned heavily on the organizational voice). We might expect, looking backward, that similar contextual changes shaped the pragmatic use of "revolution" among other actors earlier in the century.

It will be interesting to see what workers, intellectuals outside the Party, peasants, etc., "heard" from this complex signal. We can hypothesize that other strata and groups in Chinese society indeed shared the same "substructure of meaning," such as the values of reasonableness, hierarchy, and emotional release through vicarious violence. This would make the reception of CCP ideology easier and likely to produce mobilization, but not necessarily mobilization to do what the surface ideology desired. After all, the link is on the deeper level of shared concepts, not on the higher level of shared ideas (leaning heavily on Kosellek's distinction between "idea" or word and "concept" here). Alternatively, different social groups may have fundamentally different conceptual organization, and the CCP ideology would be radically unsuited to their "meaning worlds." That difference would likely produce little or no mobilization or only passive compliance, as among urban intellectuals who finally spoke up in the 1957 "Hundred Flowers." These suggestions await further theoretical refinement and testing.

Finally, at the most general level, it is clear that rectification is part of a more general discourse, ideological thinking. This analysis has not clarified the definition of that thinking because the texts and contexts under analysis are fully within the ideological domain. Looking more broadly, we might be able to construct a definition of "revolution" and a test for the periodization of the Chinese Revolution by adopting the following definition: the Revolution is defined by the preponderant use, or the hegemony, of ideological thought. When the dominant public and private conceptions and representations of the world are not organized according to the paradigms of ideological thought, then that society is not in a revolution.

1. This is a working paper. I welcome criticisms and suggestions which can be sent to me at the Department of History, The Colorado College, 14 E. Cache La Poudre, Colorado Springs, CO 80903; Ph. (719) 389-6525; FAX: 719-389-6524; E-Mail: TCheek@cc.Colorado.edu.

2. Timothy Cheek, "The Fading of Wild Lilies: Wang Shiwei and Mao Zedong's Yan'an Talks in the First CPC Rectification Movement," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 11 (1984), pp. 25-58.

3. Zhang Ruxin's text, as well as those of Yang Shangkun and Kang Sheng were collected by Dai's research associate Song Jinshou and are translated in full in Dai Qing, Wang Shiwei and `Wild Lilies': Rectification and Purges in the Chinese Communist Party, 1942-1944 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994): Zhang, pp. 115-134; Yang, pp. 135-145; Kang, pp. 146-155. My citations in this working paper will be to these translated pages, though I am working from the Chinese texts that are not readily available. Copies of the original Chinese texts are on file at the Fairbank Center Library, Harvard. Titles in Chinese are: (1) Zhang Ruxin, "Zhongyang yanjiu yuan zhengfeng yilai sixiang gaizao zongjie--zai zhongyang yanjiu yuan zongjie dangfeng shide baogao, 1942 nian 9 yue" in Dai's Chinese manuscript, pp. 222-231; (2) Yang Shangkun, "Tuopai Wang Shiwei de huodong yu dang nei ziyouzhuyi, 1942 nian 10 yue 31 ri," in Dai's Chinese manuscript, pp. 239-56; (3) "Kang Sheng zai xunlian ban de baogao (zhailu), 1943 nian 8 yue," in Dai's Chinese manuscript, pp. 257-63.

4. Elizabeth Perry has summarized (and applied) the insights of what she calls "the new political culture" approach, drawing particularly from Lynn Hunt's work on the French Revolution. See Perry, "Introduction: Chinese Political Culture Revisited," in Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China, eds. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 5 ff.

5. Reinhart Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschichte and Social History," in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1985), p. 74.

6. Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschicht and Social History," p. 79.

7. Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschichte and Social History," pp. 82-3.

8. The locus classicus is the Party's own "Historical Resolution" made in 1945 and included in Mao's Selected Works. Major Western studies include: Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951); Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents 1942-44 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952), which includes full translations of key rectification documents; Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics & Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1979); Wylie, The Emergence of Maoism; and Patricia Stranahan, Molding the Medium: The Chinese Communist Party and the Liberation Daily (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990).

9. This and all further text citations are to the translations of Zhang's, Yang's, and Kang's texts in Wang Shiwei and `Wild Lilies.'

10. Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).

11. See studies listed in note 8, above, especially Teiwes, Politics and Purges, which traces the changing application of rectification within the CCP elite over the next twenty years, and Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse, which includes extensive interviews with participants in the Yan'an Rectification movement.

12. See for example Michael Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies Monographs, 1992) for a detailed analysis of the procedures for revising central propaganda (including the ostensible "news") right down to tifa or "formulations" of key terms.

13. Note the contrast with the personalized voice of the inquisitional domain, as reflected in Kang Sheng's speech, below. This is an example of the contradiction in logics between the various voices of rectification.

14. Recorded in some candor in the pages of Liberation Daily in Wen Jize's "Diary of Struggle," translated in Wang Shiwei and `Wild Lilies' and in Tony Saich's The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Movement: Documents and Analysis (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

15. The debates within Party history as a "mirror" to current policy are best analyzed along the terms of "doctrinal culture" used in Western legal and Church studies and applied effectively by Steven Van Zoren to the hermeneutics of the Classic of Poetry from Han to Song times. The reader will, however, be spared this analysis for the moment.

16. Danny Wynn Ye Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

17. Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

18. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Thinking with Colors in China during the 1920s: The Debates on Redness," paper presented at the 1991 AAS meeting for the "Keywords of the Chinese Revolution" panel, pp. 9-10.

19. Most of his remaining writings are translated in Wang Shiwei and `Wild Lilies', pp. 89-98.

20. This is my reading of Wang Shiwei's texts and acts. See "The Fading of Wild Lilies."

21. Wang Shiwei and `Wild Lilies', pp. 135-145.

22. Apter and Saich conclude in Revolutionary Discourse that this was the case for most participants in the original rectification movement.

23. See, for example, the first zawen in Wang's "Wild Lilies," translated in Wang Shiwei and `Wild Lilies', pp. 29-30.

24. See fn. 2 above.

25. It was also part the notorious and widely unpopular "rescue campaign" of 1943-44 run by Kang for Mao. Mao soon distanced himself from that campaign and (we may presume) was not inclined to publicize documents from it. For details, see Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, "Formation of the Maoist Leadership," in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven, eds., New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution (New York: M.E. Thorpe, 1994).

26. See Chen Yung-fa, Yan'an de yinying [Yenan Shadows] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1990).

27. Lin Man-houng, "Two Social Theories Revealed: Statecraft Controversies over China's Monetary Crisis, 1808-1854," Late Imperial China 12.2 (1991): 1-35.