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## The Butterfly Effect: The Iraq War and Asylum Seeking in Sweden

by Maureen Eger

On the five year anniversary of the Iraq War, political scientists, politicians, social movement organizations, humanitarian organizations, the media, and people throughout the world contemplated the consequences of the United States' decision to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power. Indeed, the many ways in which this war has affected social and political order in the Middle East, international security, world economies, and foreign relations have been the topics of both scientific inquiry and journalistic investigation. Although recent analyses have focused on the relationship between the war and political schisms within the European Union as well as the future of EU-USA relations, relatively less attention has been paid to the effect of the war on the social structure and politics within European countries.

Ninety-five percent of the four million displaced Iraqis still live in the Middle East. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, most of the rest have found asylum in Europe. In fact, Iraqis became the largest nationality to seek asylum in Europe in 2006. The 1951 Geneva Convention specifies that a refugee is a person "who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution." Nevertheless, not all applications of this law have been equal. While most EU member states require that refugees prove that their lives are in extreme peril, Sweden had, until July of 2007, made an exception for Iraqis, who needed only demonstrate that they were fleeing central or southern Iraq to receive asylum.

In 2006, over 40% of all Iraqi applications for asylum in Europe went to Sweden, and according to Statistics Sweden, 91%, or approximately 9,500 Iraqis, received residence permits. This increased the number of Iraqis residing in Sweden to approximately 83,000. Then, in 2007, 18,000 Iraqis applied for asylum, and, according to the Swedish Migration Board, 93% were granted permits. Statistics Sweden puts the number of Iraqis currently living in Sweden at 97,513, which, for a country of only 9.1 million people, is no small thing.

Moreover, unlike other European countries that have been reluctant to recognize that immigrants do not necessarily desire to return to their countries of origin, Sweden's universalist policies have made it relatively easy for refugees to obtain citizenship. In fact, it is easier for foreigners who come to Sweden with asylum permits to apply for citizenship than it is for those who come with work or study visas. Granting citizenship, of course, stimulates more immigration, and according to the Swedish Integration Board, family reunification is the most prevalent reason

As of June 30th, Patricia McManus and David Ransel signed off as Co-Directors for the European Union Center of Excellence. Patricia will return full time to the Sociology department where she, in addition to from teaching and pursuing her own research, will take on the responsibilities of the department's Director of Graduate Studies. David continues as Director of the Russian and Eastern European Institute (REEI) and will now be able to devote more time to that task. This is surely appreciated by David since he is responsible for organizing activities in celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of REEI, which include a large conference on the "Past and Future of Area Studies." Although I did not have the privilege of working together with Patricia and David for more than a few months, I truly appreciated their contribution and the EUCE and IU owe them a tremendous debt of gratitude. – Per Nordahl, Assistant Director, European Union Center

## **Kosovo and Serbia: Serbia's Balancing Act**

### **By Tia Trueblood**

While many Europeans flocked to ocean resorts and mountain chalets for holiday, European Union leaders have been sweating through the dog days of summer in Brussels, working diligently on what some consider the bloc's greatest security and defense operation to date: stabilizing Kosovo while encouraging Serbia to look towards EU accession and away from its Kosovo hostilities.

The stability of the Balkans is a fundamental concern for all members of the European Union. Since the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the resulting UN administrative takeover in 1998, Kosovo has experienced relative stability while political talks concerning its official status with Serbia have remained inconclusive. With the end of the UN mission in June, Kosovo is hoping that, with the help of the EU, its February declaration of independence and constitution will bring recognized statehood.

Serbia, the greatest challenger to Kosovo's independence, is now torn between two struggles. Although many Serbians have refused to relinquish Kosovo, the nation finds itself in a compromising position. There is a widespread belief that the prospect of EU membership is the only way to achieve sustainable stabilization in the Western Balkans. For Serbia, embracing the EU could be a way to heal the traumatic wounds of Kosovo. Indeed, the EU recognizes the need to work closely with Serbia during the integration process. Favoring a step-by-step approach, the EU insists that Serbia cooperate fully with the UN war crimes tribunal to extradite a suspected Serbian war criminal as a precondition for the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Undeniably, the highly publicized July arrest of Radovan Karadzic completed a major portion of this prerequisite. Furthermore, the June election of a pro-European government in Serbia was another favorable nod to Brussels.

