

Extending a natural language proof theory: On ordinary comparatives

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Goals

- Provide a natural language proof theory for MacCartny's NatLog (MacCartney (2009a,b)) that is
 - sound and complete via representation.
 - Provide a semantics for **ordinary comparatives**
 - John is taller than Mary
- that can be plausibly integrated into such a proof theory (or one like it) (see Moss (2011)).

Natural language proof

$$\frac{\frac{\text{couch} \equiv \text{sofa} \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \text{couch} \equiv \text{sofa}} \text{ Refl} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{sofa} \wedge \overline{\text{sofa}}} \wedge_1}{\Gamma \vdash \text{couch} \wedge \overline{\text{sofa}}} \equiv, \wedge$$

Synthetic logic

Definition 1: Syntax of \mathcal{S}

Let Φ be a countable set of proposition letters p_1, \dots, p_n for $n < \omega$ which I will refer to as the **set of proper terms**. Then,

- 1 If φ is a proper term, then so is $\bar{\varphi}$;
- 2 If φ and ψ are proper terms, then

$$\begin{array}{l} \varphi \equiv \psi, \quad \varphi \sqsubset \psi, \quad \varphi \sqsupset \psi, \\ \varphi \wedge \psi, \quad \varphi \Downarrow \psi, \quad \varphi \smile \psi \end{array}$$

are **synthetic terms**.

Lexical (MacCartney) relations

- **Equivalence**
 - couch \equiv sofa
 - 'Couch' and 'sofa' are **synonyms**
- **Forward entailment**
 - crow \sqsubset bird
 - 'Crow' is a **hyponym** of 'bird'
- **Reverse entailment**
 - crow \supset bird
 - 'Bird' is a **hypernym** of 'crow'
- **Negation**
 - man $\wedge \overline{\text{man}}$
 - 'Man' and 'non-man' are **antonyms**
- **Alternation**
 - cat \wedge dog
 - 'Cat' and 'dog' are **alternates**
- **Covers**
 - animal $\wedge \overline{\text{human}}$
 - 'Animal' and 'non-human' are **covers**

Definition 2: Synthetic models

Let a **synthetic model** $\mathbb{M} = \langle D, \llbracket \cdot \rrbracket \rangle$, where D is a non-empty set and $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$ is an interpretation function taking proper terms φ to their denotations in D such that

- 1 $\llbracket \bar{\varphi} \rrbracket = D - \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$;
- 2 $\llbracket \overline{\bar{\varphi}} \rrbracket = \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$;
- 3 $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \neq \llbracket \bar{\varphi} \rrbracket$; and
- 4

$$\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \neq \begin{cases} \emptyset \\ D \end{cases} \quad \text{or}$$

Definition 3: Synthetic semantics

Let φ and ψ be proper terms and R a MacCartney relation. Define the **denotation** of the synthetic term $\varphi R \psi$, written $\llbracket \varphi R \psi \rrbracket$, as

1 Equivalence

- $\mathbb{M} \models \varphi \equiv \psi \Leftrightarrow \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket = \llbracket \psi \rrbracket$

2 Forward entailment

- $\mathbb{M} \models \varphi \sqsubset \psi \Leftrightarrow \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \subset \llbracket \psi \rrbracket$

3 Reverse entailment

- $\mathbb{M} \models \varphi \supset \psi \Leftrightarrow \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \supset \llbracket \psi \rrbracket$

4 Negation

- $\mathbb{M} \models \varphi \wedge \psi \Leftrightarrow (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cap \llbracket \psi \rrbracket = \emptyset) \wedge (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cup \llbracket \psi \rrbracket = D)$


5 Alternation

- $\mathbb{M} \models \varphi \Downarrow \psi \Leftrightarrow (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cap \llbracket \psi \rrbracket = \emptyset) \wedge (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cup \llbracket \psi \rrbracket \neq D)$


