Presidential Address

The Space between Us: The Relevance of Relational Theories to Comparative and International Education

HEIDI ROSS

Not long after the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, I received a telephone call from Lynn Neary of National Public Radio. She was working on a story about how educators were responding to September 11, about how little United States students understood the rest of the world. Would I care to respond?

I did not argue with Neary about U.S. global ignorance. Who could argue that anyone’s knowledge is adequate to the task of world understanding? And yet, the unpopularity of “America” abroad was no secret. Nor did we have to dig deep to uncover the aggression and self-servingly selective support of human well-being that inspired resentment of U.S. power. How could it be, then, that students in my classes last autumn expressed shock, bewilderment, and fury that hatred of the United States, as blundering bully or opportunistic hegemon, could reach out and touch them? I told Neary that my students’ reactions underscored for me how universities were, among other better things, spaces that market possessive individualism, where knowledge is presented as the gateway to choice, financial security, and the power of acquisition. September 11 made me feel keenly what Rosalind Petchesky described as “living at the center of global capitalism—which is like living in a very dysfunctional family that fills you with shame and anger for its arrogance, greed and insensitivity, but is, like it or not, your home and gives you both immense privileges and immense responsibilities.”

Can universities, so implicated as a regime of utilitarian power, nurture those abilities and capacities that critical theorists have been demanding we nurture—“the ability to seriously interrogate the world, the capacity to imagine and re-envision a world free from the pain and disfigurement of domination and exploitation?” Can universities help students hold fast to their humanity?

These are not, of course, questions that apply only to U.S. students and teachers. They apply just as well, if for different reasons, to students and educators around the world who watched the World Trade Center towers topple and the Pentagon burn with a rush of bitter celebration or smug satisfaction that “they” finally got “theirs.” Their reactions, as well as those of my students, tell us quite a lot about what’s missing from education worldwide. And as I told Neary, knowledge alone will not supply it. What is fundamentally missing from education is empathy, caring social imagination, and personal connection—an ethics of care.

The absence of caring has been identified as a problem by more than one social commentator in the aftermath of September 11. However, how we talk about the necessity of caring in the world makes a world of difference. Anthony Lewis has argued that winning a military struggle would not end the threat of terrorism. What would, he believes, is reducing resentment of the United States His solution is relieving materially poorer nations of their crushing debt load. Redressing world poverty, writes Lewis, is “no longer a matter of grace, of charity, of patronizing kindness. It is a matter of intense self-interest.” In other words, just in case we had not really believed it before, the United States really does have to worry about what happens in places like Afghanistan. In short, “We have to care.” As I hope to make clear, conceptualizing care as a strategic defense initiative for a society that has belatedly discovered globalization has a downside is not the sort of care I have in mind.

Colgate University alumni have strong ties to the financial centers of lower Manhattan and experienced an unusually large number of personal tragedies as a result of the destruction of the World Trade Center. During one heated class discussion, when I faulted our puny capacity for compassion, most students adamantly denied the possibility that they could feel compassion or empathy for anyone, let alone enemies, who did not touch them personally. After a student sighed and said that it is just an abstract question anyway, something quite simple dawned on me. Surely one of the biggest enemies of caring is abstract thinking, which allows us to dehumanize. What allows us to see each other as human beings? Many of the scholars that I reflect on in this address argue that rationality and knowledge alone are not enough. Rather, “moral perception and imagination necessarily involve an intertwining of emotion, cognition, and action.”

Henry Giroux has written that September 11 revealed a stark need for an “alternative space for critical reflection,” a space for educators to “set an

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example for creating the conditions for reasoned debate and dialogue."

What I saw happening in my classrooms last autumn convinced me that reasoned debate alone would not create the conditions necessary for dialogue. Reasoned debate could not succeed precisely because when it did not have the authenticity of emotional response, it remained far too weak to counter the reactive, hectoring identity discourses that my students were using from the media to figure out how they should be allied to others.

In response to my students, I found myself returning to the work of scholars whom I had read in the past, sometimes long past. Many of these scholars engage in what I will call relational theorizing. For example, I found myself rereading Martin Buber, relational theorist par excellence: "If the world of man is to become a human world, then immediacy must rule between men." Buber called the essence of human relationship the sphere of the between, located not primarily in either partner but in their interchange, their intersubjective communion. I found myself rereading Mary Catherine Bateson, who concludes that "the encounter with persons, one by one, rather than categories and generalities, is still the best way to cross lines of strangeness." I found myself considering Patricia Hill Collins's description of the black women on her block when she was growing up, whose visionary pragmatism "emphasized the necessity of linking caring, theoretical vision with informed, practical struggle."

I also found myself rereading a story told by feminist ethicist Rita Manning. Manning describes how unencumbered, comfortably abstract, and elegantly rational her classroom interaction was when she first began to teach philosophy 25 years ago. She remarks of her students then, "If they were often bored and mystified by the relevance of ethical theory to their own lives, they hid it with good grace." Then one semester along came a class of 48 female nursing students who hid nothing with good grace. After struggling through Kantian and consequentialist accounts of ethics, they came to class. Silence. When prodded by Manning, they asked if there were not any other options. Manning first dismissed their question "as evidence of their inability to think sufficiently abstractly." I admit to having a similar reaction while teaching theory to undergraduates.

Gradually, however, Manning took her nursing students' dilemma seri-

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8 Collins, Fighting Words, p. 188.
10 Ibid.
ously. Exploring alternative approaches to ethical theory Manning discovered scholars like Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings. For the first time, she began to think about what an ethic of care might look like. “Before the language of care became available [to me],” Manning reflects, “I was a moral philosopher without a moral philosophy.”11 Manning’s entry into feminist ethics offered her an approach to moral decision making that created an enabling connection between rationality and emotional response. Having made the connection, Manning was no longer able to sustain the distinction that once provided her the justification for her scholarship and her pedagogy. The distinction that Manning could no longer make was, “This is what I believe, but this is what I think I can defend.”12

September 11 provided me with what Gayatri Spivak has called, with her usual brutal clarity, an enabling violation, “a rape that produces a healthy child whose existence cannot be advanced as justification for the rape.”13 It has cast a spotlight on the distance between what I can defend and what I believe—a distance, a space, that all educators have a particular responsibility to measure and traverse with care. That distance is part of what I allude to in the title of my article.