Looking to the West could ensure a more stable and prosperous future for Serbia, while refusing reconciliation with Kosovo and the EU's aid could lead to the political and economic isolation as its neighboring nations, including Montenegro, Croatia and Albania, who are moving toward European integration.

However, the issue of Serbia resigning from its century long battle for the cradle of its ethnic heritage and home to some of its most treasured Orthodox churches and monasteries – Kosovo – is far from resolved. While EU membership is indeed appealing, losing Kosovo is a battle Serbia is not ready to give up.

Serbia is not alone in the fight. Russia and China, both of whom hold UN veto powers, have pledged to support Serbia's cause and to use their political power to keep Kosovo out of international organizations. Indeed, Russia has proven to be Serbia's big-power ally, vehemently opposing Kosovo's declaration of statehood and claiming that it contradicts the UN Security Resolution 1244. According to Russia, the resolution which ended the 1999 war affirmed Serbia's ultimate sovereignty over Kosovo. Echoing this sentiment is China as well as EU member nations Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain and nearly a dozen other countries around the world. Nations with separatist movements of their own, like Spain and Turkey believe Kosovo's behavior could set a precedent for other regions to claim their own independence.

Indeed, redrawing international borders to create a recognizable new nation state would benefit from having a UN mandate, but Russia has used its voting power to ensure that will not happen. The Helsinki Charter offered commitments from the US, European states, and Russia to respect Serbia's territorial integrity, namely retaining Kosovo. However, many point to Serbia's ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians in 1999 and the resulting UN protectorate as the ensuing loss of such sovereignty.

While the legality of Kosovo's declaration under the UN Security Resolution 1244 remains disputed, the Kosovo constitution was approved unanimously on April 4 by parliament and the EU special envoy to Kosovo, Dutch diplomat Pieter Fieth, who also heads the International Steering Group (ISG) for Kosovo. The main task of the ISG is to monitor

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## Current Themes in International Public Affairs: An Interdisciplinary Look at Public Policy Issues: Conference Draws Faculty and Graduate Students

About 75 people participated in the International Public Affairs Association (IPAA) Conference on April 11th. The conference title, *Current Themes in International Public Affairs: An Interdisciplinary Look at Public Policy Issues*, reflects the diversity of the panelists and the conference's broad emphasis on global public policy issues. IPAA is composed primarily of graduate students in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, but the event included presentations from students and faculty from other IU programs and campuses as well as other universities. The success of event can be attributed to the efforts of a subcommittee of graduate students including Jennifer Pearl, Alison Behling, and Nancy Meyer.

The conference was organized into five main panels:

- Social Inclusion
- NGOs, Non-State Actors and their Influence on World Affairs;
- Global Environment and Resources
- Conflict and Resolution
- International Political Economy

A feature of the conference was its inclusion of both faculty and graduate students (Master's and Doctoral ) as panelists along with a number of papers co-authored by faculty-student pairs. Participants prepared and presented policy briefs on their subject. Topics pertinent to the European Union will be posted on the EUCE website. The policy briefs cover a range of issues including Participatory Instruments for Dam Building (Sergio Villamayor Tomas); EU Merger Review Policy (Andy Satchwell); The EU's Common Agricultural Policy and New Member states (Alison Behling and Matt Auer); EU Gender Policy Implementation in Ukraine (Edward Rakhimkulov, Oleana Suslova, and Charles Wise); Subnational Interest in Supranational Governance: Evidence from the EU (Milena Neshkova); European Family Policies and their impact on Labor Force Inclusion (Lynn Duggan and Alice Luck); Redefining Social Inclusion in the European University (David Audretsch and Nancy Meyer); and EU Free Mobility of Labor Policy and Civil Service Inclusion (Lois Wise and Jilayne Wilhoite).

### Coming Closer: Prospects for Reunification in Cyprus By Paul Pass

*This a section from a longer paper presented at the International Public Affairs Association Conference in April.*

The Republic of Cyprus, an island country in the east Mediterranean Sea, is a member of the European Union, uses the Euro as its currency, and has one of the thirty highest GDP per capita in the world. However, its northern neighbor the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is internationally isolated and economically disadvantaged. The two entities remain as one of the few examples of intra-state division in the Western world. The dispute between Cyprus and Northern Cyprus also has consequences beyond its own borders. It casts a shadow over the unity of the European Union as the organization's only divided member in addition to presenting an obstacle for possible Turkish accession to the EU. The conflict has also complicated relations between Greece and Turkey in NATO.