6 Covers

- $\mathbb{M} \models \varphi \smile \psi \Leftrightarrow (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cap \llbracket \psi \rrbracket \neq \emptyset) \wedge (\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cup \llbracket \psi \rrbracket = D)$


MacCartney relations



$$\varphi \equiv \psi$$




$$\varphi \sqsubset \psi$$



$$\varphi \sqsupset \psi$$



$$\varphi \wedge \psi$$



$$\varphi \Downarrow \psi$$



$$\varphi \setminus \psi$$

Theorem 1: Mutual exclusivity

If \mathbb{M} is a synthetic model then

$$\mathbb{M} \models \varphi R \psi \Rightarrow \mathbb{M} \not\models \varphi S \psi$$

for $R \neq S$.

Definition 4: Entailment

Let Γ be a set of synthetic terms. $\Gamma \models \varphi R \psi$ just in case

$$\mathbb{M} \models \Gamma \Rightarrow \mathbb{M} \models \varphi R \psi$$

R,S	\equiv	\sqsubset	\sqsupset	\wedge	\Downarrow	\smile
\equiv	\equiv	\sqsubset	\sqsupset	\wedge	\Downarrow	\smile
\sqsubset	\sqsubset	\sqsubset	\cdot	\Downarrow	\Downarrow	\cdot
\sqsupset	\sqsupset	\cdot	\sqsupset	\smile	\cdot	\smile
\wedge	\wedge	\smile	\Downarrow	\equiv	\sqsupset	\sqsubset
\Downarrow	\Downarrow	\cdot	\Downarrow	\sqsubset	\cdot	\sqsubset
\smile	\smile	\smile	\cdot	\sqsupset	\sqsupset	\cdot

Definition 5: M-rules

Let Γ be a set of synthetic formulas. Then,

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi R \psi \quad \Gamma \vdash \psi S \vartheta}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi T \vartheta} \quad R, S$$

are rules of the calculus.

Sample M-rule

\sqsubset, \sqsupset -rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \sqsubset \psi \quad \Gamma \vdash \psi \sqsubset \vartheta}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \sqsubset \vartheta} \sqsubset, \sqsupset$$

Definition 6: D-rules

Let Γ be a set of synthetic terms. Then,

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi} \equiv_1 \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi \equiv \varphi} \equiv_2 \quad \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \wedge \bar{\varphi}} \wedge_1 \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi \wedge \varphi} \wedge_2$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \sqsubset \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi \supset \varphi} \sqsubset_1 \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \supset \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi \sqsubset \varphi} \supset_1 \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \Downarrow \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi \Downarrow \varphi} \Downarrow_1 \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \smile \psi}{\Gamma \vdash \psi \smile \varphi} \smile_1$$

are rules of the calculus.

Theorem 2: Complementation

$$1 \quad \Gamma, \varphi \equiv \psi \vdash \varphi \wedge \bar{\psi}$$

$$2 \quad \Gamma, \varphi \wedge \psi \vdash \varphi \equiv \bar{\psi}$$

$$3 \quad \Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \bar{\bar{\varphi}}$$

(double negation)

$$4 \quad \Gamma, \varphi \sqsubset \psi \vdash \bar{\psi} \sqsubset \bar{\varphi}$$

(contraposition)

$$5 \quad \Gamma, \varphi \supset \psi \vdash \bar{\psi} \supset \bar{\varphi}$$

$$6 \quad \Gamma, \varphi \Downarrow \psi \vdash \varphi \sqsubset \bar{\psi}$$

$$7 \quad \Gamma, \varphi \smile \psi \vdash \varphi \supset \bar{\psi}$$

Natural language proof

Theorem 2.1

$$\Gamma, \varphi \equiv \psi \vdash \varphi \wedge \bar{\psi}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\text{couch} \equiv \text{sofa} \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \text{couch} \equiv \text{sofa}} \text{Refl} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \text{sofa} \wedge \overline{\text{sofa}}} \wedge_1}{\Gamma \vdash \text{couch} \wedge \overline{\text{sofa}}} \equiv, \wedge$$

Definition 7: Explosion

Let Γ be a set of synthetic terms. Then,

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi R \psi \quad \Gamma \vdash \varphi S \psi \quad \text{for } R \neq S}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi' T \psi' \text{ for all } \varphi' T \psi'} \text{Exp}$$

is a rule of the calculus.

