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Abstract

Americans' opposition toward building an Islamic community center at Ground Zero has been attributed solely to a general anti-Muslim sentiment. We hypothesized that some Americans' negative reaction was also due to their motivation to symbolically pursue a positive U.S. group identity, which had suffered from a concurrent economic and political downturn. Indeed, when participants perceived that the United States was suffering from lowered international status, those who identified strongly with the country, as evidenced especially by a high respect or deference for group symbols, reported a stronger opposition to the "Ground Zero mosque" than participants who identified weakly with the country did. Furthermore, participants who identified strongly with the country also showed a greater preference for buildings that were symbolically congruent than for buildings that were symbolically incongruent with the significance of Ground Zero, and they represented Ground Zero with a larger symbolic size. These findings suggest that identifying group members' underlying motivations provides unusual insights for understanding intergroup conflict.

Keywords

intergroup dynamics, motivation, social behavior

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Opposition to "Mosque" Directly Linked to Anti-Islam Sentiment (Sargent, 2010)

Opponents Have Said Their Problem Is Islam Itself (Goodstein, 2010)

People commonly attach strong psychological values to physical landscapes that are associated with their group history. Even if the land does not provide valuable resources, group members still react passionately when the integrity of the land is perceived to have been compromised by an out-group. Such is the case with the Ground Zero mosque controversy in the United States. Ground Zero is the name given to the former site of New York City's World Trade Center towers, which were destroyed in a terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. When the news broke in mid-2010 that developers had proposed building an Islamic community center, which would house a Muslim prayer place, near the Ground Zero site, the topic rapidly generated criticism and anger. Opponents typically argued that Muslims were the "enemy" who were responsible for the current state of Ground Zero in the first place.

How could "we" allow them to build a "mosque" so close to Ground Zero?¹

Indeed, as attested by the two headlines opening this article, most people attributed the vehement reactions to the controversy solely to a general anti-Muslim sentiment. Although we agree with this obvious wisdom, we argue that Americans' opposition toward the Ground Zero mosque may also have arisen from a latent motivation to regain a positive American identity, which had suffered from the economic recession and accompanying decline in international influence during the years preceding the mosque controversy. More broadly speaking, we used the Ground Zero mosque controversy as a case study to demonstrate that in-group members may participate in intergroup conflict for reasons other than their hostility toward an out-group.

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The Goal to Regain a Positive American Identity and the Process of Symbolic Group Completion

Social psychology research has long posited that the social groups to which an individual belongs are extensions of the self. For example, social identity theory asserts that individuals often identify themselves in terms of salient group memberships, and the positive social identity the groups provide can satisfy individuals' basic self-esteem needs (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, individuals have a vested interest in maintaining desirable group identities. Most commonly, threats to a positive in-group identity come from a specific out-group, either through direct attack via unfair treatment from the out-group (e.g., Bourhis, Giles, Leyens, & Tajfel, 1979) or indirectly through a negative social comparison between the in-group and the out-group (e.g., Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). Extensive research has found that, when this happens, in-group members engage in various forms of in-group favoritism in relation to the target out-group in order to pursue a desired group identity (see Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999, for a review).

However, threats to positive group identities may come from more nebulous sources. Such is the case when changes in the general economic, social, or political environment in which the groups are situated damage the positive in-group identity. We submit that the economic depression and accompanying decline in the global status of the United States have threatened Americans' positive national identity in such a manner, because these events signal a significant departure from the traditional high status that America formerly held in these areas. We argue that such a diffuse threat, that is, one without a salient adversary out-group, is sufficient to motivate Americans to pursue a stronger, more positive national identity. This group-identity goal would in turn have consequences such as intergroup conflict, especially conflict that involves a symbolic land of the in-group.

Drawing inspiration from the earlier theory of symbolic self-completion (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981), Ledgerwood, Liviatan, and Carnevale (2007) contend that one important means to pursue a desired group identity is through the process of symbolic completion. Consistent with past research showing that material objects a person owns are often viewed as extensions of the self and are imbued with high psychological value (Belk, 1988; McClelland, 1951), Ledgerwood and her colleagues' findings showed that individuals could pursue a desired self or group identity by acquiring or emphasizing the possession of objects that are socially recognizable symbols of the attributes that these individuals lack. At the individual level, for example, research has shown that people who feel a lack of power engage in compensatory consumption (e.g., placing a high reservation price in auction) of products related to high status (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). At the group level, similarly, Ledgerwood et al. reported that when New York University (NYU) students perceived that NYU's status was

on the decline, they assigned a higher monetary value to an NYU-related property. Thus, the theory of symbolic group completion posits that physical possessions, such as lands, are a viable medium through which group identity goals are pursued. To the extent that lands carry symbolic meaning to the groups, individuals' attitudes toward those lands and the psychological value individuals attach to them reflect the workings of group-level motivations. Although, to date, the symbolic completion process has been studied in conflict-free contexts (Ledgerwood & Liviatan, 2010; Ledgerwood et al., 2007), we believe that it is equally applicable to intergroup conflict situations, only with more serious consequences.

