Dual Commitment and Labor-Management Relationship Climates

Harold L. Angle; James L. Perry


Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4273%28198603%2929%3A1%3C31%3ADCALRC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O

The Academy of Management Journal is currently published by Academy of Management.
DUAL COMMITMENT AND LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP CLIMATES

HAROLD L. ANGLE
University of Minnesota
JAMES L. PERRY
Indiana University

In 22 municipal bus companies, the extent of union members' dual commitment—to their unions and to their employing organizations—covaried with interorganizational differences in labor-management climates. Dual commitment was higher in cooperative climates than in less cooperative ones. The extent of members' participation in the union process moderated this relationship. It was relatively strong for more active participants and relatively weak for the less active. Separate organizational and union commitments also covaried with labor-management relationship climate but in a less monotonic manner than dual commitment did.

Can unionized employees develop simultaneous commitments to their unions and their employing organizations, or is there an inherent conflict of allegiance in such dual-membership situations that forces an either-or choice? This was the essential question that formed the basis for a flurry of research on dual loyalty or dual allegiance some 25 years ago. That research left the issue largely unresolved. This study once again analyzes the dual commitment concept in relation to two variables: (1) ambient labor-management relationship climate, and (2) extent of members' participation in union activities. This study is the first to use independent sources to measure labor-management relationship climates and dual commitment.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

During the 1950s and early 1960s, an apparent concern that the rapid growth of the unionization might compete with employees' commitment to their employing organizations stimulated much research on dual allegiance or dual commitment (Gallagher, 1984). Early work by such scholars as Dean (1954) and Purcell (1960) indicated that most workers show allegiance to both union and management. Dean's analysis of three unionized plants incorporated an extended period of observation and interviews with union and managers.
management officials and rank-and-file members, followed by a questionnaire survey. In all three plants she found that those workers who were most favorable toward management also tended to be the most likely to give their union leaders high ratings. However, as Dean acknowledged, it was unfortunate that she asked a direct question about dual loyalty in only one of the plants. Purcell's landmark study, involving a single unionized meat packing plant in Chicago, was even more restricted. As Dean did with most of her data, Purcell assessed dual allegiance by tallying proportions of workers whose responses to questions tended to be favorable toward both the company and the union.

Other scholars of the period, including Barkin (1950), England (1960), and Kornhauser, Sheppard, and Mayer (1956) argued against workers' ability to display simultaneous loyalty to both systems. Barkin, for example, asserted that the notion that employees can maintain loyalty to companies and to unions concurrently "does not stand up under even a cursory examination" (1950: 64).

After about 1960, the issue of dual allegiance lay essentially unresolved and dormant for about a quarter of a century, until a new generation of researchers raised it again. In the intervening period, a strong research theme developed around the concept of organizational commitment (Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974)—a concept having obvious relevance to dual allegiance. Indeed, it has been central to recent research on dual allegiance (Fukami & Larson, 1982, 1984; Gallagher, 1984; Martin, 1981; Martin, Mageneau, & Peterson, 1982).

Reminiscent of the earlier work of Dean (1954) and Purcell (1960), such recent research has tended to measure commitment to employing organizations and commitment to unions separately and has then combined these measures to show the extent of dual commitment. For instance, Gallagher (1984) tallied employees showing strong or moderate positive responses to separate union commitment and organizational commitment scales and used the proportion that fell into these classifications on both scales as an index of dual commitment. In Martin's (1981) study of a federal government facility, questionnaires that included scales measuring attitudes toward unions and toward management\(^1\) were administered to union members and nonmembers. This research assessed dual allegiance by recording the proportion of employees whose responses were favorable toward both referents. Fukami and Larson (1982) used the correlation between employees' scores on union commitment and organizational commitment to measure dual commitment.

Commitment has been anything but a consensual construct in the general literature. It has been described in such diverse ways as: attachment to and identification with an organization (Buchanan, 1974); a binding of attitude and belief to prior behaviors (Salancik, 1977); a resignation to a status, under penalty of forfeiture of the costs of attainment of that status (Becker, 1960); and a dependency relationship in which maintenance of an indivi-

---

\(^1\) These scales were adapted from Stagner, Chalmers, and Derber (1958).
dual's "internal being requires behavior that supports the social order" (Kanter, 1972: 66). Such diverse conceptual frameworks and their operational definitions—including several variations on why and how people become committed and how to measure commitment (Angle & Perry, 1983; Kiesler, 1971; Ritzer & Trice, 1969; Stevens, Beyer, & Trice, 1978)—have created a situation in which it is often difficult to make direct comparisons among commitment studies.

