The Home Selling Problem: Theory and Evidence†

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Abstract

This paper formulates and solves the problem of a homeowner who wants to sell their house for the maximum possible price net of transactions costs (including real estate commissions). The optimal selling strategy consists of an initial list price with subsequent weekly decisions on how much to adjust the list price until the home is sold or withdrawn from the market. The solution also yields a sequence of reservation prices that determine whether the homeowner should accept bids from potential buyers who arrive stochastically over time with an expected arrival rate that is a decreasing function of the list price. This model was developed to provide a theoretical explanation for list price dynamics and bargaining behavior observed for a sample of homeowners in England in a new data set introduced by Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004). One of the puzzling features that emerged from their analysis (but which other evidence suggests holds in general, not just England) is that list prices are sticky: By and large homeowners appear to be reluctant to change their list price, and are observed to do so only after a significant amount of time has elapsed if they have not received any offers. This finding presents a challenge, since the conventional wisdom is that traditional rational economic theories are unable to explain this extreme price stickiness. Recent research has focused on “behavioral” explanations such as loss aversion in attempt to explain a homeowner’s unwillingness to reduce their list price. We are able to explain the price stickiness and most of the other key features observed in the data using a model of rational, forward-looking, risk-neutral sellers who seek to maximize the expected proceeds from selling their home net of transactions costs. The model relies on a very small fixed “menu cost” of changing the list price, amounting to less than 6 thousandths of 1% of the estimated house value, or approximately £12 for a home worth £200,000.

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1 Introduction

Buying and selling a home is one of the most important financial decisions most individuals make during their lifetime. Home equity is typically the biggest single component of the overall wealth of a household, and given the highly leveraged situation that most households are in (where mortgage debt is a high fraction of the overall value of the home), the outcome of the home selling process can have very serious consequences for their financial well-being.

Given its importance, we would expect a priori that households have strong incentives to be forward-looking and behave rationally when they sell their home. In particular, it seems reasonable to model the household’s objective as trying to maximize the expected gains from selling their home net of transactions costs.\(^1\)

Surprisingly, dynamic rational models of the “home selling problem” have been understudied both theoretically and, most notably, empirically. In pioneering work, Salant (1991) formulated and solved for the optimal selling strategy of a risk neutral seller using dynamic programming. Salant's model involves an initial choice by the household whether to use a real estate agent to help sell their home, versus deciding to save on the high commissions charged by most real estate agencies and follow a “for sale by owner” selling strategy. Under either of these options, the seller must also choose a list price each period the home is up for sale, and whether to accept a bid for the home when one arrives, or to wait and hope that a higher bid will arrive in the near future. Salant showed that the optimal solution generally involves a strictly monotonically declining sequence of list prices, and that it is typically optimal to begin selling the home by owner, but if no acceptable offers have arrived within a specified interval of time, the seller should retain a real estate agent. Under some circumstances, the optimal list price can jump up at the time the seller switches to the real estate agency, but list prices decline thereafter. To our knowledge the implications of Salant’s theoretical analysis have not been tested empirically.

Horowitz (1992) was the first attempt to empirically estimate and test a dynamic model of the home seller’s problem. Unlike Salant, who considered an environment with a finite horizon, Horowitz adopted an infinite-horizon stationary search framework, and characterized the optimal (time-invariant) list and

\(^1\) Risk aversion may also play an important role in determining the behavior of a home seller. For example, a risk averse seller may be inclined to set somewhat lower list prices than a risk neutral one, and accept lower offers in order to reduce the risk of “letting a fish off the hook.” However, we will show that it is possible to model the selling behavior of risk averse sellers via relatively straightforward adjustments to a model of a risk neutral seller, and the broad qualitative features of an optimal selling strategy are the same regardless of the degree of risk aversion.
reservation prices of the seller. Horowitz’s model implies that the duration to sale of a house is geometrically distributed, and he estimated his model using data on the list price, sale price and duration to sale for a sample of 1196 homes sold in Baltimore, Maryland in 1978.

Horowitz concluded that his econometric model “gives predictions of sale prices that are considerably more accurate than those of a standard hedonic price regression” (p. 126). He also noted that his model “explains why sellers may not be willing to reduce their list prices even after their houses have remained unsold for long periods of time” (p.126). The latter conclusion, however, is unwarranted because time invariance of list and reservation prices are inherent features of Horowitz’s stationary search framework. Hence, his model is logically incapable of addressing the issue of what is the optimal sequence of list price choices by a seller over time (and in particular whether list prices should decline or remain constant over time). Further, his data set does not appear to contain any information on changes in the list price between when a home was initially listed and when it was finally sold.2

It seems that the question of whether optimal list prices should or should not decline over time can only be addressed in a non-stationary, finite-horizon framework such as Salant’s, or else in a stationary infinite-horizon framework that includes variables such as duration since initial listing, or duration since previous offer, as state variables.3 Also, it is quite evident that any progress in the specification and estimation of plausible dynamic models of the home selling problem critically hinges on the availability of richer micro data containing detailed information on the history of relevant events (e.g., list price revisions and offers received) during the home selling process.

The model presented in this paper is motivated by the empirical findings of Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004), (henceforth MO) who introduced a new data set that to our knowledge provides the first opportunity to study the home selling problem in considerable detail. MO’s study is based on a panel data of complete transaction histories of 780 residential properties that were sold via a real estate agency in England between June 1995 and April 1998. For each home in the sample, the data include all listing price changes and all offers made on the home between initial listing and the final sale agreement. MO characterized a number of key stylized facts pertaining to the sequence of events that occur within individual property transaction histories, and discussed the limitations of existing theories of a home seller’s behavior in explaining the data.

2 Also note that Horowitz’s estimated model explains little of the observed variation in time from listing to sale.
3 However, once one includes a state variable such as duration since initial listing, the seller’s problem automatically becomes a non-stationary dynamic programming problem that is essentially equivalent to Salant’s formulation.
The dynamic model of the home selling problem we propose and estimate using MO's data takes advantage of the richness of this data set and incorporates several realistic features of the house selling process into a finite-horizon, dynamic programming model of the behavior of the seller of a residential property. We take the decision to sell a house via a real estate agency as a given, and consider the decisions of which price to list the house at initially, how to revise this price over time, whether or not to accept offers that are made, and whether to withdraw the house if insufficiently attractive offers are realized. To make these decisions the seller forms expectations about the probability a potential buyer will arrive and make an initial offer, the probability she will make additional offers if any of her offers are rejected, and the level of each of these offers. These expectations are revised over time based on the realized event history.

In this paper, we do not explicitly model the behavior of buyers and the bargaining game that leads to the sale of a house. Typically, when a potential buyer arrives and makes an initial offer for the home, it is just the first move in a bargaining subgame where the buyer and the seller negotiate over the sale price. This negotiation may either lead to a transaction, when the buyer and seller reach an agreement over the terms of the sale, or end with the buyer leaving the bargaining table when no mutually agreeable deal can be reached. Rather than modeling this situation as a bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information (where the buyer and the seller each possess private information about their own idiosyncratic valuation of the home), we capture the key features of this environment by specifying a simplified model of buyers’ bidding behavior. In particular, we assume that if a potential buyer arrives, he makes up to \( n \) consecutive offers which are drawn from bids distributions that depend, among other things, on the list price and the amount of time the house has been on the market. The seller can either accept or reject each offer, but after any rejection there is a positive probability the buyer “walks” (i.e. she decides not to make a further offer and move on and search for other properties instead).

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4 One aspect that we do not model in this paper is the seller’s decision whether to use a real estate agent, something that was a key focus of Salant’s analysis. While we agree that this is a very interesting and important issue, it is one that we cannot say much about empirically, since MO’s data set only includes properties that were listed and sold via a real estate agent.

5 In our empirical work, we assume that \( n = 3 \), which is the maximum number of offers made by a potential buyer on the same house observed in the data.

6 As is well known, game-theoretic models of bargaining with two-sided incomplete information typically admit multiple equilibria — and often a continuum of them. Furthermore, there are no general results in the literature that characterize the full set of equilibria for such games, and adopting an arbitrary equilibrium selection rule seems a rather unappealing alternative. We avoid these problems by treating buyers as bidding automata using simple piecewise linear bidding functions with exogenously specified random termination in the bargaining process. It should be noted, however, that such bidding functions could be derived endogenously in the unique equilibrium of a bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information, where the buyer is uninformed about the seller’s valuation, but the buyer’s valuation of the house is common knowledge. Our specification also accommodates the possibility of “auctions”, i.e. situations where multiple buyers are bidding simultaneously for a home, and offers may exceed the list price.
While treating buyers as *bidding automata* is obviously a simplification, modeling the offer process as one-sided, where the potential buyer makes offers that the seller can either accept or reject without making counteroffers, is not. Contrary to the standard procedure we are accustomed to in the U.S. as well as many other countries, where the owner of a house for sale can typically respond to a buyer’s offer with a counteroffer, and there may be multiple real estate agents representing the various parties involved in the sale process, the negotiating protocol that pertains to the residential properties transactions in the MO English data set is quite different. In England, most residential properties are marketed under sole agency agreement (i.e., a house is listed with a single real estate agency that coordinates all market related activities concerning the house from the time it is listed until it either sells or is withdrawn). Agencies represent the seller only, and a potential buyer who wants to make an offer on a property has to communicate the offer in writing to the agency representing the seller of that property. Upon being notified of the offer, the general practice is for the seller simply to either accept the offer or reject it, in which case the buyer has the option of either submitting a revised offer or terminating the negotiation.  

Our model incorporates a fixed “menu cost” of changing the list price. One of the most striking features of MO’s data is that housing list prices appear to be highly (though not completely) sticky. That is, 77% of the house sellers in the data never changed the initial list price between the time the house was initially listed and when it was sold. List prices were changed only once in 18% of the cases, only twice in 4% of the cases, and only three times in the remaining 1% of the cases observed. MO conclude that “listing price reductions are fairly infrequent; when they occur they are typically large. Listing price revisions appear to be triggered by a lack of offers. The size of the reduction in the listing price is larger the longer a property has been on the market” (p. 214).

This finding presents a challenge, since the conventional wisdom is that traditional, rational, forward-looking economic theories are unable to explain extreme price stickiness of this sort, unless there are large menu costs associated with price revisions. While list price changes certainly entail a cost (e.g., in
England, all documents pertaining to the listing needs to be updated — analogously, in the U.S., the new price information must be entered in the Multiple Listing Service database), this cost is unlikely to be large.

Recent research has focused on “behavioral” explanations for price stickiness. Such explanations typically rely on the notion that sellers are fundamentally backward-looking. Genesove and Mayer (2001), for example, appeal to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1991) theory of loss aversion to explain the apparent unwillingness of owners of condominiums in Boston to reduce their list price in response to downturns in the housing market. In particular, they assume that a seller’s previous purchase price serves as the “reference point” required by the model of loss aversion, and use this to explain a pattern where, when house prices begin to fall after a boom, “homes tend to sit on the market for long periods of time with asking prices well above expected selling prices, and many sellers eventually withdraw their properties without sale” (p. 1233). This type of behavior is clearly inconsistent with the rational forward-looking calculations underlying the dynamic programming models of seller behavior, which assume that homeowners have rational expectations about the amount prospective buyers are willing to pay for their home. If the housing market turns bad and it is no longer possible for the homeowner to expect to sell their home at a higher price than they paid for it, a rational seller will regard this as an unfortunate bygone, but will realize that whatever they paid for their house in the past may have little bearing on how they should try to sell their house now, which requires a realistic assessment of what will happen in the future. While many sellers do have the option not to sell their homes if market conditions turn bad, not selling a home or not selling one sufficiently quickly can entail serious losses as well.10

One of the primary contributions of this paper is to show that a very small menu cost, amounting to less than 6 thousandths of 1% of the estimated house value, or approximately £12 for a home worth £200,000, is sufficient to generate the high degree of list price stickiness observed in the MO’s data with a forward-looking dynamic programming model with risk-neutral sellers who have rational expectations about the ultimate selling price of their homes.

The period the home is on the market. However, it is well known that the type of non-convexity introduced by a menu cost can generate regions of inaction where it is optimal for the seller not to change the list price even though the list price inherited from the previous period is not the optimal forward-looking list price that the seller would choose if there was no cost of changing the list price. The larger the menu cost, the bigger the regions of inaction.10 For example, some sellers (such as those facing foreclosure, or who need to sell due to a job move, or a change in family situation such as divorce) are selling under duress, and even others who are under less time pressure may perceive a substantial “hassle cost” of having their home listed, cleaned and ready to show to prospective buyers on short notice.
There are several reasons why a very small menu cost yields a high degree of list price stickiness in our model. One reason is that our model assumes that sellers have accurate *ex ante* beliefs about the financial value of their homes. That is, we assume sellers have rational expectations about the future selling price. In the absence of macro shocks or learning about the financial value of the house, the fact that offers from potential buyers fail to arrive (or not) does not have a huge information content that would cause sellers to revise their beliefs and adjust their list price.