Ground Zero as a Valued Symbol for Americans

Before September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center twin towers had long been symbolic of America's economic and political preeminence. To Americans, the towers' tragic destruction did not weaken the symbolic significance of the now-bare land they once occupied in lower Manhattan. In addition to being socially recognizable, Ground Zero, like many other important lands in human history, is especially apt to serve as a group symbol because its existence can outlast individual group members and serve as a rallying point for generations to come. Americans with a desire to pursue a positive country identity may be engaged in symbolic group completion by emphasizing the psychological value of Ground Zero. One direct consequence of this heightened psychological value would be that Americans are motivated to preserve and even further strengthen the symbolic meaning of Ground Zero to the country. Building the Ground Zero mosque, a building highly symbolic of an out-group, would compromise the symbolic integrity of Ground Zero and thus be antithetical to Americans' group-identity goal.

On the basis of these considerations, we reasoned that although Americans' opposition to the building plan is partly driven by animosity toward Muslims, which is predicated on the long and complex relationship between the United States and the Islamic world, such opposition is also a means toward achieving a desired group identity as Americans. Such a perspective would not only provide an additional explanation for Americans' reactions toward the mosque controversy, it would also allow us to predict that if Americans were reassured of the high status of their country, they would not have this added motivation to oppose the Ground Zero mosque. Furthermore, we predicted that the same group-identity goal would lead Americans to show less support for buildings by other out-groups that could similarly weaken the symbolic meaning of Ground Zero and more support for buildings that would strengthen the symbolic meaning of this sacred in-group land.

Previous research has focused on monetary value as an index of the psychological value individuals place on a symbol (e.g., Ledgerwood et al., 2007). However, we argue that individuals' mental representations of the symbolic boundary of a sacred land would also correspond with that land's

psychological value. The symbolic size of Ground Zero, thus, may very well extend beyond its geographical boundaries. Given the psychological need to protect everything that is within the self-other boundary (e.g., Burris & Rempel, 2004), such a symbolic boundary is crucial to studying intergroup conflict involving contentious lands. This view is consistent with one notable observation from the mosque controversy that the proposed establishment of the Islamic community center is not in the Ground Zero area, but simply near it. The reason some Americans were nonetheless against the plan might have been because the Islamic building would trespass on their symbolic boundary of Ground Zero. To address this notion in our research, we directly measured the symbolic size of Americans' representation of Ground Zero. We predicted that Americans would communicate their desire to pursue a more positive identity for their country by increasing the symbolic size of Ground Zero. We further hypothesized that assigning a larger symbolic size to Ground Zero would be associated with a stronger tendency to preserve and strengthen Ground Zero's symbolic meaning to America.

How Are Group Members Loyal to the Group?

Not all group members are equally engaged in symbolic group completion. Ledgerwood et al. (2007) found that, in the service of pursuing group identity, group members who were strongly committed to a group under identity threat assigned a higher value to the group's symbols than did members who were weakly committed to the group. We agree that the need to pursue a group identity depends on the extent of identification with or loyalty toward the group. However, in view of recent emphasis on the multidimensional nature of group identification (see Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008, for a review), we further argue that Americans can be loyal toward the national group in different ways, and the type of loyalty determines whether they are more likely to pursue group identity via symbolic completion.

The most comprehensive multidimensional model of group identification (Roccas et al., 2008) advanced four different dimensions of group identification (Table 1): importance (i.e., how much respondents considered the group membership as central to their self-definition), commitment (i.e., how much respondents were willing to benefit the group), superiority (i.e., how much respondents considered their group better than other groups), and deference (i.e., how much respondents respected and submitted to group norms, symbols, and leadership). These four dimensions have been shown to be associated with different aspects of the individual-group dynamic. For example, Roccas et al. (2008) reported that the commitment dimension was a better predictor of group members' actual contribution to the group at the expense of their self-interest than any of the other dimensions were.