What we believe should not be a silent partner to what we can defend, any more than the heart should be a silent partner to the mind. Choosing not to speak from the heart is frequently rewarded in academe, but that well-learned skill almost inevitably causes personal pain. It also perpetuates a one-sided view of human understanding and communication, which “is not located in the heady realm of abstraction but centered in the earthy, emotion-infused world of human interaction.”14

At the end of October, I shared some of these thoughts in a brief keynote talk at the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES) Northeast Regional conference held in Amherst, Massachusetts. My remarks apparently came as a surprise to some members of the audience, who commented that relational theorizing was virtually absent from our field, or at least rarely mobilized as a critique of the ways that we think and act. That people were surprised by my talk in turn greatly surprised me. What I learned in Amherst was that while feminist perspectives do not disturb the academic paradigm as they used to, relational theories do. This surprises me because relational theorizing is clearly evident in the ways that many of us think, write, teach, and conduct research.

This is my second attempt, then, to consider how relational theories are relevant to how we “think with” concepts like identity, democracy, globali-

11 Ibid., p. xii.
12 Ibid.
14 Manning, p. xii.
zation, and marginality, as well as make assumptions about the possibilities for transcultural research and policy making.15 What accounts for our understanding of human separation, for the spaces between us? What accounts for the ease with which we dehumanize each other? To answer such questions, we need alternative metaphors and images to help us conceptualize “the way lives mesh, transmitting direction and power.”16

I draw on the metaphors and imagery of relational theories to think with for three primary reasons. First, they offer conceptualizations of democracy, globalization, connection, and difference with the level of complexity the topics deserve. They also take seriously the issues of “identity work.”17 Finally, relational theories represent a move toward social justice.

What I mean, generally, by relational theorizing includes perspectives on knowing and acting that draw primarily from feminist approaches to the study of schooling, human relationships, and development that are critical of rational-choice perspectives on human motivation and that encourage being-in-relationship through inclusive, multilateral, and generative approaches to power and respect. Much of this literature is situated in a narrative of care or, as Sarah Lawrence Lightfoot has written, “symmetry, empathy, and connection . . . sustained only through constant attention to the work of challenging and dismantling hierarchies.”18

Theorizing the spaces between us from this perspective presents real challenges. I take seriously Bateson’s caution that “when we use a metaphor [such as care] that is drawn from human relations, it is well to look carefully for all its hidden implications, for we run the risk of evoking human conflicts.”19 Actually, this is a risk I wish to run. One thing is certain, the space between us—including the relationships between researchers and subjects, between students and teachers, and between members of one culture or nation and another—is first and foremost one of partial and negotiated meaning. The space between us is never transparent or completely knowable and is inevitably subject to conflict and misunderstanding.

This exploration is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of how relational theorizing is part of and can contribute to the central ontological, epistemological, theoretical, and methodological questions in our field. Rather, it is an exploratory attempt “to stake out the theories’ limits,

constructively use them.”20 In addition, since relational theories could be considered a subset of and largely derived from feminist theorizing, I focus primarily although not exclusively on feminist relational theories. For many feminist relational theorists, “the moral self is radically and historically situated, that is, particularized.”21 For example, if I think about moral responses to September 11 from a relational perspective, I conceive of moral action as not only about one impersonal me reacting to one impersonal other. Knowing particular people across spaces of difference requires the moral capacities of response, care, emotional sensitivity—the ability to see the other as a being in her own right. Never is “knowledge of individual others a straightforwardly empirical matter requiring no particular moral stance toward the person.”22

Feminisms also often hold that “research has to answer the questions women have about their lives, the critical self-reflections of the researcher, and the researcher-respondent relationships.”23 For instance, bell hooks defines feminist movements as being about transforming selves in relationships.24 What she calls visionary feminism demands the building of coalitions of women that do not reduce them to one essentialist category. Visionary feminism is charged to recognize simultaneously both the need for the space between us and the need to transcend it. Noddings might go on to say that these seemingly contradictory needs should be regarded as the basis of every human encounter, each being a potential caring occasion. Confronting the space between us brings “a moment in which each must decide how to meet the other and what to do with the moment.”25

How we decide to meet each other isn’t just a matter of personal preference or agency. This, too, is a recognition that most feminist relational theories share. “Spaces are constituted through struggles over power/knowledge.”26 The challenge to remake spaces is particularly evident in postcolonial theorizing, in which the spatial politics of difference, what Adrienne Rich first called the politics of location, is central to both resisting as well as maintaining power.

Taking as a given the politics of location, feminist theorists attempt to conceptualize more reciprocal, relational notions of research. “Feminist methodology’s challenge to researchers to put themselves on the same critical plane as their research respondents is one of the most important practices

22 Ibid., p. 218.
24 bell hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: South End, 2000).
of feminist methodology and certainly the most difficult to achieve.”  

“It is,” as Michelle Fine notes, “a matter of working the hyphens” in which “researchers probe how we are in relation with the contexts we study.”

One of my specific goals in this article is to address a common misinterpretation of many relational theories and approaches. The misperception is that relational theorizing emerges from a dream of harmony, cohesion, and community—that relational theorizing might allow us to “skate over difference and division.” I argue the reverse. Most scholars who engage in relational theorizing hold strongly to the position that dreams of community “delete all that does not contribute to the unitary story.” They remain decidedly skeptical of tolerance when it is conceptualized strategically to overcome differences wrongly held to be benign. To move “beyond difference,” Collins has explored the idea of intersectionality, “the mutually constructing nature of systems of oppression, as well as social locations created by such mutual constructions.” Likewise, Lois Weis has noted that while “there has been excellent research on various groups as they struggle for emotional, intellectual, cultural, and economic space, we have not spent enough time focusing on the ways in which these groups struggle in relation to each other.”

Relational theorists maintain that understanding the space between us requires a clear recognition of what Bateson calls “dynamic dissonance.” One of relational theories’ primary contributions to understanding the space between us, then, is their careful delineation of an “anti-essentialist, democratic feminism. . . one that recognizes community and people as seductive words that hide inequalities.”