A second reason for the price stickiness in our model is that sellers realize that the list price is just a starting point for negotiations, and the seller is not committed to selling only at the list price. In general, most offers are less than the list price and subsequent bargaining between the buyer and the seller leads to an increasing sequence of offers until a final transaction price is agreed upon (or the buyer walks away). However, the final transaction price is generally less than the current list price of the home. Thus, most of the real “action” in terms of the realized transaction price occurs during this bargaining process, and the purpose of the list price is mainly to attract potential buyers to the bargaining table. While we do not model the bargaining process explicitly, our empirical framework incorporates the key features of this process, and in particular the fact that when a potential buyer arrives, she may make not just one offer (as it is assumed in the models of Horowitz and Salant alike), but an increasing sequence of offers. Indeed, our estimated model predicts that while list prices are piecewise flat functions of duration on the market (just as we observe in the data), the seller’s reservation values do decline continuously as a function of duration on the market. The combination of the probability of receiving multiple increasing offers from a potential buyer once the potential buyer arrives and declining reservation prices results in significant actual price flexibility that is not evident in the list prices.

A final reason is that while we find that the rate of arrival of offers is a decreasing function of the list price, the estimated relationship between the arrival rate and the list price is fairly inelastic. In effect, it appears that it is a matter of common knowledge that most of the action in terms of determining an actual sale price of a home will occur as a result of a bargaining process, and therefore while we show that the list price is a good predictor of the ultimate transaction price (and indeed, a much more accurate predictor of the transaction price than a hedonic price estimate) once the initial list price is set at the time the house is listed, the apparently highly rational manner in which the initial list price was set largely precludes the need for significant further adjustments over reasonable horizons. Our estimated model predicts only large reductions in the list price for houses that have been on the market for a very long time without having
received an acceptable offer, consistent with what we observe in the English housing data.

Our estimated model is also consistent with most of the other key features of the MO data, including the distributions of times to sale, initial list prices, the overall trajectory of list prices, sale prices and the number of ”matches” between a seller and a potential buyer. An interesting finding of our empirical analysis is that houses are generally overpriced when they are first listed. In the English housing data the degree of overpricing is not huge: the initial list is on average 5% higher than the ultimate transaction price for the home. However, it is important to point out that our theoretical model could also generate underpricing as an optimal seller’s behavior. Underpricing can result when the arrival rate of buyers is sufficiently sensitive to the list price, and when there is a significant chance that multiple buyers can arrive at the same time, resulting in an auction situation and potential “bidding war” that tends to drive the final transaction price to a value far higher than the list price.11

Section 2 provides a brief review of the English housing data analyzed by MO, reviewing the legal environment, the overall housing market, and the way the real estate agency operates in the parts of England where the data were gathered. We refer the reader to MO for a more in depth analysis, but we do attempt to lay out the key features of the data that we attempt to account for in this analysis. Section 3 introduces our model of the seller’s decision problem. Section 4 describes the model of buyer arrival and bidding behavior that constitutes the key “belief objects” in the seller’s decision problem that must be estimated to empirically implement and test our model. Section 5 presents estimation results based both on quasi maximum likelihood (QML) and simulated minimum distance (SMD) estimation methods. We show there are substantial problems with the smoothness of the estimation criterion using either of these approaches, which calls into question the validity of standard first order asymptotic theory and the usual methods for computing parameter standard errors and goodness of fit statistics. So instead of focusing on presenting statistics of dubious validity, we provide a fairly extensive comparison of the predictions of our model to the features we observe in the English housing data. While we have not yet found the “best fitting” parameter estimates or specification of the model (due largely to the non-smoothness of the QML and SMD estimation criteria), we argue that the provisional or trial parameter values and model specification that we present here already provides a very good approximation to a wide range of features that MO documented

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11 In the data, initial bids and final transaction prices in excess of the list price are observed in approximately 4% of all sales. Our model allows for the possibility of such “overbidding” which results from the fact that in England, the seller has no legal obligation to accept a bid that is greater than or equal to the list price. Previous models, including both Salant’s and Horowitz’s models, do not allow for the possibility that a bid or transaction price would ever exceed the list price.
in their analysis of the English housing data. Section 6 presents a number of hypothetical simulations and calculations using our model. In addition to calculating a seller’s willingness to pay for the services of a real estate agency, we also show how risk aversion affects the seller’s strategy. We also perform other calculations with our risk neutral seller model to show how different beliefs on the part of sellers can result in underpricing, and even situations where list prices can increase rather than decrease as a function of time on the market. A final calculation is to show how seller behavior would be changed if sellers were legally obligated to sell to any buyer who is willing to pay the seller’s posted list price. Section 7 provides some concluding comments and directions for future research.

2 The English Housing Data

In England, most residential properties are marketed under sole agency agreement. This means that a property is listed with a single real estate agency that coordinates all market related activities concerning that property from the time it is listed until it either sells or is withdrawn. Agencies represent the seller only. Listing a property with an agency entails publishing a sheet of property characteristics and a listing price. Although not legally binding, the listing price is generally understood as a price the seller is committed to accept.

The listing price may be revised at any time at the discretion of the seller. The seller does not incur any cost when revising the listing price, except the cost of communicating the decision to the agent. The agent has to adjust the price on the posted property sheet and reprint any property detail sheets in stock, a minimal cost.

Potential buyers search by visiting local real estate agencies and viewing properties. A match between the seller and a potential buyer occurs when the potential buyer makes an offer. Within a match, the general practice is for the seller to either accept or reject offers. In the event the seller rejects an offer, the potential buyer either makes another offer or walks away. If agreement occurs, both parties engage the administrative procedure leading to the exchange of contracts and the completion of the transaction. This procedure typically lasts three to eight weeks. During this period, among other things, the buyer applies for mortgage and has the property surveyed. Each party may cancel the sale agreement up to the exchange of contracts.

For each property it represents, the agency keeps a file containing a detailed description of the property,
its listing price, and a record of listing price changes, offers, and terms of the sale agreement, as required by law. The information contained in each individual file is also recorded on the accounting register that is used by each agency to report to the head office. Although all visits of a property by potential buyers are arranged by the listing agency, recording viewings is not required either by the head office or by law. However, individual agencies may require their agents to collect this information for internal management purposes.

The data set we use in our research was obtained from the sales records of four real estate agencies in England. These agencies are all part of Halifax Estate Agencies Limited, one of the largest network of real estate agents in England. Three of these agencies operate in the Greater London metropolitan area, one in South Yorkshire. Our sample consists of 780 complete transaction histories of properties listed and sold between June 1995 and April 1998 under sole agency agreement. Each entry in our data was validated by checking the consistency of the records in the accounting register and in the individual files.

Each observation contains the property’s characteristics as shown on the information sheet published by the agency at the time of initial listing, the listing price and the date of the listing. If any listing price change occurs, we observe its date and the new price. Each match is described by the date of the first offer by a potential buyer and the sequence of buyer’s offers within the match. When a match is successful, we observe the sale agreed price and the date of agreement which terminate the history. In addition, for the properties listed with one of our Greater London agencies (which account for about a fourth of the observations in our sample), we observe the complete history of viewings. Since events are typically recorded by agents within the week of their occurrence, we use the week as our unit of measure of time. Our data spans two geographic areas with different local economic conditions and two different phases of the cycle in the housing market. While the local economy in Greater London has been experiencing a prolonged period of sustained growth, this has not been the case in South Yorkshire. Furthermore, from June 1995 to April 1998, the housing market in the Greater London metropolitan area went from a slow recovery to a boom. While this transition occurred gradually, for ease of exposition we refer to 1995-96 as the recovery and to 1997-98 as the boom.

This data set was the one analyzed by Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004), and their main findings can be summarized as follows. First, listing price reductions are fairly infrequent; when they occur they are typically large. Listing price revisions appear to be triggered by a lack of offers. The size of the reduction in the listing price is larger the longer a property has been on the market. Second, the level of a first
offer relative to the listing price at the time the offer is made is lower the longer the property has been on the market, the more the property is currently over-priced, and if there has been no revision of the listing price. Negotiations typically entail several offers. About a third of all negotiations are unsuccessful (i.e., they end in a separation rather than a sale). The probability of success of a negotiation decreases with the number of previous unsuccessful negotiations. Third, in the vast majority of cases, a property is sold to the first potential buyer who makes an offer on the property (i.e., within the first negotiation), although not necessarily at the first offer. The vast majority of sellers whose first negotiation is unsuccessful end up selling at a higher price, but a few end up accepting a lower offer. The higher the number of negotiations between initial listing and sale agreement, the higher the sale price.

Figure 2.1 illustrates two typical observations in the data set. We have plotted list prices over the full duration from initial listing until sale as a ratio of the initial listing price. The red dots plot the first offer and the blue squares are the second offers received in a match. The stars plot the final accepted transaction prices. Thus, the seller of property 1046 in the left hand panel of figure 2.1 experienced 3 separate matches. The first occurred in the fourth week that the property was listed, and the seller rejected the first bid by a bidder equal to 95% of the list price. The buyer “walked” after the seller rejected the offer. The next match occurred on the sixth week on he market. The seller once again rejected this second prospective buyer’s first bid, which was only 93% of the list price. However this time the bidder did not walk after this first rejection, but responded with a second higher offer equal to 95% of the list price. However when the seller rejected this second higher offer, the second bidder also walked. The third match occurred in the 11th week the home was on the market. The seller accepted this third bidder’s opening offer, equal to 98% of the list price. Note that there were no changes in the initial list price during the 11 weeks this property was on the market.

The right hand panel plots a case where there was a decrease in the list price by 5% in the fourth week this property was on the market. After this price decrease another 5 weeks elapsed before the first offer was made on this home, equal to 90% of the initial list price. The seller rected this offe and the bidder made a counteroffer equal to 91% of the initial list price. The seller rejected this second offer too, prompting the bidder to make a final offer equal to 94.5% of the initial list price which the seller accepted.

Figure 2.2 plots the number of observations in the data set and the mean and median list prices as a function of the total number of weeks on the market. The left hand panel plots the number of observations (unsold homes reamining to be sold) as a function of duration since initial listing. For example only 54
of the 780 observations remain unsold after 30 weeks on the market, so over 93% of the properties listed by this agency sell within this time frame. If we compute the ratio of first offers received to the number of remaining unsold properties, we get a crude estimate of the offer arrival rate (a more refined model and estimate of this rate and its dependence on the list price will be presented subsequently). There is an 11% arrival rate in the first week a home is listed, meaning that approximately 11% of all properties will receive one or more offers in the first week after the home is listed with the real estate agency. The arrival rate increases to approximately 15% in weeks 2 to 6, then it decreases to approximately 12% in weeks 7 to 12, and then drops to about 10% thereafter, although it is harder to estimate arrival rates for longer durations given the declining number of remaining unsold properties.

The right hand panel of figure 2.2 plots the mean and median list prices of all unsold homes as a function of the duration on the market. We have normalized the list prices by dividing by the predicted sale price from a hedonic price regression using the extensive set of housing characteristics that are available in the data set (e.g. location of home, square meters of floor space, number of baths, bedrooms, and so forth). However the results are approximately the same when we normalize using the actual transaction prices instead of the regression predictions: this is a consequence of the fact that the hedonic regression provides a very accurate prediction of actual transaction prices.

We see from the right panel of figure 2.2 that initially houses are listed at an average of a 5% premium above their ultimate selling prices, and there is an obvious downward slope in both the mean and median
list prices as a function of duration on the market. However the slope is not very pronounced: even after 25 weeks on the market the list price has only declined by 5%, so that at this point list prices are approximately equal to the *ex ante* expected selling prices. The apparently continuously downward slope in mean and median list prices is misleading in the sense that, as we noted from figure 2.1, individual list price trajectories are piecewise flat with discontinuous jumps on the dates where price reductions occur. Averaging over these piecewise flat list price trajectories creates an illusion that list prices are continuously declining as a function of duration on the market, but we emphasize again that the individual observations do not have this property.