Considering previous findings that individuals who value national identity equally could differ on how much they

Table 1. Multidimensional Group-Identification Scale (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008)

Commitment dimension	
	I feel strongly affiliated with this group.
	I am glad to contribute to this group.
	I am strongly committed to this group.
	I like to help this group.
Superiority dimension	
	Other groups can learn a lot from us.
	Compared to other groups of this kind, this group is particularly good.
	Relative to other groups, we are a very moral group.
	This group is better than other groups in all respects.
Importance dimension	
	Belonging to this group is an important part of my identity.
	It is important to me that I view myself as a member of this group.
	It is important to me that others see me as a member of this group.
	When I talk about the group members, I usually say "we" rather than "they."
Deference dimension	
	In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the group leaders.
	All group members should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of the group.
	It is disloyal to criticize this group.
	There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the group leaders propose.

Note: In the actual survey, items from the four dimensions were presented in alternation.

cringed at the idea that their national flag is used to wipe the toilet (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), we reasoned that the type of loyalty that hinges on a high respect for group symbols would be most relevant to the symbolic completion process. Thus, we hypothesized that group deference, the dimension that refers to the reverence for group symbols, would be the main driving force behind the symbolic group-completion effect.

Overview of the Study

Our hypothesis was that Americans who felt that the traditionally high status of the United States was threatened would symbolically pursue a group-identity goal. To investigate this hypothesis, we experimentally manipulated Americans' perceptions of the global status of the country and investigated this manipulation's effect on (a) subjects' reaction toward the controversy, (b) the symbolic size that subjects assigned to Ground Zero, and (c) subjects' support for other building projects at the proposed location of the Ground Zero mosque. We further predicted that the effect of our manipulation would be moderated by participants' level of identification with America, especially on the deference dimension. Finally, we hypothesized that the symbolic size assigned to Ground Zero,

an index of the psychological value that participants attached to Ground Zero, would predict the various reactions people have toward the mosque controversy.

Method

One hundred two (63 women, 39 men) American undergraduates from Indiana University Bloomington participated in the experiment. They first read a booklet entitled "Survey Development" and completed the multidimensional group-identification questionnaire (Roccas et al., 2008) as a U.S. citizen and as a member of two other filler social groups (Indiana University students and gender group). A composite score was computed for each of the four U.S. identification dimensions ($\alpha > .76$). Participants also reported their attitudes toward Muslims and three irrelevant filler groups via four 7-point semantic-differential scales (negative–positive, bad–good, unlikeable–likeable, unattractive–attractive) and a feeling thermometer ranging from 0, *extremely cold*, to 100, *extremely warm*. The standardized average of these five items ($\alpha > .94$) constituted participants' attitude toward Muslims.

Next, participants were asked to read a second booklet, which constituted our threat manipulation. Participants were asked to decide whether two sample articles had the appropriate writing style and seriousness for a new online newspaper. After reading a filler article, participants in the decline condition read an article entitled "America on the Decline," and participants in the rise condition read an article entitled "America on the Rise" (see the Supplemental Material available online for these two articles). These articles provided fabricated reports that, in terms of international influence, the United States had either fallen and was unlikely to recover or risen and was likely to stay on top, respectively. Neither article referenced any Islamic threat or mentioned any Muslim countries. At the end of each article, several questions regarding the interestingness and appropriateness of the materials were asked to maintain a believable cover story.²

Participants were then told that their opinions on various current events would be sampled by the university's Political Science Department. The two events of interest were the Ground Zero mosque controversy and the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (filler). After reading a brief description of the Ground Zero mosque controversy, participants reported

their attitudes, emotional reactions, and behavioral intentions toward the proposed building project on five 7-point items (see Table 2) among other filler questions. The first three items tapped participants' general attitude toward the building plan. The last two questions assessed participants' emotional response and behavioral intention toward the plan, respectively. Responses on these five items were averaged to form an antimosque index for each participant ($\alpha = .90$).

To assess the symbolic size of Ground Zero, we provided each participant with a map of Lower Manhattan on which Ground Zero was highlighted (Fig. 1). We instructed him or her to circle the area within which the mosque should not be built. The shortest distance from the perimeter of participants' drawing to the center of Ground Zero was measured in centimeters (results ranged from 0–12.9 cm) and regarded as the symbolic size of Ground Zero. Participants were also asked, "How far away from Ground Zero is it okay to build an Islamic mosque?" Each participant's responses to these two measures were transformed to remove positive skew, standardized, and then averaged to create an index of the symbolic size of Ground Zero ($\alpha = .73$).