Diversity in conceptualizations and measurements of commitment has had clear effects on the coherence of recent research on dual commitment. For example, although both Gallagher (1984) and Fukami and Larson (1982) measured dual commitment by combining scores on separate measures of commitment to union and organization, they measured commitment in different ways. Gallagher employed a scale based on the work of Porter and colleagues (1974), but Fukami and Larson adopted a measure patterned after the work of Ritzer and Trice (1969). These two scales rest on quite different conceptualizations of commitment and tend to be only moderately correlated (Ferris & Aranya, 1983), making direct comparison problematic. The underlying distinction between these conceptualizations regards the extent to which an affective, as opposed to a calculative, attachment is presumed. This duality resembles Etzioni's (1975) distinction between moral and calculative involvement. The instrument developed by Porter and colleagues emphasizes members' moral involvement, but Ritzer and Trice's approach appears to have a more nearly calculative involvement as its premise (Ferris & Aranya, 1983).

In calculative involvement, bonding between member and social system results from a committed individual's linking the relationship to extrinsic outcomes on the basis of costs and benefits. Becker (1960), for example, defined commitment in terms of aversion to bearing costs of forfeiture. This refers to losses of investments or side bets that would be incurred in severing a relationship. Such an instrumental orientation seems incongruent with common definitions of allegiance or loyalty, which usually connote an affective attachment or sense of devotion.

The perspective on organizational commitment taken by Porter and his colleagues (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979, 1982; Porter et al., 1974) comes closer to such notions of loyalty and allegiance. This organizational behavior approach (Staw, 1977) essentially treats commitment in terms of individuals' psychological attachments to social systems. According to Porter and his colleagues, a committed employee: (1) has a strong desire to remain a member of his or her organization; (2) internalizes the values and goals of that organization; and (3) is willing to work extra hard on behalf of the organization. Thus, attachment to membership derives not from economic exchange, but from such processes as identification and internalization (Kelman, 1958)—processes more clearly consonant with loyalty or allegiance.

A great deal of published empirical research across a range of organizational and employee types has employed the measurement procedure associated with this approach to commitment (Mowday et al., 1979). Thus there is a
substantial amount of normative and psychometric information regarding
the measure. Furthermore, a major research effort on commitment to unions
appears to have its roots in this framework (Gordon, Philpot, Burt, Thompson,
& Spiller, 1980; Ladd, Gordon, Beauvais, & Morgan, 1982).

In addition to studies of organizational commitment, the period between
the two waves of research on dual allegiance or dual commitment has seen at
least two other streams of research develop that appear clearly relevant to
the issue. One such research domain is role conflict (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn,
relevant form of role conflict in the present context would appear to be
interrole conflict, in which an individual simultaneously occupies two or
more roles that may make incompatible demands; the roles of union member
and organization member are an example. Lieberman’s (1956) famous study
of attitude shifts illustrated how group membership can affect attitudes and
values and in particular how such values differ between union and manage-
ment identifications. He studied individuals as they changed their primary
roles, moving back and forth between being workers and either union stew-
ards or foremen.

The other stream of research involves a distinction between cosmopoli-
tans and locals. This concept concerns the dilemmas facing professionals
whose values and loyalties to organizations and professions sometimes col-
lide (Gouldner, 1957; Miller & Wager, 1971). In a classic study of the occupa-
tion of personnel manager, Ritzer and Trice (1969) illustrated that the issue
of dual allegiance is not limited to labor-management relations, but also
clearly applies to organizational versus occupational commitments.

Gouldner (1957) and other early researchers saw cosmopolitanism and
localism as decidedly zero-sum. Cosmopolitanism and localism appeared to
be antithetical; strong attachment to a profession precluded attachment to an
organization and vice versa. However, more recent research has suggested
that an either-or choice is not inherent in these orientations. Ritzer and Trice
(1969) found personnel managers to be committed to both their occupation
and their employing organizations “and only slightly more to their occu-
pation” (1969: 33). Miller and Wager (1971) held that the two orientations
need not be mutually exclusive when the expectations and role demands of
profession and organization remain congruent—if, for example, an organiza-
tion does not demand behavior contrary to professional norms. Accordingly,
cosmopolitanism and localism need not be viewed as incompatible. Rather,
they may coexist, contingent perhaps upon the extent to which individuals
can avoid choice dilemmas or fundamental role conflicts.

