

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

What Do Chinese Lawyers Want? Political Values and Legal Practice

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Searching for vanguards of political reform in China has become a veritable cottage industry among social scientists. Scholars have identified—and disagree about—various sources of popular sentiment in Chinese society supportive of democracy. Regarding China’s incipient middle class, some argue that its members are, on the whole, conservative, while others argue the opposite.¹ On the whole, the political values and aspirations of the Chinese middle class appear from some survey data to be highly unified, while other data show them to be mostly incoherent.² With respect to their political values, differences between China’s “lower” and “middle” classes, which are inconsistently defined using competing occupation and income criteria, are statistically marginal and difficult to interpret.³

A separate body of research suggests that the way out of this analytical morass is to disaggregate the middle class into its constitutive elements. More narrowly focused research on specific social groups brings into high relief the limitations of conceptualizing and analyzing the middle class as a monolithic entity. The concept of a middle class obscures internal variation as much as it illuminates internal commonalities. For example, business entrepreneurs appear to be generally politically conservative, whereas support for democratic political reform appears to arise from

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intellectuals, homeowners, students returning from overseas, and Internet users (netizens), groups that do not always map neatly onto income strata or occupational categories.⁴ We thus eschew approaches to the study of attitudes that lump together disparate social groups. We instead borrow and build on the microclass approach of sociology, in which the operative unit of analysis is the occupation rather than the “big class.” Research in this tradition suggests that attitudes and values are shaped by specific occupational experiences more than by socioeconomic outcomes.⁵

Our aim in this chapter is to use the case of lawyers to contribute to the growing body of research on specific component parts of Chinese society that, taken together, help constitute the middle class. More specifically, we assess the extent to which lawyers, as a part of China’s emerging middle class, want political change. Chinese lawyers have grown dramatically in number from only a few thousand shortly after their revival in 1979 to almost 150,000 in 2007.⁶ However, recent reports suggest that their thirst for political reform is disproportionate to their still-small population.⁷ Using data from a national survey we conducted in the summer of 2009 of about 1,500 lawyers and nonlawyers working in China’s legal system, we assess more thoroughly and rigorously than has been done previously the political values of Chinese lawyers. We measure the political values of Chinese lawyers, compare them to various reference populations, and identify some of their sources.

We find that, on the whole, Chinese lawyers are strongly inclined toward political reform, attach greater importance to political rights than to economic rights, and are profoundly discontented with the political status quo. At the same time, their politically radical values are explained in large measure by their economic and institutional vulnerabilities, including deadbeat clients who fail to pay their legal fees, exploitative employers who fail to support their professional work and protect their social security, and state actors who interfere with and obstruct their work. The lawyers who express the most politically radical values are those who are most vulnerable and exposed to these sources of trouble and therefore at the greatest risk of professional failure. In the absence of these sources of vulnerability, Chinese lawyers’ political values are no different from those of the general Chinese population.

We conclude that Chinese lawyers’ commitment to radical political reform is probably unstable and unlikely to be politically consequential insofar as their overriding priority is to protect and enhance their livelihood. Our findings suggest that their palpable discontent with the

political status quo and the importance they attach to political rights and political reform stem less from ideological commitment and more from their desire for institutionalized protection against the sources of vulnerability that compromise their legal practice.

Survey Data and Key Measures

We analyze data from the China Legal Environment (CLE) Survey, a survey we conducted in the summer of 2009. The high rate of Internet usage among Chinese lawyers was the premise that motivated our decision to conduct an Internet survey. Terence C. Halliday and Sida Liu, for example, document the popularity of electronic message boards among Chinese lawyers as a means of sharing information and airing grievances.⁸ We collected e-mail addresses from all of the profiles of registered users of four popular electronic message boards frequented by Chinese lawyers: www.acla.org.cn/forum/; www.fl168.com/; www.chinalawyer.org.cn/; and www.law-lib.com/. Because registered users on the four websites also include nonlawyers, our sample includes other actors in the legal system, including judges, prosecutors, law school students and faculty, as well as a few hundred spectators who work outside the law and who thus do not belong to the legal system.

After eliminating redundant e-mail addresses, and after identifying and consolidating multiple e-mail addresses attached to unique users, our database contained the e-mail addresses of 17,276 users. We sent out survey invitations and administered the survey on SurveyMonkey.com (using its alternate URL, Surveyymk.com). Each survey invitation contained a unique hyperlink to the survey. We were thus able to track respondents, limit the survey to people we targeted, and prevent people from submitting multiple questionnaires. We launched the survey on July 2, 2009, and closed it on October 4, 2009 (Beijing time).

SurveyMonkey.com reported that 2,660 of the original 17,276 e-mail addresses in our database were “hard bounced,” or invalid. Of the remaining 14,616 users with seemingly valid e-mail addresses, 2,335 responded, yielding a response rate of 16 percent. However, the true response rate is undoubtedly much higher for at least two reasons. First, despite our efforts to consolidate e-mail addresses among unique users, some individual respondents reported receiving invitations at multiple addresses. Second, invalid e-mail addresses were undoubtedly far more numerous than the 2,660 reported by SurveyMonkey.com.

Of the 2,335 people who responded to our survey invitations, 1,511 identified themselves as members of the legal system. The remaining 824 individuals either refused to participate in the survey after reading the study information sheet (63), refused to identify their occupation (239), or identified themselves as working outside the law (522).

We should address inevitable concerns about sampling bias. Lawyers eligible to receive our survey invitation—and, among them, lawyers who actually participated—may not represent the true population of lawyers. However, given that many Chinese lawyers work independently of their firms and given that officially published rosters of lawyers contain law firm contact information but not that of individual lawyers, coupled with the fact that such rosters are far from nationally comprehensive, alternatives to an Internet research design offer no obvious advantages. Overall, the benefits of conducting the survey via the Internet—namely, vastly greater geographical coverage at a tiny fraction of conventional survey costs—far outweigh the limitations of this research design. The geographical diversity of our sample is perhaps unparalleled in Chinese survey research: our sample includes lawyers in every province, autonomous region, and centrally administered city. Lawyers reported themselves to be in 194 cities; respondents of every stripe (that is, lawyers and nonlawyers) self-reported from 244 cities.