What better day than today, March 8, International Women’s Day, to declare, “We cannot cure our estrangements and the suspicion they bring with them by ignoring difference or by imposing similarity.” As a salute to International Women’s Day, I want to suggest that as women and men “making over our worlds our first task is . . . resisting the temptation to erase things and people who do not conform with the dream.” As hooks puts it,

27 Bloom (n. 16 above), p. 53.
30 Ibid., p. 43.
31 Collins, Fighting Words (n. 4 above), p. 152.
33 Bateson, Full Circles (n. 7 above), p. 30.
34 Cockburn, p. 44.
35 Bateson, Full Circles, p. 13.
36 Cockburn, p. 229.
“Women do not need to eradicate difference to feel solidarity.”

Care in this context means negotiating the multiple spaces between us, which is a way of being in relation and working against a politics of certainty.

Absolutist thinking, grounded in whatever religious or ideological tradition, is exactly the opposite—it presumes to make all knowable and predictable. As an educator I have found it necessary to challenge absolutist impulses. How do we cultivate “the willingness to learn and to be changed?”

One way is to help students reconsider the wisdom of some of our more questionable metaphors of community—the melting pot, for instance, whose “reference is to the melting down of scrap metal, often enough to make bullets.” The ability of relational theorizing to help us articulate the complexities of responding to the human need “to be understood, received, respected, recognized” is perhaps its greatest contributions.

When I began this exploration, I turned to the *Comparative Education Review* to gauge the presence of relational theorizing (or at least relational metaphors) by scholars in our field. I discovered no shortage of relational thinking, broadly defined, by past CIES presidents. Gary Theisen spoke of alliances, bridges, and confessions. David Wilson drew a tree whose branches represented the intellectual connections that construct the field. Carlos Alberto Torres traced the dilemmas of citizenship in a global world. And Vandra Masemann noted the importance to the field of paradigms that are “holistic, context dependent, and integrative,” that “propose ways in which knowledge and society might be knit together again, not sundered apart.”

This process, however, quickly made me consider how narrowly to define my operative term relationship. As others have noted, “Relationship has become a hackneyed word, made to carry so many meanings that it ceases to have much connotative force.” I also began worrying whether I could write about caring without sounding sentimental.

This last question is particularly relevant in the context of policy making, where “ethical utopianism” has been sharply criticized as a lapse into sub-

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38 Bateson, *Full Circles*, p. 17.
39 Ibid., p. 30.
jectivism. It would be easy but I believe wrongheaded to do the same in the context of relational theory. An ethic of care is not necessarily incompatible with linear rationality, although I generally agree with Noddings that it puts priority on “creating, maintaining, and enhancing positive relations—not on decision making in moments of high moral conflict, nor on justification.”

In a 1971 presidential address titled “Revolt against the Schools,” Philip Foster criticized school reform movements by wide-eyed radicals or “feelies” by quoting Karl Popper: “he who teaches that love should rule opens the way for those who rule by hate. . . . I insist that no emotion, not even love, can replace the rule of institutions controlled by reason.” I reject Popper’s assumption that emotion and reason are separable. The implications that hate and love are of equal weight and have no place in ethical discourse represent the zenith of relativism and had hobbled the study of ethics until feminists came to the rescue. Foster’s point was a policy question, though—that reason must guide policy, and emotion gets in the way. It would seem to me that policy must proceed, whether we like it or not, from how people in reality live their lives. This is also where relational theory helps tremendously. We want to understand the spaces between us. To do this we need to know empirically how we hate each other, how we love each other. We need to know, as Cynthia Cockburn puts it, how peace is done. Reason will take us only part of the way toward understanding how people live with policy. People live with policy and shape it. Policy is, in the end, relational.

In a recent issue of Comparative Education Review, Mark Ginsburg and Jorge Gorostiaga argue for the importance of dialogue between theorists, researchers, policy makers, and practitioners. They write that “joint reflection and action means that we are interested in relationships between/among theorists, researchers, policy makers, and practitioners that are more extensive and more intensive.” Likewise, relational theory helps explain what Rosa Maria Torres has pointed out as “the separation of, and the need of synergy between the dimensions of policy, action, and research.” Relational theorizing can help us withstand the temptation to think simplistically and, instead, think “spirally.” This spiral image resonates with Torres’s criticism that “the think globally, act locally motto is misleading and must be chal-

47 Noddings, Educating Moral People, p. 21.
48 Foster, p. 269.
52 Bateson, Peripheral Visions (n. 19 above).
lenged.” Thinking and acting are “intertwined and are required at every level, from the local to the global.” Relational thinking can help us “widen scopes, pay attention to context and culture, accept diversity, insure participation is a conviction rather than a concession.”

The Genre of Relational Theorizing

My understanding of the space between us has been informed by a number of genres that illuminate the space-place concerns and questions of comparative and international education. Even if I had the theoretical wit, I do not have the space to rehearse in these pages the range of relational theorizing these genres represent or their relevance to international and comparative education. Instead, I introduce them and then move on to explain in more detail three interrelated genres that have been particularly helpful to me and that speak in intriguing ways to each other. My construction of distinct genres is somewhat arbitrary, since relational theorists seem to delight in crisscrossing disciplinary, theoretical, and metaphorical boundaries.

The first genre I investigated includes scholars—Paolo Freire and Giroux, for example—of critical curriculum theory, liberation pedagogy, and transformative learning, all of whom advocate communicative learning through interpersonal interaction. A second genre of relational theorizing is rooted in and inspired by indigenous or local knowledge. This genre is illustrated by the current popularity and evocation of the ideal of ubuntu. Wary of the “colonialist subtexts” of some attempts at coalition building by genre-one theorists, scholars in this second genre are edgier and more ambivalent about power, a sensibility they share with scholars in genre three, whose representatives question the potentially dualistic assumptions of liberation theory. Scholars representative of this third genre build a more complex vision of liberation pedagogy that validates difference, challenges universal claims to truth, seeks to create social transformation in a world of shifting and uncertain meanings, and examines closely the interrelationship between structure and agency. The diverse theorists whom I gather into this genre, from Kathleen Weiler to Chandra Mohanty to Trinh Minh Hah to Collins, share the project of reconceptualizing agency (and space), not as self-assertion or mastery, but as creating and sustaining relationships for change. These relationships are enacted among and between individuals whose different group standpoints provide them with

53 R.-M. Torres, p. 57.
varying levels of power and advantage. Feminist geographers could be included in this genre, as they contend that “gendered spaces should be understood less as a geography imposed by patriarchal structures, and more a social process of encoding and decoding.”