These two concepts, role conflict and cosmopolitanism versus localism,
are obviously relevant to the study of labor-management relations to the
extent that unions and employing organizations force members to choose
between incompatible values or make incompatible behavioral demands.
There is substantial evidence that various union-management interfaces dif-
fer systematically with respect to how compatible or incompatible the per-
ceived orientations of the two parties are. Scholars have long held that they
can characterize labor-management relations by the relative amounts of ambient conflict or cooperation that reside in the two parties’ orientations toward one another. This background condition has been called attitudinal climate (Chalmers, Chandler, McQuitty, Stagner, Wray, & Derber, 1954), models of labor management relations (Harbison & Coleman, 1951), or, perhaps most commonly, labor-management relationship patterns (Walton & McKersie, 1965). Whatever the terminology, the underlying idea has been quite consistent. As labor and management interact in a given setting over time, each develops a somewhat stable frame of reference regarding the orientations of the other party; in effect, this frame of reference describes where the fundamental relationship lies along a cooperation-conflict continuum. Within such frames of reference the parties engage in sensemaking behaviors—interpreting the meanings of otherwise ambiguous events and making attributions (Shaver, 1975) regarding the intentions, motivations, and beliefs that underlie the other party’s actions.

It appears reasonable to expect that, whatever other variables might influence the likelihood of dual commitment, the ambient relationship climate will be a factor. Social-psychological theories of cognitive consistency predict, for example, that individuals who try to be loyal to two conflicting social systems will encounter considerable cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Indeed, both the old and the new research on dual allegiance or dual commitment contain this premise. Gottlieb and Kerr (1950), in their survey of the Buchsbaum Company, concluded that the high correlation between attitudes toward management and toward the union was associated with a 62-year history that was devoid of union-management hostility. Rosen (1954) also suggested that dual allegiance is most likely under circumstances in which no intense role conflict is activated. Furthermore, although Dean (1954) concluded that “there is little . . . that precludes dual loyalty, even where the union-management relationship is antagonistic” (1954: 536), the patterns she reported in her comparison of three plants appeared to indicate that participation in union activities and dual allegiance were more apt to occur together in the plant whose climate she designated cooperative than in the plants whose relationships were characterized by conflict. Her observation suggests that the intensity of members’ personal involvement in a union might moderate any relationship between dual loyalty and labor-management relationship climate.

In more recent research, Martin (1981), using Walker and Lawler’s (1979) classification scheme, found that dual allegiance was typical of union members in protective unions, and unilateral allegiance was typical in aggressive unions. Fukami and Larson (1982) found a significant correlation between commitment to union and to company \( r = .27, p < .001 \). However, when they partialled out employees’ perceptions of the union-management relationship, the correlation fell to a nonsignificant .06. Gallagher (1984) reported a similar finding; when he controlled for individual perceptions of the quality of the union-management relationship, positive and statistically significant rela-
tionships between union members' organizational commitment and union commitment became nonsignificant.

By and large, the research we have reviewed—particularly the new wave of research—tends to lead to the following conclusions: (1) dual commitment is a relatively common phenomenon—70 percent of Gallagher's (1984) union members were so classified; (2) the ambient labor-management relationship climate might explain much of the variance in dual commitment. However, both the old and the new studies have been vulnerable to certain response artifacts. It has been the norm to assess dual commitment by counting the numbers of people whose attitudes were positive toward both union and management. Furthermore, in each of the studies reported earlier in this paper, both the commitment measures and the judgments of the quality of the overall union-management relationship derived from the same self-reports. Thus, yea-saying response bias could inflate both the extent of dual commitment per se and observed covariation in measures of relationship climate and commitment.

Overcoming such artifacts necessitates deriving a direct measure of dual commitment. It also requires using independent sources to measure: (1) labor-management relationship climate, and (2) employee commitments. Providing an opportunity for variance to occur in a relationship-climate measure mandates conducting a study across several independent units or organizations rather than in a single organization that would theoretically have a single climate.