Although it is not a probability sample (that is, not every member of the Chinese bar had an opportunity to be included), our sample of lawyers is representative of the true population of lawyers in at least two respects. First, the geographical distribution of the 1,019 full-time lawyers who supplied geographical information is almost perfectly correlated ($R = .92$) with the geographical distribution of the 114,253 full-time lawyers in the true population in 2005. Second, the proportion of lawyers who are Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members in our sample (27.5 percent) is practically identical to the proportion of the true population (27.3 percent). However, our sample of lawyers appears to underrepresent women. Whereas the true population of lawyers was 15.8 percent female in 2005, our sample of lawyers is only 11.3 percent female.⁹

Using complex skip patterns, we tailored the instrument to respondents according to their occupations. That is, not every respondent was asked the same set of questions. We first identified members of the legal system (“Are you a legal service provider?”). All survey participants, members and nonmembers of the legal system alike, were asked about their class status, educational background, and political values. Members

of the legal system, lawyers and nonlawyers alike, were also asked a battery of questions concerning lawyers' professional challenges. Finally, only lawyers were asked specific questions about their professional practice, including their incomes and various dimensions of job satisfaction.

Class Status

We borrowed measures of class status and political values from the 2005–07 wave of the World Values Survey.¹⁰ Because China was part of the World Values Survey, we were able to use existing Chinese translations and thus to make comparisons between the two surveys with a greater degree of confidence. Although our income data are limited to lawyers, we have subjective measures of class status for all respondents. Moreover, because household income is missing in 40 percent of the 2007 China World Values Survey sample, we would, in any event, still be limited to subjective class measures for purposes of comparison. Our primary measure of subjective class status is the following: “Sometimes people divide themselves into higher and lower classes. To which social class would you describe yourself as belonging?” Response categories include: upper class (*gao ceng*), upper middle class (*zhonggao ceng*), middle class (*zhong ceng*), lower middle class (*zhongxia ceng*), and lower class (*xia ceng*).

Political Values

A battery of eight questions from the World Values Survey is the basis of two measures of political values. First, three questions on the importance of economic rights plus three questions on the importance of political rights are the basis of a measure we term *the extent to which political rights should trump economic rights*. A higher value, reflecting a greater degree of relative importance attached to political rights, implies more liberal political values. Conversely, a lower value, reflecting a greater degree of relative importance attached to economic rights, implies more conservative political values.

Second, two additional questions from the World Values Survey are the basis of a measure we term *the extent to which democratic aspirations are fulfilled*. This measure is calculated simply as the extent to which the “current level of democracy” falls short of the “importance of democracy.” A lower value, reflecting a lower degree of fulfillment and a greater degree of discontent with the political status quo, implies more liberal political values. Conversely, a higher value, reflecting a higher

degree of fulfillment and greater satisfaction with the political status quo, implies more conservative political values.

In addition to the forgoing two measures of political values, we also analyze responses to an additional question in our 2009 CLE Survey: the extent to which “lawyers are inclined toward political reform.” A higher extent implies more liberal political values, and a lower extent implies more conservative political values. More details both on these key dependent variables and on key independent variables are available from the authors upon request.

Economic Status and Class Identity

Chinese lawyers overwhelmingly define themselves as middle class. In the China World Values Survey, 43 percent of respondents identify themselves as middle class; if upper middle class is also counted, then 48 percent of respondents consider themselves middle class. Only 0.6 percent identify themselves as upper class. This distribution is very similar to that of the United States, where 47 percent of all respondents in the 2000–04 General Social Survey identify themselves as middle class and only 4 percent as upper class.¹¹ Compared to the general Chinese population, Chinese lawyers situate themselves more squarely in the middle class: 55 percent say they belong to the middle class; if the middle also includes upper middle, then 70 percent say they belong to this class. Meanwhile, similar to the World Values Survey, only 0.9 percent of lawyers say they belong to the upper class.

As one would expect, income is considerably higher in the legal profession than in the general population. With respect to perceived income decile, 58 percent of people in the China World Values Survey sample situate themselves below the 5th decile. By contrast, only 34 percent of the lawyers in the 2009 CLE Survey situate themselves below the 5th decile. According to the World Bank, the Chinese middle class is defined as people with personal annual income in the range of 20,000–90,000 yuan.¹² An alternative definition of middle class—created by the Economic Research Institute of the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission—includes individuals with an annual income in the range of 34,000–100,000 yuan.¹³ By either definition, 84 percent of Chinese lawyers in our sample are in or above the middle class. Indeed, the median income of lawyers who self-identify as middle-class is 88,000 yuan. If upper middle class is included, the median increases to 100,000 yuan.

Many Chinese lawyers are also doing well by international standards. Of the lawyers in our sample, 9 percent report annual incomes above 500,000 yuan, or \$73,000.¹⁴ Indeed, twenty-five lawyers in the sample report incomes of at least 1 million yuan (or \$146,000), and five respondents report incomes of at least 10 million yuan (or about \$1.5 million). At the same time, as is the case with the general population, variation in education helps explain variation in income among lawyers. Median income among lawyers in our sample with junior college degrees or less, with B.A. degrees, with M.A. degrees, and with Ph.D. degrees is 50,000, 88,000, 138,000, and 231,000 yuan, respectively. According to official government data, 74 percent of full-time lawyers in 2005 possessed a university degree.¹⁵ In our sample, almost every lawyer who reports educational data holds a B.A. degree or higher.