The recent history of the Cyprus conflict comes from an attempted Greek coup and a Turkish invasion over three decades ago. Pro-enosis (i.e. those in favor of Cypriot union with Greece) paramilitary forces in Cyprus and supporters of the Greek military junta led a coup in 1974 to overtake the Cypriot government in Nicosia. Turkey responded by invading the north of the island in order to protect Turkish Cypriots. The United Nations intervened and an eventual ceasefire was agreed upon, thus establishing the so-called Green Line that divides the island to today. Pro-enosis forces were not able to accomplish union with Greece primarily due to the fall of the junta in Athens. Nevertheless, the result was a Greek Cypriot run Republic of Cyprus and a unilaterally-declared, Turkish Cypriot-led Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Today Turkey is the only country to recognize Northern Cyprus. The island is partitioned into four sections: 1) the Republic of

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the implementation of a plan for independence in Kosovo while providing special protection for the Serbian minority population and Serbian cultural heritage. The plan drafted by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari aims to resolve the Kosovo status conflict by calling for comprehensive decentralization and autonomy for the approximately 130,000 Serbs living among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Fieth agreed that the constitution ensures and respects the rights of the minority population, who currently live in separate areas of Kosovo, watched over by NATO peacekeepers.

Despite some differences of opinion within member states, most EU nations have pledged full support for the EU Rule of Law engagement mission, Eulex. The state-building mission is aimed at ensuring a smooth transition for Kosovo authorities to implement a juridical and police system which guarantees that all members of society benefit from the Rule of Law. This hands-on aspect of Ahtisaari's plan would undoubtedly stand as the greatest civil crisis management operation in the history of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to date. However, the ambitious mission, slated to deploy some 1,900 police, judges, prosecutors and administrators by June has encountered opposition and setbacks this summer. Nearly one month after the scheduled UN to EU handover, the Eulex mission has still not held a significant presence in the war torn region. In short, Russia's veto power in the UN along with selected uncertainties in the legality of the mission has led UN and EU officials to reconsider the details of the mission, namely towards an appeal to reconfigure the Eulex mission to operate under the UN authority.

The EU is the largest donor to Kosovo, having already spent 1.8 billion Euros and envisioning some 200 million Euros for the development of Kosovo's institutions and advancement toward regional integration from 2007-2009. Undeniably, Kosovo is the biggest per capita beneficiary of the EU munificence. Raising Kosovo from a fragile, underdeveloped infant state into a stable and independent nation presents a daunting task. With no functional industry and over half of the population unemployed, Kosovo remains a massive challenge that will test the strength of the European Union's crisis management capabilities and its economic and political commitment to stabilizing the Western Balkans. With positive results, the EU's security and defense policy could be recognized as a legitimate force in the global conflict resolution realm.

Tia Trueblood is a second year master's student in West European Studies. Her research focus is on higher education reform policies of the European Union.

## Q&A With Per Nordahl, Assistant Director

### 1. Tell us a little bit about yourself—where you are from, something about your family, etc.

I was born and lived most of my life up in the far north of Sweden. I've lived in several places but if I were to pick one Umeå. Umeå is also where my three



children live, study, and work today.

### 2. What is your academic background? (Where did you study, what did you study, etc.)

Academia is actually my second profession. Before I entered the academic world I was a fine mechanic working for laboratory equipment. Having a family natural to pursue my studies there. At first I thought of becoming a high school teacher. I was also admitted in to that program with history and religion as my main fields. However, during my years studying history I, more or less by accident, stumbled upon a topic of Swedish political radicalism, labor and migration. Given the fact that most Swedes immigrated to the United States, this topic eventually brought me here. The whereabouts of Swedish political radicals and their social networks in the U.S. then became the topic of my dissertation.

### ground? (Where did you study, what did

you study, what did you study, etc.)

sional career. Before I entered the academic

### 3. As an historian, what are some of your personal research interests (past or present)?

Naturally my research interests have developed from various aspects of my dissertation. Although I initially was most

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fascinated by the role of the political left, I now look more on conditions for social mobilization in general. Coming from a Swedish context where class and gender have been two decisive categories it has become more and more evident that factors such as race and ethnicity are entering the center stage. With an increasing level of international migration, Northern Europe in general, and Sweden in particular, has, and will be, affected by this. Hence, migration and integration are areas on which I try to focus today.