At the risk of simplifying quite diverse views, a fourth genre includes the exploration of spirituality and ecology by scholars who argue against human centeredness and recognize moral value in the nonhuman world. This genre implies the most radical form of renegotiating the space between us and renegotiating who “us” is (the human and nonhuman world). Empathy in this genre extends from an expansive sense of self in relationship, including a relational image of nature, the “womb as the first human habitat.” From this vantage point, “devaluation of relatedness is another form of destroying not just our selves but our intergenerational and interspecies environment.”

A fifth genre has changed the landscape of developmental psychology and is best exemplified by the work of Gilligan. This genre is characterized by the rejection of any “dichotomy between the sociological and the psychological.” It also presents relatedness as the central plot of human development. A sixth and related genre, the ethics of care and feminist ethics, includes a provocative body of scholarship about particularity in moral thinking. Noddings has neatly summarized “moral education from the perspective of an ethic of caring as having four major components: modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation.”

Scholars such as David Hansen, who write from a relational perspective regarding the moral dimensions of teaching, make up a seventh genre. Hansen defines a teacher’s moral sensibility as “a disposition of mind and feeling centered around attentiveness to students and their learning.” This sensibility, Hansen writes, becomes evident in “how a person fuses humaneness and thought in the way he or she regards and treats others.” It implies a critical, self-reflexive, and unsentimental orientation: “the ability to stand back from the scene at certain moments in order to discern the issues at stake, to appreciate differences in point of view that may be involved, and more.”

An eighth genre might include two very different types of sociological and psychological theorizing, embodied knowledge on the one hand, rep-

57 Collins, Fighting Words (n. 4 above), p. 5.
63 Noddings, Educating Moral People (n. 25 above), p. 22.
64 David T. Hansen, Exploring the Moral Heart of Teaching: Toward a Teacher’s Creed (New York: Teachers College Press, 2001), pp. 21, 32–33.
resented by theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, and emotional knowledge on the other, which explores how feeling and emotions give intelligence its humanity.65

The ninth and tenth genres include, respectively, caring jurisprudence and nursing. The former introduces into legal deliberation the concept of an ethic of care—in a conscious attempt to disrupt the predominant ethic of justice that is the foundation of the rule of law and universalistic approaches to rational and fair decision making. Nursing grounded in an ethics of care requires envisioning medical relationships as much more than just problem-solving relationships, which are, after all, “preceded by a moment of receptivity—one in which the full humanity of both parties is recognized.”66

Finally, relational theory plays a particularly fascinating and prominent role in my eleventh genre, which we could call challenging democracies that reconceptualize and problematize democracy and public spaces, often in the context of globalization.67 This genre overlaps with the postcolonial theorizing about identity and belonging that characterizes genre three.68

Relational Theory and Freedom, Development and Sustainability

Exemplifying genre four, C. A. Bowers uses relational theorizing to reveal how systems of education package the myths of modernity, “perpetuating the most extreme expressions of modern consciousness, with devastating consequences for the environment.”69 The outcome is that human beings have lost their capacity for self-limitation.

According to Bowers, modern consciousness is “an individually-centered way of understanding intelligence, creativity, and moral judgment.”70 This way of understanding is based on core assumptions, for example, that science and technology are culturally neutral and a manifestation of human progress, that human experience of time is linear and progressive, and that the judgment of the supposedly autonomous individual is the primary authority for assessing the relevance and worth of traditions. This view of the world cel-

70 Bowers, Culture of Denial, p. 85.
ebrates as a taken-for-granted good the continual search by human beings for what is new and innovative. Bowers argues that liberation and participatory theorizing that identifies the critical reflection of the individual as the source of authority for judgment, theorizing represented by educators from John Dewey to Maxine Greene and Freire, are preecological. Their views derive from “deep cultural assumptions” of modernity and ignore that individuals are cultural beings dependent on natural systems. For example, from Bower’s point of view, because critical theory embodies the cultural roots of ecological crisis, it does little to help us clarify the importance of transgenerational relationships, that is, “how youth play a necessary part in this vital cultural renewal and ecologically centering process.” 71

In putting forward the need for an alternative “pedagogy of the oppressor,” Bowers simplifies the subtle theorizing of Freire and Greene that holds: “Freedom can be thought of as a refusal of the fixed, a reaching for possibility, an engagement with obstacles and barriers and a resistant world, an achievement to be sought in a web of relationships, an intersubjective reality.” 72 Yet, Bowers is correct that the assertive individual is very present in liberation theories; as Freire puts it, to exist humanly is to name the world, to change it. 73 It is this ontological foundation of emancipatory education that ecofeminists and writers like Bowers believe has become reactionary in the face of environmental crisis. Bowers contends that even in poststructuralism, with its adamant decentering of the individual as singular subject, the innovative and experimental society is construed as progressive, a good in itself. For Bowers, “moral relationships should meet the test of contributing to the long term sustainability of ecosystems.” 74 Bowers also argues that the founding principles of education should include interdependence, sustainability, ecological cycling, energy flow, and diversity. 75

These ideas resonate with Wolfgang Sachs’s provocative analysis of the modern impetus to test, regulate, and manage the environment. 76 “Treating as a technical problem the inability of the earth to carry the north’s lifestyle . . . what falls by the wayside are efforts to elucidate the much broader range of futures open to societies which limit their levels of material output in order to cherish whatever ideals emerge from the cultural heritages.” 77

What also falls by the wayside is any vocabulary of helping or assistance that isn’t implicated in the power of surveillance and control, that might

71 Ibid., pp. 86–87.
74 Bowers, Culture of Denial, p. 51.
75 Ibid., pp. 206–7.
77 Ibid., p. 36.
instead be conceptualized as “an act of restoration given without regard to the person in need, the situation, the probability of success . . . the helper is literally overwhelmed by the sight of need.”

In this context, Sachs’s conclusion that “universalist aspirations are generally space-centered, while localist worldviews are mainly place-centered” is especially evocative. It helps articulate “our uneasy cultural preoccupation between the universal and the local” and helps explain why negotiating the spaces between our thick places, concentrations of meaningful human activity, is so difficult.

Sachs calls for a different vision of empowerment and a different vision of agency, with participation “redefined by such qualities as attention, sensitivity, goodness or compassion, and supported by such regenerative acts as learning relation and listening.”