Figure 2.3 plots the distribution of sales prices (once again normalized as a ratio to the predicted transaction price) and the distribution of duration to sale. The left hand panel of figure 2.3 plots the distribution of sales price ratios. There are two different distributions shown: the blue line is the distribution of ratios of sale price to the hedonic prediction of sales price, and the red line is the distribution of the ratio of sales price to the initial list price, multiplied by 1.05 (this latter factor is the average markup of the initial list price over the ultimate transaction price, as noted above). Both of these distributions have a mean value of 1 (by construction), but clearly the distribution of the adjusted sales price to list price ratio is much more tightly concentrated than the distribution of sales price to hedonic value ratios. Evidently there is significant information about the value of the home that affects the seller’s decision of what price to list their home at that is not contained in the $x$ variables used to construct the hedonic price predictions.

\[ \text{Figure 2.2 Number of Observations and List Prices by Week on Market} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{List Price} & \quad \text{First Offer} \\
& \quad \text{Second Offer} \\
& \quad \text{Third Offer}
\end{align*} \]
model we present in section 3 will account for this extra private information about the home that we are unable to observe. However even when this extra information is taken into account, there is still a fair amount of variation/uncertainty in what the ultimate sales price will be, even factoring in the information revealed by the initial list price: the sales price can vary from as low of only 53% of the adjusted list price to 32% higher than the adjusted list price.

The right hand panel of figure 2.3 plots the distribution of times to sale. This is a clearly right skewed but unimodal distribution with a mean time to sale of 10.27 weeks and a median time to sale of 6 weeks. As we noted above, over 90% of the properties in our data set were sold within 30 weeks of the date the property was initially listed. Scatterplots relating time to sale to the ratio of the list price to the hedonic value (not shown) do not reveal any clear negative relationship between the degree of “overpricing” (as indicated by high values of this ratio) and longer times to sale. Thus, we do not find any clear evidence at this level supporting the “loss aversion” explanation advocated by Genesove and Mayer (2001). However an alternative explanation is the fact that prices in London were generally rising over the time period of the data (see figure 2.4 above), so an alternative explanation that few of the sellers had experienced any adverse shocks, and thus our sample is not in a regime where the “downward stickiness” prediction of the loss aversion theory is relevant.

We conclude our review of the English housing data by showing figure 2.5, which plots the distributions of the first offer received and the best (highest) offer received as a ratio of the current list price for
properties with different durations on the market. The left hand panel of figure 2.5 shows the distributions of first offers. We see that in the first week a home is listed, the mean first offer received is 96% of the list price (which is also the initial list price in this case). However first offers range from a low of only 79% of the list price to a high of 104% of the list price. We see that even accounting for declines in the list price with duration on the market, that first offers made on properties tend to decline the longer the property is on the market. There is a notable leftware shift in the distribution of first offers for offers received on homes that have been on the market for 20 weeks, where the mean first offer is only 91% of the list price in effect for properties that are still unsold after 20 weeks.

The right hand panel of figure 2.5 shows the distribution of the best offers received in a match. In the first few weeks the best offers show only modest improvement over the first offers received (e.g. the best offer is 97% of the list price, whereas the first offer is 96% of the list price). However we see more significant improvement in offers received for homes that were still unsold after 20 weeks: the best offer received is 94% of the current list price, which is 3 percentage points higher than the ratio of the first offer to the list price.

Figure 2.4 Price Indices in the Regions Covered in the English Housing Data
3 The Seller’s Problem

This section presents our formulation of a discrete-time, finite-horizon dynamic programming problem of the seller’s optimal strategy for selling a house. The model we propose incorporates several features of the house selling process in England illustrated in the previous section.

Since our data set only includes properties that were listed and sold via a real estate agent, we take the decision to sell a house (via a real estate agency) as a given, and consider the seller’s decisions of which price to list the house at initially, how to revise this price over time, whether or not to accept offers that are made, and whether to withdraw the house if insufficiently attractive offers are realized. To make these decisions the seller forms expectations about the probability a potential buyer will arrive and make an initial offer, the probability she will make additional offers if any of her offers are rejected, and the level of each of these offers. These expectations are revised over time based on the realized event history.

We do not explicitly model the behavior of buyers and the bargaining game that leads to the sale of a house. Rather, we capture the salient features of the bargaining environment by specifying a simplified model of buyers’ bidding behavior. In particular, we assume that if a potential buyer arrives, she makes up to 3 consecutive offers (where 3 is the maximum number of offers observed in the data), which are drawn from bids distributions that depend, among other things, on the list price and the amount of time the house has been on the market. The seller can either accept or reject each offer, but after any rejection there is a

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\[\text{Figure 2.5 Distribution First Offer and Best Offer as a Ratio of List Price}\]
positive probability the buyer “walks” (i.e. she decides not to make a further offer and move on and search for other properties instead). As explained above, the procedure where a potential buyer makes offers that the seller can simply either accept or reject mimics the negotiating protocol in the data.

A decision period is a week, and we assume a finite horizon of 2 years. If a house is not sold after 2 years, we assume that it is withdrawn from sale and the seller obtains an exogenously specified “continuation value” representing the use value of owning (or renting) their home over a longer horizon beyond the 2 year decision horizon in this model.\(^\text{13}\)

The seller’s continuation value will generally be different from a quantity we refer to as the seller’s financial value of their home. This is the seller’s expectation of what the ultimate selling price will be for their home. While it is clear that the ultimate selling price is endogenously determined and partly under control of the seller, we can think of the financial value as a realistic appraisal or initial assessment on the part of the seller of the ultimate outcome of the selling process. Since the seller’s optimal strategy will depend on the financial value of the house, if the financial value is to represent a rational, internally consistent belief on the part of the seller, it will have to satisfy a fixed-point condition that guarantees that it is a “self-fulfilling prophecy”. Although we do not explicitly enforce this fixed-point constraint in our solution of the dynamic programming problem, we verify below (via stochastic simulations) that it does hold for the estimated version of our model.\(^\text{14}\)

Let \(F_0\) denote the seller’s perception about the financial value of their home at the time of listing. We assume that \(F_0\) is given by the equation

\[
F_0 = \exp\{X\beta + \eta_0\}
\]

where \(X\) are the observed characteristics of the home (the basis for the traditional hedonic regression prediction of the ultimate sales price discussed in Section 2), and \(\eta_0\) reflects the impact of other variables that are observed by the seller but not by the econometricians that can affect the seller’s perception of their

\(^{13}\) The continuation value may include the option value of relisting the home at a future date, perhaps during a period where conditions in the housing market are more favorable to the seller. However, we do not model the decision that leads either to “entry” (i.e. the initial decision to sell) or to “re-entry” (in case the property is withdrawn and then re-listed) of a house on the market.

\(^{14}\) While it is possible to enforce the rationality constraint as a fixed-point condition on our model, from our standpoint it is useful to allow for formulations that relax the rationality constraint. This gives us the additional flexibility to consider models where sellers do not have fully rational, self-consistent beliefs about the financial value of their homes. Indeed, allowing for inconsistent or “unrealistic” beliefs may be an alternative way to explain why some home sellers set unrealistically high listing prices for their homes that would be distinct from the loss aversion approach discussed in the introduction. However, as we show below, we do not need to appeal to any type of irrationality or assume that sellers have unrealistic beliefs in order to provide an accurate explanation of the English housing data.
home’s financial value. These variables could include the seller’s private assessment of aggregate shocks that affect the entire housing market, regional or neighborhood level shocks, as well as idiosyncratic house-specific factors. We assume that after consultation with appraisers and the real estate agent, the seller has a firm assessment of the financial value of their home that does not vary over the course of their selling horizon. Hence, $\eta_0$ can be interpreted as reflecting the seller’s private information about the financial value of their home that is not already captured by the observable characteristics $X$.

Recall the left panel of figure 2.3 that shows that the adjusted list price is a far more accurate predictor of the ultimate selling price of the home than the hedonic value, $\exp\{X\beta\}$. In our estimation of the model, we assume that $\exp\{\eta_0\}$ is a lognormally distributed random variable that is independent of $X$, and we estimate $\beta$ via a log-linear regression of the final transaction price on the $X$ characteristics assuming that the random variable $\exp\{\nu_0\}$ satisfies the restriction $E\{\exp(\eta_0)\} = 1$. This restriction represents the rationality constraint we refer to above, which we verify is satisfied by our estimated model.

Due to the fact that the seller’s optimal selling decisions depend critically on the seller’s financial value $F_0$, which in turn depends on a very high dimensional vector of observed housing characteristics $X$ as well as unobserved components $\eta_0$, straightforward attempts to solve the seller’s problem while accounting for all of these variables immediately presents us with a significant “curse of dimensionality”. In principle, we could treat the estimated hedonic value $\exp\{X_i\hat{\beta}\}$ as a “fixed effect” relevant to property $i$ and solve $N = 780$ individual dynamic programming (DP) problems, one for each of the 780 properties in our sample. However, the problem is more complicated due to the existence of the unobserved “random effect” $\eta_0$. This is a one dimensional unobserved random variable and in principle we would need to solve each of the 780 DP problems over a grid of possible values of $\eta_0$, and thereby approximate the optimal selling strategy explicitly as a function of all possible values of the unobserved random effect $\eta_0$, which would be then “integrated out” in the estimation of the model.

However, by imposing a linear homogeneity assumption, we can solve a single DP problem for the seller’s optimal selling strategy where the values and states are defined as ratios relative to the seller’s financial value. In particular, define the seller’s current list price $P_t$ to be the ratio of the actual list price divided by the seller’s financial value $F_0$. Then $P_t = 1.0$ is equivalent to a list price that equals the financial value, and $P_t > 1.0$ corresponds to a list price that exceeds the financial value and so forth. The implicit assumption underlying the linear homogeneity assumption is that, at least within the limited and fairly homogeneous segment of the housing market in our data set, there are no relevant further “price subseg-
ments” that have significantly different arrival rates and buyer behavior depending on whether the houses in these segments are more expensive “high end” homes or not. The homogeneity assumption reflects a reasonable assumption that arrival rates and buyer bidding behavior are driven mostly by whether a given home is perceived to be a “good deal” as reflected by the ratio of the list price to the financial value. However, as we discuss below, the actual bid submitted by a buyer will depend on the buyer’s private valuation for the home (also expressed as a ratio of the financial value $F_0$).

Let $S_t(P_t, d_t)$ denote the expected discounted (optimal) value of selling the home at the start of week $t$, where the current ratio of the list price to the financial value is $P_t$, and where the duration since the last match is $d_t$, with $d_t = 0$ indicating a situation where no matches have occurred yet. Here a match is defined as a buyer who makes an offer on the home. We will get into detail about the timing of decisions and the flow of information shortly, but already we can see that this formulation of the seller’s problem has three state variables: 1) the current total time on the market $t$, 2) the duration since the last match $d_t$, and 3) the current list price to financial value ratio $P_t$. The value function $S_t(P_t, d_t)$ provides the value of the home as a ratio of the financial value, so to obtain the actual value and actual list price we simply multiply these values by $F_0$. Thus $F_0S_t(P_t, d_t)$ is the present discounted value of the optimal selling strategy, and $F_0P_t$ is the current list price, both measured in UK pounds (£). Via this “trick” we can account for substantial heterogeneity in actual list prices and seller valuations by solving just a single DP problem “in ratio form.” However an important implication of this assumption is that timing of list price reductions and the percentage size of these reductions implied by the seller’s optimal selling strategy are homogeneous of degree 0 in the list price and the financial value.

Our model of the optimal selling decision does not require the seller to sell their home within the 2 year horizon: we assume that the seller has the option to withdraw their home from the market at any time over the selling horizon. Since we do not model the default option of not selling one’s house, we do not attempt to go into any detail and derive the form of the value to the seller of withdrawing their home from the market and pursuing their next best option (e.g. continuing to live in the house, or renting the home). Instead we simply invoke a flexible specification of the “continuation value” $W_t(P_t, \tau)$ of withdrawing a home from the market and pursuing the next best opportunity.$^{15}$

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$^{15}$ Alternatively, we could allow for different types of sellers who have different continuation values and specify $W_t(P_t, \tau)$, where the parameter $\tau$ could denote the seller’s “type.” Fortunately, however, although our model can allow for other types of unobserved heterogeneity beyond the privately observed component of the financial value $\eta_0$, we did not need to appeal to any type of unobserved heterogeneity in seller types in order for the model to provide a good approximation to the behavior we...
The seller has 3 main decisions: 1) whether or not to withdraw the property, 2) if the seller opts not to withdraw the property, there is a decision about which list price to set at the beginning of each week the home is on the market, and 3) if a prospective buyer arrives within the week and makes an offer, the seller must determine whether or not to accept the offer, and if the seller rejects the offer and the buyer makes a second offer, whether to accept the second offer, and so on up to (possibly) a third and final offer. We assume that the first two decisions are made at the start of each week and that the seller is unable to withdraw their home or change their list price during the remainder of the week. Within the week, if one or more offers arrive, the seller decides whether or not to accept them.

