Another Graphical Proof Of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem


Publication: Journal of Economic Education

Volume: Volume 33, No. 2

Issue: Spring 2002

Pages: 217-235

Author(s): Paul Hansen (University of Otago)

Address (Principal Author):Paul Hansen
Department of Economics
University of Otago
P.O. Box 56
Dunedin
NEW ZEALAND
Phone: +64 3 479 8547
Fax: +64 3 479 8174

Internet Address (Principal Author): phansen@commerce.otago.ac.nz

Title: Another Graphical Proof Of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Abstract: Arrow's (1951) Impossibility Theorem is that the social orderings of particular alternatives, that are meant to reflect individuals' preferences, must match the preferences of an arbitrary individual (the dictator). The patterns of agreements and conflicts over all possible combinations of two individuals' rankings of alternatives are made transparent through a graphical proof of Arrow's Theorem. A self-test for readers is included.

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