In sum, by all measures—income, education, and subjective class identification—lawyers are disproportionately represented in the middle class. Moreover, their overall income advantage appears to have remained stable between 2000 and 2009.¹⁶

Political Values

Lawyers' political values and aspirations are extreme both in international comparison and compared to other members of the legal system. The following is a very small selection of comments volunteered by our survey respondents:

—“The thirst for rights and democracy is far greater among Chinese lawyers than among any other segment of society!” (lawyer, respondent #91164, Henan)

—“Protect every citizen's freedom and equal rights. Democratic constitutions are the standard (*zhunsheng*) guiding our actions.” (lawyer, respondent #30954, Jiangsu)

—“I greatly hope China will elevate political reform on its agenda. I greatly hope China can swiftly become a genuinely democratic and rule-of-law society.” (lawyer, respondent #36071, Chongqing)

—“Democracy and rule of law! This is what we pursue!” (lawyer, respondent #63481, Fujian)

—“The rule of law is premised on democracy; rights are premised on the rule of law; rights defense (*weiquan*) is premised on rights; and lawyers are premised on rights defense.” (lawyer, respondent #27619, Henan)

These comments also reflect Chinese lawyers' conflation of different dimensions of political rights. Even if lawyers in historical and comparative perspective have often pushed for a moderate state (that is, executive power "counterbalanced by forces outside the state") but not for democracy, Chinese lawyers in our survey tend to conflate these two sets of political rights.¹⁷ The Cronbach's alpha value (a common measure of internal consistency among multiple measures) for the three items we include in our measure of political rights is .65, meaning that they can be meaningfully combined into a single scale. Indeed, Cronbach's alpha exceeds .60 in thirty-four of the forty-seven countries (with nonmissing data) in the 2005–07 wave of the World Values Survey, meaning that Chinese lawyers are no different from most people in the world in their conflation of these two dimensions of political rights.

International Variation

Table 14-1 shows that compared to people elsewhere in the world, China's general population tends to prioritize political rights over economic rights to a far smaller extent. With respect to our measure, *the extent to which political rights should trump economic rights*, China ranks toward the bottom. This finding supports the argument that Chinese people tend to privilege socioeconomic security over individual political rights.¹⁸ At the same time, China ranks toward the top of the rankings with respect to our measure, *the extent to which democratic aspirations are fulfilled*. In other words, relative to most people elsewhere in the world, Chinese people tend to be content with the current level of democracy in their country. Although Internet users in China are no different from the general population in terms of the relative importance they attach to economic and political rights, they are less likely to be content with China's current level of democracy.

Differences between Internet users and the general population in China are, at best, modest. However, differences between lawyers and the general population in China are dramatic. If Chinese lawyers are treated like a country and compared to the populations of other countries, they rank in the top ten with respect to the relative importance they attach to political rights and near the very bottom with respect to the extent to which their aspirations for democracy are realized. In our survey, Chinese lawyers privilege political rights over economic rights to a similar degree as people in the World Values Survey samples from Sweden, Norway, Australia, the United States, and Argentina. Likewise,

TABLE 14-1. China and Chinese Lawyers in the Global Distribution of Political Values^a

Subjective class	Extent to which political rights should trump economic rights			Extent to which democratic aspirations are realized		
	Rank of 49	Mean (95% confidence intervals)	N	Rank of 47	Mean (95% confidence intervals)	N
<i>Full China World Values sample</i>						
Lower	42	0.27 (0.16, 0.39)	782	17	77.5 (75.6, 79.5)	637
Middle	43	0.28 (0.16, 0.40)	763	18	78.4 (76.6, 80.1)	671
<i>Internet users</i>						
Lower	37	0.39 (-0.05, 0.82)	69	31	68.3 (61.3, 75.2)	62
Middle	46	0.20 (-0.10, 0.50)	135	25	74.4 (70.5, 78.3)	133
<i>Chinese lawyers</i>						
Lower	4	1.74 (1.38, 2.10)	233	46	46.1 (42.5, 49.8)	241
Middle	10	1.63 (1.40, 1.85)	561	46	52.2 (50.0, 54.5)	563

Source: 2007 China World Values Survey; 2009 China Legal Environment Survey.

a. This table presents rankings (in descending order) of all countries in the 2005–07 wave of the World Values Survey plus two additional groups: Internet users in the China World Values Survey sample and lawyers in the 2009 CLE Survey. Thus Chinese Internet users are double-counted; they appear in both the full sample group and the Internet users group. The number of country samples is forty-five or forty-seven, depending on whether questions were omitted from country-specific questionnaires. Thus the total number of groups ranked is forty-seven or forty-nine. Details on measures used in the above rankings are available from the authors upon request. Rankings are disaggregated by subjective class identification: *lower class* is defined as respondents who identify their class status as lower class or lower-middle class, *middle class* is defined as respondents who identify their class status as middle class or upper-middle class. 95 percent confidence intervals: upper and lower bounds containing mean scores of 95 percent of samples drawn randomly from the same populations.

Chinese lawyers' contentment with their country's current level of democracy is surpassed by every World Values Survey sample except Ethiopia and Georgia and is not far below Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Morocco. We can also see in table 14-1 that, for the most part, subjective class identification has little effect on our measures of political values and political aspirations. The differences between self-identified members of the lower class and the middle class are trivial.

Variation within the Chinese Legal System

According to our measure, *the extent to which democratic aspirations are fulfilled*, lawyers are more discontented with the political status quo than any other occupational group in the legal system. According to our measure, *the extent to which political rights should trump economic rights*, lawyers' political values are more liberal than those of every other

occupational group except law school faculty.¹⁹ Two additional findings are noteworthy. First, the political values of legal actors as a whole are far more radical than those of the general population as a whole and than those of Internet users, as well. Second, although their overall class status is indistinguishable from that of the general Chinese population, spectators in our sample working outside the legal system attach markedly more importance to political rights and harbor markedly higher levels of political discontent. The reason is simple: many ordinary people who register as users on the websites from which we collected e-mail addresses do so in search of legal help with a long-standing, unresolved grievance, which often involves a government agency or other public organization. Many of these spectators provided details about their grievances and disappointments.

Vulnerabilities in Legal Practice

Our efforts to explain why Chinese lawyers' values are so liberal relative to those of both China's general population and other populaces focus on this group's sources of vulnerability. Our survey data suggest three primary sources of vulnerability in the Chinese bar: clients who fail to pay their legal fees, law firms that provide scant support to—while exacting heavy fees from—the lawyers they employ, and state actors who obstruct or otherwise undermine the work of lawyers.