The Bellman equation for the seller’s problem is given in equation (2) below.

\[
S_t(P_t, d_t) = \max \left[ W_t(P_t), \max_P [u_t(P, P_t, d_t) + \beta ES_{t+1}(P, P_t, d_t)] \right] \tag{2}
\]

The Bellman equation says that at each week \( t \), the optimal selling strategy involves choosing the larger of 1) the continuation value of (permanently) withdrawing the home from the market, or 2) continuing to sell, choosing an optimal listing price \( P \). The function \( ES_{t+1}(P, P_t, d_t) \) is the conditional expectation of the week \( t+1 \) value function \( S_{t+1} \) conditional on the current state variables \((P_t, d_t)\) and the newly chosen list price \( P \). Pursuant to the “forward-looking” perspective that we discussed in the introduction, in the version of the model we actually estimate in the next section, this expectation depends only on \( P \) and not on the previous week’s list price \( P_t \). That is, the current list price \( P \) is a sufficient statistic affecting the arrival rate of buyers and the magnitude of bids submitted. However one could imagine a world with information lags where arrival rates and bids could depend on previous list prices, including the last week list price \( P_t \). While it is not hard to allow for such lags without greatly complicating the solution of the model (at least provided we only allow a single week lag), we have found that it was not necessary to account for information lags to enable the model to provide a good approximation to the behavior we observe in the English housing data.

The function \( u_t(P, P_t, d_t) \) captures two things: 1) the fixed “menu cost” of changing the list price, and 2) the “holding cost” to the seller of having their home on the market.

\[
u_t(P, P_t, d_t) = \begin{cases} 
-h_t(d_t) - K & \text{if } P \neq P_t \\
-h_t(d_t) & \text{if } P = P_t
\end{cases}
\tag{3}
\]
The function $h_t(d_t)$ is the net disutility (in money equivalent units) of having to keep the house in a tidy condition and to be ready to vacate it on short notice so the real estate agent can show it to prospective buyers. $K$ is the fixed menu cost associated with changing the list price. This fixed cost can include the cost of posting new advertisements in a newspaper and/or websites, and printing up new flyers with the new listing price, and other bureaucratic costs involving in making this change (i.e. consulting with the realtor to determine the best new price to charge). We would expect that $K$ should be a small number since none of the costs listed above would be expected to be large in absolute terms.

We now write a formula for $ES_{t+1}(P, P_t, d_t)$ that represents the value of the within week events when a match occurs. To keep the notation simpler, we will omit $P_t$ from this conditional expectation, since as we noted above, we did not need to include $P_t$ to capture any information lags that might affect arrival of buyers or the bids they might make. In order to describe the equation for $ES_{t+1}$, we need to introduce some additional information to describe the seller’s beliefs about the arrival of offers from buyers, the distribution of the size of the offers, and the probability that the buyer will walk away (i.e. not make a new offer and search for other houses) if the seller rejects the buyer’s offer. Given the negotiation protocol described above, within a given week there are at most 3 possible stages of offers by a potential buyer and accept/reject decisions by the seller. To simplify notation, we write $ES_{t+1}$ for the case where at most one buyer arrives and makes an offer on the home in any week.\footnote{Note however that our framework also accommodates the possibility of “auctions”, i.e. situations where multiple buyers are bidding simultaneously for a home.}

Let $\lambda_t(P, d_t)$ denote the conditional probability that an offer will arrive within a week given that the seller set the list price to be $P$ at the start of the week and the duration since the last offer is $d_t$. Let $O_j$ be the highest offer received at stage $j = 1, 2, 3$ of the “bargaining process.” Let $f_j(O_j|O_{j-1}, P, d_t)$ denote the seller’s beliefs about the offer the buyer would make at stage $j$ given that the buyer did not walk in response to the seller’s rejection of the buyer’s offer in stage $j - 1$. If the seller accepts offer $O_j$, let $N_t(O_j)$ denote the net sales proceeds (net of real estate commissions, taxes, and other transactions costs) received by the seller. The seller must decide whether to accept the net proceeds $N_t(O_j)$, thereby selling the home and terminating the selling process, or reject the offer and hope that the buyer will submit a more attractive offer, or that some better offer will arrive from another potential buyer in some future week.

If a seller rejects the offer $O_j$, there is a probability $\omega_j(O_j, P, d_t)$ that the buyer will “walk” and not make a new offer as a function of the last rejected offer, $O_j$, and the current state $(P, d_t)$. With this notation
we are ready to write the equation for the within week problem which determines $ES_{t+1}$ and completes the Bellman equation. We have

$$ES_{t+1}(P,d_t) = \lambda_t(P,d_t)S_{t+1}(P,d_t) + [1 - \lambda_t(P,d_t)] \int_{O_1} \max \left[ N_t(O_1), ES^{1}_{t+1}(O_1,P,d_t) \right] f_1(O_1|P,d_t) dO_1.$$  

(4)

The function $ES^{1}_{t+1}(O_1,P,d_t)$ is the expectation of the subsequent stages of the within-week “bargaining process” conditional on having received an initial offer of $O_1$ and conditional on the beginning of the week state variables, $(P,d_t)$. We can write a recursion for these within-week expected value functions similar to the overall backward induction equation for Bellman’s equation as a “within-period Bellman equations”

$$ES^{1}_{t+1}(O_1,P,d_t) = \omega_1(O_1|P,d_t)S_{t+1}(P,d_t + 1) + [1 - \omega_1(O_1|P,d_t)] \int_{O_2} \max \left[ N_t(O_2), ES^{2}_{t+1}(O_2,P,d_t) \right] f_2(O_2|O_1,P,d_t) dO_2.$$  

(5)

and

$$ES^{2}_{t+1}(O_2,P,d_t) = \omega_2(O_2|P,d_t)S_{t+1}(P,d_t + 1) + [1 - \omega_2(O_2|P,d_t)] \int_{O_3} \max \left[ N_t(O_3), S_{t+1}(P,1) \right] f_3(O_3|O_2,P,d_t) dO_3.$$  

(6)

What equation (5) tells us is that after receiving 2 offers and rejecting the second offer $O_2$, the seller expects that with probability $\omega_2(O_2|P,d_t)$ the buyer will walk, so that the bargaining ends and the seller’s expected value is simply the expectation of next periods’ value $S_{t+1}(P,d_t + 1)$. However, with probability $1 - \omega_2(O_2|P,d_t)$, the buyer will submit a third and final offer $O_3$ which is a draw from the conditional density $f(O_3|O_2,P,d_t)$. Once the seller observes $O_3$, he can either take the offer and receive the net proceeds $N_t(O_3)$, or reject the offer, in which case the potential buyer leaves for sure and the seller’s expected value is the next week value function, $S_{t+1}(P,1)$. Note that the second argument, the duration since last offer, becomes 1 at week $t + 1$ reflecting that an offer arrived at week $t$.

4 Models of Bidding by Prospective Buyers

Our initial intention was to develop a highly flexible model of buyer behavior that could be consistent with a wide range of theories of buyer behavior. We attempted to estimate the distribution of the first offer $f_1(O_1|P,d)$ and the conditional densities $f_j(O_j|O_{j-1},P,d)$ representing the improvement in bids when the
seller rejects the previous bid and the buyer offers at bidding stages 2 and 3 using non-parametric and semi-parametric estimation methods in a semi-parametric two-step approach to the estimation of our model of seller behavior.

Unfortunately, this strategy did not work. Although we were able to estimate the bid densities $f_j$ under fairly weak assumptions, when we used these estimated densities to solve for the optimal selling problem we obtained unreasonable results, including predictions that the seller should set infinite list prices.

One important fact about observed bidding behavior is that there is a positive probability that a prospective buyer will submit a bid equal to the current list price. In the English housing data, over 15 percent of all accepted offers are equal to the list price and over 10 percent of all first offers are equal to the list price. Further, we also observe offers in excess of the seller’s list price. For example, over 2% of all first offers are above the list price, and nearly 4% of all accepted offers are higher than the list price prevailing when the offer was made.

Thus, any estimation of the offer distributions needs to account for mass points in the distribution, particularly at the list price. We found that we obtained unreasonable implications for the seller model even when we imposed a fair amount of parametric assumptions on the offer distributions, which were intended to help enforce “reasonable” behavioral implications for the seller.

One of these parametric models is a double beta distribution with a mass point at the list price. An example of the double beta density function for bids is presented in the left hand panel of figure 4.1 below. There is a right-skewed component of the bid distribution to the left of the list price mass point, and then a smaller left skewed beta distribution above this mass point. The most important part is the piece below the list price, which captures the “underbidding” that is the predominant outcome of matches between a buyer and the seller. The right skewed beta component has as its support the interval $[.25, 1]$ where we have normalized the bid as a ratio of the current list price of the house, $P$. Thus, the lower support .25 represents a bid equal to 1/4 of the current list price of the home.

The distribution plotted in the left hand panel of figure 4.1 is actually a rescaled version of the double beta distribution. The figure does not include the mass point at the list price due to problems with plotting density values and the mass point on the same scale. The beta density component to the left of the mass point the list price has been scaled to have a total mass of .85, representing the probability that a bid will be strictly below the list price. The component of the beta distribution above 1 is scaled to have a total mass of .05, representing a 5% probability of receiving a bid strictly above the list price. The remaining
mass is a 10% probability of receiving a bid equal to the list price.

Based on initial empirical work, we judged this double beta model to be a good approximation to the actual distribution of bids we observe in the English housing data. The double beta distribution was specified so that the probabilities of receiving a bid below, equal to, or strictly above the list price was given by a trinomial logit model and the \((a, b)\) parameters of the beta distributions were specified as (exponential) functions of state variables in the model (e.g. number of weeks on the market, the list price, and other variables). Unfortunately, as we see in the right hand panel of figure 4.1, the results of this model have unreasonable implications for sellers’ beliefs about the relationship between the list price and the expected bid submitted by buyers. The expected bid function is a monotonically increasing function of the list price. It seems quite unreasonable that a seller should expect to receive to roughly double the expected bid on his house by doubling the list price, but this is exactly what the results from an unrestricted reduced form estimation of the offer distribution implies!

Further, our reduced form estimation results for the arrival rate of matches resulted in a positive relationship between list price and arrival rates of buyers, even after controlling for unobserved random effects, as represented by the \(v_0\) term in the seller’s financial value of the home. Combining these two results, it is clear that any seller with such beliefs would find it optimal to set an arbitrarily large list price for their homes, something we never observe in practice. So clearly there is some problem with the flexible two step approach to estimating the seller model.
The problems we experienced are probably not due to a misspecification of beliefs, since our reduced form model is a highly flexible specification capable of closely approximating the actual distribution of bids (and rates of arrival of matches). We believe the problem is due to the endogeneity of list prices. In particular, unobservable characteristics $\eta_0$ that increase the financial value of a home also tend to increase the list price, and also bids made on a home. If we fail to control for these unobservables (as we have in our initial reduced form estimations), it is perfectly conceivable that the endogeneity problems could be strong enough to produce the spurious and implausible monotonic relationship between list price and expected bid values that we see in figure 4.1.

It might be possible to try to use more sophisticated reduced-from econometric methods to overcome the endogeneity problems. However it is clear that the seller’s behavior is largely determined by the seller’s beliefs about buyers. Particularly important are the seller’s beliefs about how the list price affects the rate of arrival of offers and distribution from which these offers are drawn from when they do arrive. Thus, there is a huge amount of information that can be brought to bear in estimating these rather slippery objects by adopting a fully structural, simultaneous approach to estimation where we estimate the sellers beliefs along with the other unknown parameters of the seller (e.g. the discount rate, and the parameters affecting hassle costs, and so forth) using a nested numerical solution approach. Under this approach we would solve the seller’s dynamic programming problem repeatedly for different trial values of the parameters governing the seller’s beliefs as well as the other parameters of the model. Trial parameter values that produce “unreasonable” beliefs for the seller (such as shown in figure 4.1) would be discarded by this algorithm since these parameter values imply an optimal selling strategy that is greatly at odds with the behavior we observe in the data.

While it may ultimately be possible to estimate fairly flexible specifications for sellers’ beliefs about buyer bids and arrival rates (such as the double beta distribution and even more flexible semiparametric specifications for the offer distributions), we have decided that it would be best to start by providing more structure on the bid distribution. There are two main reasons for this. First, even if we were able to successfully estimate the parameters of the double beta model as structural parameters in a maximum likelihood or simulated minimum distance estimator, there would be the issue of how to interpret these estimated coefficients in terms of an underlying model of bidder behavior.

Instead, we felt that more insight could be gained by trying to build some sort of rudimentary model of bidding behavior on the part of buyers. By placing more structure on the offer distributions we obtained
much more control over the estimation of the model. This is especially important since small movements in the parameters for beliefs can result in “unreasonable beliefs” and these unreasonable beliefs can lead to discontinuous “bang-bang” type shifts in the optimal selling strategy. The semi-reduced form model has fewer free parameters than the more flexibly specified reduced form models of bidding behavior, the parameters are more readily interpretable, and it is easier to see whether the estimated parameters are unreasonable or not, and how to constrain parameters to “reasonable” sections of the parameter space.

