(Le thème de la conférence)

The conference will look at the long-standing and new commons. We propose to explore common-property institutions of the past centuries - many of which continue into current times-and examine how they adjust to technology development and changes in the structure of the users as well as how they respond to an ever-expanding global economy. The conference will examine the role of donors as their ideas and incentives may shape the performance of different institutional arrangements. Further, we will explore new commons as they are created with invention of new institutions and technology. The global commons will be examined as they continue to increase in importance. We will look at a multitude of institutional arrangements as they are likely to be used in complex, large-scale commons. Market institutions will be looked at as they may exist side-by-side with common property and governmental institutions, particularly when rights to place greenhouse gases are paired with obligations to create carbon sinks in forests that may be governed and managed by common property or governmental arrangements. Thus, the long-standing and the new commons will be important topics for serious research and continued policy analysis. A major challenge is to provide a coherent theoretical analysis and synthesis of prior and current empirical research so that scholars, citizens, and officials are prepared for the future.

Paper and Panel Proposals Deadline:

We invite anyone interested in the new and the long-standing commons to participate in the conference. We encourage scholars and practitioners to submit panel, individual paper, and poster proposals early. The panel, paper, and poster abstracts not to exceed 500 words should be submitted to the Program Co-Chairs, at iascp00@indiana.edu, at the latest by October 30, 1999. The final papers should be submitted by April 3, 2000. Please send Word or Word-Perfect file as an e-mail attachment.

Session Topics:

(1) New Commons
Technology development creates new common pool resources (Internet) and enables codification and management of existing common pool resources (genetic pool). How do issues of access, social exclusion, intellectual property rights, and commercialization shape the governance of these common pool resources (CPRs)? Population settlement creates common property that has to be managed by all residents (condominiums). Budgets of private and government corporations as well as international organizations (for example, EU farm subsidies) and the allocation of their shares among competing activities can also be analyzed as a common pool resource.

(2) Global Commons
The use of global environment (atmosphere, oceans, forests) and allocation of resources in nobody's land exhibit high complexity, larger number, and high heterogeneity of resource users. How can we then apply lessons learned from selected international regimes to the design of governance of new international problems?

(3) Natural Resources and Their Interlinkages
Fisheries, surface and ground water, and forestry have traditionally been the strongest topics in the work of IASCP members. How can we incorporate economic and political context in the analysis of these resources? When we analyze change over time, what is the time frame we should examine? In addition to exploring the issues that pertain to these resources, we propose to look at the interlinkages in the use of different resources.

(4) Adaptation and Resilience to Change
What challenges do CPR managers face when technologies allow for more efficient (and/or destructive) use of a resource and when demographics of the resource users change? How do changes in macro-economic and macro-political systems affect management of CPR? Did Asian financial crisis affect local CPRs? Do common property regimes change as countries exhibit drastic shifts from stable political systems to periods of flux and a lack of well functioning domestic macro-political institutions? What aspects of these changes can be accommodated within common property regimes and what kinds have detrimental effects?

(5) Theoretical Questions
A number of important theoretical questions will be addressed that will enable a synthesis of the efforts in the empirical, case-study approach, statistical analyses, as well as experimental research. The major theoretical issues proposed to be addressed are: emergence and sustenance of self-organized cooperation; property rights, markets, and CPRs; linkages of higher-level organizations in CPR cooperation problems; heterogeneity and change among resource users; uncertainty, variability, and shocks - adaptive management of CPRs; experimental laboratories work.

(6) Experimental Economics
Given the initial experiments on common-pool resources that establish the willingness of subjects to agree upon a distribution of appropriation rights, sanction each other, and use communication for creating agreements and for verbal sanctions, what have recent experiments added to our knowledge about common pool resources. Has anyone explored multi-good commons? How does heterogeneity of assets or information affect behavior? We know that size of group tends to be positively related to contributions to public goods. Is the opposite effect found in common-pool resources? What else is going on in the study of experimental commons?

(7) Failures and What We Can Learn from Failing Institutions
What we can learn from the well-intended schemes to improve people lives and resource management that failed to do either? Were the managers too optimistic about the capability of managing the system? Was the institutional arrangement imposed on the resource users who lacked the capability to resist a failing plan? Did the external shocks shake the CPR beyond its ability to adapt?

(8) Privatization
Under what conditions will markets work most effectively in managing and allocating the flow from CPRs? How we can apply lessons from selected successful marketable permit schemes to other CPRs?

(9) Historical communal societies - especially New Harmony, Shakers
Indiana and Midwest experienced a strong history of communal societies. New Harmony flourished in the mid 1800's and at its peak had nearly one thousand members. Shakers communities were common in Midwest and reached their peak by the mid 1800's. Both societies lost its importance with the onset of industrial revolution and with decline of popularity of their values.

(10) External influences on local commons
How much autonomy can a common property regime have? What gives a common property regime the autonomy - low importance for the national economy, its superiority over other institutional arrangements, or others?

(11) Role of donors
When outsiders donate financial and other resources to support common property regimes, their action sometimes significantly affects the outcomes both in positive and negative ways. Many of the problems come as a result of the set of ideas that are being implemented as well as the incentives the donors face. Academics share some of the responsibilities here since our ideas have been the ones that they have tried to implement.

(12) Advocacy as a means of empowering resource managers
Advocacy may improve the ways the external environment views a common property regime and empower the resource managers. However, if advocacy is pursued by an organization, this may fundamentally change the nature of the organization.

Comments:IASCP 2000 Web Team Last Updated 10-21-99 © Copyright 1998