Economic Vulnerability vis-à-vis Clients

Chinese lawyers experience difficulty collecting their fees from clients.²⁰ Among all lawyers in the sample, mean and median client arrears are 77,000 and 13,000 yuan, respectively. Lawyers reporting total client arrears of at least 100,000 yuan account for 15 percent of the total lawyer sample.²¹ Lawyers in our survey were asked to rate the importance of seven factors they take into consideration when deciding whether or not to represent a client. The most important factor of all is “the probability that the client will refuse to pay your fee,” which even edged out “the legal merit of the case” and “the chances of winning the case.” In response to the statement “Lawyers have trouble collecting their fees from clients,” lawyers in the sample are more than 50 percent more likely to choose one of the two most “prevalent” categories (33 percent chose category 4 or 5) than to choose one of the two most “rare” categories (20 percent chose category 0 or 1).

Economic Vulnerability vis-à-vis Law Firms

Lawyers' vulnerability vis-à-vis troublesome clients was compounded by the organization of law firms. Although almost all lawyers belong to law firms, they tend to work independently of their firms. "Most Chinese lawyers 'eat what they kill'; despite mandatory firm membership, they operate like solo practitioners, solely responsible for finding and representing clients from beginning to end."²² Almost half (46 percent) of the lawyers in our sample indicate that they operate entirely independently of their firms (by selecting, "In reality I work independently of my law firm").

Lawyers' independence from their firms is reflected in their remuneration methods. More than half of the lawyers in Michelson's earlier 2000 lawyer survey report getting paid exclusively by commission—calculated as a percentage of the business they generate.²³ In a 2007 survey of lawyers in three major cities and five provinces, between 24 percent and 40 percent of lawyers in the cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou) report getting paid exclusively on a commission basis, while the spread is between 54 percent and 93 percent for the provincial samples.²⁴ In our 2009 CLE Survey, 54 percent of lawyers report getting paid "mainly by commission."²⁵ Another 9 percent of lawyers in our sample report making an annual lump-sum payment to their firms. Among the lawyers who report working entirely independently of their firms (lawyers who do not supervise or work with a team of junior lawyers and who receive no help or support from their firms with respect to finding and managing clients), the annual amount of money lawyers pay to their law firms in the form of client billings or lump-sum payments averages 131,000 yuan.

Not only do they receive little in the way of professional help or support in exchange for the "rents" they pay to their firms, but lawyers also receive little in the way of perks and benefits from their firms. Of twelve items that lawyers were asked to assess in terms of satisfaction, "the social security benefits supplied by my firm" registers far and away the highest levels of dissatisfaction. Lawyers are more than twice as likely to say they are "very dissatisfied" (32 percent) with their firms' perks and benefits than they are with the item generating the second-highest levels of dissatisfaction ("my chances for advancement," with which 15 percent of lawyers said they were "very dissatisfied"). In light of the high costs and negligible benefits of law firm membership, we should not be surprised that 71 percent of lawyers in our sample who report working entirely independently of their firms also report hoping or planning "in

the future to take advantage of the provision in the revised Law on Lawyers to establish an individually owned firm.”

In his earlier research, Michelson found that lawyers in general and commission-based lawyers in particular characterize themselves as “fighting the battle alone” (*dan da du dou*), which fits into the larger rhetorical trope of fighting and hunting, of the combat character of lawyering.”²⁶ In 2009 a lawyer in our survey echoes this theme: “Currently the vast majority of Chinese law firms are fake partnerships. Lawyers are all soldiers in war. Law firms only collect fees and do not shoulder any labor remuneration. They especially fail to provide any form of social insurance.”²⁷ On the whole, law firms take much from their lawyers and give back very little. This source of economic vulnerability exacerbates the widespread problem of clients who renege on their lawyer fee agreements.

Institutional Vulnerability vis-à-vis State Actors

Lawyers’ responses to seven statements describing their status in the criminal justice system, their relations with judges, levels of support and cooperation they receive in the course of their work, and their overall effectiveness in the legal system poignantly reveal additional sources of vulnerability. These are the same seven questions that Ethan Michelson combines into an aggregate measure of lawyers’ “vexation with their institutional environment.”²⁸ Only 9 percent of lawyers in our 2009 survey fail to assess at least one of these seven statements negatively; another 10 percent assess all seven statements negatively. More than half (58 percent) of the lawyers in our sample report negatively on at least four of the seven statements.²⁹

Our questionnaire also includes a question about concrete, first-hand experiences with government interference and obstructionism. Lawyers were asked to identify organizations that, “over the past year . . . obstructed your work or failed to provide reasonable and lawful cooperation in other ways.” Lawyers were asked to select all applicable organizations from a list: public security (police), procuracy (state prosecution), court, bureau of justice or lawyers association, and “other government agency.” Only 23 percent of lawyers in the sample report no such direct experience with any of the listed state actors. Meanwhile, 54 percent report an experience of interference or obstructionism with at least two—and 20 percent with at least four—different types of state actor over the previous year. Overall, lawyers in the sample report this type of experience with an average of two different types of state actor.

Lawyers' high degree of vulnerability—both economic and institutional—helps explain why so many regret their choice of career. More than one in four lawyers in the sample (27 percent) say they would not become a lawyer if they “had it all to do over again,” and almost one in five lawyers in the sample (18 percent) says he or she does not “hope to be working in the same job in five years.”

Bivariate Associations between Vulnerabilities and Political Values

Chinese lawyers' aspirations for political rights, including democracy, reflect their craving for basic professional rights to carry out their work free of arbitrary state interference and obstructionism and with greater support from their law firms. They reflect more than anything else their desire for enhanced professional status, protection, and security.

Most of our measures of economic vulnerability (*vis-à-vis* clients and law firms) are strongly associated with the two measures of political values we analyze above, that is, *the extent to which political rights should trump economic rights* and *the extent to which democratic aspirations are fulfilled*. Lawyers who work independently of their firms, lawyers who are dissatisfied with their firms' social security benefits, and lawyers who regret their career decision or who plan to stop practicing law attach significantly greater importance to political rights and are more discontented with the political status quo than other lawyers. Lawyers who are owed at least 100,000 yuan in client arrears attach significantly more relative importance to political rights but are not significantly more discontented with the current level of democracy. The relationship between subjective class identification and political values is mixed: it is only weakly associated with the relative importance attached to political rights but strongly (and significantly) associated with the fulfillment of democratic aspirations.