The “semi-reduced form model” of buyers’ bidding behavior derives the distribution of bids from two underlying “semi-structural” objects: 1) a specification of buyers’ bid functions, $b(v, l, F)$, and 2) a specification of the distribution of buyer valuations, $h(v|F, l)$, where $v$ is the buyer’s private valuation of the home, $F$ is the financial value of the home, and $l$ is the current list price. In order to maintain the homogeneity restriction, we assume that $l$ and $F$ only enter $b$ and $h$ in a ratio form, i.e. as $p = l/F$. Thus, in the subsequent notation we will write these objects as $b(v, p)$ and $h(v|p)$.

We put “structural” in quotes because a fully structural model of buyer behavior would derive the buyers’ bid functions from yet deeper structure: from the solution to their search and bargaining problem. We eventually want to extend the model in this direction, but since the English housing data contain relatively little data on buyers other than the bids they make in matches observed in the data set, it seems sensible to start out with a less complicated and detailed model of their behavior. In particular, since we do not have any data that follows buyers as they search among different homes and allow us to see homes they visit and don’t make offers on and homes they visit and do make offers on, it seems that a more complicated buyer search model will have many additional parameters characterizing buyer search costs and opportunity sets and preferences for different locations and types of houses. The presence of so many additional parameters in the absence of good data on how buyers actually search and decide which houses to bid on could lead to severe identification problems if we have to rely only on a highly self-selected data set of actual matches. This is our justification for failing to pursue a more detailed model of buyer behavior at this point.

The simplest specification for bid functions that we could think of that yields an offer distribution with a mass point at the current list price of the house is the following class of piecewise linear bid functions:

$$b(v, p) = \begin{cases} 
  r_1(p)v & \text{if } v \in [\underline{v}, v_1) \\
  p & \text{if } v \in [v_1, v_1 + k(p)) \\
  r_2(p)v & \text{if } v \in [v_1 + k(p), \overline{v}] 
\end{cases}$$

(7)
where \( \underline{v} \) and \( \overline{v} \) are the lower and upper bounds, respectively, on the support of the distribution of buyer valuations (to be discussed shortly). To ensure continuity of \( b(v, l) \) as a function of \( v \), \( r_1 \) and \( r_2 \) must satisfy the following restrictions

\[
p = r_1(p)v_1 \\
p = r_2(p)(v_1 + k(p))
\]

This implies that

\[
v_1 = \frac{p}{r_1(p)} \\
r_2(p) = \frac{p}{l/r_1(p) + k(p)}
\]

Thus, the bid functions are fully determined by the two functions \( r_1(p) \) and \( k(p) \). The first function determines how aggressive the bidder will be in terms of what fraction of the buyer’s true valuation the buyer is willing to bid, for the first bid (we will consider specifications for 2nd and 3rd bid functions below). The closer \( r_1(p) \) is to 1 the more “aggressive” the buyer is in his/her bidding (i.e. the closer they are to truthful bidding). We assume that the buyer interprets the list price \( l \) as a signal from the seller about what the seller’s reservation value is and as a signal of how reasonable the seller is. If the list price ratio \( p \) is substantially bigger than 1, the buyer will interpret this as a sign of an “unreasonable” list price by the seller, and so the buyer will respond by shading their bid to a higher degree. Conversely, a seller that “underprices” their home by setting a list price less than the financial value will result in more aggressive bidding by buyers, i.e. \( r_1(p) \) will be closer to 1 when \( p < 1 \). Thus, we posit that \( r'_1(p) < 0 \), so that a seller who considers overpricing their home will expect that buyers will shade their first bids to a greater degree.

The bid functions have a flat segment equal to the list price for valuations in the interval \([v_1, v_1 + k(p)]\). As we noted above, this flat section is empirically motivated by the fact that we observe a mass point in bid distributions at the list price. By adjusting the length of this flat segment \( k(p) \) we can affect the size of the mass point in the bid distribution and thereby attempt to match observed bid distributions.

We posit that \( k'(p) < 0 \) for reasons similar to the assumption that \( r'_1(p) \leq 0 \): a seller who overprices his/her home by setting a list price bigger than 1 will result in a shorter range of valuations over which buyers would be willing to submit a first offer equal to the list price. Conversely, if a seller underprices his/her home by setting a list price less than 1, there should be a wider interval of valuations over which the buyer is willing to submit a first offer equal to the list price. Observe that since the probability of a first
offer equal to the list price is the probability that valuations fall into the interval \([v_1, v_1 + k(p)]\), it is not strictly necessary for \(k'(p) \leq 0\) in order for the probability of making an offer equal to the list price to be a declining function of \(l\), which is another feature we observe in the English housing data. However initially we will assume that \(k'(p) \leq 0\), but we can obviously consider relaxations of this condition later.

The left hand panel of Figure 4.2 plots examples of bid functions for four different values of \(p\). These bid functions were generated from the following specifications for the function \(r_1(p)\) and \(k(p)\):

\[
\begin{align*}
    r_1(p) &= 0.98(1 - \gamma(p)) + 0.85\gamma(p) \\
    k(p) &= 0.12(1 - \gamma(p)) + 0.07\gamma(p)
\end{align*}
\]

where

\[
\gamma(p) = \frac{p - v}{v - v_0}
\]

We see that the bid function for the highest list price, i.e. for a list price of \(p = 1.62\) given by the blue dotted line in the left hand panel of figure 4.2, involves the most shading and lies uniformly below the bid functions at other list prices. It follows that the list price of \(p = 1.62\) is dominated in terms of revenue to the seller by lower list prices. However, at more moderate list prices, the bid functions generally cross each other and so there is no unambiguous ranking based on strict dominance of the bid functions. For example if we compare the bid function for a list price of \(p = 1\) with the bid function with a list price of \(p = 1.09\) (the former is the orange dotted line and the latter is the solid red line in the left hand panel of figure 4.2), we see that the bid function for the lower list price \(p = 1\) is higher for buyers with lower valuations and also for buyers with sufficiently high valuations, but the bid function with \(p = 1.09\) (corresponding to a 9% markup over the financial value of the home), is higher for an intermediate range of buyer valuations. Thus the question of which of the two list prices result in higher expected revenues depends on the distribution of buyer valuations: if this distribution has sufficient mass in the intermediate range of buyer valuations where the bid function for the higher list price \(p = 1.09\) exceeds the bid function for the lower list price \(p = 1\), then the expected bid from setting the higher list price will exceed the expected bid from setting a lower list price. Of course this statement is conditional on a buyer arriving and making a bid: we need to factor in the impact of list price on the arrival rate to compute the overall expected revenue corresponding to different list prices.

The right hand panel of figure 4.2 shows how the bid functions change in successive bidding stages. Bid functions for later bidding stages dominate the bid functions for earlier bidding stages, resulting in a
monotonically increasing sequence of bids that is consistent with what we almost always observe in the English housing data. However, there are intervals of valuations where the bids lie on the flat segment of the bidding function, so this model can generate a sequence of bids where a previous bid (equal to the list price) is simply resubmitted by the bidder. This is also something we observe in the English housing data.

We complete the description of the semi-reduced form model by describing assumptions about the distribution of buyers’ valuations for the home, \( h(v|p) \). We assume that \( h(v|p) \) is in the Beta family of distributions and thus it is fully specified by two parameters \((a, b)\), as well as its support, \([v, \overline{v}]\). We do not place any restriction on the distribution of valuations. In particular, it might be the case that buyers who have relatively higher than average valuations for a given home may choose to make offers: this would argue for a “positively biased” specification where \( E\{v|p\} > p \). The direction of the bias might also depend on the list price: overpriced homes that have been on the market for a long time might be more likely to attract “vultures” i.e. buyers with lower than average valuations who are hoping to get a good deal if the seller “caves”. We could imagine many other types of stories or scenarios. All of these suggest allowing for a more general model of valuations of the form \( f_t(v|p, d) \) where the distribution of valuations of buyers who make an offer on a home with a price ratio of \( p \) also depends on the duration since the last offer \( d \) and the length of time that house has been listed, \( t \).

While there is a value (in terms of additional flexibility in the types of bid distributions that can be generated) by allowing for flexibility in the distribution of buyer valuations, it is clear that if we allow...
arbitrary amounts of flexibility then we might run into the same sorts of paradoxes that we illustrated for
the fully reduced form specification of buyer bidding behavior. In particular if the distribution of buyer
valuations shifts upward sufficiently quickly as the list price rises, then it is clearly possible that such a
model could result in expected bids that are a monotonically increasing function of \( p \), just as we observed
in the double beta specification in figure 4.1. In addition there can be difficult identification problems
since higher bids can be increased by either a) fixing a set of piecewise linear bid functions but shifting
the distribution of valuation to the right, or b) fixing a distribution of valuations but allowing the piecewise
bid functions to rise. For this reason, we have started by fixing the support and \((a, b)\) parameters of the
distribution of valuations and focus on estimating the parameters of the piecewise linear bid functions.

Let \( B(u|a, b) \) be a beta distribution on the \([0, 1]\) interval with parameters \((a, b)\). We can derive the
distribution of bids from this distribution by first rescaling this distribution to the \([v, \overline{v}]\) interval to get the
distribution of valuations \( H(v) \) given by

\[
H(v) = Pr\{\tilde{v} \leq v\} = B((v - \overline{v})/\overline{v} - v|a, b). \tag{12}
\]

The left hand panel of figure 4.3 plots an example of a beta distribution of valuations on the interval
\([\underline{v}, \overline{v}] = [0.5, 3]\) for different values of the \((a, b)\) parameters. These parameters give us the flexibility to affect
both the mode and the tail behavior of the distributions independently of each other. For fixed \( a \), increases
in \( b \) decrease the expected value \( E\{v\} \) and move the mode towards zero and thin out the upper tail, whereas
for fixed \( b \), increases in \( a \) increase the mode, the mean, and thickens the upper tail of \( H(v) \) although larger changes are required in \( a \) to produce comparably dramatic shifts in \( H(v) \) compared with changes in \( b \), at
least for \( a > 1 \).

The right hand panel of Figure 4.3 plots the implied probability that an offer equals the list price, as
a function of \( p \) at successive stages of the within week bargaining process for buyers whose distribution
of valuations is a beta distribution on the support \([0.85, 1.8]\) with parameters \((a, b) = (4.5, 12)\). We see that
these implied probabilities are roughly in line with the data for the limited range of list prices that we
observe in the English housing data (i.e. a mean first offer that is roughly equal to the financial value, i.e.
\( E\{b(v, p)\} \simeq 1 \), where the mean value of \( p \) is approximately equal to 1.05. This implies that \( r_1(p) \simeq 0.95 \)
when \( p \simeq 0.95 \). Actually, for the specification of \( r_1(p) \) given above, we have \( r_1(1.05) = 0.9248 \).

The implied distribution of bids, \( G(x|a, b, p) \), is given by

\[
G(x|a, b, l) = Pr\{b(\tilde{v}, p) \leq x\}
\]
Due to the presence of the flat segment, the usual notion of an inverse of the bid function does not exist. However if we interpret the inverse of the bid function at the value \( p \) as the interval \([v_1, v_1 + k(p)]\), we obtain a distribution of bids that has a mass point in the distribution of bids at the list price, consistent with what we observe in the English housing data.

In summary we can write the distribution of bids implied by our semi-reduced form specification of bidding behavior explicitly in terms of the functions \( r_1(p) \) and \( k(p) \) as

\[
G(x|a,b,p) = \begin{cases} 
  B \left( \frac{x}{r_1(p) - v}/(\nu - v) | a,b \right) & \text{if } x \in [v_1, p) \\
  B \left( \frac{(k(p) + p/r_1(p) + k(p) - v)/(\nu - v)}{a,b} - B \left( \frac{(p/r_1(p) - v)/(\nu - v)}{a,b} \right) \right) & \text{if } x = p \\
  B \left( \frac{(x/p/r_1(p) + k(p) - v)/(\nu - v)}{a,b} \right) & \text{if } x \in (p, \nu] 
\end{cases}
\]

Using this distribution function, we can compute the expected bid function \( E \{ \tilde{b} | p \} \) as

\[
E \{ \tilde{b} | p \} = \int xG(dx|a,b,p) = \int_{v_1}^{\nu} b(v,p)H(dv). \tag{15}
\]

Note that the expectation depends both on the list price and on the financial value because bids are interpreted as ratios of list price to the financial value of the home.
Figure 4.4 plots the expected bid functions for several different specifications of the distribution of valuations. We see that the expected bid functions are unimodal and are maximized at list prices that are higher than 1, providing an incentive for the seller to “overprice” when the seller sets a list price. Of course this is not the full story, since the seller must also account for the effect of the list price on arrival rates of buyers. The dynamic programming problem takes both factors into account, as well as other dynamic considerations and the fixed menu costs involved in changing the list price.

