For info about the review session time and place, see the Discussion
Exam 4 Review Topics
Updated 11:00 pm, Thursday Dec. 7, 2000.
- Importance of representing the relevant information in problem
solving (lecture; Action p. 356-357).
- Representational desiderata (lecture).
- Functional fixedness (Disorders pp. 167-168; Action p. 351).
- Problem solving "set" (Disorders pp. 168+; Action p. 351).
- Means-end analysis (Action p. 354; Disorders pp. 170+).
- Hill climbing heuristic, applied to the detectives and criminals/
hobbits and orcs/ calvins and hobbes/ missionaries and cannibals
problem (lecture; Action p. 354-355; Disorders pp. 171+).
- Expertise in problem solving (Action pp 358+; Disorders pp. 172+).
- Problem solving by analogy (Disorders pp. 173-175; Action pp. 360-363).
- Deductive logic: Relative difficulty of modus ponens, modus
tollens, affirming the consequent, and denying the antecedent
(Disorders pp 176-177; Action p. 339).
- Can people behave as if they know modus tollens without really
knowing modus tollens? (Action bottom p. 346. NOTE: There is an error
in the book. The argument form should say, "if p then q / not
q [the book has not p] / therefore not p").
- Syllogistic reasoning and influence of believability (Disorders pp
177-179; cf. Action pp. 336-337, p. 345, p. 348).
- Mental models: Representing premises versus
manipulating/integrating the model (Disorders pp 179-181; Action
p. 338, 347-348).
- Confirmation bias and effects it explains (Disorders p. 182-183).
- The Wason card selection task: The basic finding (Disorders
p. 183; Action pp. 340-341).
- The Wason card selection task: Explanations (confirmation bias,
matching bias, personal experience, pragmatic reasoning schemas;
Disorders pp. 183-186).
- Pragamatic reasoning schemata and the influence of perspective or
point of view (Action bottom p. 343; cf. Disorders pp. 185-186).
- Availability heuristic in judging probability (Disorders
pp. 186-187; Action pp. 384-387)
- Representativeness heuristic in judging probability and
explanation of the base rate and conjunction fallacies (Disorders
pp. 187-189; Action pp. 381-384)
- Definition of expected value (Action p. 369).
- Risk aversion and paradox for utility theory (Action p. 374).
- Violation of the sure-thing principle (Action pp. 374-375).
- Framing effect (Action pp. 377-378).
- Regret theory and individual differences (Action p. 380).
- Base rates of diseases in medical diagnosis: Does a positive test
result imply you have a rare disease? (Action pp. 388-390).
- Strength and weight of evidence in decision making (Action
- Phineas Gage and social decision making (Disorders pp. 195-196).
- Frontal lobe damage: Inability to sustain attention;
distractability; inability to suppress habitual response (Disorders
- Frontal lobe damage: Perseveration and disinhibition (Disorders
- Frontal lobe damage and violating hill climbing (Disorders
- The multiple errands test (Disorders pp. 208-209).
- The Norman and Shallice model of of the supervisory attentional
system and its relation to frontal lobes (Disorders pp. 210-211).
- Correlation or lack of correlation between various tasks that
assess frontal lobe damage (Disorders p. 212).
- The CYC project (video).
- Expert versus toddler knowledge - what's easier to program and