The Thoroughly Modern Aristotle: Was He Really a Functionalist?
   by Christopher D. Green
      York University

In recent years a debate has developed over whether Aristotle's theory of the psuchê is properly characterized as having been "functionalist" in the sense that contemporary computational cognitive scientists claim to be adherents of that position. It is argued here that there are indeed some similarities between Aristotle's theory and that of contemporary functionalists, but that the differences between them make it misleading, at best, for functionalists to look to Aristotle for ancient support. In particular, it is argued that Aristotle would not have -- indeed, specifically did not -- support the claim, central to functionalism, that the mind can, in principle, be transported from one body to another simply by instantiating in the new body some set of organizational properties that were instantiated in the old.

Wolfgang Köhler and Gestalt Theory: An English Translation of Köhler's Introduction to Die physischen Gestalten for Philosophers and Biologists
   translated by Rudolf Arnheim
      Harvard University

This paper presents an English translation (from the German) of one of Gestalt psychology's most significant documents, first published in 1920 in Köhler's Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand. The book it introduces both embodies Kohler's extension of Gestalt theory into new domains and did much to insure the broad impact of these ideas and approaches. This Introduction itself well illustrates Köhler's own thought processes both as his ideas emerged and as he sought to convince his readers of their value. And despite their being over 70 years old, Köhler's words have many implications for late-20th-century discussions of the relationships among psychology, physiology, and physics.

"The Defects of His Race": E. G. Boring and Antisemitism in American Psychology, 1923-1953
   by Andrew S. Winston
      University of Guelph

From the 1920s to the 1950s, Edwin G. Boring wrote letters of reference for Jewish students and colleagues in which he followed the common practice of identifying them as Jews and assessing whether or not they showed "objectionable traits" thought to characterize Jews. I discuss these practices in relation to the increasing antisemitism of the interwar period, with specific reference to Abraham A. Roback and Kurt Lewin. In Roback's case, the "defect" of Jewishness was thought to explain his undesirable personality; with Lewin, personal charm mitigated the "defect" of Jewishness. Boring's unsuccessful attempts to place Jewish students, his subsequent pessimism, and his postwar discussions of Jewish identity are examined in relation to the general issue of antisemitism in the history of academic psychology.

Gordon Allport, Character, and the "Culture of Personality," 1897-1937
   by Ian A. M. Nicholson
      University of Prince Edward Island

This paper examines the cultural context of early American personality psychology through a consideration of the early career of Gordon Allport. Between 1921 and 1937, Allport was among the leading figures in the movement to establish "personality" as a research category in American psychology. Far from being a strictly scientific concern, Allport's project was deeply embedded in the cultural politics of the age. Of particular importance was the gradual erosion of the language of character and the self-sacrificing, morally grounded self that it supported. Allport's "psychology of personality" helped fuel this trend while simultaneously attempting to resist it. His experience illustrates the elasticity and moral ambiguity of the newly emerging category of personality.

N. Weidman (1994) claims that "Karl Lashley and Clark Hull had a long and unresolved controversy about the structure and function of the brain, its relationship to the mind, and the use of machine metaphors to explain intelligence" (p. 162). The record contained in published articles and unpublished correspondence is otherwise. The clash was explicitly about continuity versus noncontinuity in discrimination learning, stimulus generalization, and the development of quantitative and mathematical psychological theory and its relation to neurophysiological data. Weidman also contends that the subtext of the debate was whether heredity or environment was more important in determining intelligence and behavior. This is doubtful. It is more probable that the debate stemmed from Lashley's career-long opposition to connectionism.

The case of Francis Galton illustrates that a psychologically oriented biographer must be opportunistic in selecting which psychodynamic theories to employ, because such choices are inevitably constrained by the nature of the available data. The data from Galton's childhood, while copious, are more usefully dealt with from an Adlerian than a Freudian perspective. Galton's theory of innate and hereditary intellectual differences is derived at least partly from his sense of personal inferiority, and his scientific and literary style is related to his birth order position as a youngest child. For interpreting Galton's responses to the stresses of medical training in adolescence, the Freudian conception of ego defense mechanisms proved to be useful. The few available hints regarding his sexuality are possibly related to a mid-life crisis he experienced in the 1860s, which culminated in his inspiration for Eugenics. The paper concludes with a discussion of the general nature, advantages, and limitations of the personality theories available to the biographer.

The research on male-female dominance relations in chimpanzees conducted by Robert Yerkes and his associates during the 1930s and 1940s provides fertile ground for an examination of some aspects of Yerkes' research strategies in particular and of the conduct of science more generally. I describe the processes of primary, secondary, and tertiary simplification, wherein there is a progressive simplification of the mass of data collected in experiments. The emphasis is on secondary simplification, the gradual trimming of the qualifications and limitations of a study with successive presentations of its results. The manner in which Yerkes handled his results and simplified his presentations is instructive.

The experimentally-derived scoring systems for motives, developed during the period 1947-1953 by David McClelland and his associates at Wesleyan University, marked a scientific transformation of the TAT and were an important milestone in personality research. These scoring systems combined the humanistic approach to personality, pioneered by Murray at Harvard, with the experimental tradition of McClelland's training at Yale. This paper suggests some factors that led to this transformation, presents some of the characteristics of the experimentally-derived scoring systems, and discusses some implications for our understanding of scientific innovation.

This article addresses the disagreements the author has with Darryl Bruce regarding their interpretation of the debate between Karl Lashley and Clark Hull. These differences include: what actually constituted "the debate"; the extent to which the nature/nurture dichotomy was a feature of the debate; and the role of Watson's behaviorism in shaping Lashley's views. The article ends by noting a point on which the author and Bruce agree.

Karl Lashley's cerebral research publications from 1917 to 1926 show that his move away from connectionism occurred gradually between 1923 and 1926. The cause was the increasing complexity of his findings, a complexity that connectionism as a mechanism of cerebral integration proved inadequate to handle. The complete break occurred in 1926 when Lashley reported for the first time a mass action correlation: a positive relation between the amount of forgetting of a brightness discrimination habit and the extent of injury to the visual cortex.

Wundt's influence on the development of linguistics and psychology was pervasive. The foundations for this web of influence on the sciences of mind and language were laid down in Wundt's own research programme, which was quite different from other attempts at founding a new psychology, as it was deeply rooted in German philosophy. This resulted in certain gaps in Wundt's conception of mind and language. These gaps provided a double repudiation of Wundt's theories, by linguists and psychologists. The psychological repudiation has been studied by historians of psychology and the linguistic repudiation by historians of linguistics. This article wants to bring the linguistic repudiation to the attention of historians of psychology, especially the one outlined by two important figures in the history of psychology, Karl Bühler and George Mead.

The indebtedness of applied psychology to classical laboratory psychology is much greater than is usually assumed. It manifests itself both in the initial use of laboratory apparatus as diagnostic tools and in the conception of vocational fitness as a matter of the same elementary mental functions as those measured in the laboratory. In America this psychological essentialism soon gave way to a more pragmatic approach, aimed at prediction of success. As the history of the psychotechnical movement shows, this transition occurred on the European continent much later. The disparity is explained by differences in the "primary audience" of the pioneers of practice at both sides of the Atlantic. The development of occupational psychology is used as a case of transition in investigative style in general.

As late as 1907 Americans knew little of psychotherapy. The word itself was virtually nowhere to be found in either professional or popular literature. Taking cures were not talked about. Despite growing medical and cultural awareness of mental suffering, few physicians made any effort to treat such states by appealing to mind. Indeed, for more than three decades, American physicians - particularly those who specialized in the treatment of nervous and mental disorders - had scoffed at anything even remotely resembling mental therapeutics. By 1910, this situation had changed dramatically. Whereas decades of vigorous internal professional debates had failed to generate a consensus among American physicians and academic psychologists regarding the scientific legitimacy and clinical efficacy of mental therapeutics, in two short years the Emmanuel Church Healing Movement had forced both physicians and psychologists to confront squarely and publicly a subject that they had long avoided. Lasting from 1906 to 1910, this popular movement was the primary agent responsible for the efflorescence of psychotherapy in the United States.

This history of German Critical Psychology focuses on the works of its most significant representative, Klaus Holzkamp (1927-1995), and reconstructs the development of his ideas, critiques, and results. For historical-systematic reasons his work is divided into a pre-critical period (till 1968), a critical-emancipatory period (1968-1972), a critical-conceptual period (1973-1983), and a subject-scientific period (1984-1995). Social movements and internal problems of traditional psychology are identified as factors in the rise of his psychology, whereas the decline of Critical Psychology in the 1980s and 1990s is attributed to social developments, limitations of a systematic-foundational framework, and the emergence of alternative critical approaches. Despite these problems the article shows that Holzkamp is an eminent theoretical psychologist who has made significant contributions to psychological knowledge.

Chen Li is one of a small group of psychologists in China who trained abroad early in their careers, returned to teach and do reserach, and contiunued doing so into later life beyond retiremnent age. His contacts with a number of prominent psychologists in England and Germany in the 1930s, and his being inadvertently at the centre of a political row in China in the 1960s, leading to psychology shutting down for ten years, make him historically important. Known for his work in organizational psychology and education, he is a distinguished psychologist and educational leader. Although trained as an experimentalist, he now embraces a broader view of psychology but remains emphatic it should be applied to real life problems.

Throughout most of the Middle Ages, it was generally held that stored mental representations of perceived objects or events preserved the forms or species of such objects. This belief was consistent with a metaphor used by Plato, the belief that a number of cognitive processes took place in the ventricles of brain, and the phenomenology of afterimages and imagination itself. In the fourteenth century, William of Ockham challenged this belief by claiming that mental representations are not stored but instead constructed on the basis of past learned experiences.

The history of mental retardation previously focused on residential institutions and the ideas of professionals. Given that the vast majority of people with mental retardation lived in their family homes or other situations in their local communities, this emphasis has been misleading. Recent historical studies by James Trent, Philip Ferguson, Steven Noll, and the British scholars in David Wright and Anne Digby's collection, From Idiocy to Metal Deficiency, have opened up the field by describing the complicated relationships between families and the state, by outlining the development of lay concepts of mental disabilities, and by acknowledging the wide diversity of experiences of people with mental disabilities.

The mid-twentieth century dominance of albino rats in non-human research in experimental psychology often presumed that the animal embodied fundamental psychological processes that could generalize to a wide range of vertebrates. The author describes the conceptual basis for the original choice of white rats by the two individuals most responsible for establishing rats as a prominent animal model in the life sciences at the turn of the century: Henry H. Donaldson and Adolf Meyer. The author stresses the comparative rationale that justified their choice and argues that they sought generality through attention to diversity and species differences. Their approach contrasts sharply with the later view of the rat as a generic animal model that could represent similarities shared by all vertebrates. It is suggested that the change resulted from an emphasis on standardization produced by the growing industrialization of the life sciences in America.

This article asks why the analogy between humans and computers was understood by cognitive psychologists to mean that "minds exist and that it is our job as psychologists to study them." Earlier psychologists, such as Clark Hull, used analogies between humans and complex machines such as telephone switchboards to defend a rigorous behaviorism. How, then, did the computer metaphor of mind come to be seen as the root concept underlying a paradigm shift from behaviorism to cognitivism? To answer this question, this article examines the life and work of George A. Miller, one of the most prominent of a generation of psychologists who began their careers as "good behaviorists" but later came to embrace cognitivism.

