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## ACADEMIC POSITIONS

*July 2010- Present* Associate Professor  
Department of Political Science, Indiana University

*2004-2010* Assistant Professor  
Department of Political Science, Indiana University

*2003-2004* Lecturer and Postdoctoral Scholar  
Department of Political Science and Social Science History Institute  
Stanford University

## EDUCATION

### *Stanford University*

*1998-2003:* PhD. In Political Science.  
*Fields of Specialization:* Political Organizations, Institutional Analysis (Comparative and American Politics), and Positive Political Economy (Graduate School of Business).

*1999-2001:* M.S. in Statistics

*1995-1996:* M.A. in Latin American Studies

### *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

*1989-1993:* B.S. in Economics

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

Political Economy of Development, Informal Institutions, Social Network Analysis (Formal, Statistical, and Experimental Approaches), and Latin American Politics.

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

*Undergraduate:* Authoritarian Government, Latin American Politics, Theories and Models of Collective Choice, Political Economy of Corruption, Research methods, and Introduction to Comparative Politics.

*Graduate:* Political Economy of Development, Positive Political Economy, Institutional Analysis, Quantitative Methods, Decentralization and Regulation, and Networks and Institutions.

**BOOKS**

Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship (2008). Stanford University Press.

The Politics of Property Rights (2003). Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series. Cambridge University Press. Co-authored with Stephen Haber and Noel Maurer.

**PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLES**

Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer, and Armando Razo (March 2003). "When the Law Doesn't Matter: The Rise and Fall of the Mexican Oil Industry," The Journal of Economic History, 63:1, pp. 1-31.

Armando Razo and Stephen Haber (1998). "The Rate of Growth of Productivity in Mexico, 1850-1933: Evidence from the Cotton Textile Industry," Journal of Latin American Studies 30:3, pp. 481-517.

Stephen Haber and Armando Razo (1998). "Political Instability and Economic Performance: Evidence from Revolutionary Mexico," World Politics 51, pp. 99-143.

**BOOK CHAPTERS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS**

"Autocrats and Democrats", Forthcoming in the Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition (Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton, MA).

"Polycentric Orders and the Governance of Public Economies," Transnational Corporations Review, (June 2010) Vol. 2:2, pp. 17-36.

Book Reviews of The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy in Argentina by Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi (Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Policymaking in Latin America, edited by Ernesto Stein and Mariano Tommasi (Inter-American Development Bank and Harvard University, 2008) in Perspectives on Politics 6: 4, pp. 854-56.

Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer (2002). "Sustaining Economic Performance under Political Instability: Political Integration in Revolutionary Mexico" in Stephen Haber, ed. Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America: Theory and Evidence (Hoover Institution Press), pp. 25-74.

Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer, and Armando Razo (2001). "Corrupción, capitalismo de compadrazgo, y compromisos creíbles" (Corruption, Crony Capitalism, and Credible Commitments), Gaceta de Economía (Mexico City) 7:13, pp. 5-21.

Stephen H. Haber and Armando Razo (2000). "Industrial Prosperity under Political Instability: An Analysis of Revolutionary Mexico" in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root (eds.), Governing for Prosperity (New Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 106-152.

## UNDER REVIEW

“Strategic Embeddedness and the Microfoundations of Collective Action: theory and application to decentralized cooperation.”

This paper contributes to the literature on collective action with a notion of embeddedness that applies to specific social interactions rather than individuals, which is used to characterize a network-augmented game involving third-party assistance through social connections. Although many theoretical and empirical studies in political science assume a positive impact of networks on various social outcomes, the analysis here indicates that more connectedness is not generally associated with enhanced cooperation.