5 Empirical Results

This section presents econometric estimates of our model of the house seller’s decision via two different estimation methods: a (quasi) maximum likelihood approach (QMLE), and a simulated minimum distance approach (SMD). In general terms, the objective of both estimation methods is to find estimates of the unknown parameters of our semi-reduced form model of bidding behavior that enable the predicted optimal selling strategy from our dynamic programming model to best fit the actual selling behavior that we observe in the English housing data. The current version of the model has 26 unknown parameters that we estimate, and most of these parameters affect the seller’s beliefs about the arrival rate of buyers and the nature of the bargaining process when a buyer arrives and makes an offer.
As we noted in section 3, we have adopted a “full solution” approach to estimation — that is, we estimate the seller’s belief parameters by repeatedly numerically resolving for the optimal selling strategy for different trial values of the parameters in an inner dynamic programming subroutine while an outer optimization algorithm searches for parameters that maximize the likelihood (for the QMLE estimator) or minimize a quadratic form in a vector of actual versus simulated moments of interest from the real and simulated housing data (for the SMD estimator). We found that the full solution approach resulted in much more sensible outcomes, because this approach enforces the requirement that the implied optimal selling strategy should be close to the selling behavior we observe.17

Before we go into further detail about the estimation methods, we illustrate our principal empirical findings in figure 5.1 below. As we noted in the introduction, our main empirical finding is that our model of optimal selling by a rational seller is able to fit the key features we observe in the English housing data, particularly the observed stickiness in list prices. The left hand panel of figure 5.1 plots the optimal list prices, reservation values and the value function corresponding to the estimated parameters from the model. The top blue line is the optimal list price, and notice that it is nearly flat as a function of weeks on the market. The most significant drop in list prices occurs in week 74, when the list price drops from $P = 0.9819$ to $P = 0.7000$ (recall that the list price is represented as a ratio of the actual list price of the home in £ to the seller’s unobserved financial value of the home). In this version of the model the selling horizon is assumed to be $T = 80$ weeks, so the final price cut in the last period, plotted as a further list price cut to a list price of 0, actually corresponds to withdrawing the home from sale in the last period of the model.

The other three solid color lines in the left hand panel of figure 5.1 are the seller’s reservation values at the three stages in the “bargaining process” of our model. We see that even though list prices are essentially flat as a function of duration since listing, the reservation prices decline more or less continuously over time, and their rate of decrease accelerates after a house has been on the market unsold for over one hear. At this point the price the seller is willing to accept drops rapidly, falling below 90% of the seller’s estimate of the financial value, even though the seller maintains the list price at slightly above his/her estimate of

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17 Recall that we were not successful in using a “semiparametric two step” approach to estimation where we attempted to estimate a much less restrictive “fully reduced form specification” of the sellers’ beliefs via flexible non-parametric and semi-parametric methods in the first stage, and then estimate the remaining “preference parameters” for the seller in the second stage. We have speculated that endogeneity issues, particularly the presence of unobserved characteristics of a home that are correlated with arrival rates, bids, and bargaining behavior, to be responsible for the failure of the semi-parametric two step approach: so far we have not been able to determine any way to deal with the existence of unobserved variables that act as confounding variables in the first stage of the two stage estimation strategy.
The right hand panel of figure 5.1 illustrates the optimal list price decision rule in detail in week 2 of the selling process. The unconstrained optimal list price (i.e. the price the seller would choose if there were no menu costs to changing the list price) is $P = 1.0226$, i.e. a 2.26% premium above the seller’s estimate of the financial value of the home. However at the time the seller first listed the home, the optimal list price at that point was $P = 1.0299$, i.e. a nearly 3% markup over the seller’s estimate of the financial value. What the right hand panel of figure 5.1 shows is that the presence of a fixed menu cost creates an inaction zone about the unconstrained optimal list price of $P = 1.0226$. That is, for any list price that is sufficiently close to this unconstrained optimal value (either above or below), the gains the seller would expect from reducing the list price do not exceed the small menu cost, which we estimate to be less than $K = .00006$, or 6 thousandths of 1% of the seller’s financial value of the home. This would be less than £12 for a home with a financial value of £200,000.

It follows that since the initial list price $P = 1.0299$ lies within this inaction zone after 2 weeks on the market, in fact the seller will not adjust the list price in week 2, but rather continue to maintain the initial list price of $P = 1.0299$. In fact, in simulations of the optimal strategy, it will not be optimal for a seller who has not received any acceptable offers on his/her home to reduce the list price until the 26th week that the home is on the market. At that point gain from reducing the list price from the initially optimal value of $P = 1.0299$ to the optimal value that prevails in week 26, $P = 1.0085$ is large enough to overcome the
menu cost, and so the seller announces a large, discontinuous cut in the list price at this time.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the foregoing discussion by plotting two simulated realizations of the optimal selling strategy. In the left hand panel we see that the seller maintains his/her initial list price for the first 26 weeks, but no offers were received. Then in the 27th week the seller reduced the list price by just over 2% and in the 30th week a buyer arrive and made an initial bid equal to 83% of the list price, which the seller rejected. This is illustrated by the red dot in the left hand panel of figure 5.2. Then the buyer increased her offer with a bid equal to 86% of the list price and the seller rejected this too (illustrated by the blue square). The buyer then made a final offer of 87.5% of the list price and since this exceeded the seller’s reservation value of .8744 (this latter number is as a ratio of the seller’s financial value, which is approximately equal to the list price also at this point), the seller decided to accept this final counteroffer. The right hand panel of figure 5.2 illustrates a case where a seller receives no offers at all until the 60th week on the market, at which point an offer arrives that equals the seller’s list price, which the seller had reduced in the 26th week to a value just slightly higher than their financial value. The seller accepted this first offer immediately, since it substantially exceeded his/her reservation value of .8320.

The other significant point to notice about the optimal selling strategy at this point is that the seller’s reservation values decline at each successive stage of the “bargaining process.” The reason we obtain this prediction in our model is due to the assumptions underlying the bidding automata that constitute our model of buyer behavior. Our seller does use all information to determine the “type” of the buyer based
on the buyer’s initial bid. Indeed, we presume that the seller also knows the coefficients of the piecewise linear bid function used by the buyer and inverts this function to determine the buyer’s bid (unless the buyer bids at the seller’s list price, in which case the seller only knows that the buyer’s valuation is on the flat segment of the piecewise linear bid function). However, because of the exogenous probability that a buyer will walk if the seller rejects the buyer’s previous bid, the model tells us that it is optimal for the seller to lower his/her reservation price when evaluating a new offer by the same buyer. The intuition is that the seller regards the buyer as a “fish nibbling at the bait” and it would be better to sell now at a somewhat lower price than to try to be too greedy and risk the chance that the buyer would walk if the seller rejected the buyer’s new offer. If the current buyer leaves, the seller knows that it could be many weeks before the next interested buyer arrives who is willing to make an offer on the home.

Before we turn to a discussion of the details about the estimation and overall fit of the model, it is useful to illustrate some of the rich implications of our model for some counterfactual parameter values. Figure 5.3 illustrates the impact on the value function and reservation prices if we change the seller’s beliefs about the rate of arrival of buyers to make the arrival rate significantly more sensitive to the list price than our estimation results indicate are the case. Thus, in a binary logit specification of the arrival rate, there are four coefficients, a constant term $\theta_{16}$ that governs the overall rate of arrival, a coefficient on the list price $\theta_{17}$, and two other dummy variables that are designed to capture the higher rate of arrival of buyers in the first 10 weeks that a home is listed for sale, $\theta_{18}$ and $\theta_{19}$. Our QMLE parameter estimates result in an estimated constant term of $\hat{\theta}_{16} = -2.018$ and an estimated coefficient of the list price equal to $\hat{\theta}_{17} = -0.28962$. In figure 5.3 below we illustrate how the solution changes when we change these coefficients to $\theta_{16} = -1.0$ and $\theta_{17} = -1.5$. The sum of these two coefficients is approximately $-2.5$, which is slightly lower than the sum of of the two estimated coefficients, thus implying a somewhat lower rate of arrival of buyers under the counterfactual of setting a list price at $P = 1$.

The changes in the optimal selling strategy resulting from this seemingly small change in the seller’s beliefs are striking: while the initial list price is somewhat smaller than the previous (estimated) model illustrated in figure 5.1 (i.e. $P = 1.0017$ versus $P = 1.00299$), the optimal solutions diverge dramatically after the 9th week on the market. In the version of the model where the arrival rate is more sensitive to the list price, the seller reduces the list price to $P = 0.7$ in the 9th week and keeps this value in all subsequent weeks of the selling horizon. We also see an interesting situation with an “inverted” selling strategy, i.e. where the seller’s reservation values are higher than the list price. This is an example of an underpricing
strategy that we discussed in the introduction: the seller lowers the list price significantly below the seller’s belief about the true financial value of the home in order to “get buyers through the door”. Once the buyers actually come to view the home they are willing to pay more than the list price, and this is reflected by the seller’s reservation price functions, which are not dramatically lower than the reservation prices illustrated in the left hand panel of figure 5.1. Indeed, simulations of this model show that the seller expects to earn 96% of the financial value from following this underpricing strategy — only slightly lower than what the seller would expect to earn under the original model using the estimated arrival rate parameters.

Now that we have a better idea of the types of outcomes that are possible from the dynamic programming model, we can turn to the details on how we estimated the unknown parameters of the model. The quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) was constructed by writing a likelihood for as many of the statistically “non-degenerate” components of the model as possible. Let $\theta$ denote the $26 \times 1$ vector of unknown parameters that we are interested in estimating (to be described shortly). The optimal strategy from the solution to the dynamic programming model results in an initial list price ratio $P_0(\theta)$ that all sellers are assumed to list their homes at. In addition, the model results in a contingent sequence of subsequent list prices $P_t(\theta|P_{t-1}(\theta), \ldots, P_0(\theta))$ that represent the history dependence in list prices arising from the presence of a fixed menu cost of changing the list price, as illustrated in figure 5.2 and the discussion.
above. The solution to the DP model also results in a sequence of seller reservation values \( \{R_t(s, \theta)\} \), \( s = 1, 2, 3 \) and \( t = 0, 1, \ldots, T - 1 \), where \( T \) is the selling horizon which we have assumed to be fixed at \( T = 80 \) weeks. Finally, our semi-reduced form model of bidding behavior results in a stochastic arrival process of bids according to a non-stationary Markovian arrival rate function and probability of walking in the event a bid is rejected (to be described below), and the distribution of bids generated from our assumed beta distribution of buyer valuations and the piecewise linear bidding functions.

Using this solution, it is possible to derive non-degenerate distribution for the some components of the observables from which a likelihood function can be constructed. For example, the initial list price has a lognormal distribution given by the relation

\[
P_0 = \exp\{X\beta + \eta_0\}P_0(\theta),
\]

where \( \eta_0 \) is the normally distributed unobserved component of the seller’s financial value of the home, \( F_0 = \exp\{X\beta + \eta_0\} \). If \( P_0 \) is the actual list price set by the seller (in £), then we can solve equation (16) for \( \eta_0 \) and use this constructed residual to estimate the \((\mu, \sigma)\) parameters of the assumed normal distribution of \( \eta_0 \) along with the other parameters in \( \theta \) in a lognormal likelihood equation for the initial list prices.

However as we noted above, once the initial list price is determined, the subsequent sequence of list prices for the home evolve as a deterministic recurrence relation

\[
P_t = P_t(\theta|P_{t-1}(\theta), \ldots, P_0(\theta))
\]

which is a statistically degenerate model of subsequent price adjustment since price declines of certain magnitudes and at certain durations will have zero probability of occurring for any given value of the parameters, \( \theta \). This degeneracy can easily result to a “zero likelihood problem” whereby even though any initial list price can be rationalized for some choice of \( \eta_0 \), many of the subsequent list price values will be predicted to have zero probability of occurring by our model. While it is possible to introduce other state variables or other unobservables that can result in positive probabilities of price changes of various sizes and at different durations, it is very difficult to allow for a sufficiently flexible specification without introducing some \textit{ad hoc} elements to the model, and increasing the computational burden of evaluating the likelihood.