This article focuses on the author's activities in the United States relating to the history of psychology. It does not deal with his involvement in applied psychology in Europe (1937-1939), and it only touches on research on malnutrition and behavior, illumination and performance, and aging carried out in the Laboratory of Physiological Hygiene at the University of Minnesota (1941-1958). Activities bearing on the history of psychology dominated the years spent at Lehigh University (1959-1979) and the years of retirement (1979-present). The principal events include organizing the first scientific meeting of the American Psychological Association's Division 26, History of Psychology (1966); two summer institutes on the history of psychology (1968, 1971); the editing of a historically oriented volume on psychology in the USSR (1972) and of R.I. Watson's papers on the history of psychology (1977); organizing and editing a volume containing 6 monographs on the history of psychology in the United States (1984); and editing a volume concerned with international research during the years 1919-1981 on malnutrition and behavior.

Jung's use of Kabbalistic symbols and ideas as well as his personal Kabbalistic vision are critically examined. It is argued that as great as Jung's acknowledged affinity is to the Kabbalah, his unacknowledged relationship was even greater. Jung has been accused of being a contemporary Gnostic; however, the interpretations which Jung placed on Gnosticism and the texts which Jung referred to on alchemy, were profoundly Kabbalistic, so much so that one would be more justified in calling the Jung of the Mysterium Coniunctionis and other late works a Kabbalist in contemporary guise. Although Jung, at least during the 1930s, appears to have had powerful motives that limited his receptivity to Jewish ideas, his highly ambivalent and at times reproachable attitude toward Judaism should not prevent one from appreciating the affinities between Jungian psychology and Jewish mystical thought.

Over the course of 3 decades, from the turn of the century to the late 1920s, Mary Whiton Calkins articulated and defended a system of self-psychology that held that psychology as a field should be organized as the science of selves. Calkins' system was far from popular at the time, which leads one to the question why she persisted in dedicating herself to the cause of defending it. Previous research has sought answers to this question through examination of Calkins' experience as a faculty member at Wellesley College. In this article it is additionally argued that Calkins was not prepared to abandon her system of self-psychology because it was intricately connected to her ideas about ethics and morality.

Otto Rank's will therapy helped shape the ideas and techniques of relationship therapy developed by the Philadelphia social workers Jessie Taft, Virginia Robinson, and Frederick Allen in the 1930s. Rank's work and these ideas and techniques in turn strongly influenced the formulation of Carl Rogers' person-centered psychotherapy. This article compares and contrasts will, relationship, and person-centered approaches to psychotherapy and discusses the social factors--primarily the professional conflicts between a male-dominated psychiatry and female social workers over the independent practice of psychotherapy--that were crucial in the dissemination of Rank's psychological thought and the early popularity of Rogers.

Herbart's Mathematical Psychology
   by Geert-Jan A. Boudewijnse, David J. Murray, and Christina A. Bandomir
      Queen's University

J.F. Herbart (1942/1890b) provided a mathematical theory about how mental ideas (Vorstellungen) in consciousness at Time 1 (T1)could compete, possibly driving 1 or more Vorstellungen below a threshold of consciousness. At T1 a Vorstellungen A could also fuse with another, B. If at a later T2, A resurfaced into consciousness, it could help B to re-resurface into consciousness. This article describes the historical and mathematical background of Herbart's theory, outlines the mathematical theory itself with the aid of computer grapfics, and argues that that the theory can be applied to the modern problem of predicting recognition latencies in short-term memory (Sternberg's task; Sternberg, 1966).

Wundt's Laboratory at Leipzig in 1891
   by Serge Nicolas and Ludovic Ferrand
      Université René Descartes and Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

This article describes Wundt's laboratory at Leipzig in 1891 as viewed by a Belgian psychologist, J.J. Van Biervliet (1859-1945). Although few French-speaking psychologists worked in Wundt's laboratory, several of those who did reports wrote on how students were trained there. Van Biervliet decided to visit Wundt's laboratory at Leipzig in order to strengthen the foundation of his own laboratory at the University of Ghent and to become familiar with Wundt's experimental techniques. A translation of J.J. Van Biervliet's (1892) paper "Experimental Psychology: Wundt's Institute at Leipzig," is presented here as one of the first and most complete articles in French describing the functioning of Wundt's laboratory.

The events leading up to the founding of the Psychological Laboratory at University College London are examined in the light of correspondence from James Sully to Francis Galton. The correspondence reveals the dependence of Sully on Galton for detailed advice at every stage of the process, possible reasons for which are discussed. It also provides sufficient clues to enable identification of a hitherto anonymous donor. Although Galton may have inspired and advised on the initial setting up of the laboratory, his influence on its work did not become apparent until after his death.

From 1911 to 1921, Helen Thompson Woolley served as director of the Vocation Bureau of the Cincinnati Public Schools. In this position she designed and supervised a massive longitudinal study comparing the development of adolescents who remained in school with those who left school to go to work. Although the original goals for this study were not accomplished, the achievements of the Vocation Bureau brought national recognition to the city and to Helen Woolley. The accomplishments of the bureau reflected Woolley's view of the role of experimental psychology in contributing to the scientific understanding of adolescents and to educational and social reforms.

This article reviews additions to 3 ways of visually enriching verbal accounts of the history of psychology: illustrated books, slides, and videos. Although each approach has its limitations and its merits, taken together they constitute a significant addition to the printed word. As such, they broaden the toolkits of both the learners and the teachers of the history of psychology. Reference is also made to 3 earlier publications.

Physiognomy is the belief that fixed aspects of physical appearence are indicative of the qualities of a person. It was popular in the early 19th century as a purported means of identifying personal qualities and differences, but it had a mixed reception in mainstream science. By the beginning of the 20th century, inspection of individual differences using mental tests was emerging, and the tests were viewed as superior to systems based on physiognomy, phrenology, and anthropometry. After presenting a brief history of physiognomy, the author argues that despite the emergence of mental tests, speculations about relationships between physical appearance and psychological qualities continued to appear in works by Sir Francis Galton, Alfred Binet, and Sir Cyril Burt. The article concludes with a consideration of the durability of speculations on physiognomy.

Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), Founder by French Psychology: A Biographical Introduction
   by Serge Nicolas
      Université René Descartes and École Practique des Hautes Etudes
         and
   David J. Murray
      Queen's University

Théodule Ribot taught philosophy before obtaining 2 doctoral degrees from the Sorbonne in 1873: 1 about David Hartley and 1 about heredity factors in psychology. Ribot wrote books on the topics of the 19th-century British psychology (1870), 19th-century German psychology (1879), diseases of memory (1881), diseases of will (1883b), and diseases of personality (1885), among others. He founded the Revue Philosophique (Ribot, 1876b), had a chair created for him at the Collège de France (in 1888), helped organize the first French laboratory of experimental psychology (in 1889), and presided over the First International Congress of Psychology in Paris in 1889 (Ribot, 1889b).

In the 5 years before 1878, when his career in psychology was becoming established, William James wrote a series of notes and reviews assessing the work of many of the pioneers in the new field. Adopting a public and confident voice, even while he was privately still uncertain and searching, James criticized the dogmatism of positivist and idealist claims to the study of the human brain and mind. In his short writings of 1873-1877, James started to formulate his own middle path. His first steps on that path show that he did not reject either scientific or philosophic inquiry; instead, he viewed scientific knowledge as a way to understand philosophical questions more deeply. Saving his sharpest critiques for positivism, James endorsed scientific investigation without materialist assumptions. While his career in psychology was still only a hope, James treated science as a means toward humanist insight.

It is well known that, as part of Freud's early work with "hysteria," he reported making discoveries of sexual abuse that he interpreted first as genuine but subsequently as fantasy. Several writers now argue that Freud never made such discoveries; rather that he lied about them, only inferred abuse from his patients' symptoms, or suggested false memories to his patients. The present authors evaluate Freud's original work and these recent claims and conclude that: a) they are not new and are similar to the original reaction that Freud received; b) the assertion that Freud did not make discoveries of abuse is unwarranted; and c) these recent writers frequently have supported their positions by misrepresenting what Freud actually wrote, ignoring evidence that contradicted their position, failing to consider obvious and more plausible explanations for Freud's behavior, and going beyond the available data and stating with certainty what cannot be determined.

Professors of mental philosophy who taught and wrote textbooks in colleges and universities in the United States before the Civil War contributed significantly to the development of the new psychology that replaced mental philosophy in the last quarter of the 19th century. Their contributions have been neglected in textbooks on the history of psychology, even those devoted to the history of psychology in the United States. These mental philosophers eased the transition to, and influenced the nature of, the new psychology in the United States by establishing a place in the curriculum for mental philosophy that the new psychology came to occupy; by identifying topics for laboratory methods to address; by pursuing an empirical, inductive, scientific approach to the study of the mind; and by their tradition of functional analysis that came to characterize psychology in the United States.

Bertha Pappenheim ("Anna O.") was treated for hysteria by Josef Breuer when she was a young adult. As a mature adult she became a leading social worker, writer, and feminist activist in the German Jewish community. This article examines her therapy with Breuer, her own struggle for recovery, and some links between her earlier and later life, in particular the lack of intimate relationships in her life and her work against the victimization of women. Throughout the article psychoanalytic interpretations, social history, and feminist analyses are integrated to provide a contextualized examination of Pappenheim's life.

The authors present the history of the founding of the French journal L'Année Psychologique. The names of Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), Henry Beaunis (1830-1921), and Alfred Binet (1857-1911) are closely associated with the journal. Ribot's election to the chair of Experimental and Comparative Psychology at the Collège de France in 1888 marked the official emancipation of psychology in France. Becuase there was no laboratory associated with the chair, Beaunis, physiological psychologist from Nancy, proposed to Ribot the creation of the first French laboratory of experimental psychology (1889). Under Beaunis's direction, this laboratory was established at the Sorbonne in Paris but was in fact dependent on another educational institution, L'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. In 1893, the laboratory's research was first published in a yearly journal named Travaux du Laboratoire de Psychologie Physiologique (2 volumes: 1893-1894). Binet, who joined the laboratory in 1891, was not satisfied by the form of this publication. With Beaunis's agreement, he then created the L'Année Psychologique in 1894 in order to develop the reputation of the laboratory's research. The authors present the evolution and vicissitudes of the journal from 1895 to 1912, with a glance up to the present.

H.Crowther-Heyck (1999) argued that early advocates of computational cognitive science, especially George Miller, aimed to bring about a revival of traditional mentalism, including the issues of consciousness and free will. He therefore found it inexplicable, and even "ironic," that they selected the computer as their main research tool because computers seem no more conscious and no more free than, for instance, the telephone switchboard that was one of the behaviorists' key metaphors. I argue, by contrast, that this misunderstands the main thrust of cognitive science, which was not to bring back all of traditional mentalism, but was rather only to give a rigorous account of intentionality. Once this is recognized, Crowther-Heyck's "mystery" of cognitive science is dispelled because, as is well known, computers use symbolic representations, and thus were seen by the early cognitive scientists as being prime mechanical models of intentional processes.

In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metephor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation to the cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.