## WORKING PAPERS

“Social dilemmas with Manifest and Latent Networks”

This study implements an agent-based model to examine the impact of network structure on simple two-person coordination tasks. The impact of network awareness (or lack thereof) does not produce consistent results, and is contingent on particular informational assumptions. In particular, assuming less knowledge of underlying social structures may lead to more coordination than in the case where people make random inferences (that is, they attempt to know more) about latent network ties. *Under Revision.*

“Social Structures, Informal Institutions, and Governance in Dictatorships”

Two distinguishing features of dictatorships include (1) the private formulation and dispensation of special privileges; and (2) social connections among beneficiaries. I present a game-theoretic framework with a dictator and an arbitrary number of political and economic actors who are embedded in various social networks. I explore how network structure affects a dictator’s incentives to prey on private actors. *Under Revision.*

“How does awareness of social structure affect n-player collective action games?”

This paper develops a computational model of cooperation among  $n$  players with varying social structures. These players follow simple relational rules that predispose them to cooperate with connected players. In addition to structural variation, I examine various informational scenarios in which agents have partial knowledge of network structures. As observed behavior is used to make inferences about network structures, the results indicate that networks can sometimes impede collective action by propagating false beliefs about connections (or lack thereof).

“The Impact of Political Regimes on Credibility and Governance (1972-1998)”

This study includes a cross-country statistical analysis of the institutional determinants of policy credibility (1972-1996) and the impact of regime type on the quality of institutional environments in the late 1990s.

“Rules and Relations in Comparative Politics: Connecting the dots between formal and informal institutions “

This paper goes beyond the conventional formal-informal dichotomy in comparative politics by proposing a richer framework of institutional-relational configurations in developing countries that take into account individual social connections.

**AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS**

- 2011-12      National Fellow  
Hoover Institution  
*Stanford University*
- 2005              Summer Research Faculty Fellowship  
*Indiana University*
- 2002:              Budde Fellowship  
Department of Political Science  
*Stanford University*
- 1989-1993:      Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program Awards for research on  
cooperative R&D in Mexico.  
*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*
- 1990:              Center for International Studies Research Abroad Fellowship  
Carroll L. Wilson Award for research on informatics policy in Mexico.  
*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

**CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS**

- “Social Structures, Informal Institutions, and Governance in Dictatorships.” Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, October 2010.
- Discussant at “Workshop on Social Capital.” Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, July 2010.
- “Social dilemmas with Manifest and Latent Networks“ Presented at the 2010 Political Networks Conference, Duke University, May 2010.
- Chair and Discussant, Panel on “Institutions and Natural Resource Management”, Human-Environment Interactions Workshop, Indiana University, February 2010.
- “How does awareness of social structures affect n-player collective action games? “ Presented at the 2009 North American Computing and Philosophy "Networks and Their Philosophical Implications" Conference, Bloomington, IN, June 2009.
- “Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship.” Inter-Institutional Seminar for Economic History at El Colegio de México (COLMEX-SIHE) and Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE), Mexico City, February 2009.
- “Networks and Institutions.” Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE), Mexico City, February 2009
- “Political Economy of Networks and Institutions.” Program for Environmental and Development Research. Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE), Costa Rica, July 2008.

