Papers

  • "Why Moore Matters"
    G.E. Moore’s writings on external world skepticism show us, in broad outline, how to dispense with external world skepticism in a way that is satisfying, intellectually responsible, and yet avoids engaging in constructive epistemological theory-building altogether. His work thus reveals something very important about the relation between epistemology and ordinary life, and also about what it would take to reach a satisfying resolution of certain sorts of perennial philosophical problems.
  • "Changing One's Mind", forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
    Self-consciously attempting to shape one’s beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one’s beliefs as one’s own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one’s beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms requires the ability to self-consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well-supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self-conscious process of changing one’s mind.
  • “Experiential Self-Understanding”, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 97(2), April 2016, 305-32 (co-authored with David Bell)*
  • “Projective Identification, Clinical Context, and Philosophical Elucidation,” forthcoming, Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology (special issue on psychoanalysis; approx. 4800 words)
  • "Some Thoughts on Varieties of Skepticism" (invited critical review), Nordic Wittgenstein Review, vo. 4 no. 2, Dec. 2015, 146-52.
  • “Why Don’t I Know I’m Not a Brain-in-a-Vat?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90:11, 2015, 205–213 (invited symposium on Krista Lawlor’s Assurance)
  • “Self-Hatred, Self-Love, and Value,” in Love and its Objects, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014, pp. 75-90. (co-authored with Kate Abramson)*
  • "Standing Beliefs, Skepticism, and Some Questions about Zalabardo’s Probabilistic Approach", Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (special issue on Jose Zalabardo’s Skepticism and Reliable Belief), XXXIIII/3 (October 2014), 159-70.
  • ‘“That’s not evidence; it’s not even true!”’, Philosophical Quarterly, 63:250, 2013, 81-104 (published online December 17, 2012)*
  • “Love as a Reactive Emotion,” Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 245, 2011, 673-699; published online 2 August 2011 IDOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.716.x  (Co-authored with Kate Abramson.  Winner of the 2010 Philosophical Quarterly essay prize.)*
  • "How to Take Skepticism Seriously" (pdf) read at an invited session at the 2009 Pacific APA. Published in Philosophical Studies. Can we get a global argument for external world skepticism out of the commitments of our ordinary epistemic practices? I argue that the answer is "No." From the standpoint of our ordinary epistemic practice, a fully adequate response to (for instance) the evil demon argument is to point out that there are no evil demons.
  • “Austin, Dreams, and Skepticism” Published in a volume of essays on J. L. Austin (Oxford University Press). Austin thought that empirical considerations about what dreams are like could provide a satisfactory reply to the dreaming argument for external world skepticism. I argue that given his larger epistemological framework, he was right. (Includes previously neglected material from Austin's notes for Sense and Sensibilia.)
  • “Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism,” (pdf) forthcoming in Synthese (special volume on epistemic reasons). Draft of December 2008.
  • "Believing One's Reasons are Good" (pdf) Synthese (special volume on epistemic responsibility), 161(3), 419-441. April 2008. (The paper here is the final draft; the original publication is available at www.springerlink.com)
  • "On Justifying and Being Justified" (pdf) (Philosophical Issues (a supplement to Nous), vol. 14, Epistemology, 2004, pp. 219 - 253.) (As required by Blackwell's for copyright purposes: This is an electronic version of an article published in Philosophical Issues. Complete citation information for the final version of the paper, as published in the print edition of Philosophical Issues, is available on the Blackwell Synergy online delivery service, accessible via the journal’s web site at www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/nous or http://www.blackwell-synergy.com.)
  • "Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LXX no. 3, May 2005, 505 - 533). (Abstract pdf) (Paper pdf ) The version here is the final draft, not the published version.
  • "A Localist Solution to the Regress of Epistemic Justification" (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 83 no. 3, Sept., 2005, pp. 395 - 421). (Abstract pdf)(Paper pdf ) The version here is the final draft, not the published version.
  • “Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?” (The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 54: Issue 215, April 2004, pp. 232 – 251.) (Abstract pdf) (Paper pdf) The version here differs slightly from the published version.
  • "Some Worries for Would-Be WAMmers" (Grazer Philosophische Studien, special issue on contextualism in epistemology, vol. 69, 2005, pp. 101 - 25) (Paper pdf) (Note: This is an uncorrected galley proof of the paper.)
  • "Skepticism, Closure, and Sensitivity, or Why the Closure Principle is Irrelevant to Skepticism" (The Croatian Journal of Philosophy (special issue on Robert Nozick), vol. IV no. 12, 2005, pp. 335 - 350) (Paper pdf)
  • "On Williamson's Arguments that Knowledge is a Mental State" (Ratio (new series), vol. XVIII no. 2, June 2005, pp. 165 - 75) (Abstract.pdf) (Paper pdf) The version here is the final draft, not the published version.
  • “How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A reply to DeRose’s 'Assertion, Knowledge, and Context',” Philosophical Studies, 134 (2), 2007, pp. 111-129 (Abstract pdf) (Paper pdf ) The version here is the final draft, not the published version.
  • Critical Review of Duncan Prichard, Epistemic Luck (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, April 20, 2006). (Prichard Review - External Link)
  • “Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: a reply to Tom Kelly,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2), 2007, 456–464. (Paper pdf) The version here is the final draft, not the published version.
  • "Fallibilism" (draft of an article to appear in the Blackwell's Companion to Epistemology, 2nd ed., edited by Sosa and Steup; updated to remove an error in the previously posted version regarding Williamson's view of knowledge). (paper pdf)
  • "What the Basing Relation can Teach us about Epistemic Justification" (delivered at the Central APA, April 2004. Contains material drawn from "On Justifying and Being Justified".) (Abstract pdf) (Paper pdf)