Lawyers' institutional vulnerability (*vis-à-vis* state actors) also promotes liberal political values. Litigation, for example, exposes lawyers to the advantages as well as the potential interference and obstructionism of state actors. Bivariate associations between litigation work (measured as the proportion of total legal effort devoted to litigation) and these two measures of political values are both statistically significant. Consistent with this pattern, we also find that both measures of political values

are positively and statistically significantly associated with lawyers' "vexation with their institutional environment" and direct experience with government obstructionism. CCP members and Communist Youth League (CYL) members are significantly less politically liberal than both members of the official state-sponsored democratic parties (*minzhu dangpai*) and lawyers with no political affiliation. However, we find no support for our expectation that lawyers with prior work experience in government agencies, including as former judges, prosecutors, and other state actors, would be less politically liberal than lawyers without this special background. We also find no evidence that the political values of self-identified rights defense (*weiquan*) lawyers differ from those of lawyers who do not identify as such. Our survey data thus fail to support popular accounts of rights defense lawyers as politically radical and instead support Fu Hualing and Richard Cullen's account of rights defense lawyers as generally nonthreatening politically.³⁰ Indeed, given that almost half of all the lawyers in our sample assume the rights defense moniker, it appears to be largely devoid of political significance.

Our third measure of political values yields similar findings. Overall, 32 percent of the lawyers in our sample selected "very prevalent" (response category 5) when assessing the following statement: "Lawyers are inclined toward political reform." An additional 19 percent chose response category 4, meaning over half of our sample believes that lawyers are inclined toward political reform. Although lawyers tend to attach importance to political reform, they do so mainly because they also tend to be highly vulnerable. With respect to economic vulnerabilities, lawyers who work independently of their law firms and lawyers who complain about their social security benefits report stronger overall support for political reform than their counterparts who receive more support from their law firms. Not surprisingly, frustration expressed in terms of regretting the decision to practice law is positively associated with support for political reform. Client arrears, however, are not associated with support for political reform. At the same time, neither subjective income nor subjective class status is associated with support for political reform.

As with our previous two measures of political values, institutional vulnerabilities are also closely associated with this measure of political values. Support for political reform increases commensurately with negative general assessments of and negative direct experiences with state actors.

Multivariate Associations between Vulnerabilities and Political Values

We performed multivariate regression analysis to test whether the bivariate associations reported above are robust to controls. Owing to space limitations, however, we do not present detailed results in this chapter.³¹


These multivariate regression models support our finding that, with the exception of law school faculty, Chinese lawyers' political values are more liberal than those of any other group of actors in the legal system. They also suggest that occupation explains some but not all of the effects of party affiliation. CCP and CYL members are, on the whole, more politically conservative than lawyers without these affiliations. Respondents who report attending a Communist Party school (*dang xiao*) are likewise more politically conservative than those who do not report this educational experience. The regression models also show that, with only a few exceptions, the effects of lawyers' economic and institutional vulnerability on their political values generally persist independent of controls.

Our finding that the political values of self-identified rights defense lawyers are no different from those of other lawyers also persists in multivariate analysis. Lawyers' "vexation" with their institutional environment is a statistically significant predictor of all measures of political values. Direct experiences with state interference or obstructionism are statistically significant determinants of all measures of political values except the relative importance attached to political rights.

The effects of lawyers' subjective economic status on their political values and aspirations are mixed and contradictory. In multivariate models, lawyers' subjective income is significantly positively associated with the relative importance attached to political rights, suggesting it is an engine of liberal political values. However, it is not significantly associated with the other two measures of political values. Furthermore, its strong and positive bivariate association with the extent to which democratic aspirations are realized—suggesting it is an engine of conservative political values—is explained by our measures of vulnerability. Results are similarly murky when we replace subjective income with subjective class identification.

Whereas the simple bivariate relationships described in the previous section reveal the effects of various dimensions of vulnerability one at a time, multivariate regression models allow us to simulate the effects


FIGURE 14-1. Predicted Probabilities of Support for Political Reform, with 95 Percent Confidence Intervals^a



Source: 2009 CLE Survey.

a. *Low-vulnerability lawyers* are defined as those who do not operate independently of their firms, who devote 20 percent of their legal effort to litigation, with no negative evaluations of their institutional environment, and who report no state obstructionism in the past year. *High-vulnerability lawyers* are defined as those who do operate independently of their firms, who devote 80 percent of their effort to litigation, with at least one negative evaluation of their institutional environment, and who report three sources of state obstructionism in the past year. All remaining variables are set to sample means. Predicted probabilities for each group of lawyers sum to 100 percent. For details on postestimation techniques, see J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*, 2nd ed. (College Station, Texas: Stata Press, 2006). The multivariate regression model used to calculate the predicted probabilities in this figure is available from the authors upon request.

of simultaneously erasing multiple sources of vulnerability. If we plug low values of our vulnerability measures into our regression models, we can predict the political values of low-vulnerability lawyers. By the same token, if we plug in high values we can predict the political values of high-vulnerability lawyers. We define low-vulnerability lawyers as those who do not operate independently of their firms, devote 20 percent of their practice to litigation, have no negative evaluations of their institutional environment, and report no state obstructionism in the past year. We define high-vulnerability lawyers, by contrast, as those who operate independently of their firms, devoted 80 percent of their effort to litigation, have at least one negative evaluation of their institutional environment, and report three sources of state obstructionism in the past year. Figure 14-1 depicts the predicted distributions of these two

FIGURE 14-2. Predicted Values of Remaining Measures of Political Values, with 95 Percent Confidence Intervals^a

Source: 2009 CLE Survey.

a. See note a, figure 14-1, for definitions of *low-vulnerability* and *high-vulnerability* lawyers. The multivariate regression models used to calculate the predicted probabilities in this figure are available from the authors upon request.

groups' responses to the statement, "Lawyers are inclined toward political reform." High-vulnerability lawyers are 2.5 times more likely than low-vulnerability lawyers to choose "very prevalent" (39 percent and 15 percent, respectively), whereas low-vulnerability lawyers are more than three times more likely than high-vulnerability lawyers to choose "very rare" (17 percent and 5 percent, respectively). Confidence intervals show that these differences are statistically significant.