Salvaging the Self in a World Without Soul: William James's The Principles of Psychology
   by Deborah J. Coon
      University of New Hampshire

This article explores William James's Transformation of the religious soul into the secular self in The Principles of Psychology. Although James's views on the self are familiar to many historians of psychology, the article places his treatment of the self within the broader social and cultural context of a secularizing, industrializing society. There were palpable tensions and anxieties that accompanied the cultural shift, and these are particularly transparent in James's Principles. James attempted the project of secularizing the soul in order to promote a natural science of the mind but with marked ambivalence for the project, because it left out some of the moral and metaphysical questions of great interest to him.

Psychology in the Human Sciences in France, 1920-1940: Ignace Meyerson's Historical Psychology
   by Françoise Parot
      Université Paris V

Between World War I and World War II, psychology adopted a direction open to other human sciences; I. Meyerson was the main organizer of this choice. Leading the Société de Psychologie and the Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, he tried to construct an individual and collective psychology that reflected not only the scientific preoccupations of his masters and friends but also their political choices: They had been the founders of the Human Rights League at the end of the 19th-century. Behind Durkheim and Seignobos, with Mauss, Levy-Bruhl, and Blondel, Meyerson answered the new historians' call for a unified science of "mentalities," a historical psychology of collective representations. Meyerson offered to sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, and historians several forums to debate in which psychology was the unifying science. But at the end of World War II, his psychology was marginalized, and a positivistic and behavioristic way was preferred. Meyerson's historical psychology disappeared from academic psychology, but historians have preserved its legacy.

Francis Cecil Sumner: His Views and Influence on African American Higher Education
   by Thomas F. Sawyer
      North Central College

During the mid-1920s, Francis Cecil Sumner, the first African American to earn a PhD in psychology, published 2 articles concerning stratigies for the higher education of African American youths. These articles called for a system of segregated education emphesizing an "industrial" style advocated by Booker T. Washington, as well as suggesting a measure of character development. The justification cited by Sumner for such unequal education for African Americans was the cultural inferiority of that population. The present article argues that Sumner's views were couched in terms that fit the prevailing paradigm of the White establishment, with the purpose of generating political and economic support for any type of higher education for African Americans. Evidence drawn from Sumner's early education and his graduate school days at Clark University, as well as testimonials from colleagues and students, are provided in support of this hypothesis.

Kenneth B. Clark whose scientific and political legacy has been the subject of controversy over the years, is presented as an important model of Afrocentric scientific praxis. Key characteristics of the Afrocentric scholar are outlined. Using Clark's academic and nonacademic writings as evidence, it is argued that Clark, though complex, exemplifies these characteristics. Clark's profound yet at times obscure vision of integration and his views on the role of empathy and respect in education are presented in detail. Clark's life and work are then reexamined and recast through the lens of W.E. Cross's (1971, 1991) nigrescence model and the political-historical lens of the 2-phase Black social movement. It is concluded that academics interested in promoting diversity, particularly within the social sciences, as well as psychologists looking for models of activist praxis, examine and learn from the life and work of Clark.

Triarchic Theories of Intelligence: Aristotle and Sternberg
   by Robert B. Tigner
      Truman State University
     and
   Steven S. Tigner
      Boston University

Aristotle's triarchic theory of intelligence prefigures, but apparently does not serve directly as a source for, Sterberg's comparable contemporary theory. The independently derived similarities in their gross structure lend weight to some triarchic view. Sterberg's analytical, practical, and creative intelligences closely resemble Aristotle's theoretical, practical, amd productive excellences of intelligence. Each comparable component incorporates signifcantly related ideas. Disparities may be attributed to a variety of differences in the aims, methods, and resources of Aristotle's and Sternberg's inquiries. This is not the first time in the historyof psychology that roughly parallel investigations have yielded comparable theories, but it is surely among the most temporally disjoined.

Cross-Disciplinary Verification of Theories: The Case of the Triarchic Theory
   by Robert J. Sternberg
      Yale University

There are at least 4 good reasons to study the history of psychology. First, we can give credit to those who deserve it. Second, historical views can provide converging operations that help demonstrate the validity of our own views (or rather, operations that invalidate our views). Third, we can learn that other natural and social sciences can inform our views. Fourth, we learn that philosophical and psychological analyses often converge. I show how historical views can inform current thinking about intelligence.

Nineteenth-Century Inhibitory Theories of Thinking: Bain, Ferrier, Freud (and Phineas Gage)
   by Malcolm Macmillan
      Deakin University

The theories of thinking of Alexander Bain, David Ferrier, and Sigmund Freud are examined and their relation to Phineas Gage explored. During the 19th century Ferrier derived an inhibitory-motor theory of thinking from a similar theory of Bain's, and aspects of Freud's theory of thinking resemble both. All 3 theories were modeled on the senory-motor reflex, and all proposed that thinking was inhibited action. Ferrier used his theory to explain the behavior of monkeys whose frontal lobes were ablated and the disinhibited behavior Phineas Gage exhibited after massive damage to his frontal lobes. I show there is some possibility that Freud knew about the Bain-Ferrier theory of thinking and its application to Gage.

Piaget and Lévy-Bruhl
   by Gustav Jahoda
      University of Strathclyde

Lévy-Bruhl exerted a powerful influence, seldom considered, on Piaget. The Lévy-Bruhlian thesis of a "pre-logical mentality" characterized by "mystical participation" is outlined, together with its initial reception. The first evidence of Piaget'sinterest in it dates fron 1920, and when he began his studies of childeren's thinking he compared it with that of "primitives," also adopting Lévy-Bruhl's concept of "participation." By 1928 Piaget had elaborated a theory of the social foundation of different types of thought, which he regarded as also explaining the alleged similarity between the thinking of primitives and children: Both are subject to constraint, primitivesby elders and children by parents and teachers. Logical as opposed to pre-logical thought was said to depend on cooperation in free social interaction. Piaget continued to maintain essentially the same views long after Lévy-Bruhl himself had a renounced the notion of pre-logicality.

The Triumph of the Segregationists? A Historiographical Inquiry Into Psychology and the Brown Litigation
   by John P. Jackson, Jr.
      Department of Ethnic Studies
      University of Colorado

Psychologists testified at the trials of Brown v. Board of Education and helped write briefs that were submitted to the Supreme Court on appeal. Psychologists were once proud of what they did in Brown but are now seen as liberal reformers who masked their political wishes in the guise of social sciences. The argument that psychologists involved with Brown were social reformers rather than objective scientists dates to the segregationist critique of Brown. The author traces the history of the critique of the Brown psychologists from its segregationist origins to its acceptance by mainstream social scientific and historical scholars. The author concludes that the critique is based on a misreading of what the Brown psychologists did during litigation.

Subjective Science: Kenneth Spence's Human Learning Research Program
   by David B. Wiseman
      Brookdale College

This article examines Kenneth Spence's human learning research from 1949 to 1967. His work show the conditioning field to be in turmoil over basic issues during this time. These issues included whether determinism should be accepted, how to interpret a psychological test score, what psychometric properties a test should have, and how to use theoretical constructs. Turmoil occurred because behaviors and events had different meanings and degrees of importance to different investigators. Thus, what appeared as "objective" scientific change in the conditioning field was really the adaptation of personal preferences in word meanings, research goals, and research methods. These issues also indicate disputes about definitions and purposes of scientific activity during Spence's era.

There are surprisingly strong connections between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics. One particular important example can be seen in the Regulae (1628) of Descartes. In "the noblest example of all," he used his new abstract understanding of numbers to demonstrate how the brain can be considered as a symbol machine and how the intellect's algebraic reasoning can be mirrored as operations on this machine. Even though this attempt failed, it is illuminating to explore it because Descartes launched 2 traditions -- mechanistic philosophy of mind and abstract mathematics -- that would diverge until A. Turing (1936) approached symbolic reasoning in a similar "symbol machine-existence proof" way. Descartes's and Turing's thought experiments, which mark the beginning of modern psychology and cognitive science, respectively, indicate how important the development of mathematics has been for the constitution of the science of mind.

In 1761 Benjamin Franklin invented the armonica (often referred to as the glass harmonica), an instrument designed to simplify the playing of the musical glasses. The instrument immediately became popular and inspired compositions by Wolfgang Mozart, who had the opportunity to hear and play one at the house of Franz Anton Mesmer. Armonica music was used by Mesmer in his seances, because he felt it could promote healing by propagating a mystical fluid that he called animal magnetism through the body. After Mesmer's theories were debunked by a highly respected panel of scientists, the armonica fell out of vogue. Because Franklin was on the panel that examined and discredited mesmerism, he indirectly contributed to his own invention's demise.

The Psychological Round Table (PRT) was an important yet anomalous society founded by young American experimental psychologists. Although it was secretive, it encouraged contact among young experimental psychologists. Although it was motivated by perceived inequities in professional psychology, it was governed by an autocratic minority. And although it was self-consciously informal and irreverent, it clandestinely used formal selection procedures. These aspects of the PRT are documented and explained (counter to L. Benjamin, 1977) as manifestations of the PRT's devotion to psychological experimentation, specially understood. Secrecy, specifically, served not to protect PRT participants from senior colleagues but to create an environment free of political and professional influences and thus taken to be well suited to the vetting of experiments. In this regard, the PRT is distinguished from more familiar scientific societies.

B. F. Skinner is perhaps 2nd only to Freud among the most publicly identifiable psychological figures of the last century. This article reviews the popular press coverage of Skinner between 1934 and 1990 to examine how radical behaviorism was interpreted, portrayed, and received by psychology's public. Reactions to Skinner were. Often skeptical or condemnatory .It is suggested that some members of the .public had difficulty accepting his views because of the disparities between the philosophy of radical behaviorism and the phenomenology of everyday experience. Furthermore, Skinner's status as a psychological expert was inextricably linked to the public's perception of his credibility not only as a scientist but also as a human being.

The authors explore the use of space within and outside the buildings of Valkenberg, a Cape Colonial asylum. Valkenberg's design was conditioned by a complex interplay of factors: the way insanity itself was viewed by the colonial government, developments in medical knowledge, social-economic relations in the colonial setting, and practical forms of treatment. The internal structuring of space within the building, and the way the building was situated in the landscape, are graphic representations of 4 influences, in tension with each other: determination to reform the colony's psychiatric practices, a desire to reproduce British institutions in colonial settings, a stigmatising fear of insanity and lunatics; and a desire to maintain strict segregation between White and Black staff and patients.

James Mark Baldwin was one of the earliest American practitioners of the "new psychology" and an influential figure in the emergence and establishment of psychology in the United States. He left the United States due to a scandal in Baltimore resulting from his arrest at a "colored" bordello. Baldwin returned only occasionally to North America following his forced resignation from Johns Hopkins University in 1909. Contrary to the few references to his life after leaving Baltimore, Baldwin appears to have initially settled in England. He made numerous extended trips to Mexico and continental Europe, especially France, which eventually became his adopted home. Baldwin's later life and work in Europe is examined in this article.

Henry Rutgers Marshall (1852-1927), architect and psychologist, in his aesthetic theory opposed the severing pain from pleasure in neurological theories in the 1890s. He held that pain and pleasure are poles of the same quale of experience. Marshall's was an introspective psychology, which he used in his architecture criticism and support of the City Beautiful ideal. The practice of introspection educated him, making him a better judge of personal and civic life. Marshall's work represents a road not taken in 20th-century psychology, one centered on the cultivation of the psychologist rather than the elaboration of objective methods.