These qualities, he suggests, would be impossible to co-opt. “One world” is “an ever present regulative idea for local action,” a “cosmopolitan localism” that “seeks to amplify the richness of a place while keeping in mind the rights of a multi-faced world.”

This implies, as Amartya Sen has noted, that “there is a deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements. It is important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual freedom and to the force of social influences on the extent and reach of individual freedom. To counter the problems that we face, we have to see individual freedom as a social commitment.”

Linking development and freedom in this way, Sachs shares common ground with Amartya Sen, who argues persuasively that “individual freedom is quintessentially a social product” and that development is “a momentous engagement with freedom’s possibilities.”

Relational Theory and Just Caring: Holding Difference among Encumbered Selves

One of the most influential relational theorists in education and ethics is Gilligan, whose groundbreaking work in developing a voice-centered method of psychological inquiry “described morality based on the recognition of needs, relation, and response.”

Gilligan’s empirical claim is for the existence of a moral way of thinking and acting distinct from impartialist conceptions based on justice, formal rationality, and universal principle. Perhaps Gilligan’s most important contribution to moral development has been a reconceptualization of identity to include experiences of interconnection, that is, the notion of self-in-relation. Through this conceptual move, Gilligan

78 Ibid., pp. 53–54, 65.
79 Ibid., pp. 109–10.
80 Ibid., p. 111.
81 Ibid., p. 129.
82 Ibid., p. 113.
84 Ibid., pp. 31, 298.
reconfigured, or expanded, “the moral domain by the inclusion of responsibility and care in relationships.”

In *Between Voice and Silence*, Gilligan and her colleagues record their attempts, while working with “at-risk” girls, to develop theory through listening. “If listening strengthens our relations by cementing our connection with one another, it also fortifies our sense of self. In the presence of a receptive listener, we’re able to clarify what we think and discover what we feel.”

As the project proceeds, racial tensions grip the research team. The project, and the diverse women that it brought together, comes close to breaking down as the group “attempts to hold differences by maintaining the distinctness, the individuality, and the cultural tonality of people’s voices, and thereby to sustain relationship.”

Particularly interesting is this work’s explicit discussion of what is necessary for unlearning privilege, a process that is gradually understood by members of the research team as not erasing or denying but, rather, displacing their subjectivities.

How can white women take off the mantle of privilege and power in the presence of women of color and expose and explore their often puzzling and intimate connections with a white, privileged, patriarchal social order? To break a cycle of repetition, it becomes necessary at some point to go past the edge of the familiar and enter a place that is truly unknown. To open oneself to change, to feel the hope that such an opening brings, means also to become vulnerable to the reenactment of past hurts and betrayals. To feel the hope that change is possible creates the most intense psychological vulnerability. But in the absence of the willingness to risk relationship—the experience of really hearing and taking the other’s voice into oneself—the talking just goes on and on, because in the absence of relationship, change is impossible. Betrayal then readily becomes the reason for giving up hope. What would it mean for women to stay with one another, to link hands across the usual fences of difference, to resist the old divisions, to become a politically effective majority, to act in concert to bring about change?

Answering this question about the space between us is the central aim of feminist ethics, which conceptualizes morality as “grounded in relationship and response.” Feminist ethicists reject abstract individualism and hold that human needs must be filled in relationship. The conceptualization of human selves, then, is relational or, in Michael Sandel’s word, “encumbered.”

Scholars pursuing relational ethics whom I find most insightful on this point include Noddings, Lawrence Blum, and Manning. This trio is not exceptional in writing in reaction to traditional, rule-based accounts of the good

88 Ibid., p. 11.
90 Manning (n. 9 above), p. xiv.
and consistently point to Iris Murdoch as one of their intellectual inspirations. "In The Sovereignty of the Good Iris Murdoch suggests that the central task of the moral agent involves a true and loving perception of another individual, who is seen as a particular reality external to the agent."92 In other words, a human being’s moral task or accomplishment, usually referred to as particularity, "is not a matter of finding universalizable reasons or principles of action, but of getting oneself to attend to the reality of other persons."93 Feminist ethicists reassert into moral theory that which had been theorized away in impartialist approaches to ethics: love, care, and human relationships, and the importance of moral agency, perception, and responsiveness. Caring is not a virtue but, rather, develops in relationship.

In a recent book, Noddings turns her attention to the conditions and spaces “that support moral ways of life.”94 If “reason alone can motivate moral action,” then the passions and moral sentiments must be educated.95 “We want schools to be places where it is both possible and attractive to be good.”96

Also attempting to understand the capacities required to practice caring, Blum asks, “How must a compassionate person view someone in order to have compassion for him? . . . Compassion is not a simple feeling-state but a complex emotional attitude toward another, characteristically involving imaginative dwelling on the condition of the other person, an active regard for his good, a view of him as a fellow human being, and emotional responses of a certain degree of intensity.” In other words, negotiating, bridging, and respecting the spaces between us requires a moral imagination of humanity and compassion, that is, “imaginatively reconstructing someone’s condition out of concern for her good.”97

How generous human beings can be with their moral obligation to care, how far their “human capacity for sympathetic identification with others” can be stretched is a matter of debate among relational ethicists.98 In her attempt to find the moral breaking point, Noddings distinguishes between natural and ethical caring. The former is the caring that we “naturally” give for those with whom we are directly connected: children, family members, even colleagues, and students. Our obligation for ethical caring, however, which is cultivated through practice based on what we think our ideal caring self should be, seems limited only to people with whom there exists a potential for growth in relationship. Where does this leave our obligation to care for “distant others” such as unrelated and unseen street children? It does not

92 Blum (n. 21 above), p. 12.
93 Ibid., p. 12.
94 Noddings, Educating Moral People (n. 25 above), p. xiii.
95 Ibid., p. 1.
96 Ibid., p. 9.
97 Blum, pp. 173, 175–76.
98 Manning, p. 67.
The relevance of relational theories

seem enough to say that ethical caring can only take place where there is the possibility for dynamic and mutual relationships. What I find most persuasive about Manning’s response to Noddings is her strong recognition that we cannot always choose to whom we are obligated. How do we remind ourselves to care for sufferers we do not know, since we do know that we share with them the basic human desire to care and be cared for? Manning tries to answer this question by calling for the cultivation and practice of moral imagination, “our sentiments balanced by our rich understanding of context.”


