Papers
In-print/Forthcoming:
The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp, Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan M. Weinberg
(forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research)
Abstract: A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.
Reading Conflicted Minds: An Empirical Follow-up to Knobe and Roedder, Chad Gonnerman
(Philosophical Psychology, Volume 21(2): 2008: pp. 1-13)
Abstract: Recently Joshua Knobe and Erica Roedder found that folk
attributions of valuing tend to vary according to the perceived moral
goodness of the object of value. This is an interesting finding, but it
remains unclear what, precisely, it means. Knobe and Roedder argue that
it indicates that the concept MORAL GOODNESS is a feature of the
concept VALUING. In this article, I present a study of folk
attributions of desires and moral beliefs that undermines this
conclusion. I then propose the beginnings of an alternative
interpretation of the data that appeals to intrinsic biases in our
third-person mindreading mechanisms.
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy, Joshua Alexander and Jonathan M. Weinberg
(Philosophy Compass, Volume 2(1), 2007: pp. 56-80)
Abstract: It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement—experimental philosophy—has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that holds between experimental philosophy and the future of standard philosophical practice (what we call, the proper foundation view and the restrictionist view), discuss some of the more interesting and important results obtained by proponents of both views, and examine the pressure these results put on analytic philosophers to reform standard philosophical practice. We will also defend experimental philosophy from some recent objections, suggest future directions for work in experimental philosophy, and suggest what future lines of epistemological response might be available to those wishing to defend analytic epistemology from the challenges posed by experimental philosophy.
Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology, Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich and Jonathan M. Weinberg
(The Skeptics, ed. S. Luper, (Ashgate Press, 2003): pp. 227-247)
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions, Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich
(Philosophical Topics, Volume 29, 2001: pp. 429-460)
Under Review/Conference Presentations:
Accentuate the Negative, Josh Alexandar, Ron Mallon, Jonathan M. Weinberg
(Submitted to European Review of Philosophy special issue on Experimental Philosophy)
Unstable Intuitions and Need for Cognition:
How Being Thoughtful Sometimes Just Means Being Wrong in a Different Way, Jonathan M. Weinberg, Joshua Alexander, and Chad Gonnerman
(Presented at SPP 2008)
Abstract: Some recent work by experimental philosophers has purported to raise the challenge that the kinds of hypothetical case intuitions so often used by analytic philosophers are, in fact, unstable and ought not to be trusted. One line of response to that work is that the experimentalists’ subjects have only reports quick, unthoughtful judgments, but philosophers’ intuitions are the product of greater thought and reflection, and thus can be expected to avoid that instability. This line of response is tested empirically, and found wanting – and in an unexpected way.
Intuitions and Calibration, Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Stephen J. Crowley, Stacey Swain and Ian Vandewalker
(currently under review)
Abstract: The Practice of appealing to esoteric intuitions, long standard in analytic philosophy, has recently fallen on hard times. Various recent empirical results have suggested that philosophers are not currently able to distinguish good intuitions from bad. This paper evaluates one possible type of approach to the problematic methodological situation: calibration. Both critiquing and building on an argument from Robert Cummins, the paper explores what possible avenues may exist for the calibration of philosophical intuitions. It is argued that no good options are currently available, but leaves open the real possibility of such a calibration in the future.
The X-Phi(les): Unusual Insights into the Nature of Inquiry, Jonathan M. Weinberg and Stephen J. Crowley
(Presented at 2006 Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association)
Abstract: Experimental philosophy is often regarded as a category mistake. Even those that reject that view typically see it as irrelevant to standard philosophical projects. We argue that neither of these claims can be sustained and illustrate our view with a sketch of the rich interconnections with philosophy of science.
Other Papers by EEL Members:
How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism, Jonathan M. Weinberg
(Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31(1), 318-343)
Abstract: Using empirical evidence to attack intuitions can be epistemically dangerous, because various of the complaints that one might raise against them (e.g., that they are fallible; that we possess no non-circular defense of their reliability) can be raised just as easily against perception itself. But the opponents of intuition wish to challenge intuitions without at the same time challenging the rest of our epistemic apparatus. How might this be done? Let us use the term “hopefulness” to refer to the extent to which we possess a good capacity for the detection and correction of the errors of any fallible source of evidence. I argue that we should not trust putative sources of evidence that are substantially lacking in hopefulness (even if they are
basically reliable), and that we are indeed already operating under such a norm in our ordinary and scientific practices. I argue further that the philosophical practice of the appeal to intuitions is, in these terms, badly hopeless. But perception is very hopeful. Thus, recognizing the norm of
hopefulness allows the opponents to challenge intuitions without thereby risking skepticism
Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals, Jonathan M. Weinberg
(Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4(1), 66-92)
Abstract: Although radical forms of relativism are perhaps beyond the epistemological pale, I argue here that a more moderate form may be plausible, and articulate the conditions under which moderate epistemic relativism could well serve our epistemic goals. In particular, as a result of our limitations as human cognizers, we find ourselves needing to investigate the dappled and difficult world by means of competing communities of highly specialized
researchers. We would do well, I argue, to admit of the existence of unresolvable disputes between such communities, but only so long as there is a sufficient amount of fruitful exchange between them as well. I close with some speculation about when it is or is not legitimate to make an “appeal to discipline”: responding to another’s argument by saying something like, “we should do it this way, because we are philosophers (/linguists/psychologists/...), and that’s just what we do”.
What’s epistemology for? The case for neopragmatism in normative metaepistemology, Jonathan M. Weinberg
(Epistemological Futures, ed. S. Hetherington, (Oxford University Press, 2006): pp. 26-47)