Kamala of Midnapore and Arnold Gesell's Wolf Child and Human Child: Reconciling the Extraordinary and the Normal
   by Adriana Silvia Benzaquén
      Department of History
      University of British Columbia

This article examines the reception of the story of Kamala, the "wolf girl" of Midnapore, in the Anglo-American scientific community. Two aspects of the case are analyzed in detail: the controversy regarding the authenticity of the reports and the meaning of the evidence, and Arnold Gesell's (1941) "psychological biography" of Kamala, Wolf Child and Human Child. Although most scientists interested in wild children approach them with the expectation that these children might furnish the key to human nature and development, Gesell turned to Kamala for confirmation of a knowledge he already had. Gesell's "obsession" with Kamala is connected to his conception of development: He advanced an alternative interpretation in maturational terms to counter the prevalent environmentalist interpretation of the wolf girl, and he integrated her radical difference into his theory to prove its claim to be a truly universal account of childhood and growth.

Psychology's boundaries consist of a network of methods, categories, and institutional practices. Strategically important, these markers distinguish the field from common sense, and popular psychology. Although psychologists have attempted to define themselves in terms of natural science, gender considerations have also been woven into the fabric of the field. This paper examines psychology's gender identity through a consideration of the career Abraham Maslow. Trained as an experimentalist, Maslow is widely known for his attempt to expand the discipline's boundaries into humanistic domains. He was convinced that psychology had become too masculine for its own good, yet he struggled to find a way to "soften" psychology without completely undermining its "rigorous" foundation. His work highlights the connection between masculinity and science and the difficulty of redrawing psychology's boundaries without undermining its credibility.

In the 30 years following its fullest presentation in 1824, the mathematical psychology of J. F. Herbart (1776-1841) was widely taught and often favorably discussed by scholars such as M. W. Drobisch. But Herbart's theory received considerable criticism after the introduction of experimentation into psychology by Fechner and Wundt; Ebbinghaus was more friendly toward it. In the period from about 1885 to 1910, with the focus on unconscious processing in Freud's theory and the revival of interest in Herbart's educational theory, one might have expected interest in Herbart's mathematical psychology to rekindle, but this was not the case. The theory remained neglected throughout the 20th century, but it deserves reappraisal at the start of the 21st century.

Helena Antipoff played an important role in the development of a sociocultural perspective in educational psychology in Brazil. Drawing on her previous training in Paris, Geneva and Petrograd, she proposed an original explanation for the high rates of school failure in the public system, from 1929 onwards, when she became chairwoman of one of the first laboratories of psychology established in the country. This article focuses on her work, divided in 3 periods: the experience in Europe (1909-1929); the critique of the public educational system in Brazil (1929-1945) and the proposal of alternatives (1945-1974). Her contribution to the analysis of the development of intellectual skills in children, based on cultural and environmental factors, is related to the influence of Genevan interactionists and of Soviet cultural-historical theory, within the context of a critical view of the Brazilian educational system.

The Victim and the Psychologist: Changing Perceptions of Israeli Holocaust Survivors by the Mental Health Community in the Past Fifty Years
   by Arie Nadler
      Tel Aviv University

The article focuses on the changing themes of psychological theory in regard to posttraumatic effects of the Holocaust on its survivors in the course of the past 50 years. An examination of pertinent changes in the Israeli society during that time period helps clarify these themes. Three stages of change have been identified, each with its different concerns, key issues, consensual answers, and attitudes toward Holocaust survivors. These concerns are: (a) who survived? (b) are survivors psychologically healthy or sick? (c) have the posttraumatic effects extended beyond the survivors? (e.g., to their families). The analysis reveals similarity between the concerns that guided the development of psychological theory and those that governed social discourse on the Holocaust and its survivors in Israeli society. The implications of this analogy for the development of psychological theory and the understanding of societal coping with massive social traumas are discussed. The analysis draws on psychological literature on posttraumatic stress and on sociohistorical analyses of Israeli society.

By accepting psychology's borders of concern, some histories of psychology tend to mute significant interfaces between research and society. The alternative approach of critical theory provides histories more sensitive to these relations. Critical theory's conceptual problems with regress of explanation and with determining adequate criteria for evaluating differing historical narratives are considered. By employing this approach, the study of history of psychology can broaden its borders to include more socially responsive and morally engaged issues.

D.B. Wiseman's (2000) claim that Kenneth Spence's human learning research program is an example of a subjective science derives from his misconception of the role of subjectivity in natural-science methodology. Natural science is suffused with subjective ideas, but the major consideration is not their subjectivity but whether they are designed to meet the objective standards of natural-science epistemology or some vague knowledge base that has no predictive validity. Within this context, Kenneth Spence, as his entire career reveals, was actively committed to the ideal that psychology should operate within a natural-science orientation.

A response to H. H. Kendler's (2001) comments on D. B. Wiseman's (2000) original article about Kenneth Spence's human learning research is presented. Specifically addressed are distinctions between objectivity and subjectivity and Kendler's view about Spence. The current response also describes a contrast between Spence's (a) philosophical views about science as formally expressed to psychologists outside of the University of Iowa, and (b) behavior when conducting his experimental research within the Iowa classical conditioning laboratory.

William James's philosophy of history is explored in his classic psychological and philosophical works and in 2 articles he devoted specifically to the topic. Historical issues are set forth in terms of James's individualism, pragmatism, and radical empiricism. It is argued that a Jamesian philosophy of history provides a reasoned and believable middle way between the extremes of realism and constructionism. James believed that historical change is brought about both by the contributions of individuals and by forces in cultures and the environment that help shape the direction of things. Finally, the author explores implications of James's pluralism for history and his quarrel with absolutistic conceptual schemes that attempt to reduce all things to 1 thing.

Some well-known psychological "facts" are actually false, but dispelling them is difficult. One such false fact is that Titchener introduced the illusion depicting a circle ringed by smaller circles, which appears larger than an equivalent circle surrounded by larger circles. A review of contemporary sources indicates that Ebbinghaus probably introduced this illusion in the 1890s, although not in any explicit publication, and Titchener neither had nor asserted any authorship of this figure. There are also 3 other illusions sometimes labelled the Ebbinghaus illusion. The modern custom of attributing the surrounded-circles illusion to Titchener, although widespread in the 1960s and 1970s, does not appear before 1957.

The case of Cole's and Pressey's mental survey of southern counties in Indiana provides a microhistorical view of intelligence testing and its popularization. Providing fresh insight into the nature and commerce of mental surveying outside of the Army's notorious program during World War I, this case is an example of larger phenomena at that time. Intent on popularizing their products, Cole and Pressey attended to the minutiae of the consumption and production of their psychological apparatus in their attempts to create and satisfy market conditions. Here, markets would dictate the success of their scales, and in turn mediated their psychology. I argue that the popularization of intelligence testing had as much to do with the mundane market practices of psychologists as with the intellectual practices of Army elites.

Research on moral development existed long before the work of Piaget and Kohlberg. Early psychological opinions, along with empirical testing of moral judgments at the turn of the century, showed themes of the development of moral ideas in children and adults. After the appearance of Binet's intelligence tests, and guided by educational goals, moral testing began to reach its height, only to fail in reaching its objectives. These research endeavors did, however, provide some understanding of the nature of morality, the motives behind moral judgments, and the development of morality by using a scientific method.

This brief memoir reports a freighted conversation between the author and Christiana Morgan -- Henry A. Murray's long-time mystical companion -- in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1961. The principal topic was her idea, called the creative paranoid hypothesis, that people who have special pressures (such as the truly gifted, or the Jewish people as a whole) are more apt to make meaningful artistic or intellectual contributions. She was troubled by the burden of having to hold on to her belief in her own unrecognized potential greatness and wanted to explore how it might relate to Jewishness, of which the author was a convenient living example. Over and above the content of the talk, what was most memorable were the illuminating insights into the special relationship between Murray and Morgan, specifically how an extraordinary woman can influence a great man and subtly change the course of intellectual history.

Does authentic personhood exist independently, or is it necessarily tied to contingent cultural arrangements and historical change? This review essay considers 5 recent books in history, psychology, and law that address this question. They also treat development, gender, subjectivity , therapeutic expertise, family welfare policy, and how and why children turn out as they do. These important topics in the history of modern American psychology are equally central to scholarship on childhood and the cultural history of personhood. The books under review (in order of consideration) are:

Joan Jacobs Brumberg, The Body Project: An Intimate History of American Girls (New York: Vintage, 1997).

Hamilton Cravens, Before Head Start: The Iowa Station and America's Children (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

Kathleen W. Jones, Taming the Troublesome Child: American Families, Child Guidance, and the Limits of Psychiatric Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

Judith Rich Harris, The Nurture Assumption: Why Children Turn Out the Way They Do (New York: Touchstone, 1998).

Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody's Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999).

John Dewey and Early Chicago Functionalism
   by Andrew Backe
      Department of History and Philosophy of Science
      Indiana University

John Dewey and James Angell are regarded respectively as the founder and systematizer of the Chicago school of functional psychology. The early Chicago school traditionally has been portrayed as a unified theoretical approach based primarily on William James's naturalistic theory of mental processes. It is argued in the present essay that although the psychology systematized by Angell bore a close affinity to James's naturalism, Dewey's own psychology was based primarily on the neo-Hegelian philosophy of Thomas Hill Green. Through a review of a number of Dewey's major writings, Green's neo-Hegelian philosophy is shown to have influenced Dewey's views on psychological concepts such as reaction, emotion, and perception during the formative period of the Chicago school. The interpretation of Dewey's psychology developed in this article leads to the conclusion that early Chicago functionalism should not be regarded as a unified theoretical approach.

There is a striking parallel between the treatment of F. C. Bartlett's theories of memory in the psychological literature and Bartlett's own characterization of reproductive memory as interest driven and constructive. Three periods of intensified interest in Bartlett's classic book Remembering (1932/1995) can be identified. The 1st occurred in the wake of the publication of Remembering and focused on replication and extension of the empirical work. The 2nd was during the period of the "cognitive revolution" and treated Bartlett's key theoretical concept of "schema" within an information-processing framework. The 3rd is an ongoing revitalization of interest in the cultural and social aspects of Bartlett's multifaceted theory. Each wave of increased interest in Bartlett's work has brought different aspects of his thinking to the fore, producing different versions of his theory of remembering that reflect the theoretical climate of the time.

The radical behaviorist Zing-Yang Kuo's other career reveals a figure who moved in the circles of senior university administrators and significant political figures. When he left China for Hong Kong after World War II (WWII), he did no more scientific research but embarked upon an autobiography and a study of Chinese national character. A chance renewal of his acquaintance with Leonard Carmichael led to the simultaneous publication of several papers based on work done in the 1930s, and thereby to the revival of his scientific reputation. However Kuo preferred to pursue his national character studies -- his only post-WWII funded work. The author argues that it was the failure of Kuo's ambitions in China that led to both his interest in national character and to the revival of his scientific reputation, which might otherwise have lain dormant.