Definition 8: Consistency

Γ is consistent if, and only if $\Gamma \not\vdash \varphi R \psi$ for some synthetic term $\varphi R \psi$.

Inconsistency

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\text{animal} \sqsubset \text{life} \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \text{animal} \sqsubset \text{life}} \text{Refl}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{life} \sqsupset \text{animal}} \sqsubset_1}{\Gamma \vdash \text{life} \sqcup \overline{\text{human}}} \text{Refl} \quad \frac{\frac{\text{animal} \sqcup \overline{\text{human}} \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \text{animal} \sqcup \overline{\text{human}}} \text{Refl}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{life} \sqcup \overline{\text{human}}} \supset, \sqcup}{\Gamma \vdash \varphi' T \psi' \text{ for all } \varphi' T \psi'} \text{Refl} \quad \frac{\text{life} \sqsupset \overline{\text{human}} \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \text{life} \sqsupset \overline{\text{human}}} \text{Refl} \quad \text{Exp}$$

Representation

Theorem 3: Completeness

Let Γ be a consistent of synthetic terms. Then,

$$\Gamma \vdash \varphi R \psi \Leftrightarrow \Gamma \models \varphi R \psi$$

- Every consistent Γ induces an order on the set of proper terms Φ ;
- That ordered set can be transformed into an **orthoposet**;
- Every orthoposet can be **represented** as a system of sets (Zierler and Schlessinger (1965), Calude *et al* (1999) Moss (2007));
- The system of sets will function as a synthetic model.

Ordinary comparatives

Ordinary comparatives

- **Ordinary Comparatives**
 - 1 John is taller than Mary
- **Negation:**
 - 1 John is no taller than Mary
 - 2 John isn't taller than Mary
- **Coordination:**
 - 1 John is taller than Mary or Sue is
 - 2 John is taller than Mary is or Sue is
- **Quantification:**
 - 1 John is taller than everyone else
 - 2 John is taller than exactly two woman
- **Temporal expressions:**
 - 1 John is taller than he was yesterday
 - 2 John will be taller than he is today
- **Modal expressions:**
 - 1 John is taller than he was yesterday
 - 2 John will be taller than he is today

Previous analyses

1 Degrees (Seuren 1973)

$$\exists d (\mathbf{tall}(\mathit{john}, d) \wedge \neg(\mathbf{tall}(\mathit{mary}, d)))$$

where d is a variable ranging over degrees.

2 Precisifications (Kamp 1975)

$$\exists p (p \models \mathbf{tall}(\mathit{john}) \wedge \neg(p \models \mathbf{tall}(\mathit{mary})))$$

where p is a variable ranging over precisifications of a base model \mathbb{M} .

3 Comparison classes (Klein 1980)

$$\exists c (c \models \mathbf{tall}(\mathit{john}) \wedge \neg(c \models \mathbf{tall}(\mathit{mary})))$$

where c is a variable ranging over comparison classes.

4 'Measure' functions (Kennedy 1997)

$$\mathbf{tall}(\mathit{john}) > \mathbf{tall}(\mathit{mary})$$

where $\mathbf{tall}(\mathit{john})$ and $\mathbf{tall}(\mathit{mary})$ correspond to the degrees of John's and Mary's (maximal) height respectively.