The limits of our moral imagination to care for others lead to some very engaging relational theorizing in attempts to reconceptualize democracy and globalization. The words “relational theory” do not explicitly appear in much of this literature, and in fact some authors argue that new conceptions of citizenship “must move beyond feminist engagement with voice, subjectivity and difference.” Nevertheless, relational theorizing is central to how scholars of this genre interpret identity and alliance. Theorists like Dale Snauwaert search for alliance through the concept of cosmopolitan democracy, which would allow human beings to transcend national, communal, cultural, and civilizational boundaries. Snauwaert argues that as a result of globalization, democracy can no longer be conceived of as just a nation-state phenomenon but, rather, a cosmopolitan one. Snauwaert draws on both an ethic of care and an ethic of justice in support of his argument. He begins with the principle of moral equality among human beings, which in turn is based on at least two other basic moral values and dispositions: sympathy and respect. Sympathy demands an active response of care, and respect requires us to refrain from violating each other’s “rights.”

In contrast to cosmopolitan democracy is “agonistic democracy,” which affirms the necessity of identity. Cockburn argues that such a democratic space

has to afford an optimal distance between differences, small enough for mutual knowledge, for dispelling myths, but big enough for comfort. It needs to be crisscrossed with the webs of a structure and a process capable of sustaining stable relationships and conveying clear meanings from one side of it to the other. It has to be strong enough to prevent implosion, a collapse of differences into rape, silencing or annihilation. But it also has to be flexible enough to permit differences

99 Ibid., p. 89.
100 Arnot and Dillabough (n. 67 above), p. 38.
to change their form and significance, and for increased intimacy as and when the quality of relationships allow of it. Love, even. 103

The distinction between cosmopolitan and agonistic democracy is illustrated by two different metaphors for listening and speaking across the spaces between us—a nurturing public home place and a caring struggle in a well-lit place. These metaphors provide the central images in two recent studies, both of which describe the practical experiences of building women’s alliances for social change.

In A Tradition That Has No Name, Mary Belenky, Lynne Bond, and Jacqueline Weinstock set out to document women’s developmental leadership styles that allow communities to thrive. 104 The tradition that has no name refers to African-American female leadership styles that make their communities into public home places. The relational practices used by the connected or midwife leaders of public home places included “rejecting the notion of an Other, envisioning hearts and minds developing in tandem, and developing a common set of goals and values to animate and guide the community.” 105 Salient metaphors for leadership, including drawing out and lifting up, drew on maternal thinking as a revolutionary discourse and rejected dualisms that divide and deny. Although the women leaders Belenky and her colleagues talked to had “devoted their lives to righting injustices, when they talked about what that meant they were much more likely to speak of growth interrupted than a right denied.” 106

In a very different book, The Space between Us, Cockburn attempts to understand how women form voluntary alliances to communicate across religious and ethnic spaces that have been violently politicized by nationalism and war. I was drawn back to this book after September 11, recalling the question with which Cockburn begins, “we need to know more about how peace is done. I mean, really done.” Not how politicians posture, demand, and concede. Not how people tolerate each other by muffling their disagreements and turning a blind eye to their injustices. But “how ordinary people arrange to fill the space between their national differences with words in place of bullets. What do they say to each other then?” 107

Cockburn focuses her analysis on how women make democracy out of difference. What she learns from her study is that if an alliance is to thrive and make a difference it must face this question. Cockburn’s conclusions resonate with those of Gilligan. Women make alliances work, even across unthinkable barbarism, by “holding together difference whose negotiation

103 Cockburn (n. 17 above), p. 224.
104 Mary Field Belenky, Lynne A. Bond, and Jacqueline S. Weinstock, A Tradition That Has No Name: Nurturing the Development of People, Families, and Communities (New York: Basic, 1997).
105 Ibid., p. 17.
106 Ibid., p. 259.
107 Cockburn, p. 1.
is never complete, and is not expected to be so. . . . This is the crux of an alliance: a creative structuring of a relational space between collectivities marked by problematic differences.\footnote{108}

Cockburn borrows from Italian activists the notion of transversal politics, “a conceptual move to get around and above the immobilizing contradiction in which we often find ourselves: between a dangerous belief in universal sisterhood and a relativist stress on difference that dooms us to division and fragmentation. . . . In transversal politics, perceived unity and homogeneity are replaced by dialogues which give recognition to the specific positioning of those who participate in them as well as to the unfinished knowledge that each such situated positioning can offer.” What does the space between us look like from Cockburn’s perspective? “We can be thought of,” she writes, “as on its periphery, looking for meanings that will bring us into relationship across it.”\footnote{109} Cockburn found that the women trying to create a sustainable space between difficult differences suffered from what she came to think of as identity hurt. The pain occurred where there was disjuncture between a woman’s sense of self and the identities with which she was labeled, held to account for, or felt seduced by.

Cockburn concludes that a creative handling of difference and of hurt is central to democratic process and “that the arrangements we choose to make for our interactions with each other, the structures and processes we create for our organizations, shape the way we deal with identities.”\footnote{110} “A crucial step in developing interventions must be to expect and find ways to resolve conflicts resulting from competing knowledge claims and moral positions.”\footnote{111} What we might learn from women’s projects about creating democratic, sustainable polices is to replace dangerous daydreams of promised “homes of our own” or of an apocalyptic demolition of all walls, with what might really be attainable: a “careful and caring struggle in a well-lit space.”\footnote{112}

As long as care is missing from education, the resources for learning, teaching, and cultural criticism most vital for the formation of democratic communities will remain fragmented and distorted, leaving our students and ourselves unable to initiate the critical dialogue between world pictures of globalization that we all need—and deserve.

In her recent book, Coming of Age in Academe, Jane Roland Martin talks about how university scholars too often turn away from the lived experiences of real people, creating a “brain drain.”\footnote{113} She does not mean the geograph-
ical brain drain to which we usually refer when scholars traverse the globe and thereby enrich global centers with their talents. In contrast, this is a brain drain that is the result of scholars becoming estranged from their own societies. Too often, at least in the United States, academic work remains isolated from practice and from people’s lived experiences. As Martin puts it, universities tolerate “the 3 Cs of care, concern, and connection as they relate to ideas but not to other people, other living things, or the earth itself.”

The university, through its processes of socialization, “is a society whose trained intellectuals do not know how to respond directly to human needs, indeed do not even see the value of trying to do so.”