This article examines the origins and development of psychological associations in the German Democratic Republic and the Republic of South Africa and the ways membership in the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS) -- fouded in 1951 -- figured in the process. The political regimes in these 2 countries had difficulties of their own in achieving a standing in the international community and, as a result, psychologists faced significant dilemmas in gaining legitimacy for the discipline. Membership in the IUPsyS served an important function in gaining legitimacy for the discipline in both countries, but it also contradicted legitimizing strategies that involved the countries' distinctive political and social structures. Membership in the IUPsyS was sufficiently important for psychologists to try to strike a compromise between different legitimation strategies.

The present study provides a turn-of-the-century status report on the teaching of the history of psychology in colleges and universities in the United States. The data indicate that the course is offered regularly in most departments of psychology and is frequently required of majors, findings consistent with earlier research. Most instructors teach the course largely out of personal interest and self-taught expertise with their primary teaching and research commitments to other areas of psychology. Few instructors engage in publication of research and scholarship in the history of psychology although there are two journals in the field to provide an outlet for scholarship. The few positions that allow for primary commitment to teaching and research in the history of psychology is a possible cause of concern for the future of the course and for its place in the education of psychologists in the 21st century.

The "Chicago Five" was a group of integrative psychobiologists, including Frank A. Beach, Donald O. Hebb, David Krech, Norman R. F. Maier, and Theodore C. Schneirla, all of whom worked with Karl S. Lashley at the University of Chicago during 1929-1935. Although they went on to careers in diverse fields of psychology, their approaches reflect a set of underlying themes that can be traced to their experiences in Chicago. Nine primary beliefs that, with occasional exceptions, underlie their work are delineated. The term family is proposed to refer to a group of psychologists who share a common professional development in one place within a limited time period and whose later work, although it may be diverse, reflects commonalities that may be traced to that experience.

American psychology by the 1920s contained a greater capacity for viewing some homosexual experiences as normal than most current historical literature suggests. Developmental psychologists agreed with psychiatrists that adult homosexuality was pathological, but they also agreed that adolescent sexual development included a homosexual phase. Until the late 1960s developmental texts reassured parents and teachers that homosexual behavior among adolescents was transitory and quite normal. The psychiatric view of homosexuality as pathology came under attack after mid-century and eventually was abandoned. The developmental concern with a transitory homosexual phase disappeared gradually. This trend in psychology suggests underlying social and cultural changes.

An undergraduate assistantship with Abraham Maslow, research with Solomon Asch, and an indirect exposure to Ernest Nagel's philosophy of science, encouraged Howard Kendler to become involved with methodological issues in psychology. Graduate training with Kenneth Spence led to an active research career that was initially immersed in the latent learning controversy and later, with the collaboration of his wife Tracy Kendler, in the extension of the Hull-Spence model to cognitive development. Methodological concerns from a variety of sources (Army clinical psychologist, the cognitive revolution, interactions with SPSSI psychologists) encouraged Kendler to express his ideas on the methodology and history of psychology, as well as the role of the profession of psychology in ethical and social policy issues. A productive symbiotic relationship is created from the interaction of democracy, natural-science psychology, and moral pluralism.

Gleaves and Hernandez (1999) write in relation to the seduction theory that "recent writers now argue that...Freud never made discoveries of sexual abuse," and that "the assertion that Freud did not make discoveries of abuse is unwarranted." In the following comments an outline of the case that Freud had no adequate grounds for his 1896 claims of having uncovered infantile "sexual scenes" will be given. Some of the more important misconceptions and erroneous arguments to be found in Gleaves and Hernandez's article will then be examined.

Esterson (2002) responds to our analysis of recent reformulations of Freud's seduction theory and alleged sexual abuse discoveries. Esterson gives us several additional examples of the same type of problematic writing that we discussed in our original paper. His commentary is largely a repetition of several already published arguments, and his numerous criticisms of our paper are, in our opinion, without merit. We address confusion over inferring abuse from symptoms, treatment of symptoms versus resolution of cases, and fathers as perpetrators of abuse. It is clear that, as long as the topic of child sexual abuse elicits heated debate, so will that of Freud's seduction theory, but there may be times when one needs to step back to allow a debate to move forward.

The story recounted by Jeffrey Masson of the medical community's outraged response to the seduction theory is treated as historical fact in some of the recent literature on Freud's early psychoanalytic experiences. In this article the evidence adduced by Masson in The Assault on Truth (1984) to buttress his account of Freud's supposed ostracism is critically examined. It is concluded that this evidence fails to substantiate Masson's version of events, that there is abundant evidence that refutes it, and that he has ignored the historical research that demonstrates that the notion that Freud's early psychoanalytic writings received an irrationally hostile reception is a myth.

Between 1919 and 1956, psychologists at the University of Toronto built a research program in developmental psychology on a functionalist, holistic, and ecological basis. They conducted longitudinal studies on mental health in growing children in educational settings instead of in laboratories and formed a strong alliance with the local educational system in order to do so. They initially defined mental health as adjustment and considered conditions within schools to be conducive to its attainment. After developing a psychological theory of personality development, they came to view educational conditions as discouraging the development of mental health. The alliance between the educational system and psychology consequently unraveled, and the program declined.

The Hawthorne interview program between 1929 and 1932 was one of the most significant industrial studies in the United States. The Hawthorne researchers applied Jean Piaget's clinical method in their extensive interviews with tens of thousands of workers. Chiefly responsible for the program's methodology was Elton Mayo, an Australian who saw interviewing as a means to promote social cooperation. Previous discussions of the Hawthorne experiments have ignored the influence of Piaget in the social sciences. This article provides an account of Mayo's and the Hawthorne researchers' efforts to fuse Piaget's innovation with burgeoning American industrial psychology. The endeavor was not an isolated event, but rather drew on the theories and practice of Janet-Piaget psychology, on the support of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Foundation, and on a discourse among social scientists about Piaget's work.

The destruction of psychological science during the early years of the National Socialist (NS) regime is an important part of psychology's history. The proceedings of the Congresses of the German Society for Psychology describe the very quick takeover of German psychology by the supporters of the regime and the removal of any opponents of the regime and of Jewish members from the executive structure. The leadership of the field was taken over by psychologists who were early supporters of the government's anti-democratic and anti-Semitic policies. Some of the figures of the NS period reappeared in leading positions in the post war period.

The teaching of the history of psychology in professional psychology training programs presents to students and teachers any number of opportunities and challenges. The increasing number of professional psychologists teaching the history of psychology coupled with advances in historical scholarship point to an ongoing evolution in the teaching of the history of psychology. In this introduction to the papers that follow, issues of content and context in teaching the history of psychology in professional psychology are discussed and affirmations offered.

The author discusses ways to make the history of psychology relevant for a clinical psychology doctoral program within a multidenominational Protestant theological seminary. She uses a personalist orientation that emphasizes the need to integrate psychology, philosophy, and theology. She differentiates among the intrapersonal, interpersonal, impersonal, and transpersonal dimensions of experience. She illustrates the rich multidisciplinary histoirical roots of contemporary psychology by tracing the history of the term psychology and examining its meanings in the existential psychology of Søren Kierkegaard and in 19th-century novel. She includes brief histories of "the new psychology" and of the unconscious. She describes how she uses the field of psychotheological integration to illustrate principles of historiography, and summarizes resources used to supplement traditional textbooks.

The author explores 3 ways the history of psychology can be made relevant to professional training in clinical psychology. Focusing on the practitioner-scholar model of clinical professional training, he argues that 3 central facets of historical understanding can be wedded to existing goals of professional training: (a) providing an interdisciplinary context for psychology, (b) addressing concerns about humans in the field, and (c) mediating theory-practice tensions that often exist in professional training. Suggestions are also made for encouraging historical understanding as essential to fostering critical self-reflection among students preparing for careers in professional psychology.

There is a need to make the teaching of the "history and systems" of psychology course more relevant for students in professional training programs. Most typical courses and textbooks are oriented around the history of the science of psychology, giving scant and generally passing attention to the development of the profession of psychology. The author draws on his experience teaching a history and systems course in PsyD programs and provides a structure for enhancing the relevancy of such courses in professional training programs. Two frameworks are used. The author develops a conceptualization of 4 archetypes as defining of the range of roles, activities, contexts, and justification of professional psychologists: (a) the shaman/priest, (b) the physician, (c) the teacher, and (d) the scientist. Stephen Pepper's world hypothesis theory, which characterizes the epistemic approaches underlying modern science and philosophy, is used to organize the development of the science of psychology. The integration of these 2 frameworks is discussed, and the curricular modifications that flow from it are outlined.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Alfred Binet sought teaching positions at the Collège de France and the Sorbonne. Binet wanted to develop experimental psychology in France, but the strong psychopathological orientation of French psychology blocked his ambition. The 1st part of this article relates the history of the introduction of psychology, via Théodule Ribot, to the Sorbonne and the Collège de France. Ribot's premature retirement from the Collège de France in 1901 triggered a battle that led to Binet's repeated failure to gain access to these institutions of higher education and the success in 1902 of Ribot's students: Pierre Janet at the Collège de France and Georges Dumas at the Sorbonne.

Psychological tests, especially the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, became the center of public controversy and Congressional scrutiny during the 1960s. This unwanted attention actually helped American psychologists more than they imagined. Assisted by those on Capitol Hill, psychologists were able to defend their science in a manner that avoided imposed forms of public accountability. Social questions were reformulated as technical problems. The need to adjust intelligence and aptitude tests reinforced psychologists' control over them. Conversely, personality tests were not made more transparent and non-intrusive, unless psychologists thought these changes were scientifically necessary. This episode prompted tighter regulation of test use and demonstrated that traditional forms of testing were far too important to popularize and "give away."

Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881), is best known as the 1st ethnographer of Native American culture, but he also wrote on animal psychology, beginning in 1843, some 50 years before the founding of comparative psychology as a scientific discipline. Although not an evolutionist, Morgan argued that animals possess many human mental abilities, such as reason and moral judgment, and he rejected the scientific utility of the concept of instinct, a view that did not gain much currency in psychology until the rise of behaviorism in the 1920s. This 1857 manuscript, which is in the Lewis Henry Morgan papers at the University of Rochester, in Rochester, New York, formed the basis for the last chapter of his 1868 monograph on the American beaver but gives additional information on his sources and an expanded criticism of the concept of instinct.

Elton Mayo was born in Australia and spent most of his first 42 years in that country. This article explores the Australian context in which he developed his views of industrial society. There are key differences between the political context of Australia compared with that of the United States during the time that Mayo developed his approach to psychology and the role of workers in industry. In addition, the social context in which Mayo established his career was shaped by significant political events in Australia. The construct of revery, which describes a specific state of consciousness, is central to Mayo's early theorizing and was developed by Mayo partly in reaction to political and industrial conflict occurring in Australia.

The author examines the historical role of Euro-American psychology in constructing Orientalist representations of the natives who were colonized by the European colonial powers. In particular, the author demonstrates how the power to represent the non-Western "Other" has always resided, and still continues to reside, primarily with psychologists working in Europe and America. It is argued that the theoretical frameworks that are used to represent non-Westerners in contemporary times continue to emerge from Euro-American psychology. Finally, the author discusses how non-Western psychologists internalized these Orientalist images, and how such a move has led to a virtual abandonment of pursuing "native" forms of indigenous psychologies in Third World psychology departments.