The effect of erasing lawyers' vulnerability is even more apparent in simulations of the remaining two measures of political values. Figure 14-2 depicts the predicted values of our measures of the relative importance attached to political rights and the extent to which democratic aspirations are realized. Recall from table 14-1 that according to the 2007 China World Values Survey, the general population of China averages between 0.27 and 0.28 on the first measure and 78 on the second measure. In figure 14-2 we can see that low-vulnerability lawyers are similarly politically conservative, clocking in at 0.16 on the first measure

and 75 on the second measure. In other words, the political values of low-vulnerability lawyers are indistinguishable from those of the general population of China. By contrast, the predicted values of high-vulnerability lawyers are dramatically—and statistically significantly—more politically liberal.

Conclusions

The findings we report in this chapter suggest that, by any standard, Chinese lawyers' political values are highly liberal. The extent to which they embrace political rights (relative to economic rights) and the extent of their aspirations for more democracy in China are extreme relative to three reference standards: the general population of China, the general populations of forty-six additional countries included in the 2005–07 wave of the World Values Survey, and other members of China's legal system.

The story of political values in this chapter is not about “big classes”—aggregations of occupations whose inhabitants share similar socioeconomic outcomes.³² We find that the effects of subjective class and subjective income on political values are small and mixed not only among lawyers but also among the general population. Data from the 2007 China World Values Survey fail to confirm findings reported elsewhere of a Chinese middle-class affinity for democracy.³³ In the Chinese population as a whole, people who identify as members of the middle class are no more liberal in their political values than people who identify as members of the lower class, at least according to the measures we analyze in this chapter. One implication of our findings is that existing and future research on Chinese middle-class attitudes that treats the middle class monolithically rather than disaggregating it into specific occupations could be seriously flawed.

This chapter's emphasis on the occupation-specific reasons for Chinese lawyers' liberal political values was inspired by and supports the microclass approach, in which big classes are disaggregated into their specific constituent occupations. Our findings are consistent with other microclass research insofar as they suggest that political values map onto specific occupations more reliably than onto aggregates of occupations.³⁴ Chinese lawyers' liberal political values are not reducible to their socioeconomic status. The generally great importance they attach to political rights, the generally small degree to which their democratic hopes are fulfilled, and their general perception that the bar as a whole

is inclined toward political reform are, more than anything else, functions of the occupational hazards of their work. Chinese lawyers, as a whole, embrace liberal political values in large measure because their occupational vulnerability is so acute and widespread. Thus our findings further contribute to microclass research by identifying work experiences, work conditions, and work environments as occupation-specific causes of political values.

Notwithstanding their radically liberal character, Chinese lawyers' political values may be harmless to the political status quo. First, our data suggest that Chinese lawyers' demands fall far short of systemwide political change. Most lawyers simply want more and better-protected rights vis-à-vis their clients, law firms, and state actors. Chinese lawyers support political freedoms only to the extent that their professional livelihood is compromised by their marginal status and their weakly protected rights in the legal system. High-vulnerability lawyers—the majority—crave basic rights and protections to keep capricious state actors off their backs. Put another way, the importance they attach to political rights is conditioned by their demand for institutionalized constraints on the power of state actors who obstruct their work and compromise their livelihood, their demand for institutionalized protections in dealings with clients, and their demand for institutionalized support from their law firms. Redressing their sources vulnerability could thus serve to blunt their political demands and aspirations. By implication, Chinese lawyers' political values are unstable and could easily swing in the opposite direction if the sources of their discontent are remedied. It follows, then, that lawyers could potentially follow a trajectory similar to that of politically conservative business entrepreneurs and other politically conservative middle-class citizens who align their interests with the state and the CCP.

Second, if vulnerability breeds political radicalism within the Chinese bar, and if vulnerability causes lawyers to abandon legal practice, then politically liberal lawyers are at elevated risk of exiting the bar and taking their political values with them. Politically conservative lawyers, on the other hand, are more likely to survive, helping to color the political values of the bar as a whole. Ethan Michelson estimates an annual attrition rate of 5 percent in the Beijing bar between 1995 and 2004, meaning that every year in this time period one in twenty lawyers exited the bar. Over the nine years between 1996 and 2004, 35 percent—or more than one in three lawyers—dropped out.³⁵ As one lawyer in our 2009 survey

comments, “I think it is essential to study young lawyers’ survival difficulties, which is an important reason why the legal profession is losing so much talent” (respondent #47169, Chongqing).

Third, in historical and comparative perspective, lawyers’ political mobilization efforts are generally more successful in response to the plight of ordinary people than in response to their own professional difficulties. They tend to be successful when mobilizing in support of universal political rights but not in support of their narrow professional interests. At the same time, a *sine qua non* of lawyers’ successful mobilization in support of political liberalism is an alliance with judges and other members of the legal system.³⁶ Insofar as Chinese lawyers are relegated to “a marginal status of outside interloper” in the judicial system, and insofar as their political values are shaped by their narrow professional interests, Chinese lawyers are not likely to become the vanguard of political change.³⁷

In sum, although Chinese lawyers’ counterparts elsewhere in time and place often support political freedoms, such a natural affinity does not appear to extend to the contemporary Chinese bar.³⁸ If Chinese lawyers were more ideologically committed to political reform and political freedoms, our data would exhibit less variation between low-vulnerability and high-vulnerability lawyers. If Chinese lawyers’ embrace of liberal political values were more deeply entrenched, even low-vulnerability lawyers’ political values would be more liberal than those of the general Chinese population.