Derived degrees

- Authors have tried to derive ‘degrees’ as equivalence classes of more basic ontology such as individuals (Cresswell 1976; Bale 2008; van Rooij 2010; Bale 2011; van Rooij 2011).
- Natural to view entities e as being an ordered set of ‘atoms’
 $e = (A, \leq)$.
- Minimally extend Frege’s definition of **having the same amount as** to formalize Carnap’s (1967) example of arranging rods by length.
- Let δ be a function taking an individual e , world w , and time t , to the set of triples (e', w', t') such that e is **order isomorphic** (\cong), i.e., **has the same height**, to e' at world w' and time t' .
- δ induces a linear order $>$ over the set $I \times W \times T$, where each equivalence class of entity, world, time triples corresponds to a ‘degree’.
- This order can serve as a ‘trans-world/time measuring rod’.

Derived degrees (cont.)

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (e_1, w_8, t_2), (e_2, w_1, t_2) \\ (e_1, w_4, t_1), (e_3, w_4, t_4) \end{array} \right\} > \dots > \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (e_1, w_3, t_1), (e_3, w_2, t_1) \\ (e_2, w_3, t_9), (e_5, w_2, t_4) \end{array} \right\}$$

Current analysis

Definition 9: taller

Let e and e' be entities, w a world, and t a time. Then,

$$e \text{ taller } e' \text{ at } w \text{ and } t \Leftrightarrow \delta((e, w, t)) > \delta((e', w, t))$$

(which can intuitively be understood as reading, 'e has more degrees of height than e' at world w and time t').

- Define **shorter** as the **order dual** ($<$) of **taller**.
- Define **as tall as** (\geq) as **not taller than**.

Negation

Claim: (1) \Leftrightarrow (2) \Leftrightarrow (3)

- 1 John is not taller than Mary
- 2 Mary is as tall as John
- 3 John is as short as Mary

van Rooij (2008)

\neg (*john taller mary*) \Leftrightarrow *mary as tall john*
 \Leftrightarrow *john as short as mary*

Entity/sentential-level coordination

Claim: (1) \Leftrightarrow (2)

- ① John is taller than Mary (is) and Sue (is)
- ② John is taller than Mary or Sue (is)

von Stechow (1984)

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\textit{john taller mary}) \wedge (\textit{john taller sue}) &\Leftrightarrow \textit{john taller max}(\{\textit{mary}, \textit{sue}\}) \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \textit{john taller}(\textit{mary} \sqcup \textit{sue})
 \end{aligned}$$

Quantification

- 1 John is taller than everyone (else at the current world and time)

$$\forall x (x \neq \textit{john} \rightarrow (\delta((\textit{john}, w, t)) > \delta((x, w, t))))$$

- 2 Every man is taller than some woman (at the current world and time)

$$\forall x (\mathbf{man}(x)(w)(t) \rightarrow \exists y (\mathbf{woman}(y)(w)(t) \wedge (\delta((x, w, t)) > \delta((y, w, t))))))$$

Time and modality

- 1 John might be taller than Mary

$$\exists u (\delta((john, u, t)) \textbf{taller} \delta((mary, u, t)))$$

- 2 John will be taller than Mary

$$\exists s (\delta((john, w, s)) \textbf{taller} \delta((mary, w, s)) \wedge t < s)$$

Inference patterns

Using

- properties and concepts of (linear) orders; and
- classical rules of inference, e.g., De Morgan's Law

we get a robust set of inferences involving comparatives.

Future work

- Develop a natural language proof theory integrating ordinary comparatives that builds on the insights of the semantics of ordinary comparatives presented here (again see Moss (2011)).
 - What orders do other adjectives induce, e.g., **clever** (see Kamp (1975) among others)?
 - How are those orders determined?
- Integrate ‘comparative proof theory’ with a larger natural language proof theory that allows reasoning across construction types
 - **Temporal expressions** (**before**, **after**, etc.)
 - **Quantifiers** (**every**, **some**, etc.) via
- **Monotonicity calculi** (van Benthem (1986), Valencia (1991), Moss (2010) among others).

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