Demographic characteristics of 79 women who were accused of satanist child abductions in the parish of Rättvik, Sweden 1670-71, 53 adults who promoted such accusations by bringing children to interrogations; and samples from the general population of Rättvik were compared. Results indicate that men were more likely to promote allegations of aatanism than women and that these men were more likely to be married than the average Rättvik male. Promoters of allegations were older than average parishioners and land-owning people who were involved in the panic owned more land than landowners who were not involved. People who were involved in the panic knew less about Luther's catechism than members of the general population. It is suggested that most of these findings may reflect a tendency of people who lived in the proximity of children to become involved in the panic.

Scientific comparative psychology in America dates from the mid 1890s, but there is a body of earlier literature on the topic, written during a period of theistic debates over Darwinian evolution. The anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan rejected instinct as an explanation of animal behavior in 1843 and defended the mental similarities between animals and humans, although he was not an evolutionist. John Bascom's textbook Comparative Psychology (1878) is the earliest American work to use that title and its theistic approach anticipates some arguments found in much later evolutionary works. Beginning in 1860, the geologist Joseph LeConte, who is well known for defending the compatibility of evolution and religion, wrote several articles in which he outlined a comparative evolutionary approach to psychological problems. However, these writers did not establish a coherent research tradition and were ignored by the "New Psychologists" of the 1880s.

The author analyzes the potential influences of Paul Flechsig's work on early Freudian theory, particularly on Sigmund Freud's 1966b/1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology. Gehirn und Seele, a discourse authored by Flechsig in 1894, is the focus of this analysis. The author believes that the links between the intellectual production of both German-speaking neurologists have been underrated to this day and attempts to establish that the early Freudian approach to many key issues in the history of psychoanalysis -- dreams, unconscious processing, drives, to name a few -- was not unique but shared with some distinguished colleagues in neuropathology and psychiatry. Thus, he attempts to shed additional light to the transition from state-of-art neurology in the last decade of the 19th century to the creation of psychoanalysis as a discipline on its own.

Wilhelm Wundt distinguished between "experimental psychology" and Völkerpsychologie. It is often claimed that Wundt maintained that social psychological phenomena, the subject matter of Völkerpsychologie, could not be investigated experimentally, but must be explored via comparative-historical methods. In this article it is argued that it is doubtful if many of the passages usually cited as evidence that Wundt held such a view actually support such a view. It is also argued that if Wundt did hold such a view, it was inconsistent with his own general theoretical position and methodological practice. It is suggested that it is anachronistic to attribute such a view to Wundt, since he appears to have had little interest in the experimental analysis of the synchronic social dynamics of psychological processes. Most of Wundt's arguments about the inappropriateness of experimentation were directed against the introspective analysis of diachronic historical processes.

Why was there a preponderance of women engaged in laboratory-based studies of animal behaviour in Britain in the early years of the 20th century? As a new experimental subject with recently neglected potential, animal psychology then represented an opportunity for women to make further inroads into academic science. Because the study of psychology before World War I offered negligible professional opportunities for the application of the subject, the intake of students was restricted. Perhaps this encouraged academic access to it by aspiring women scientists who felt that career prospects, uncertain and socially unexpected of them in any case, were worth chancing for greater long-term rewards. The academic circumstances and contributions of 3 British female pioneers in experimental comparative psychology are discussed.

Since the 1920s, the road to the acknowledgment of personality psychology as a field of scientific psychology that has individuality as its object begins with the founding of the discipline by Gordon W. Allport. Historians of psychology have made serious attempts to reconstruct the cultural, political, institutional, and chronological beginnings of this field in America in the 20th century. In this literature, however, an important European tradition of psychological studies of personality that developed in France in the 2nd half of the 19th century has been overlooked. The aim of this article is to cast some light on this unexplored tradition of psychological personality studies, and to discuss its influence on the development of the scientific study of personality in the United States.

Howard Andrew Knox was Assistant Surgeon at the immigration station at Ellis Island, New York, between April 1912 and May 1916. In response to public disquiet that the physicians at Ellis Island were failing to prevent mentally retarded people from entering the country, Knox and his colleagues assembled a collection of performance tests that could be administered to potential immigrants with little knowledge of the English language. They were subsequently used in clinical practice and in educational, psychological, and social research. Because of the early work done at Ellis Island, it is nowadays taken for granted that any adequate measure of intelligence must include both verbal and performance subtests.

This article examines the origins and early development of psychoanalytically inspired psychohistory from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. It focuses on Erik H. Erikson, Bruce Mazlish, and Robert Jay Lifton and illustrates their contributions to psychoanalytic psychohistory. Erikson, Mazlish, and Lifton were core members of the Wellfleet group, a research project originally funded by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1965 to conceptualize the foundation of psychohistory. The article gives an account of the early history of the Wellfleet group and argues for specific historical reasons to explain why psychoanalytic psychohistory emerged on the East Coast of the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. A critique of the Wellfleet group in the unpublished correspondence of Erich Fromm and David Riesman is also discussed.

In a recent article, Howard H. Kendler (2002) criticized Kenneth B. Clark and the other social scientists who worked in Brown v. Board of Education for polluting their science with value judgments. This article argues that Kendler's critique is misguided because it conflates a policy judgment with a value judgment. In addition, Kendler inconsistently applied his own standard of objectivity when he examined the social science used in Brown.

Three fundamental issues separate Jackson's (2003) methodological views from mine. One, whereas he believes an absolute moral view can prevail in a democracy, I assume moral pluralism is an inevitable byproduct of an open society. Two, Jackson feels that psychology can identify a correct moral position, whereas I postulate natural science psychology is only capable of revealing the empirical consequences of competing social policies and their moral implications. Three, Jackson espouses a politically active psychology that from my perspective is antithetical to a democratic and scientific ethic. In sum, Jackson's coupling of science with political advocacy will lead to a mistrust of psychology that will deny a democracy the opportunity to base its social policies on reliable psychological information.

The authors provide a description of the Virtual Laboratory at Department III of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. The Virtual Laboratory currently provides Internet links to rooms that present texts, instruments, model organisms, research sites, and biographies. Existing links provide access to a library of journals, handbooks, monographs, and trade catalogues; research institutes and laboratories; biographies and bibliographic essays; and essays by contemporary researchers. Historians of psychology are encouraged to submit photographic material and essays to the Virtual Laboratory.

Amidst the voluminous correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams are several letters pertaining to the material basis of mental life. These reveal in a most suggestive way the substantial differences between them. Well informed on prevailing scientific and philosophical perspectives, Jefferson and Adams used the issue to express their positions on the nature and limits of knowledge, the relative authority of scientific methods and speculations, and the larger question of human perfectibility. At the same time, their exchanges illuminate the prevailing and divergent perspectives on human psychology adopted by major leaders of thought in the New World.

The famous clinical case of Anna O. /Bertha Pappenheim, who was treated by Breuer from 1880 to 1882 and whose pathology was discussed by him and Freud in 1895 print, is reviewed based on biographical information regarding the patient, which appeared from 1953 onward. The objective is to show that in order to better understand the case, the diagnosis of chloral hydrate and morphine dependence, as well as that of mood disorder (primary or drug-induced) has to be taken into account. The method used is a careful literature review. The conclusion is that, based on all available data disclosed in recent years, these 3 diagnoses should be considered in this case, which is the most studied one in the history of psychoanalysis.

Tracy Kendler's strong desire to get a college education had to overcome economic hardships of the Great Depression and a mother's conviction that finding a suitable husband was more important. Solomon Asch at Brooklyn College, by scholarly example, encouraged her to seek a career in psychology. At the University of Iowa she studied with both Kurt Lewin and Kenneth Spence and finally opted to conduct a research program, ultimately on cognitive development, within a neobehavioristic methodological orientation. Being married to academic psychologist Howard H. Kendler, and a mother of 2 sons, created problems in fashioning an independent academic career, but persistence and research productivity, sometimes a result of collaborative efforts with her husband, finally led to a distinguished career.

Coleman R. Griffith is widely known as the father of sport psychology in the United States. He directed the Research in Athletics Laboratory at the University of Illinois in the late 1920s and early 1930s and produced many articles and books on the psychology of sport. In 1938 P. K. Wrigley, owner of the Chicago Cubs, hired him to help improve the team's performance. Griffith and an assistant filmed and measured the players' skills, attempting to build a "scientific" training program for the team. Many of Griffith's subjects, most notably the managers, objected to his interference (as they saw it) and attempted to undermine his work. Griffith wrote over 600 pages of reports on his work with the Cubs between 1938 and 1940. This article examines the content of those reports the reasons for the failure of Griffith's project.

This article outlines the studies conducted in Italy on the history of psychology since the 1970s, with particular attention to those elaborated in the 1990s. Reference is made to the institutions, authors, congresses, and other initiatives that in the course of 3 decades have promoted the growth of the history of psychology, and a review is presented of the principal research themes undertaken by scholars. An attempt has been made to identify the principal historiographic tendencies and to illustrate the passage from a sort of "positivistic" historiography to an orientation that could be considered multifactorial or one of complexity, attentive to both the internal and external components of the scientific enterprise, though with a propensity for the history of ideas.

Wilhelm Stekel, one of Freud's earliest followers, was expelled from the psychoanalytic movement in 1912 ostensibly because he did not know how to behave himself. Although he remained active as a psychoanalyst, his post-1912 work was mostly neglected, and consequently his historic import is seriously undervalued. The author reviews recent literature, reexamines the Freud-Stekel break, and focuses on Stekel's role as silent antipode. Freud's reference to an unnamed individual in his 1907 Gradiva paper (S. Freud, 1907/1959b) -- commonly believed to be Jung -- is now identified as Stekel. This not unimportant correction of the historical record begins the exploration of a hitherto-undocumented antagonistic dialogue between Stekel and Freud.

Behaviorist B. F. Skinner is not typically associated with the fields of personality assessment or projective testing. However, early in his career, Skinner developed an instrument he named the verbal summator, which, at one point, he referred to as a device for "snaring out complexes," much like an auditory analogue of the Rorschach inkblots. Skinner's interest in the projective potential of his technique was relatively short lived, but whereas he used the verbal summator to generate experimental data for his theory of verbal behavior, several other clinicians and researchers exploited this potential and adapted the verbal summator technique for both research and applied purposes. The idea of an auditory inkblot struck many as a useful innovation, and the verbal summator spawned the tautophone test, the auditory apperception test, and the Azzageddi test, among others. This article traces the origin, development, and eventual demise of the verbal summator as an auditory projective technique.

Although her work was greatly respected by eminent scholars from both psychology and biology such as Wolfgang Köhler, Max Wertheimer, and Karl von Frisch, the life and work of the German sensory physiologist and comparative psychologist Mathilde Hertz (1891-1975) have remained relatively obscure until recently. Her research represented a combination of biological principles fused with a psychological-phenomenological perspective. After a prolific career within a short time span, Hertz's career came to an abrupt end in 1933, despite the intervention efforts of Max Planck. Hertz's personal and professional fates are in many ways representative for the field of comparative psychology in Germany prior to the middle of the twentieth century, both its history and its demise.

The author offers a brief description of The Adoption History Project, a Web site launched on June 1, 2003, that covers the people and organizations, issues, and studies that shaped adoption in theory and practice throughout the 20th century. The Adoption History Project offers many brief biographical and topical sketches, a wealth of primary texts (excerpted from published and unpublished sources), numerous images, a timeline, bibliography, and a search engine. Historians of psychology will be especially interested in how the consolidation of professional communities (in psychology, social work, and medicine) influenced family formation and in the history of the adoption research industry.