For example, if we were willing to assume that the seller chooses list prices that are rounded to the nearest multiple of £1000, and that there were unobservables \( \{\varepsilon_t(P)\} \) that were additive components of the cost of changing the list price to an alternative value \( P \), then it would be possible to recast the seller’s
problem as a standard dynamic discrete choice problem that have been analyzed elsewhere (see, e.g. Rust (1988)). However besides the fundamental arbitrariness of deciding what value/procedure the seller uses to “round” their list prices, the additional unobservables \( \{ \epsilon_t(P) \} \) ordinarily lead to a high dimensional integration problem if they are serially correlated over time. If we make the standard assumption following Rust (1988) that these unobservables are \( IID \) (both across different list prices \( P \) and over time) extreme value random variables, then conditional on \( \eta_0 \) the likelihood \( L(P_0, \ldots, P_T|\theta, \eta_0) \) of observing a sequence of list prices \( (P_0, \ldots, P_T) \) in week \( T \) by seller \( i \) is a product of multinomial logit conditional choice probabilities that take the form of discrete Markov transition probabilities \( \pi(P_t|P_{t-1}, \theta, \eta_0) \) that the seller will set a list price of \( P_t \) in week \( t \) conditional on setting a list price of \( P_{t-1} \) in the previous week and conditional on the unobservable component of the seller’s financial value, \( \eta_0 \). Thus to compute the likelihood for a single seller, we would need to integrate this likelihood with respect to the normal density for \( \eta_0 \), i.e. we compute the unconditional likelihood as

\[
L(P_0, P_1, \ldots, P_T|\theta) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} L(P_0, P_1, \ldots, P_T|\theta, \eta_0) f(\eta_0) d\eta_0 = L(P_0, P_1, \ldots, P_T|\theta, \mu + \sigma z) \phi(z) dz,
\]

where \( \phi \) is the standard normal density.

While this approach can be used to deal with statistical degeneracies in the dynamics of list prices, there are still other places where statistical degeneracies arise in this model. For example, while the distribution of the first offer submitted by a bidder is statistically non-degenerate, as it can be derived from the beta distribution of buyer valuations (which is an unobservable to the econometrician) and the piecewise linear bidding strategy that we assume buyers use — see equation (??) — the subsequent offers made by a bidder are predicted to be a deterministic function conditional on the first offer, and thus this model will result in zero likelihood problems if we attempt to write a full likelihood function for all parts of the data we observe.

Thus, rather than attempt to introduce artificial devices to try to produce a full, statistically non-degenerate likelihood function, we opted to use a “quasi” maximum likelihood approach, where the “quasi” denotes the use of \textit{ad hoc} “measurement error” assumptions (assumptions that we do not really believe because we do not believe there is any significant measurement error in our data), to derive a likelihood. Thus, if we assume that subsequent list prices are contaminated by additive, normally distributed measurement errors, it is possible to write a likelihood for the entire sequence of list prices, and components of this likelihood after the (legitimate) likelihood for the initial list price can also be interpreted as a non-linear
least squares approach where we try to find values of $\theta$ that minimize the squared deviations between the actual list prices and the ones predicted by our model.

Similarly we can include additive normally distributed measurement error to the subsequent bids after the initial rejected bid to generate binomial probit components that describe the probability a seller will accept or reject a sequence of bids from a buyer in any given match. The alternative interpretation is that this probit is just a device for smoothing out a (degenerate) indicator function that predicts that any bid in excess of the seller’s reservation value will be accepted with probability 1 and any bid that is less than the reservation value will be rejected with probability 1.

We will not go into further details and take the space to actually write down the quasi maximum likelihood function in all of its (gory) detail, but suffice it to say if one was willing to assume that there was measurement error in the list prices and bids, that this quasi maximum likelihood would be a legitimate and nondegenerate full likelihood function under these assumptions about measurement error.

It is useful to describe the functional forms for the arrival probabilities and the probabilities that a buyer will walk if a previous offer was rejected. The arrival probabilities are given by

$$
\lambda_t(P,d_t) = \frac{\exp(\theta_{16} + \theta_{17}P + \theta_{18}I\{2 \leq t \leq 5\} + \theta_{19}I\{6 \leq 6 \leq 10\})}{1 + \exp(\theta_{16} + \theta_{17}P + \theta_{18}I\{2 \leq t \leq 5\} + \theta_{19}I\{6 \leq 6 \leq 10\})} \quad (19)
$$

Similarly the probability of walking is also specified as a binomial logit model involving 6 coefficients $(\theta_{21}, \ldots, \theta_{26})$ where, for example, the stage 1 probability of walking (i.e. the probability the buyer leaves after the seller rejects the buyer’s first offer) is given by

$$
\omega_1(O_1,P,d_t) = \frac{\exp(\theta_{21} + \theta_{22}(O_1/P))}{1 + \exp(\theta_{21} + \theta_{22}(O_1/P))} \quad (20)
$$

The expressions for $\omega_2(O_2,P,d_t)$ and $\omega_3(O_3,P,d_t)$ are the same as above, but involve the coefficients $(\theta_{23}, \theta_{24})$ and $(\theta_{25}, \theta_{26})$, respectively.

The first 15 parameters of the model, $(\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{15})$ are used to specify the piece-wise linear model of bidding described in section 3. Due to the concerns about identification, we did not attempt to estimate the parameters of the beta distribution of buyer valuations. We assumed that this distribution had support $[v, \bar{v}] = [0.85, 1.8]$ (recall these values are ratios of the financial value of the home, so $\bar{v} = 1.8$ indicates a buyer whose private valuation of the home is 1.8 times its financial value), and the $(a,b)$ parameters of the beta distribution are $(a,b) = (4.5, 12.0)$, resulting in the distribution of valuations displayed in the left hand panel of figure 4.3.
Recalling the discussion in section 4, we can write the piecewise linear bid functions as functions of the parameter vector \( \theta \) as follows

\[
\begin{align*}
    r_{1s}(p) &= \mathcal{L}_{1s}(\theta)(1 - \gamma(p)) + \mathcal{R}_{1s}(\theta)\gamma(p) \\
    k_{s}(p) &= \mathcal{K}_{s}(\theta)(1 - \gamma(p)) + \mathcal{K}_{s}(\theta)\gamma(p)
\end{align*}
\]

(21)

where

\[
\gamma(p) = \frac{p - v}{v - v'}
\]

(22)

and \( s \) denotes the \( s \)th stage of the bargaining subgame, \( s = 1, 2, 3 \). Thus, \( r_{1s}(p) \) is the bid ratio (the ratio of the buyer’s valuation \( v \) that the bidder is willing to bid) in the first linear segment of the bid function in stage \( s \) of the bargaining subgame. Similarly, \( k_{s}(p) \) is the length of the flat segment of the bid function at the list price. This determines the probability that the buyer will submit a bid equal to the list price. The final segment of the bid function is \( r_{2s}(p) \). We assume that this is given by

\[
r_{2s}(p) = \mathcal{R}_{2s}(\theta)r_{1s}(p),
\]

(23)

so only three additional coefficients \( (\mathcal{R}_{21}, \mathcal{R}_{22}, \mathcal{R}_{23}) \) to specify the upper linear segment of the bid functions corresponding to bids in excess of the list price.

Thus, there are a total of 15 coefficients required to specify the piecewise linear bid functions: the 6 coefficients \( (\mathcal{L}_{1s}(\theta), \mathcal{R}_{1s}(\theta)), s = 1, 2, 3 \) determining the first linear segment of the bid functions below the list price, the 6 coefficients \( (\mathcal{K}_{s}(\theta), \mathcal{R}_{s}(\theta)), s = 1, 2, 3 \) determining the length of the flat segments corresponding to bids equal to the list price, and the 3 remaining ratio terms \( (\mathcal{R}_{2s}(\theta)), s = 1, 2, 3 \) determining the slope of the positively sloped component of the bid function for bids above the list price.

We found if we tried to estimate these 15 coefficients directly in an unrestricted QMLE or SMD estimation algorithm, the algorithm would quickly produce trial values for these parameters that would fail some basic monotonicity conditions to ensure that the bid functions are not downward sloping, that the bids at the lowest list price dominate the bids at the highest list price, and that the bid functions at higher stages of the bidding process dominate bid functions at lower stages (this latter requirement ensures that the sequence of counteroffers submitted by a buyer are a strictly increasing sequence, with the exception of possible ties at the list price).

The following equations describe a 1 : 1 mapping between \( \mathbb{R}^{15} \) and a restricted subset of \( \mathbb{R}^{15} \) where the above constraints are all satisfied with probability 1:
\[ \begin{align*}
\theta_1 &= \log(1/\ell_{11} - 1) \\
\theta_2 &= \log((1 - \ell_{11})/(\ell_{12} - \ell_{11}) - 1) \\
\theta_3 &= \log((1 - \ell_{12})/(\ell_{13} - \ell_{12}) - 1) \\
\theta_4 &= \log(\ell_{11}/\tau_{11} - 1) \\
\theta_5 &= \log((\ell_{12} - \tau_{11})/(\tau_{12} - \tau_{11}) - 1) \\
\theta_6 &= \log((\ell_{13} - \tau_{12})/(\tau_{13} - \tau_{12}) - 1) \\
\theta_7 &= \log(1/k_{11} - 1) \\
\theta_8 &= \log((1 - k_{11})/(k_{12} - k_{11}) - 1) \\
\theta_9 &= \log((1 - k_{12})/(k_{13} - k_{12}) - 1) \\
\theta_{10} &= \log(k_{11}/k_{11} - 1) \\
\theta_{11} &= \log((k_{12} - k_{11})/(k_{12} - k_{11}) - 1) \\
\theta_{12} &= \log((k_{13} - k_{12})/(k_{13} - k_{12}) - 1) \\
\theta_{13} &= \log(1/\ell_{21} - 1) \\
\theta_{14} &= \log((1 - \ell_{21})/(\ell_{22} - \ell_{21}) - 1) \\
\theta_{15} &= \log((1 - \ell_{22})/(\ell_{23} - \ell_{22}) - 1)
\end{align*} \]

Using this mapping, we can conduct an unrestricted parameter search over \((\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{15})\) and rest assured that the implied coefficients of the piecewise linear bid functions will obey the requisite monotonicity conditions. It is essentially a clever way of imposing inequality constraints that avoids the use of constrained optimization algorithms, which are typically less efficient and less reliable optimizers than unconstrained optimization algorithms.

In summary, coefficients \((\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{15})\) are the parameters specifying the seller’s beliefs about the piecewise linear bid functions used by bidders. Coefficients \((\theta_{16}, \ldots, \theta_{19})\) are the parameters specifying the seller’s beliefs about the arrival probability of buyers, and parameters \((\theta_{21}, \ldots, \theta_{26})\) are the parameters specifying the seller’s beliefs about the probability a buyer will walk at each stage of the bargaining subgame if the buyer’s previous offer was rejected.

The remaining parameter of the model is \(K = \exp\{\theta_{20}\}\), the fixed menu cost of changing the list price. The remaining parameters of the seller’s problem have been fixed. We assumed that the seller’s subjective discount factor is \(\beta = 1\), corresponding to a 0% annualized subjective interest rate, and we assumed that the seller’s beliefs about the distribution of buyer valuations is the time invariant beta distribution discussed above and presented in the left hand panel of figure 4.3. In addition, we fixed several other parameters that relate to the continuation value of withdrawing the home from the market and the weekly holding cost.
function \( h_t(P, d_t) \) given in equation (??). As per our previous discussion about the difficulty of identifying the continuation value given that none of the 780 sellers in our sample withdrew their homes from the market (i.e. all were eventually successful in selling their homes), we simply assumed that \( W_t(P, d_t) = .2 \), i.e. the continuation value is 20% of the seller’s estimate of the financial value of the home. We assumed that the holding cost was a simple linear increasing function of duration on the market

\[
\begin{align*}
  h_t(P, d_t) &= h_0(1 - w(t)) + h_T w(t),
\end{align*}
\]  

(25)

where \( w(t) = t/T \) and \( t \) is number of weeks the home has been on the market. In the results presented here, we assumed that \( h_0 = .007 \) and \( h_T = .008 \), so that the weekly hassle costs of having a home listed for sale start at 0.7 percent and increase to 0.8 of the financial value of the home. Thus for a home with a financial value of £100,000, this holding cost starts at £700 per week and increases to £800. These numbers may seem relatively high, but we found that the solutions of the model were relatively insensitive to the particular values we used. However in the next section we will show how the solution to the seller’s problem changes for a desperate seller, i.e. one for whom the weekly holding costs are substantially higher than what we assumed here. The main effect of lowering the weekly holding costs in a uniform (i.e. parallel) way is to make the seller slightly more aggressive in the list prices he/she sets, and in the reservation values. In effect, the holding costs are another way to reflect an “impatient seller” and when the seller is quite impatient (i.e. has high holding costs), the seller prices less aggressively and is willing to accept lower offers in order to sell the home more quickly and avoid having the selling proceeds consumed by the holding costs.