We then asked participants to rate their support for the following building projects at the proposed location of the Islamic community center: a memorial, a museum of American history, a relocation of the French embassy, and a large "Toyota center." Participants in a pilot study ($N = 22$) rated each of the four building projects on the buildings' potential to strengthen or weaken the symbolic meaning of Ground Zero; items were rated on 7-point scales ranging from -3 , *definitely weaken*, to $+3$, *definitely strengthen*. The memorial ($M = 2.23$, $SD = 0.75$) and the museum ($M = 1.27$, $SD = 1.01$) were both rated significantly above zero, $t(21) = 13.90$, $p < .001$, $d = 2.97$, and $t(21) = 5.89$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.25$, respectively; in contrast, the embassy ($M = -1.05$, $SD = 1.21$) and the Toyota center ($M = -2.59$, $SD = 0.80$) were rated significantly below zero, $t(21) = 4.07$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.87$, and $t(21) = 15.26$, $p < .001$, $d = 3.23$, respectively. Therefore, in the main study, we averaged participants' support for the first two buildings ($\alpha = .71$) and latter two buildings ($\alpha = .68$) as their support for, respectively, symbolically congruent and symbolically incongruent building projects. In a funneled debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), we found that no participants in the main study guessed the true purpose of the experiment.

Table 2. Items Measuring Participants' Reaction Toward the Ground Zero Mosque Controversy

Item	Rating scale
1. What is your general opinion toward the proposed building of the Islamic community center?	1 = <i>strongly support</i> ; 7 = <i>strongly oppose</i>
2. I think the proposed plan is a bad idea.	1 = <i>strongly disagree</i> ; 7 = <i>strongly agree</i>
3. Do you think Americans should not protest against the proposed building of the mosque? (reverse-scored)	1 = <i>definitely should</i> ; 7 = <i>definitely should not</i>
4. Are you angry at the proposed building of the mosque?	1 = <i>not at all</i> ; 7 = <i>very much</i>
5. How willing are you to sign a petition against the proposed Islamic building?	1 = <i>not at all</i> ; 7 = <i>very much</i>



Fig. 1. Map of Lower Manhattan given to participants in the study. Participants indicated the symbolic size of Ground Zero by circling an area on the map within which an Islamic mosque should not be built.

Results

The predictive power of various dimensions of group identification

We first sought to demonstrate that the deference dimension is the driving force behind symbolic group completion. We constructed four regression models, each of which included our experimental manipulation, one of the four individual group-identification dimensions (see Table 3 for means, standard deviations, and the intercorrelations among the dimensions), and the corresponding interaction term as predictors of the antimosque index. As expected, the regression model that included the deference dimension had the largest predictive power (adjusted $R^2 = .11$, all other R^2 s $< .03$). Therefore, we focused our subsequent analysis on the deference dimension of group identification.

Antimosque index and symbolic size of Ground Zero

In separate analyses, we regressed participants' antimosque index and symbolic size of Ground Zero on attitude toward Muslims in the first step ($R^2 = .21$ and $R^2 = .08$, respectively) and on the experimental manipulation, group deference, and the interaction term in the second step ($\Delta R^2 = .13$ and $\Delta R^2 = .07$, respectively). A significant effect of Muslim attitude was found for both the antimosque index, $b = -0.89$, $t(97) = 6.19$, $p < .001$, and the symbolic size of Ground Zero, $b = -0.31$, $t(97) = 2.98$, $p < .01$, such that the more negatively participants felt toward

Muslims, the more they opposed the proposed building plan and the bigger their symbolic size of Ground Zero.