In the mid-1920s, applied (and theoretical) psychologists in many countries turned from studying elementary abilities to character or personality. This article examines this shift within the offices of the German labor administration, which aimed to place all German youths in appropriate jobs. Contrary to recent works on the history of psychology, which have emphasized the importance of cultural context, this article explains the turn to characterology in terms of German industry's evolving production strategies. As German companies developed a niche in flexible production, they came to value the high-skilled worker, who needed such character qualities as reliability, diligence, and conscientiousness. The article thus argues that historical analyses of applied, and perhaps even theoretical, psychology should also consider political economy as a potentially important context.

In the recent memory, Jean Piaget was a cognitive developmental psychologist. But in 1936 when Harvard gave him his first honorary degree, he was recognized mainly as a sociologist. Why did Harvard honor him in 1936? Who knew his work well enough to nominate him? This article will address these questions by exploring archival documents from different sources. Evidence draws our attention to a broad social and intellectual endeavor in philanthropy, other social sciences, and especially industrial research that brought Piaget across the water. This article also attempts to interpret the circumstances of the nomination process inside and outside of Harvard University by using a theory of institutional design. It suggests that embodied in Harvard's honor of Piaget in 1936 was an idealistic act in social designing for a future society.

By 1980, the previously held dichotomy of Black and White racial identity in America had yielded to a mosaic of red, yellow, brown, black, and white. During the 1960s and 70s, identity, and thus psychological knowledge, was articulated and differentiated in terms of gender, sexual orientation, and class in unprecedented ways. In this article, the author contextualizes efforts to make mainstream American psychology more receptive to ethnic minorities between 1966 and 1980. Advocacy and activism by ethnic minority psychologists forced American mainstream psychology to yield a place at the table to non-White, non-European individuals. He emphasizes the recruitment and retention of ethnic minority graduate students and faculty, and conclude that many individual psychologists were important in forcing changes in these areas.

Systems psychodynamics is an interdisciplinary field amalgamating a triad of influences -- the practice of psychoanalysis, the theories and methods of the field of group relations, and the task and boundary awareness of open systems perspectives. Although systems psychodynamics is not a new field of study, there has been a general lack of awareness of its roots, how its formative elements have become intertwined over the years, and the role of the Tavistock Institute in developments in the field. This article provides a synthesis of this history and focuses, in particular, on the intellectual foundations of the Tavistock method of working experientially with groups and the application of this method to the study of organizations.

A Witness Seminar brings together individuals involved in a significant event in the treatment of a medical condition to describe its background and to discuss, debate, and even to disagree with their peers' recollections. A brief description is given of the Witness Seminar, held in June 2001 by the Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at University College London, which considered the history of the Medical Research Council's Applied Psychology Unit (APU) at Cambridge, United Kingdom. The APU was created in 1944 and produced more than 3,000 papers before it was renamed the Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (CBU) in 1998. Photographs of key figures and purpose-built apparatus illustrate some of its early work as recorded in the published transcript of the meeting.

As in other areas of American culture, the boundaries of psychological expertise in modern America were often imagined in gendered terms. Studies of child development, consequently, served as one of many staging areas where dominant notions of masculinity and femininity collided at a historical moment in which women were increasingly present in the traditionally-male worlds of science and higher education. Attributes that many female authors regarded as necessary qualifications for understanding child development (such as patience, sympathy, and maternal care) were routinely dismissed by male writers as contrary to an authentic scientific disposition. Thus, disputes over the meaning of "child development" (and the methods of studying it) indicate some of the ways that women's labor was both acknowledged and demoted during the formative years of American social science.

In 1889, George Paxton Young, the University of Toronto's philosophy professor, passed away suddenly while in the midst of a public debate over the merits of hiring Canadians in preference to American and British applicants for faculty positions. As a result, the process of replacing Young itself turned into a continuation of that argument, becoming quite vociferous and involving the popular press and the Ontario government. This article examines the intellectual, political, personal dynamics that were at work in the battle over Young's replacement and its eventual resslution. The outcome would have an impact both the Canadian intellectual scene and on the development of experimental psychology's development in North America.

The article presents the historical analysis of one of the central questions in psychology -- how and why the non-automatic, psychological level of regulation (in contrast to automatic physiological processes) emerges both in evolution and in everyday context of activity. The authors discuss several approaches (by Lipps, Groos, Stern, James, Dewey, Claparède, Pavlov, and Leontiev) that culminated in the system of ideas developed by Galperin, one of the key figures in the cultural-historical activity theory. The authors analyze the relation of Galperin's ideas to Vygotsky's theoretical framework and then focus on Galperin's account of the origin and functions of mental activity. Galperin's contribution is highly relevant for understanding the role of psychological regulation and for contemporary research on cognition, consciousness and conscious awareness.

J. B. Watson's Behaviorism, a complete presentation of the mature psychological points of view of its author, had two editions, in 1925 and 1930, which present significant differences in their texts. While Watson maximized such variations, to the point of considering the second one nearly as a brand new book, both suppressions and additions reveal his feelings when presenting his ideas to a general audience. Such variations are here presented through an in-depth analysis.

William James placed great importance on clothing, and this emphasis on apparel is reflected in his writing on psychology, in his letters, and by his own style of dress. His perspective on dress was influenced by a passage on the "philosophy of clothing," contained in Hermann Lotze's Microcosmus. James believed clothing to be an essential part of the material self; in this article it is argued that it is important to the spiritual and social selves as well. James's interest in the self-expressive aspects of clothing was reflected in his attire, his descriptions of colleagues' clothing, his account book; and his chairmanship of Harvard's Committee on Academic Dress.

This article analyzes professional challenges to the 1915 commitment law and the ultimate demise of eugenic institutionalization in Illinois. It reveals the pivotal role of psychologists and intelligence testing in the debate over the necessity and viability of a state-sponsored system of eugenic commitment. It focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on a specific group of young female test subjects and the female professionals who attempted to measure their intelligence. The article relies on published studies as well as case records chosen at random from the Illinois State Training School for Girls at Geneva to explain and analyze the complex relationships among mental testing, feeblemindedness, and eugenics. Focusing on Geneva enables the author to highlight and evaluate previously underanalyzed social and environmental factors that affected testing as well as the experience of women in both eugenics and intelligence testing.

The relationship between a classic 1953 study by R. L. Solomon and L. C. Wynne on traumatic avoidance learning, and the pioneering efforts by Robert Bush and Frederick Mosteller and others to develop mathematical models of learning is analyzed. The main purpose is to explore how Bush and Mosteller disembedded a carefully selected set of Solomon and Wynne's data from its original context, which allowed something as seemingly humble as a set of numbers to become a widely available and valuable resource for the newly emerging field of Mathematical Learning Theory (MLT). The creative use that the MLT community made of these data once Bush and Mosteller had systematically reduced the empirical and conceptual uncertainties within Solomon and Wynne's study is also discussed.

J. M. Cattell's 1903 study of the 1,000 most eminent people of history was repeated using current sources. Of Cattell's names, 476 recur, and on average these names have higher ranks than those appearing in only Cattell's list or the new one. Similarities between the 2 lists include the following: highest frequency of names for the century preceding that of the study; dominance of British and French names; and highest frequency of military/government people, with literature 2nd. However,the new list has less scholarship and more art/architecture and music. The new list yields a negative exponential function between the space a person receives in biographical sources and his or her eminence rank.

As the discipline of psychology coalesced during the latter half of the 19th century in American institutions of higher learning, the role of God as an explanatory force declined dramatically. Part of this story must include the role played by James McCosh, president and primary psychology professor at Princeton, 1868-1888, in assuring orthodox educated believers that the new psychology was essentially a safe endeavor and that the truths discovered therein posed no threat and ultimately would harmonize with the truths of the historic Christian faith. Several of McCosh' students later credited him with "leading the way." Where McCosh led and how he did it is the focus of this article.

In The Principles of Psychology, William James (1890) articulated an influential, boundary-setting argument against faculty psychology, subsequently dubbed the Fallacy of the Faculty Psychology. This argument was reiterated in American psychology textbooks for the next several decades, arguably solidifying and simplifying American perceptions of the "old" faculty psychology and establishing belief in the superiority of the "New Psychology." When placed in the context of American theological and philosophical history, however, the New Psychology argument appears unoriginal, somewhat unfair, and deeply (and even tragically) ironic. Despite their best intentions, a fallacy did emerge in the old psychology as they sought psychological foundations for libertarian free will. For those members of New Psychology still committed to free will, then, the Fallacy argument cut both ways -- refuting the fallacy also meant tearing down a long-standing foundation for free will in American psychology. Offering no viable alternative to fill the moral void, the New Psychology appeared at times conflicted with its new deterministic identity.

Chemicals that could be used scientifically to force an individual to tell the truth -- dubbed truth sera -- were first described in the early 1920s. Ever since, the notion of "truth drugs" has remained tenaciously within popular culture. One of the most important reasons for the development and survival of the notion of a pharmaceutical technology of authenticity was the role of the barbiturates sodium amytal and sodium pentothal in psychiatric research and treatment during the 1930s through the 1950s. This article traces that history, giving special emphasis to one feature of it, namely the role of motion pictures. The artucle argues that researchers were seeking to develop a technology of authenticity (rather than of truth per se). It examines how they used motion pictures to help them develop and disseminate this technology.

What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments affected the dynamics of psychological research, with what possibilities and limits? What is a psychological instrument? This article provides a conceptual foundation for specific case studies concerning such questions. The discussion begins by challenging widely accepted assumptions about the subject and analyzing the general relations between scientific experimentation and the uses of instruments in psychology. Building upon this analysis, a deliberately inclusive definition of what constitutes a psychological instrument is proposed. The discussion then takes up the relation between instrumentation and theories and differentiates in greater detail the roles instruments have over the course of psychology's history. Finally, the authors offer an approach to evaluating the possibilities and limitations of instruments in psychology.

In the 1830s, Charles Babbage worked on mechanical computer he dubbed the Analytical Engine. Although some people around Babbage described his invention as though it had authentic mental powers, Babbage refrained from making such claims. He does not, however, seem to have discouraged those he worked with from mooting the idea publicly. This article investigates whether (1) the Analytical Engine was the focus of a covert research program into the mechanism of mentality; (2) Babbage opposed the idea that the Analytical Engine had mental powers but allowed his colleagues to speculate as they saw fit; or (3) Babbage believed such claims to be fanciful, but cleverly used the publicity they engendered to draw public and political attention to his project.

In Wilhelm Wundt's (1832-1920) Leipzig laboratory and at numerous other research sites, the chronoscope was used to conduct reaction time experiments. The author argues that the history of the chronoscope is not the history of an instrument, but of an experimental setup. This setup was initially devised by the English physicist and instrument maker Charles Wheatstone (1802-1875) in the early 1840s. Shortly thereafter, it was improved by the German clock maker and mechanic Matthäus Hipp (1813-1893). In the 1850s, the chronoscope was introduced to ballistic research. In the early 1860s, the Neuchâtel astronomer Adolphe Hirsch (1830-1901) applied it to the problem of physiological time. The extensions and variations of chronoscope use within the contexts of ballistics, physiology, and psychology presented special challenges. These challenges were met with specific attempts to reduce the errors in chronoscopic experiments on shooting stands and in the psychological laboratory.