**4. Most recently in Sweden you worked at the Swedish Emigrant Institute. What is Sweden's current situation with immigration and integration, and what do you see happening in the future?**

Today, Sweden has one of the fastest growing numbers of residents with foreign origins. Sweden has, from a few decades ago, moved from being one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the world into a country that now displays an ethnic diversity where almost 20% of the population is of foreign background. However, despite the fact that Sweden is topping the list when it comes to having all the "right" integration policies in place, the general perception among Swedes is that the integration of immigrants does not work. Part of the reason for this, I believe, is a lack of historical experience of immigrants and the meeting with "the others." Another reason, which in part is a product of the former, is that in policy making and the general discourse focus has mainly been on the immigrants rather than the meeting between immigrants and their new host society. Hence, although Swedes might talk about integration, the general mindset is still in an assimilation mode.

Due to the demographic profile, with an ageing population, there is a growing need for labor and the only way to provide sufficient numbers is through immigration. The state-, county- and municipality-level administrations all have the ambition to facilitate a smooth integration process but with a mindset still in assimilation mode they continue to come up short. Unfortunately the latest proposal for changes within the reception of refugees and other new arrivals to Sweden does not really change this.

With the economy apparently heading for a nosedive there is an evident risk for a growing sense of xenophobia in Sweden. In fact, in the last election, Sverigedemokraterna (SD), an ultra nationalistic right wing party, managed to win almost 300 seats in local and regional assemblies. This was a major breakthrough for this party and recent polls indicate that if elections were held today they would even make it past the 4% bar to get into the national parliament. In a recent poll among youngsters, SD even came out as the second largest party. If these are signs of what may lay ahead, the future does not look too bright.

**5. You have worked on several EU projects. Can you talk a little bit about these and what you feel are trends in EU migration policy?**

On one level EU is certainly aware of its dilemma of an ageing population and its need to facilitate labor as the baby boomers now are getting into retirement age. This is not only a Swedish dilemma but something with which perhaps the southern part of Europe is struggling even more. Generally, one could say that the problem can't be resolved without an increased influx of non European immigrants. The U.S. is basically built on this constant influx of immigrants. Although this process has not been an easy one, I would still argue that there is much more of a general awareness and preparedness to deal with this process here compared to Europe. Hence, there might be a lesson or two to be learned from the American experience: what to do and what not to do. To me, this is also one of the incitements for EU to sponsor centers like the EUCE.

Looking at Europe today, it is quite obvious that EU is struggling to solidify its recent rapid development and enlargement. On one hand there is this constant need to improve EU's functionality as an economic and political unit and on the other hand this is partly done by breaking down some of the old structures. Among EU politicians there is an ambition to construct a common European identity and this is perceived by many as threatening their old national identity. If you then on top of this sprinkle a growing number of non European immigrants coming in with their history and personal agendas, it is easy to understand that many Europeans feel that their identity is being challenged to the point where it becomes frightening and they then become even more protective of the old ways.

But, just as here in the U.S, there is a certain level of distrust toward big and central governments and the political bureaucracy of EU is by many perceived as even bigger and farther away than the national government. In many ways I think that the revival

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for immigrating to Sweden.

While it is easy to sing the praises of Sweden and recognize it for its generosity and humanitarianism—especially when the United States took in only 1,600 Iraqi refugees last year—I would be remiss to paint this picture entirely in hues of rose. In recent years, Sweden has transitioned from a relatively homogenous country to one of ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity—engendering economic, social, and political challenges for all involved. Currently, 16.7% of the population is either foreign-born or Swedish-born with two foreign-born parents. As a percentage of the total population, the largest numbers of foreign-born people reside in the county of Stockholm, which includes the capital city of Stockholm, its districts, and 26 other municipalities. However, the municipality with the highest concentration of foreign-born residents includes the southern city of Malmö, located only a bridge's distance from Copenhagen, Denmark. Segregation in and near these cities is common, and the vast majority of foreign nationals and foreign-born living in suburban ghettos, such as Stockholm's Rinkeby or Malmö's Rosegård. Employment rates differ greatly between native Swedes and the foreign-born population, and the Swedish Integration Board finds these differences cannot be explained fully by variation in age, education, or length of stay in Sweden. In other words, even with anti-discrimination legislation on the books, ethnicity plays a role in one's life chances even in the world's most democratic nation (as ranked by *The Economist*). Finally, while no right-wing parties with a xenophobic platform garnered enough votes to earn a seat in Parliament, the 2007 election did result in a historic shift toward more liberal economic policies and the ousting of Social Democrats from the prime minister Post and the government's ruling coalition.