The only other parameters in our model are the fixed and variable costs associated with selling the home, mainly due to real estate fees and other closing costs. The real estate commissions charged by the British real estate agency we are studying are admirably low by U.S. standards, the commission rate is only 1.8% of the sale price of the home. We assume that the entire commission is paid by the seller but the buyer pays for all other fixed selling expenses associated with the final closing, including the seller’s legal fees and taxes. Thus, we used the following specification for the net sale proceeds from selling the home as a function of the accepted offer \( O \)

\[
N_t(O) = .982 \times O.
\]  

(26)

Table 5.1 presents the QMLE parameter estimates. We do not present standard errors because due to lack of smoothness in the QMLE objective function (discussed below) we are not sure that we have truly
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>QMLE Estimate</th>
<th>SMD Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_1$</td>
<td>$\zeta_{11}$</td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td>0.899</td>
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<td>$\theta_2$</td>
<td>$\zeta_{12}$</td>
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<td>0.933</td>
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<td>$\theta_{11}$</td>
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<td>0.057</td>
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<td>$\zeta_{21}$</td>
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<td>0.759</td>
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<td>$\theta_{14}$</td>
<td>$\zeta_{22}$</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.808</td>
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<td>$\zeta_{23}$</td>
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<td>arrival constant</td>
<td>$-2.018$</td>
<td>$-1.981$</td>
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<td>list price coefficient</td>
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<td>$-0.296$</td>
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<td>$\theta_{18}$</td>
<td>coefficient of $I{1 \leq t \leq 5}$</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.461</td>
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<td>$\theta_{19}$</td>
<td>coefficient of $I{6 \leq t \leq 10}$</td>
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<td>0.400</td>
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<td>$\theta_{20}$</td>
<td>$K$ (menu cost)</td>
<td>0.00006</td>
<td>0.00004</td>
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<td>walk prob constant ($s = 1$)</td>
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<td>$-3.918$</td>
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<td>$\theta_{22}$</td>
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<td>$\theta_{24}$</td>
<td>walk prob offer coeff ($s = 2$)</td>
<td>4.310</td>
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<td>$\theta_{25}$</td>
<td>walk prob constant ($s = 3$)</td>
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<td>$-5.41$</td>
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<td>$\theta_{26}$</td>
<td>walk prob offer coeff ($s = 3$)</td>
<td>6.110</td>
<td>6.369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

maximized the likelihood function and we do not trust the traditional asymptotic approximations based on taking numerical derivatives of the QMLE objective function with respective the parameters in order to compute a numerical Hessian and information matrix. The standard “sandwich formula” involving these objects is the misspecification consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the QMLE parameter estimates, see White (1982).

The simulated minimum distance estimator (SMD), sometimes also referred to as a “simulated method of moments estimator”, estimates $\theta$ by minimizing a distance function constructed as quadratic form between an $N \times 1$ vector of moments about housing transactions that we actually observe in the English housing data, call this $m$, and a conformable $N \times 1$ vector of simulated moments, call this $m_S(\theta)$, formed by creating an artificial data set with the same set of 780 homes with the same set of observable charac-
teristics $X$ and same hedonic values $\exp\{X \beta\}$ (where the $\beta$ coefficients are computed from a first stage regression using the data, independent of the housing model), but simulated $S$ times and the individual moments from each $IID$ simulation are averaged to form the vector of simulated moments $m_S(\theta)$. Then the SMD criterion is

$$
\hat{\theta} = \text{argmin} \left[ m - m_S(\theta) \right]'W[m - m_S(\theta)]
$$

where $W$ is an $N \times N$ positive definite weighting matrix. The results we report here are based on a diagonal weighting matrix so the SMD criterion is equivalent to a form of weighted nonlinear least squares. We chose the weights so that the moments we consider the most important to try to match are given precedence.

The SMD and QMLE constitute different statistical objective functions so it should not be surprising that each results in somewhat different parameter estimates. In theory, if the model was correctly specified and if the global optimum of each of these criteria were obtained, then asymptotically the two different sets of parameter estimates should converge to the same (true) set of parameter values $\theta^*$. However more realistically our model is likely to be misspecified in important respects and parameters that maximize the QMLE criterion are not necessarily close to the ones that minimize the SMD criterion. Further, as we discuss below, both of these objective functions are quite jagged functions of the parameters, and while we tried diligently to search the 26 dimensional parameter space to ensure that the parameter estimates we report in Table 5.1 are global and not just not local optimizers, we cannot provide any guarantee that this is the case.

Despite these caveats, it is reassuring that the two sets of parameters are not far from each other. This is an independent check on the validity of each of the estimation criteria, since data problems or programming errors can easily result in problems in the statistical objective functions that can distort the parameter estimates. The SMD criterion is based on a total of $N = 286$ individual moments. We do not have space here to list all of these moments. A subset of the moments that we used are reported in table 5.2 below, along with the weights we used for each moment. In the results presented in tables 5.1 and 5.2 we used equal weights of 1 for all $N = 286$ moments.

While the SMD and QMLE parameter estimates are not dramatically different from each other in table 5.1, small changes in the parameters can result in fairly big changes in the objective function value. In part this reflects the lack of smoothness in the estimation criteria. For example, we used the converged value of the QMLE estimates in the first column of table 5.1 as the starting values for the SMD estimator. The value of the SMD criterion at the QMLE parameter estimates was 657836 but the final value that the
Nelder Mead (nonsmooth) optimizer located results in a criterion value of 379476. Thus, the algorithm found substantial improvements in the objective function by changing certain components of \( \theta \) in order to better fit certain moments in our list of \( N = 286 \) “moments of interest.”

Table 5.2 compares a selected subset of 44 of the universe of \( N = 286 \) moments that we used to estimate the parameters of the seller’s model by SMD. The reader should trust that we have not “cherry picked” moments that are most favorable to our model, and a table that compares the entire set of 286 moments is available on request. What table 5.2 shows is that the model captures a broad array of features in the London housing data, not just the stickiness of list prices. Starting with the first moment in table 5.2, we see that (as promised in section 3) the SMD parameter estimates do satisfy the “rationality constraint” that the seller’s financial value is an unbiased expectation of the ultimate selling price. The moment compares the mean of the ratios of the actual sale price for each of the 780 houses sold to the hedonic price \( \exp \{ X \beta \} \) (in the Actual Value column) to the mean of the same ratio from 5 IID simulations of the model with the same 780 houses and the same hedonic values, but with the difference being that the simulated transaction price is generated from our model. We see that the actual moment has a mean of nearly 100%, which is to be expected given that the hedonic value is by construction an unbiased predictor of the actual sales price. The fact that the simulated moment is also equal to 1 indicates that the rationality constraint, i.e. that the financial value is a conditional expectation of the actual sales prices, does hold in our model. To see this recall that the financial value is given by \( F = \exp \{ X \beta + \eta_0 \} \) where \( \eta_0 \) constitutes unobservables characteristics of the home. Recall that we assumed \( \eta_0 \) to be normal with mean \( \mu \) and standard deviation \( \sigma \), but we constrained \( \mu \) such that for any value of \( \sigma \), the mean of the lognormally distributed random variable \( \exp \{ \eta_0 \} \) is 1. This implies that if the hedonic price component of the financial value \( \exp \{ X \beta \} \) is an unbiased predictor of the sales price of the home, then so will the financial value \( F = \exp \{ X \beta + \eta_0 \} \). We regard the fact that the best fitting parameter estimates “automatically” enforce the rationality constraint (without us having to impose it) is further evidence in favor of hypothesis that the selling behavior that we observe in the English housing data can be well approximated by a model of rational sellers.

The second row of table 5.2 compares the standard deviation of the ratio of sale price to the hedonic value and the fact that these standard deviations are close is another way of saying that the model captures the overall dispersion of sales prices, not just the mean value. In fact the model provides an extremely accurate approximation of the initial distribution of list prices in addition to the final sales price.

Rows 3-6 of table 5.2 show that the model does a good job of capturing the price stickiness: it closely
matches the fraction of sales which involved no list price changes and 1 list price change. The model slightly overpredicts the fraction of homes that have 2 or more list price changes, but this can be improved by increasing the size of the menu cost slightly. Note from table 5.1 that the SMD estimate of the menu cost of changing list prices is \( K = 0.00004 \), which is only \( \frac{2}{3} \) of the QMLE estimate of this value.

Rows 7-9 of table 5.2 show that the model does not do quite as well in terms of matching the fraction of accepted offers equal to, below, and above the list price. The model predicts that 26\% of all sales should be at the list price, which is higher than the 15\% value we observe in the English housing data. The model underpredicts the number of transactions that occur below the list price (64\% versus 81\%) and it underpredicts the fraction of sales that occur above the list price (4\% versus 10\%). We believe these predictions can be improved with modest changes to the parameter values that shift the distribution of bids by buyers, and also the reservation prices charged by sellers. Overall, we think the model is generally in the “ballpark” of what we observe in the data, however.

Rows 11-14 of table 5.2 show that the simple binomial logit model of arrival rates provides a good overall approximation to the number of matches (i.e. offers) made on homes. The mean number of matches in the simulated data, 1.44, is just modestly higher than the mean number of matches we observe in the data, 1.34. Rows 16-18 show that the model also generally approximates the non-stationary pattern of arrival rates, with a significantly higher arrival rate of matches in weeks 2-5 and 6-10.

Rows 19-27 show that the model provides a reasonably good prediction of the mean duration to sale and the survival function of unsold homes at various durations after the initial listing. In general, the survival function from the model is slightly higher than we observe in the data, and this higher survival function implies a higher duration to sale in the model (12 weeks) compared to what we observe in the data (10 weeks). Again, we believe it is possible to improve the fit of the model by small adjustments to the parameters that result in a faster rate of decline in the seller’s reservation prices relative to bids made by buyers. The equal weighting of all \( N = 286 \) moments in our initial SMD estimates in table 5.1 placed more importance on fitting moments we consider less important than moments in rows 19-27, so by increasing the weights on these moments (and other moments in table 5.2 we consider especially important), we expect a revised version of the SMD estimates will result in substantially better fits than we report here.

Rows 28-30 of table 5.2 show that while the model does accurately approximate the mean time to the first match, it substantially overpredicts the mean durations to the 2nd and 3rd matches. This could be a sign of “clustering” in matches that our model does not currently account for. Recall that our formulation
of the seller model allows the duration since last offer $d_t$ to be a state variable in the model. We did not actually use this state variable in the version of the model reported here. By including this duration we can capture the clustering phenomenon by allowing the offer arrival rates to be elevated in the weeks following a previous match. This would enable the model to better approximate the mean times to a 2nd and 3rd match.

Rows 31-34 of table 5.2 show that the model is generally able to track the dynamics of list price markups and reductions as a function of duration on the market. The model predicts a somewhat lower initial markup of the list price over the hedonic value than we observe in the data (1.04 versus 1.05), but both the simulated and actual trajectories provide the additional evidence of list price stickiness, and confirm the model’s ability to capture this key feature of the data.

Rows 35-39 show that our piecewise linear model of bidding behavior and the assumed beta distribution of buyer valuations provide a good approximation to bidding behavior. The mean ratio of the first offer to the list price in the data is 94% versus 93% in our model. The model overpredicts the fraction of first bids equal to the list price (16% versus 10%), but this can be remedied by reducing the length of the flat segment of the bidding function at the list price. Conversely the model somewhat underpredicts the fraction of first offers that are below the list price and overpredicts the fraction of first offers that are above the list price. Further experimentation with the parameters of the beta distribution of buyer valuations (which is currently fixed at the initial values we guessed as discussed above) should result in a substantially better fit. Row 39 shows that the model predicts that only 27% of all first offers are accepted whereas in the data we see that nearly 42% of first offers are accepted. We believe that this is another sign that the seller reservation prices are currently somewhat too high and should fall off at a faster rate with duration on the market. We know how to fix this issue too, mainly by adjusting our (currently fixed) initial guess for the holding cost function $h_t(d)$.

Rows 40-44 present the same comparison, but for the second offers. We see a rather closer correspondence between the model and the data here, except that the model over predicts the fraction of second offers that are above the list price. This can be fixed by adjusting the estimates of how buyers adjust their counteroffers in successive stages of the bargaining subgame. The current estimates suggest that our model has buyers being somewhat too aggressive in improving their counteroffer in response to an initial rejection by the seller.
6  Implications of the Model

Not yet written up: to be presented in the seminar

7  Conclusions

Not yet written up: to be presented in the seminar
References


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<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Actual Value</th>
<th>Simulated Value</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>mean sale price/hedonic price ratio</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>standard deviation of sale price/hedonic price ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>% of homes with no list price changes</td>
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<td>% of homes with 1 list price change</td>
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<td>% of homes with 3+ list price changes</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>% of accepted offers equal to list price</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>% of first offers accepted</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>% of second offers above list</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>% of second offers accepted</td>
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