At the end of the 19th century, the graphic method kindled attempts to employ it for investigating psychic processes. In Germany, Hans Berger took up this line of research, later to become the pioneer of electroencephalography (EEG). The trajectory of Berger's work is analyzed as an "enabling constraint , guiding him towar the EEG at a time when nobody else was pursuing this line of research, and also causing serious methodological problems. In the epistemological perspective of this analysis, many of his problems extend beyond the local context of his work and point towards ambiguities surrounding the project to trace the psyche with the graphic method. From the mid-1930s, the EEG inspired ongoing attempts to decipher the specific meaning of these recordings, and large ensembles of machinery were mobilized, molding concepts of the psyche according to the results and the specifications of the graphic method.

Since its discovery in 1929 the electroencephalogram (EEG) has become a widely used tool in experimental psychology. Although originally the merits of the method were seen first of all in an improvement of medical diagnostics it was soon understood by psychologists that the EEG can also be used to study psychic processes in healthy participants. The article summarizes important events in the history of EEG research that laid the ground for this development, as Fast Fourier Transformation to analyze the spontaneous activity and signal averaging to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. The article shows how general technological developments were the prerequisite for these methodological improvements in EEG research and how they inspired new research questions. Key discoveries which proved unequivocally that psychic processes do become manifest in EEG signals are briefly reviewed and the emerging paradigm of cognitive psychophysiology, which is closely linked to the development of EEG research, is described.

Beginning around 1879, a Neoscholastic psychology developed, an experimental psychology with a soul. Opposed to materialism, it sought to renew Scholastic philosophy by incorporating the findings of the natural sciences. Neoscholastic psychology is an important chapter in the history of the relationships between science and religion in the 20th century. Neoscholastic psychology was both experimental and philosophical. This article presents the main accomplishments of North American Neoscholastic psychology in academic and applied areas. Neoscholastic psychologists championed scientific psychology, while insisting on a better conception of human nature. Philosophical critiques led to a decline of Neoscholasticism; after the 1960s it was no longer official Catholic philosophy. Neoscholasticism gave psychologists concerned with philosophical questions impetus to turn to phenomenology, existentialism, and humanistic psychology.

This article, the 1st in a 2-part series, uses patient records from California's Stockton State Hospital to unearth the mid-century roots of contemporary American psychiatry. These patient records allow the authors to examine 2 transformations: the post-World War II expansion of psychiatry to include the diagnosis and treatment not only of psychotic patients, but also nonpsychotic patients suffering from problems of everyday living; and the 1950s introduction of the first psychotropic drugs, which cemented the medical status of these new disorders, thus linking a new therapeutic rationale to biological understandings of disease. These transformations laid the groundwork for a contemporary psychiatry characterized by voluntary outpatient care, pharmacological treatment of a wide range of behaviors and distress, and a doctor-patient relationship and cultural acceptance of disease that allows psychiatric patients to identify themselves as consumers.

Scientific publications tend to be forgotten quickly. A few works, however, are still cited 100 years and more after their publication. The author used bibliometric methods to compare "hits" (works noticed by the scientific community soon after their publication) with "missed signals" (works tha went unnoticed until much later) by investigating2 psychological journals founded in the 1890s: Zeitschrift für Psychologie and Psychological Review. All articles that were published in either of these journals up to 1920 and cited more than 25 times in the Web of Science up to the year 2000 were considered for inclusion in the analysis. It emerged that "hits" corresponded more closely to the focus of scientific attention at the time of publication than "missed signals

Edwin R. Guthrie rose to prominence as a psychologist in the 1930s. His theoretical outlook was behavioristic. This approach came from his conviction that an objective method could be applied to a scientific treatment of mind. Prior to becoming a psychologist, he was a philosopher of mathematics. Guthrie was initiated into psychology by Stevenson Smith, from whom he learned a psychology of adjustment informed by comparative research, Columbia functionalism, and clinical psychology. Guthrie's first step into psychology was with Smith in Chapters in General Psychology (S. Smith & E. R. Guthrie, 1921). To synthesize their own unique position on learning from the contemorary theory and research, they used the principle of association. This article focuses on Guthrie's origin and his development into a learning theorist.

In this article, the author seeks to trace the various attempts on the part of well-known German psychologists in the Weimar Republic to emphasize the rational side of psychoanalysis. In doing so, the author tries to demonstrate that the early reception in this period often resembled a critique of Freud's rationalism. It is possible to discern one particular form of criticism that emerged time and again, namely the association of psychoanalysis with the rationalist mind. If researchers wish to pinpoint further what lay beneath this purported connection, then it is possible to perceive a pronounced desire to prevent analysis of what many deemed to be sacred and beyond scientific scrutiny: the soul. It is precisely this discontent with Freud's thought that survived well into the Federal Republic, when other forms of critique had been discredited or no longer commanded serious attention.

In this article, the 2nd in a 2-part series, the author uses patient records from California''s Stockton State Hospital to explore the changing role of gender norms and other cultural values in the care of psychiatric patients. The authors show that cultural values are always imbedded in psychiatric practice and that their role in that practice depends on the patients, treatments, and therapeutic rationales present in a given therapeutic encounter. Because the decade following World War II witnessed dramatic changes in psychiatry's patients, therapeutics, and rationales, Stockton State Hospital's records from this time period allow the authors to show not only the extent to which gender norms shape psychiatric practice, but also how psychiatry's expansion into the problems of everyday life led psychiatry to take a more subtle and yet more active role in enforcing societal norms.

Research in child development has emerged as a major intellectual discipline and a topic of great interest and importance to society. The Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD) has been the leading scholarly society concerned with the advancement of this research. As part of its focus on a history of the field, the SRCD has undertaken an Oral History Project in which prominent members are interviewed. Of the 102 completed interviews, 47 are women's accounts, which document important contributions women have made to child development. The experiences reported by individual participants reflect themes in the general history of women in psychology and child development during the early and mid-1900s. Women encountered obstacles to their efforts, even as they were supported by others and struggled to achieve prominence amid the sometimes ambiguous or conflicting circumstances that characterized women's entry into child development

This article analyzes the early evolution of Jean Piaget's renowned "clinical method" in order to investigate the method's strikingl original and generative character. Throughout his 1st decade in the field, Piaget frequently discussed and justified the many different approaches to data collection he used. Analysis of his methodological progression during this period reveals that Piaget's determination to access the genuine convictions of children eventually led him to combine 3 distinct traditions in which he had been trained -- naturalistic observation, psychometrics, and the psychiatric clinical examination. It was in this amalgam, first evident in his 4th text, that Piaget discovered the clinical dynamic that would drive the classic experiments for which he is most well known.

The "Experimentalists," created by E. B. Titchener in 1904, experienced growing pains and other stresses in the 1920s, raising concerns about its future. Those concerns became acute with Titchener's death in 1927. At the 1928 meeting, several "elders," hoping to maintain the group's vigorous advocacy of basic research in the positivist tradition, formed a reorganization committee of 5. The committee expanded to 15, 10 of whom met the following year to debate alternative plans for a new organization. The result was an honorary society for established researchers, the Society of Experimental Psychologists. Boring's highly personalized 1938 history of the original Experimentalists understated the value of the research contributions made by group members and, by overstating the degree of Titchener's influence, devalued the important contributions of others (e.g., Raymond Dodge).

Of the earliest American universities, The Johns Hopkins in Baltimore holds a unique position for psychology. At Hopkins, many of America's first psychologists received their graduate training. Of special interest is the Hopkins Metaphysical Club, organized in 1879 by Charles Sanders Peirce. It provided a forum for research and scholarship by faculty and students. Papers related to topics of the "new" psychology began to appear in 1883, about the time G. Stanley Hall was given a 3-year appointment at Hopkins. When Peirce departed Hopkins in 1885, Hall was free to develop psychology in his image and disbanded the club. Nevertheless, the Metaphysical Club played an important role in the emergence of American scientific psychology.

Personal correspondence written by Prof. Felix Krueger from Argentina in 1906-1907 to his teacher and mentor Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig is situated in the historical context of the theoretical debates taking place at the University of Buenos Aires at the beginning of the 20th century. A critical survey of the transatlantic migration of psychological theories and their reception in Argentina raises the broader issues of the nature of the cultural and social roots of local interpretations induced by the circulation of theories across national fields of scientific inquiry. It is argued that national intellectual fields and the historicity of their categories of interpretation mediate in the foreign trade of theories.

Despite an illustrious history marked by the work of Wolfgang Köhler and Mathilde Hertz, among others - the significance of which still resonates in different fields of animal behavior research and the fact that interesting work in the field continues - comparative psychology has no official status within German psychology. A partial explanation for this lack of official representation might derive from unsuccessful attempts historically to secure institutional status. 'Gifted' animals served as much of the impetus for the beginning of a scientific animal psychology in Germany and contributed to its institutionalization by providing the incentive for the establishment of organizations dealing with animal psychology. Although initially serving as a catalyst for an interdisciplinary exchange on animal psychology, the case of Clever Hans was also exploited to help psychology gain institutional status in the field albeit without lasting success.

Mesmerism, the French method of treating illness and inducing trance, was introduced to the U.S. in 1836. A cohort of Americans took to the practice enthusiastically, publishing materials, presenting lectures attended by thousands, conducting empirical investigations, and treating untold numbers of ill people. These practitioners understood their profession addressed the mind and they often referred to their work as "psychology. The mesmerists speculated about mind-brain links and investigated "interior states," "mental healing," and the controversial "higher min powers" such as clairvoyance. Antebellum culture is the backdrop for this study of the rise, fall, and dispersion of mesmerism in America. Evidence provided warrants a re-appraisal of mesmerism's significance for nineteenth-century psychology.

In the past 30 years, the "new history of psychology" and its adherents have advocated a critical approach to scholarship, increased use of primary sources, a focus on sociopolitical forces, and the active inclusion of psychologists from underrepresented groups. This paper argues that many scholars exaggerate the differences between old and new history of psychology, and that where the differences are indeed large, those discrepancies reveal certain limitations unique to the new history approach. These limitations, presented in the form of five questions posed to new historians, lead to a discussion of professional issues in the history of psychology.

Kurt Gottschaldt (1902-1991) was active in psychological research in Germany throughout much of the last century. His best-known contributions relate to three "twin camps" he ran in the late 1930's. These twin camps were designed help assess the relative contributions of heredity and environment in determining the development of psychological attributes and behavior. Gottschaldt's conclusions favored an hereditarian interpretation of his results, and Gottschaldt promoted the relevance of his twin research to "race psychology." While Gottschaldt is sometimes described as a defender of scientific objectivity who maintained independence from Nazi ideology during the NS-era, some of his work suggests that a modest revision of this view may be required.

Kurt Danziger is a senior scholar whose innovative contributions to the history of psychology have received widespread international recognition. This wide-ranging interview covers every aspect of Danziger's work since the 1970s, including his early work on Wundt, his work on psychological methods that culminated in the book, Constructing the Subject (1990) and his more recent work on psychological objects in Naming the Mind (1997). It also includes his thoughts on history of psychology in general and the related subject of historical psychology. The interviewer is a former student of Danziger and co-editor of a recent book on Danziger's work