Political unrest, war, genocide, and religious persecution in other regions of the world have dramatically increased the number of asylum-seekers throughout Europe, creating new challenges to EU institutions and member states. Currently, the European Union is working to create a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to make the EU a single protection area for refugees. This system would standardize protection for refugees as well as foster burden sharing across member states. Although variation in member states' refugee policies certainly helps explain why some states, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium, receive a larger per capita share of asylum applications, it is not the only reason. Indeed, the refugees that are brought to EU member states on the basis of UN quotas do not represent the vast majority of asylum seekers in some EU member states, while in other states they do. Many asylum seekers arrive in host countries and register themselves at asylum reception centers (over fifty such centers are scattered across Sweden). Standardizing reception procedures for all refugees coming to the EU should decrease the current imbalances created by states' policies, refugee preferences, and the interaction of the two; however, this also means that member states would lose autonomy in their refugee resettlement policy. For example, Denmark and Germany both distribute refugees on the basis of regional populations, while Sweden's current policy allows refugees to settle where they wish. In theory, differences in these policies are due to the preferences and political economies of member states, and a common system will therefore affect some states more than others.

In an increasingly globalized world, the butterfly effect is no longer the stuff of Ray Bradbury's imagination or the plot device of an Ashton Kutcher movie. A decision made in Washington does more than irrevocably alter the lives of Iraqis and American soldiers. Indeed, this war has had significant consequences for other countries far beyond the borders of the U.S. or Iraq. Of course, I am not suggesting that immigration to Sweden or EU politics are driven primarily by U.S. foreign policy; one variable can never fully explain a social, economic, or political phenomenon. Such outcomes are caused by the existence and interaction of multiple variables—the majority of which have been excluded from this article. Nevertheless, on this fifth anniversary of "Operation Iraqi Freedom," we should also examine the impact the decision to go to war has had on other countries. We should acknowledge that the world is shrinking—that a flap of a butterfly's wing in Brazil, or carbon dioxide emissions in China, may actually create that tornado in Texas...or Trosa.



**Maureen Eger** has been with the Sociology Department at the University of Washington since 2002. Previously, she studied at Stanford University. Eger is currently researching her doctoral dissertation, comparative study of immigration and welfare state politics in Europe and the USA. During the 2006-07 academic year, she was supported by a Fulbright grant and was guest Researcher at the Center for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations at Stockholm University in Sweden. Her areas of interest include political sociology, Institutional analysis, and social stratification.

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Cyprus in the south, 2) Northern Cyprus, 3) the UN-administered Green Line, and 4) two Sovereign Base Areas in Greek Cyprus that are under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.

Authorities on both sides have made little progress in the peace process over the past three decades. During the fighting between Turkish and Greek/Greek Cypriot forces in the 1970s, thousands of Greek Cypriots living in the north fled to the south and Turkish Cypriots in the south escaped to the north. This displacement of Cypriots remains a contentious issue to today as Greek Cypriots' rights to return to their former homes in the north, along with the continued Turkish military presence, remain the main topic hampering the peace process negotiations.

In 2004, the European Union expressed a desire for Cypriot accession to include both sides of the island. An UN-led referendum to reunify Cyprus was supported by 65% of the Turkish Cypriot constituency, who saw it as an opportunity to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus and hoped for improvements in living standards. However, the UN referendum was rejected by 75% of the Greek Cypriot vote. Greek Cypriots saw the referendum as unbalanced and pro-Turkish Cypriot. They argued that it would not guarantee that all Greek Cypriot refugees would have been returned their homes in the north, that it still maintained a minimal Turkish military presence on the island, and that Turkish settlers in Northern Cyprus would be permitted to stay. Even former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan admitted that his plan failed to meet all the demands of both sides; he thought acceptance of the referendum presented a historic chance for peace. Although the Annan Plan fell short in its goal, it looks to be a key part of the renewed domestic-led reunification effort.