This is a devastating indictment of academe, and one that helps explain why knowledge alone will not help us reimagine global education. Martin’s analysis represents a poignantly timely critique of power maintained through the ability not to have to respond to human needs, not to have to learn from others. Such power is as delusional in a multicultural age as it is dangerous.

I know of few scholars who write as eloquently as Bateson about the necessity to envision the unfamiliar as a resource rather than a threat. In her analysis of living with strangers, she reminds us that our interactions with other human beings must by necessity proceed without complete knowledge and that it is our conscious efforts to keep trying to understand others nevertheless that allow us to act at the edge of our knowledge, at the periphery of understanding. Her words resonate with those of Cockburn, who suggests that “the boundaries of transversal dialogue are determined by the message rather than the messenger.” That is, as we consider the space between us, “We can be thought of as on its periphery, looking for meanings that will bring us into relationship across it.” In short, relational theories may allow individuals to imagine themselves in spaces that have yet to be fully realized or constructed.

In the context of this space of uncertain, hopeful communication, we must remain sensitive to the difficulty, but never underestimate the possibility, of genuine intercultural connection. “Because it is not possible to stand aside from participation until we know what we are doing, it is essential to find styles of acting that accept ambiguity and allow for learning along the way.”

The attitude of open-minded humility, respect for others, and encumbered, improvisational agency is central to the cultivation of what Bateson calls “peripheral vision,” a sort of everyday participant observation that “de-

114 Ibid., p. 131.
115 Ibid.
116 Holland et al., p. 281.
118 Cockburn, p. 9.
119 Bateson, Peripheral Visions (n. 19 above), pp. 234–35.
pends on rejecting . . . the belief that questions of meaning have unitary answers."120 Bateson’s description of slow, careful attention, being present to context and other people, reminds me very much of what Greene has called wide-awakeness and what Noddings calls engrossment, full receptivity to the other. “When I care, I really hear, see, or feel what the other tries to convey.”121 For each of these scholars, there is a powerful link between presence and care. “This awareness is newly necessary today. Men and women confronting change are never fully prepared for the demands of the moment, but they are strengthened to meet uncertainty if they can claim a history of improvisation and a habit of reflection.”122 This process of spiral learning, which evokes Sachs’s concern for sustainable development, might assist us in coming closer to embracing learning that Bateson lovingly calls “a form of spirituality through a lifetime . . . the only pleasure that might replace increasing consumption as our chosen mode of enriching experience.”123

Seeking resonance among strangers through caring reflection implies a reconceptualization of difference and diversity. Anthropologist-critic Clifford Geertz reminds us that what we seem to need more than ever “are ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities, responsive to what Charles Taylor called ‘deep diversity,’ a plurality of ways of belonging and being, that yet can draw from it a sense of connectedness, a connectedness that is neither comprehensive nor uniform, primal nor changeless, but nonetheless real.”124 Difference has to be recognized; “it must be seen not as the negation of similarity, its opposite. . . . It must be seen as comprising it. What unity there is, and identity, is going to have to be negotiated, produced out of difference.”125 I believe that relational theory has already helped us reconceptualize identity toward this end, providing us “a language of sorting out, not of summing up.”126 What emerges is our need for a vocabulary of difference that does not alienate.

One of the purposes of education is to sustain complexity in an increasingly complex world. This means that effective teachers, students, and researchers are those who endure teaching, learning, and studying in what often seems a perverse world. Let me put this more simply and from the point of view of a teacher. What can we do in the classroom to show students that one can be a sensitive, caring human being and at the same time live a life of personal fulfillment? I think that Freire meant something like this

120 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
121 Noddings, The Challenge to Care (n. 85 above), p. 16.
122 Bateson, Peripheral Visions, p. 6.
123 Ibid., p. 74.
125 Ibid., pp. 226–27.
126 Ibid., p. 228.
when he said that one of our challenges as educators is to discover what historically is possible in contributing toward the transformation of the world, giving rise to a world that is rounder, less angular, more humane.

Reflecting on September 11, Barbara Finkelstein refers to such a process as multicultural communitarianism: “to catapult ourselves into others, reciprocity, genuine border crossing—to rise above terror and remain human. . . . The concept of multicultural communitarianism that I am suggesting today also refers to educational processes that enable participants to enter into productive and reciprocal exchanges with people in possession of culturally different habits and ways of knowing, being, and educating.”¹²⁷

One of the most provocative theorists of difference is surely Collins, who takes as her starting point a search for spaces from which a politics of resistance can be constructed. “A fundamental goal for critical social theory consists of broadening its epistemological criteria beyond truth to develop the self-reflectivity to keep its practice oppositional.”¹²⁸ Toward this end, Collins insists that any social theory in support of visionary pragmatism must address three questions. Does it speak the truth to people about the reality of their lives? Does it equip people to resist oppression? Does it move people to struggle, that is, does it give people the moral authority to act?¹²⁹ In finding answers to such questions in the deeply relational thinking of female African-American community leaders, Collins writes, “I want to be clear—I am not glorifying mother love as some sort of natural, instinctual female condition. Rather, I talk of the power of intense connectedness and of the way that caring deeply for women can foster a revolutionary politics. When informed by truths, armed with tools of resistance, and moved by faith in justice, proclaimed love that struggles without end can make a profound difference.”¹³⁰ Borrowing from Elsa Barkley Brown, Collins wonders whether some day it might be possible for human beings to “center in another experience,” not to “decenter anyone as we center someone else . . . only to constantly, appropriately, pivot the center.”¹³¹

Conclusion: Relational Theory and the Moral Obligation to Hope

Relational theorizing generally assumes interpersonal and reciprocal relationships between researchers and participants, and between subjectivity

¹²⁸ Collins, Fighting Words (n. 4 above), p. 198.
¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 200.
¹³⁰ Ibid.
and objectivity. Feminists such as Leslie Bloom assert that such relationships allow us to think and to write “under the sign of hope . . . to speak to the future by creating contexts in which women, as epistemic subjects, can learn to be critical of or even free from essentializing, naturalizing, constraining, and oppressive identifications.”

This tentative offer of hope, and the concomitant reminder that what we hope for influences our flourishing, is not unambiguous. Despite the fact that caring is offered in much relational theory as “a naive, critical faith in the moral life,” there is no concession to utopia.