- “Social Structures, Informal Institutions, and Governance in Dictatorships.” Conference on Networks in Political Science, Harvard University, June 2008.
- “Social Structures, Informal Institutions, and Governance in Dictatorships.” Conference on Dictatorships and their Governance Implications, Princeton University, April 2008.
- “Political Foundations of Growth in Dictatorships and Democracies.” Panel 3-26: Determinants of Economic Growth of the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 2006.
- “Financial Crises Compared: Asia and Latin America.” Discussant for Panel 3-15 of the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 2006.
- “Political Economy of Informal Institutions.” Presented at a colloquium of the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, December 2005.
- “Social Networks and Selective Credible Commitments in Dictatorships: Policy Credibility without Public Enforcement.” Panel 12-12: Social Networks of the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.
- “Social Networks and the Political Economy of Dictatorships.” Presented at a colloquium of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, February 2005.
- “Political Control, Regulation, and Commitments in Dictatorships.” Panel 6-3: Political Economy of Corruption of the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 2002.
- “When Institutions Don’t Matter: The Mining Economy of Revolutionary Mexico, 1876-1929.” (Joint with Stephen H. Haber). Social Science History Workshop, Stanford University, April 2002.
- “When Institutions Don’t Matter: The Rise and Decline of the Mexican Oil Industry, 1901-1929” (Joint with Stephen H. Haber and Noel Maurer). Conference on Frontiers in Latin American Political Economy, Stanford University, January 2002.
- “The Political Economy of Political Instability” (Joint with Stephen H. Haber and Noel Maurer). Spring meeting of the All-UC Group in Economic History, Berkeley, April 2001.
- “Political Organization and Economic Geography.” Workshop in Comparative Politics and Historical Analysis, Stanford University, April 2001.
- “Credible Commitments without Limited Government.” Winter Meeting of the University of California Working Group on Efficient Government, UCLA, February 2001.
- “Political Instability and Economic Performance” (Joint with Stephen H. Haber and Noel Maurer). Social Science History Institute Conference on Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America, Stanford University, April 2000.

“Political Instability and Economic Performance” (Joint with Stephen H. Haber and Noel Maurer). Third Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics, Washington, D.C., September 1999.

“Political Competition and Political Instability.” Workshop in Political Economy, Stanford University Department of Political Science, June 1999.

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

*1994-1995:* Finance Intern  
Metropolitan Transportation Commission, Oakland, CA

Principal investigator and author of evaluation report on the Measure A Traffic Improvement Program in Santa Clara County, CA.

*1993:* Under Director for Economic Research  
Office of Economic Deregulation, Ministry of Commerce  
Mexico City, Mexico  
Performed statistical analysis of potential effects of deregulation policy proposals and provided research assistance as needed by the Ministry’s Chief Economist.

*1990-1992:* Research Associate  
Directorate General for Technological Development, Ministry of Commerce  
Mexico City, Mexico

Conducted research on the use of technology programs by small manufacturing firms and provided research assistance for new intellectual property rights legislation.

## UNIVERSITY SERVICE

*2010-2011* Advisory Council  
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University

*2010-2011* Math Modeling Foundations Committee  
General Education Committee, Indiana University

*2009-2011* Graduate Committee  
Department of Political Science, Indiana University

*2008-2010* Advisory Board  
Program for International Studies, Indiana University

Steering Committee  
Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Indiana University

- 2008-2009 Undergraduate Committee  
Department of Political Science, Indiana University
- 2008-2009 The Center on Philanthropy  
Indiana University
- 2004-2008 Graduate Committee  
Department of Political Science, Indiana University
- 2008 Latin American Fellowship Committee  
Office of the Vice President for International Affairs, Indiana University
- 2006-2008 Tinker Fellowship Committee  
Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Indiana University
- 2007 Graduate Student International Recruitment  
Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Indiana University
- 2001-2002 Comparative Politics Search Committee  
Department of Political Science, Stanford University

## **REFEREEING**

American Political Science Review  
British Journal of Political Science  
Cambridge Review of International Affairs  
Economics and Politics  
International Journal of the Commons  
International Studies Quarterly  
Journal of Economic History  
Journal of Iberian and Latin American History  
Journal of Politics  
National Science Foundation  
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences  
Revista Secuencia (Latin American and Social Science History Journal based in Mexico City)  
World Development

**REFERENCES**

Prof. Elinor Ostrom  
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis  
Indiana University  
513 North Park  
Bloomington, IN 47408-3895  
(812) 855-0441  
Email: [ostrom@indiana.edu](mailto:ostrom@indiana.edu)

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Department of Political Science  
Stanford University  
Encina Hall West, Rm 100  
Stanford, CA 94305-6044  
(650) 725-4046  
Email: [haber@stanford.edu](mailto:haber@stanford.edu)

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