Despite the initial optimism for a solution to the ongoing conflict, the opposition of many Greek Cypriots led to the failure of the referendum. The outcome of the rejected referendum is twofold: only the Greek Cypriot contingent represents Cyprus in Brussels at the European Parliament; and the Turkish Cypriot support marked a reversal in the long-held position of the island's northern inhabitants.

Since the referendum, the event that arguably went the furthest in promoting the peace process was the February 2008 presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus. Dimitris Christofias was able to fend off Ioannis Kasoulidis in the second round of voting and both candidates led campaigns calling for resolution and reunification. More importantly, anti-reunification incumbent Tassos Papadopoulos was defeated, which some say indicates that Greek Cypriots have rejected his hard-line anti-reunification approach to the conflict. Enthusiasm for reunification of the island has increased since the election victory of Christofias, who has put the peace process at the forefront of his goals while in office. His initial conversation with Northern Cyprus leader Mehmet Ali Talat has also created an atmosphere of optimism for a reunified island.

It is quite remarkable how quickly positive movements in the peace process have progressed given that as recently as January 2008 there was a strong likelihood of years of diplomatic inactivity between Cyprus and Northern Cyprus. Now there is an aura of optimism considering Christofias and his Cypriot Communist Party AKEL have a history of good relations with Turkish Cypriots. His past positive relations with the Turkish Cypriot labor movement, in particular, should make talks progress as smoothly as possible. Christofias' Northern Cyprus counterpart Talat is equally enthusiastic about the peace process and believes the two parties may come to a solution to the crisis as early as the end of this year. Meeting in February 2008, the two agreed to officially reopen diplomatic relations with the goal of reunification. These initial meetings supported the governmental structure suggested by the Annan Plan. It should be noted that this

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## **Q&A With Per Nordahl, Assistant Director, continued**

of the provincial and regional identities that we can see today can be understood as a reaction to the effort to forge a new European identity. In any case, this is also part of the enigma of the processes of social inclusion, integration and democracy and I believe that these are crucial areas for a constructive development of Europe and EU. However, finding sustainable solutions to all of this will not be an easy task when the economy appears to be heading towards a recession and all the environmental issues that are at hand really should have been resolved years ago. Still, it is in situations like this when the need for international dialogue and exchange is perhaps greater than ever.

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will be a domestically-led reunification project.

The best solution for the Cyprus dispute is the implementation of the quasi-Swiss governmental structure suggested in the Annan Plan coupled with domestic deliberation on the contentious issues of Turkish military presence, a unified constitution, and territorial claims. Also, the return of property to Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot refugees would be advantageous. The Annan Plan would create a new Cypriot confederation of two constituent bodies: a Greek Cypriot state and a Turkish Cypriot state. A Presidential Council of four Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots would select a President and Vice-President from among their ranks. The two leaders would switch duties and titles every twenty months within the sixty-month term of the Presidential Council. The application of the Annan Plan governmental structure seems to be the path adopted by Christofias and Talat, although the full plan will not be detailed until later in 2008.

The two leaders will meet again for the start of fully-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the UN—though some progress has already been made in the first month of Christofias' presidency. Both he and Talat agreed in principle upon the reopening of a crossing on Ledra Street, a main thoroughfare in the capital of Nicosia that has come to symbolize the partition of the island. Though there is reason for optimism, there are always roadblocks in the peace process. The most recent hurdle comes from the fact that in exchange for its support in the February elections, Christofias promised Papadopoulos' centrist party DIKO the influential foreign ministry post. Ultimately, this could compromise new reunification efforts.

Both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders are now committed to the development of a peaceful solution, but the true test will come when leaders formulate a solution and in turn have to gain approval from their constituencies. It appears as if Greek Cypriots are more willing to accept reunification now than arguably any other time in the last thirty-five years. The compromises made between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots must be both *precise* enough to produce tangible results and *dualistic* enough to gain the satisfaction of both populations. The encouragement of the international community and the desires of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can only go so far. Success will have to come by turning wishes into a real, implementable plan.

Paul Pass is a master's student in West European Studies. He is writing his thesis on contemporary European economic growth.

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