Rather, the assumption is that struggle must be an ongoing condition of negotiating the spaces between us. Thus, cultivating our moral imagination requires a negotiation between hope and pain, hurt and disappointment, and care and resistance. Relational theory admits affect into the research process, the learning process, and the teaching process, particularly affect stemming from the pain of power and the desire to contain or redirect it toward self-understanding and critical analysis.

In Teaching to Transgress, for example, hooks writes, “I came to theory because I was hurting—the pain within me was so intense that I could not go on living. I came to theory desperate, wanting to comprehend—to grasp what was happening around and within me. Most importantly, I wanted to make the hurt go away. I saw in theory a location for healing.”

Recent comprehensive anthologies of the ideas educators think with, such as David Gabbard’s Knowledge and Power in the Global Economy, make no reference to relationship, caring, or empathy, even in entries on resistance, moral education, critical feminist pedagogy, or dialogue. And yet, relational theories act as a source of positive resistance and transformation—and can account for both pain and healing.

Relational theories can help us understand and provide substitutes for our “lethal beliefs in the proper name, home, blood, land” and give us hope as a resource. “Hope does not require ignorance of limitations and problems any more than it needs the erasure of ambiguities and complexities to be kept alive and generative.” In this sense, relational theories seem to allow us to speak to the future: “Hope for a sustainable future depends on reshaping the life cycle—not the individual life cycle alone but the overlap—

132 Bloom (n. 16 above), p. 137.
133 Ibid., p. 153.
134 Sachs (n. 76 above), p. 49.
135 Hansen, p. 50.
137 Gabbard, p. 200.
139 Bloom, p. 153.
ping and intersecting cycles of individuals and generations, reaffirming both the past and the future, not only in families but in the institutions we build and share."\textsuperscript{140}

The difficulty in persisting in what Geertz calls "the moral obligation to hope" is enduring through the hard task of caring, attending—and paying attention to—the world even when we don’t like it or specific people in it.\textsuperscript{141} In her eloquent book \textit{Bridge across Broken Time}, Vera Schwarcz reflects on what constitutes caring space as it is constructed through the transmission of remembrance and the active bearing of witness in the tradition of Chinese Cultural Memory.\textsuperscript{142} She asks us to consider, as a metaphor for the hard work of caring memory, the Chinese ideograph ren (see fig. 1), which means endurance, forbearance, or having the heart to do something—significantly, the character can also have the connotation of hardening one's heart to do something. The character ren signifies a heart suspended beneath the cutting edge of a knife. This character captures how arduous is the "protracted struggle to maintain fidelity to history in the face of violent disruption."\textsuperscript{143} A blade dangling above a heart: the character reminds us of the emotional and personal price that must sometimes be paid for caring enough to sustain relationships, how slippery are the events of history the memory tries to retrieve, like Joseph Brodsky's description of "a baby clutching a basketball—one's palms keep sliding off."\textsuperscript{144} "Grasped in our palms," Schwarcz writes, "memory is the raw material that

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{ren.png}
\caption{Ren: endurance; forbearance; to have the heart to do something; to harden one's heart to do something.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{140} Bateson, \textit{Full Circles} (n. 7 above), p. 243.
\textsuperscript{141} Geertz (n. 124 above), p. 260.
\textsuperscript{142} Vera Schwarcz, \textit{Bridge across Broken Time: Chinese and Jewish Cultural Memory} (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p. 12.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p. 15.
allows us to make time concrete, a bridge we cast backward to connect with those who went before us.\footnote{145}

Building such bridges, making audible pleas on behalf of recognition, might help us address a paradox of cultural studies that is especially relevant to this historical moment. The paradox is that at the very moment we have come to recognize and describe the world as a space of disturbed boundaries—where everything from microscopic bioweapons to personal identity is in flux—many of us also yearn to reconcile fragmentation. Historian Barbara Metcalf has explained this propensity to highlight and bridge simultaneously the disruptions of our age by suggesting that after two centuries of a history of difference, many of us yearn for a history of connections, of mobility across space.\footnote{146}

Negotiating, not negating, the spaces between us by persistent, agile, and enduring care, in our teaching and our research, is the necessary and possible work we have before us. Especially now, when human violence and the distortion of voices and stories from all corners confound our individual and collective abilities to chart a humane course, we need to see that the knife above the heart cuts both ways: "Locked away in the heart, insults and hatreds grow stale and sour, while official history becomes bloated with convenient myths. If allowed to be aired side by side, memory and history grow more vigorous."\footnote{147}

Deliberative examination of the vital connection between ourselves and others, the socially and historically constructed spaces between us, is what is missing from education—and what is necessary to our task of reimagining global education. Bateson has written that "multiple small spheres of personal experience both echo and enable events shared more widely."\footnote{148} This is what is missing from education—the nurturing environment that would support those enabling connections between our small spheres of personal experience and the wider world—that is, the caring environment that could enable us to learn to live with strangers.

The insights from relational theory remind us that, without relationship, freedom and power alone guarantee misunderstanding. They remind us that "the voice of difference is heard as that with which one should remain engaged," or it can be heard as "sickness, inferiority or evil."\footnote{149} Relational theorizing can help us think more critically about the relationships between the freedom to speak, the power to be heard and affirmed, the possibility for

\footnote{145}Ibid.
\footnote{147}Schwarcz, p. 23.
\footnote{149}Connolly (n. 102 above), p. 64, quoted in Cockburn (n. 17 above), p. 215.
love, the power to silence, and the possibilities that we will be misunderstood even in the context of a space as wonderful and rare as a public home place.

Finally, relational theorizing assists us to withstand “the allure of tidy closures and conclusions.” It also helps us, in Cockburn’s words, “to keep traveling too, stepping out into public space and across international borders, but most importantly keeping a forward momentum. Because it is only possible for partners in an alliance to hold in there, to survive the compromise and anger, if they believe that new times will come (can be brought about) in which the outline of future justice is discernible.” “When feelings are involved—when individuals feel as opposed to think they are committed—and when those feelings are infused with self-reflexive truths as well as some sort of moral authority, actions become fully politicized.”

So on this International Women’s Day, while I would wish in the face of the weariness that we feel at our insufficiency in creating a public home place, the very least we can and should demand is the continuation of a “careful and caring struggle in a well-lit place.”

150 Cockburn, p. 229.
151 Ibid., p. 230.
152 Collins, Fighting Words (n. 4 above). p. 244.
153 Cockburn, p. 214.