To be sure, however, we also recognize that countervailing forces may be at work. Lawyers’ grievances—the primary engine of their liberal political values—may very well persist into the foreseeable future for at least two reasons. First, although we argue that political values are shaped by grievances, we also acknowledge the possibility that this relationship is endogenous. Lawyers with a prior inclination toward political reform may, by virtue of their more radical political values, deliberately choose cases that expose them to vulnerability and risk. Pre-existing political values may help shape vulnerability insofar as lawyers most inclined toward political reform are also the most politically assertive and confrontational and therefore at greatest risk of administrative interference and obstructionism.

Second, from the CCP’s standpoint, co-opting lawyers is more politically risky than co-opting entrepreneurs and other members of the middle class. The beginning of some measure of judicial autonomy from

state interference and control is a necessary condition for assuaging the complaints of Chinese lawyers. Official measures to redress the sources of lawyers' vulnerability would, by necessity, include the enforcement of legal mechanisms designed to constrain the privileges—as well as the arbitrary and discretionary behavior—of state actors. Blunting lawyers' political aspirations by redressing their institutional vulnerability could paradoxically blunt the authority of the CCP and compromise its political monopoly. Thus compared to the political risks of alienating China's tens of millions of private business owners and employees, the political risks of alienating China's approximately 150,000 lawyers appear relatively trivial. Insofar as the political costs to the CCP of redressing lawyers' vulnerabilities outweigh the political benefits of ignoring them, we might expect lawyers' vulnerabilities and the liberal political values they spawn to persist for the foreseeable future.

Notes

1. For the conservative argument, see Minxin Pei, *China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy* (Harvard University Press, 2006); Jonathan Unger, "China's Conservative Middle Class," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 169, no. 3 (2006): 27–31; Dali Yang, "China's Long March to Freedom," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (2007): 58–64. For the liberal argument, see Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu, "Does China's Middle Class Think and Act Democratically? Attitudinal and Behavioral Orientations toward Urban Self-Government," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 11, no. 2 (2006): 1–20; Merle Goldman, *From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China* (Harvard University Press, 2005); Henry S. Rowen, "When Will the Chinese People Be Free?" *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (2007): 38–52; Min Tang, Dwayne Woods, and Zhao Jujun, "The Attitudes of the Chinese Middle Class Towards Democracy," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 14 (2009): 81–95.

2. Li Lulu and Wang Yu, "Dangdai Zhongguo Zhongjian Jiecheng de Shehui Cunzai: Jiecheng Renshi Yu Zhengzhi Yishi" [The social presence of the middle class in contemporary China: class awareness and political consciousness], *Shehui Kexue Zhanxian* [Social science front] 10 (2008): 202–15.

3. Chen and Lu, "Does China's Middle Class Think and Act Democratically?"; Tang, Woods, and Zhao, "The Attitudes of the Chinese Middle Class Towards Democracy." For a review of the relevant Chinese-language literature, see Guo Yingjie, "Farewell to Class, except the Middle Class: The Politics of Class Analysis in Contemporary China," *Asia-Pacific Journal* 26, no. 2 (2009) (www.japanfocus.org/-Yinjie-Guo/3181).

4. An Chen, "Capitalist Development, Entrepreneurial Class, and Democratization in China," *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 3 (2002): 401–22; Bruce J. Dickson, *Wealth into Power: The Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector* (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Kellee Tsai, *Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China* (Cornell University Press, 2007); Tang Wenfang, *Public Opinion and Political Change in China* (Stanford University Press, 2005); Benjamin L. Read, "Democratizing the Neighborhood? New Private Housing and Homeowner Self-Organization in Urban China," *China Journal* 49 (2003): 31–59; Li He, "Returned Students and Political

Urban China,” *China Journal* 49 (2003): 31–59; Li He, “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” *Asian Perspective* 30, no. 2 (2006): 5–29; Guobin Yang, *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online* (Columbia University Press, 2009).

5. Kim A. Weeden and David B. Grusky, “The Case for a New Class Map,” *American Journal of Sociology* 111, no. 1 (2005): 141–212; David B. Grusky and Kim A. Weeden, “Are There Social Classes? A Framework for Testing Sociology’s Favorite Concept,” in *Social Class: How Does It Work?* edited by Annette Laureau and Dalton Conley (New York: Russell Sage, 2008), pp. 65–90.

6. *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 2007* [China statistical yearbook 2007] (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 2008), table 22-6 (www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/html/W2206c.htm).

7. For example, Fu Hualing and Richard Cullen, “*Weiquan* (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest Lawyering,” *China Journal* 59 (2008): 111–27; Human Rights Watch, “*Walking on Thin Ice*”: *Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China*, 2008 (www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/04/28/walking-thin-ice-0); Mark O’Neill, “Legal Crusaders on the March: The Mainland Public Defenders Who Want to Reform the System,” *South China Morning Post*, September 8, 2009.

8. Terence C. Halliday and Liu Sida, “Birth of a Liberal Moment? Looking through a One-Way Mirror at Lawyers’ Defense of Criminal Defendants in China,” in *Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism*, edited by Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm M. Feeley (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 65–107.

9. *Zhongguo Lüshi Nianjian 2005* [China lawyer yearbook 2005] (Beijing: Renmin Fayuan Chubanshe, 2006), pp. 336–37.

10. World Values Survey, Official Data File c.20090621, 2009, World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), Aggregate File Producer (Madrid: ASEP/JDS, 2005).

11. Michael Hout, “How Class Works: Objective and Subjective Aspects of Class since the 1970s,” in *Social Class: How Does It Work?* edited by Annette Laureau and Dalton Conley (New York: Russell Sage, 2008), p. 29.

12. The World Bank defines the middle class as people with annual incomes between \$4,000 and \$17,000 in 2005 purchase power parity, or international, dollars. “Beyond Wisteria Lane,” *The Economist* 390, no. 8618 (February 14, 2009), pp. 7–13. The 2006 conversion rate was 3.462 yuan per PPP\$1. International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook Database*, 2009. Assuming an annual income growth rate of 11.9 percent, the World Bank’s 2005 income range corresponds roughly to 20,000–90,000 yuan in 2009. See *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 2007*, table 9-2 (www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/html/J0902c.htm).