We also found a main effect of deference for both the antimosque index, $b = 0.33$, $t(97) = 3.76$, $p < .001$, and the symbolic size of Ground Zero, $b = 0.12$, $t(97) = 2.34$, $p < .05$. Both effects were qualified by a significant interaction term, $b = 0.23$, $t(97) = 2.71$, $p < .01$, and $b = 0.13$, $t(97) = 2.12$, $p < .04$, respectively. The nature of the two interactions was almost identical (Fig. 2). For participants who perceived that the United States was on the decline, those with a stronger American group identity along the deference dimension reported a higher overall opposition toward the plan to build the mosque, $b = 0.49$, $t(54) = 3.39$, $p = .001$, and represented Ground Zero with a larger symbolic size, $b = 0.23$, $t(54) = 2.67$, $p = .01$. In contrast, participants who perceived the United States as on the rise did not have the goal to pursue a stronger U.S. identity, and their general sentiment and their representation of the symbolic size of Ground Zero were not affected by their level of group identification (all $ps > .68$).³

Support for other symbolically relevant building projects

A parallel regression analysis was performed for participants' support for symbolically congruent ($R^2 = .16$) and symbolically incongruent ($R^2 = .09$) building projects, respectively. It is notable that participants' attitude toward Muslims did not have any effect on either index, $ps > .4$. Instead, we found a significant main effect of deference on symbolically congruent

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Dimensions of Group Identification With the United States and Attitudes Toward Muslims

Variable	Mean	Correlations				
		1	2	3	4	5
1. U.S. importance	5.36 (1.25)					
2. U.S. commitment	5.52 (1.15)	.87*				
3. U.S. superiority	4.84 (1.14)	.73*	.67*			
4. U.S. deference	4.17 (1.25)	.60*	.48*	.73*		
5. Semantic differentials for Muslims	4.37 (1.22)	.09	.17	.04	.10	
6. Feeling thermometer for Muslims	54.73 (24.20)	.17	.14	.12	.19	.72*

Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. The U.S. variables were assessed on scales from 1 to 7. The larger the value, the stronger the identification. Semantic differentials and the feeling thermometer for Muslims were measured on a scale from 1 to 7 and a scale from 0 to 100, respectively. Larger values mean a more positive attitude toward Muslims.

* $p < .001$.

building projects, $b = 0.21$, $t(97) = 3.05$, $p < .01$, and symbolically incongruent building projects, $b = -0.19$, $t(97) = 2.05$, $p < .05$. Both effects were qualified by a significant interaction between condition and group deference, $b = 0.19$, $t(97) = 2.80$, $p < .01$, and $b = -0.18$, $t(97) = 2.01$, $p < .05$, respectively (Fig. 3). When U.S. status was threatened, participants who identified more strongly with the U.S. were more likely to support symbolically congruent building projects, $b = 0.40$, $t(54) = 4.44$, $p < .001$, and oppose symbolically incongruent building projects, $b = -0.36$, $t(54) = 3.41$, $p = .001$. In contrast, when the U.S. status was affirmed, participants' level of group identification did not predict their support for the various building projects ($ps > .81$).

Predictive power of symbolic size

Finally, we regressed the antimosque index and participants' support for symbolically congruent and symbolically incongruent buildings, respectively, on their symbolic size of Ground Zero. As predicted, participants who represented Ground Zero with a larger symbolic size showed more intense antimosque reaction, $b = 1.81$, $t(99) = 7.60$, $p < .001$, more support for symbolically congruent buildings, $b = 0.29$, $t(99) = 2.37$, $p = .02$, and less support for symbolically incongruent buildings, $b = -0.46$, $t(99) = 3.04$, $p < .01$, than participants who represented Ground Zero with a smaller symbolic size.




Fig. 2. Mean (a) antimosque index scores and (b) symbolic size of Ground Zero as a function of participants' deference for U.S. norms, symbols, and leadership. Results are shown for participants who were primed to believe that America's international status was on the decline and for participants who were primed to believe that America's international status was on the rise.




Fig. 3. Mean levels of support for building projects that are (a) congruent with the symbolic meaning of Ground Zero and (b) incongruent with the symbolic meaning of Ground Zero as a function of participants' deference for U.S. norms, symbols, and leadership. Results are shown for participants who were primed to believe that America's international status was on the decline and for participants who were primed to believe that America's international status was on the rise.

General Discussion

In the research reported here, we showed that, apart from deep-seated hostility toward an out-group, the latent motivations that in-group members bring to an intergroup context could lead to an overt display of bias against the out-group. Indeed, when Americans perceived that their traditional high-status national identity was threatened, those with a stronger group identity exhibited greater opposition to building the Ground Zero mosque. Consistent with the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), our results re-emphasize the importance of group-level motivation in intergroup contexts. Furthermore, we extend this line of research by showing that the in-group may discriminate against a particular out-group even if the out-group is not the source of the identity threat.