13. Guo, “Farewell to Class, except the Middle Class.”

14. During the period of the survey, the exchange rate averaged 6.841 yuan per \$1 (www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory).

15. *Zhongguo Lüshi Nianjian 2005*, p. 337; 2005 is the most recent year for which lawyer data disaggregated by province are available.

16. Income growth among lawyers seems to parallel income growth in the general population. If the average annual rate of income growth of 11.9 percent in China’s general urban population between 2000 and 2007 corresponds to lawyers’ income growth, then we should expect that Beijing lawyers’ average income of 100,000 yuan in 2000 should have compounded to 275,000 yuan by 2009. Indeed, according to the 2009 CLE Survey, average income among lawyers in Beijing was 261,000 yuan. *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian*

17. Terence C. Halliday, "The Fight for Basic Legal Freedoms: Mobilization by the Legal Complex," in *Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law*, edited by James J. Heckman, Robert L. Nelson, Lee Cabatingan (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 234; Lucien Karpik, "Political Lawyers," in *Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism*, edited by Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm M. Feeley (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 463–94; Michelson, "Unhooking from the State"; Halliday and Liu, "Birth of a Liberal Moment?"

18. Ching Kwan Lee, *Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt* (University of California Press, 2007); Elizabeth J. Perry, "Chinese Conceptions of 'Rights': From Mencius to Mao—and Now," *Perspectives on Politics* 6, no. 1 (2008): 37–50.

19. Other occupational groups include employees of foreign law firms, basic-level legal workers, employees of legal aid organizations, employees of government agencies, law teaching or research faculty, house counsel in state-owned enterprises, house counsel in foreign or private enterprises, legal consultants, police, law students, patent agents or other intellectual property workers, and employees of mass media organizations.

20. Ethan Michelson, "The Practice of Law as an Obstacle to Justice: Chinese Lawyers at Work," *Law and Society Review* 40, no. 1 (2006): 1–38.

21. Unlike income, which refers to the previous year (twelve months), client arrears refer to the respondent's entire career as a lawyer: "In the course of your career as a lawyer, roughly how much are you owed by clients who refused to pay your fee?" The mean value of client arrears is so much higher than the median because the distribution is so skewed. While almost half (46 percent) of the lawyers who supplied information reported arrears of less than 10,000 yuan, 9 percent reported arrears of at least 200,000 yuan, and 2 percent reported arrears of at least 1 million yuan.

22. Michelson, "The Practice of Law as an Obstacle to Justice," p. 11. Before the 2007 revised Law on Lawyers, individual law firms were banned; only a small number existed on a trial basis. Official statistics on law firm ownership in the time since the general prohibition on solo practice was lifted in 2007 are not yet available. The owners of individually owned law firms are not always solo practitioners. In our 2009 CLE Survey, only two lawyers indicated working alone in individually owned firms, while fifty-nine lawyers indicated that they were employed by individually owned law firms.

23. Michelson, "Unhooking from the State," p. 43.

24. We are grateful to Professor Ji Weidong for generously sharing his 2007 survey data collected with the financial support of the Center for Legal Dynamics of Advanced Market Societies, Graduate School of Law, Kobe University, Japan.

25. In 2009 the modal commission rate (percent of billings kept as income) was 70 percent. Of all lawyers who reported commission-based income, 30 percent indicated this level, 15 percent reported 60 percent, and 14 percent reported 80 percent.

26. Michelson, "The Practice of Law as an Obstacle to Justice," p. 11.

27. Respondent #206901, Liaoning.

28. Ethan Michelson, "Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China's Transition from Socialism," *American Journal of Sociology* 113, no. 2 (2007), p. 386.

29. The extent of lawyers' vulnerability vis-à-vis state actors appears to have remained fairly stable, and has perhaps even intensified, since 2000. In Michelson's 2000 survey, 8 percent of lawyers failed to assess at least one of these seven statements negatively; another 5 percent assessed all seven statements negatively; and 49 percent supplied negative assessments of at least four of the seven statements. See Michelson, "Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China's Transition from Socialism."

30. Ariana Eunjung Cha, "China Suspends Lawyers' Licenses: Representatives of Dissidents Are Targeted," *Washington Post*, June 28, 2009, p. 8; Peter Ford, "China Cracks

Down on Human Rights Lawyers,” *Christian Science Monitor*, February 25, 2009, p. 1; Louisa Lim, “Rights Lawyers in China Face Growing Threats,” National Public Radio, May 3, 2009); O’Neill, “Legal Crusaders on the March”; Fu and Cullen, “*Weiquan* (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an Authoritarian State.”

31. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. None of our analyses considers regional variation because we found no obvious patterns with respect to local city-level characteristics (population, economic indicators, social indicators, and so on).

32. Weeden and Grusky, “The Case for a New Class Map.”

33. Chen and Lu, “Does China’s Middle Class Think and Act Democratically?”; Goldman, *From Comrade to Citizen*; Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People be Free?”; Tang, Woods, and Zhao, “The Attitudes of the Chinese Middle Class Towards Democracy.”

34. Weeden and Grusky, “The Case for a New Class Map.”

35. Ethan Michelson, “Gender Inequality in the Chinese Legal Profession,” *Research in the Sociology of Work* 19 (2009): 337–76.

36. Halliday, “The Fight for Basic Legal Freedoms”; Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik, “Politics Matter: A Comparative Theory of Lawyers in the Making of Political Liberalism,” in *Lawyers and the Rise of Western Political Liberalism: Europe and North America from the Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries*, edited by Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 15–64; Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik, “Political Lawyering,” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Bates (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), pp. 11673–78; Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm M. Feeley, “The Legal Complex and Struggles for Political Liberalism,” in *Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism*, edited by Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm M. Feeley (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 1–40.

37. Quotation from Michelson, “Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China’s Transition from Socialism,” p. 358.

38. On the relationship between lawyers and political liberalism, see Halliday, “The Fight for Basic Legal Freedoms”; Halliday and Karpik, “Politics Matter”; Halliday and Karpik, “Political Lawyering”; Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley, “The Legal Complex and Struggles for Political Liberalism.”