Our research also indicates that, consistent with the research on in-group love versus out-group hate (see Brewer, 1999, for a review), such out-group derogation only occurs in the service of pursuing an identity goal. Preserving the symbolic meaning of Ground Zero, a means of pursuing a group-identity goal, called for Americans to oppose not only the "mosque" but also the buildings of out-groups other than Muslims as long as those buildings were similarly symbolically threatening. In contrast, rather than prohibiting any building projects near Ground Zero, Americans endorsed the building projects that would accentuate the symbolic meaning of Ground Zero. Furthermore, we demonstrated that once the high status of America was affirmed, Americans' additional opposition to the mosque, especially the opposition of those who strongly identified with the country, disappeared, presumably because out-group derogation was now rendered unnecessary. Our research thus highlights the need to uncover tacit motivations that group members may bring with them in future investigations of intergroup conflict.

Previous research on intergroup relationships has focused on group members' attitudes and behaviors toward members or abstract values of the groups. However, our findings, along with those of Ledgerwood et al. (2007), suggest that symbolic lands can be a viable medium through which individuals pursue identity goals. Given that many lands (e.g., Jerusalem) are at the center of intractable intergroup conflict, this line of research has tremendous real-life implications. We further propose that the symbolic boundaries of sacred lands may be an especially important variable for future research. As is evident in the results of our study, the symbolic size that participants assigned to Ground Zero reflected the working of symbolic group-completion processes and predicted a host of responses related to the Ground Zero mosque controversy.⁴

Our special case study also suggests new directions for studying the symbolic group-completion process. For instance, our findings on participants' opposition to other building projects raise the important question: How do in-group members determine whether certain out-group buildings are symbolically threatening? One especially revealing observation from the Ground Zero mosque controversy is that Americans who were against the building project kept calling what was an Islamic community center a "mosque," presumably to increase its symbolic threat. We think it plausible that out-group buildings that are symbolic of that group's defining traits (e.g., the Toyota center represents Japan's economic competence) are especially threatening.

Finally, our results highlight the value of taking a multidimensional view of group identification (e.g., Roccas et al., 2008). Specifically, the deference dimension of group identification is uniquely germane to the symbolic group-completion process. Individual differences may exist in the degree to which deference (as opposed to importance, commitment, or superiority) constitutes a major component of one's group

identification. Take the ubiquitous liberal-conservative distinction in politics, for instance. Given that liberals differ reliably from conservatives in both their personalities (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008) and their moral foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007), we predict that conservatives would likely manifest their loyalty to social groups along the deference dimension to a greater extent than would liberals. Future research should focus on how individuals pursue group identity as a function of the dimension through which they express their group loyalty.

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Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

Additional supporting information may be found at <http://pss.sagepub.com/content/by/supplemental-data>

Notes

1. We want to emphasize that we are discussing the perspective of certain groups of people, and we in no way share these viewpoints.
2. In a pilot study, we asked 40 participants (separated into the same decline and rise conditions as in the main experiment) to spontaneously list their thoughts after reading the "Survey Development" and threat-manipulation booklets. No participants listed thoughts related to Muslims or terrorism in either condition. Their comments mostly focused on feelings of upset with regard to America's low status in the decline condition (e.g., "Wow, we are really not doing that well") or the appropriateness of the article for the online newsletter (e.g., "This is a more interesting article than the arts one"). Furthermore, participants reported their desire to raise the country's status by answering three questions (e.g., "I want the other countries to look up to us more than they do now") on a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Participants in the decline condition had a greater desire to raise the country's global status than did those in the rise condition (decline: $M = 5.65$, $SD = 0.92$; rise: $M = 4.95$, $SD = 0.89$), $t(38) = 2.42$, $p = .02$, $d = 0.77$, and this result suggests that our manipulation was successful.
3. The crossover interaction suggests that low-deference participants had less concern about building the mosque when the in-group status was under threat than when it was affirmed. Perhaps low-deference Americans believe that group loyalty should not be based on a respect for group symbols and consequently devalue the group symbol under threat.
4. Drawing inspiration from recent literature on the commonality between spatial and temporal distance (e.g., Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008), we also tried to measure participants' symbolic size of Ground Zero along the temporal dimension with the question, "How many years later do you think you would accept such a proposed plan?" We found that the

symbolic size in the spatial dimension (e.g., "I don't want the mosque anywhere near Ground Zero") and the temporal dimension (e.g., "I don't want the mosque built in my, if not my children's, lifetime") were reasonably correlated, $r(102) = .46$, $p < .001$. Future research should explore the full implications of symbolic size using both spatial and temporal dimensions.

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