The research reported here investigated the relationships between ambient labor-management relationship climates and both dual and separate member commitments to employing organizations and unions. In addition, we assessed the moderating influence of member participation in union activities on this relationship. We included this aspect in view of Dean's (1954) observation that dual loyalty and active participation in union activities tended to co-occur where an overall relationship was relatively cooperative.

Hypotheses were as follows:

**Hypothesis 1:** Relatively high levels of dual commitment will occur in organizations whose ambient labor-management relationship climates are relatively cooperative.

**Hypothesis 2:** The relative level of members participation in their unions' activities will moderate the relationship between climate and dual commitment. This relationship will be stronger under conditions of high member participation than under low participation.

In addition to investigating the hypothesized relationships, an exploratory analysis investigated the covariance between the labor-management relationship climate and sole commitments to organization or union. However, we established no directional hypotheses concerning sole commitments. Although observers often note that conflict with an out-group polarizes in-group members and increases their cohesiveness, in this instance the
members in question were not members of one system alone but were attached to both groups. Thus our treatment remained exploratory.

METHODS

Setting and Participants

This research was part of a larger study of labor-management relations and organizational performance in 28 separate municipal bus companies in the western United States. We gained access to each organization by corresponding with its general manager. We obtained access to union members through separate negotiations with the leadership of the appropriate unions.

Teams of two researchers made two-day long visits to sites in the summer of 1977. We administered separate-form questionnaires to: (1) transit organization managers who were involved in union-management relations; (2) their opposite-number labor leaders; and (3) rank-and-file employees who were members of the bus drivers' bargaining unit. As we were able to administer the rank-and-file questionnaires in only 22 of the 28 organizations, the organizational N for purposes of this article is 22.

With the number of bus drivers employed serving as an indicator, organizations varied in size from 13 to 4,940, with a median size of 58. When maintenance personnel, who were normally in the drivers' bargaining unit and thus included in the survey, are taken into account, median organization size was 69.

Eighteen of the organizations were unionized, 11 in transit unions and seven in general unions; drivers in the remaining four were represented in collective bargaining by local employee associations that were functional equivalents of unions. Although only 12 of the organizations had union shops and three others were agency shops, 85 percent of the respondents to the rank-and-file survey were members of unions or associations. During their most recent rounds of negotiations, strike votes had occurred in eight of the organizations and the membership had supported strikes in seven; however, only one organization had seen an actual strike.

Respondents either hand-delivered their anonymous completed questionnaires to us or mailed them in prepaid mailer envelopes. Response rates and usable response Ns were 84 percent (N=67) for managers, 73 percent (N=57) for labor leaders, and 64 percent (N=1,244) for rank-and-file employees. Only members of the union or employee association in each organization answered questions on dual and union commitment. This reduced the rank-and-file N for analyses involving union commitment or dual commitment to 1,057.

Bus drivers accounted for 89 percent of the rank-and-file sample; 6 percent were driver supervisors or bus maintenance personnel; the remaining 5 percent were clerical and related personnel. Rank-and-file respondents were 82 percent men, 74 percent white, 14 percent black, and 10 percent Hispanic. Mean age was about 38, with 28 percent younger than 30 and 18 percent older than 50. Eighteen percent had worked less than two years in their
present organizations, and 30 percent had been employed there longer than five years.

Measures

Each question in the scales listed in this section had a 7-point Likert agree/disagree format. We incorporated scales as appropriate in questionnaires administered to transit managers, labor leaders, and rank-and-file employees. The Appendix contains all items for these scales, except for the Organizational Commitment Questionnaire, which has been fully described elsewhere (Mowday et al., 1979).

Manager and Labor Leader Questionnaires

Labor-management relationship climate. The ambient labor-management relationship climate for each organization was measured by a 23-item scale. We adapted most of the items from the University of Michigan Organizational Assessment Package (Institute for Social Research, 1975). Parallel forms were developed so that each side responded to questions about their perceptions of their opposite numbers. Reliabilities for the scales (α) were .92 for managers and .95 for labor leaders.

Employee Questionnaire

Dual commitment. A 5-item Likert scale measured dual commitments to employing organizations and to unions or employee associations (α = .71).

Commitment to organization. The 15-item Organizational Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ) (Mowday et al., 1979) measured rank-and-file employees' commitments to their employing organizations (α = .89).

Commitment to union. A 4-item scale measured members' commitments to unions or employee associations (α = .76).

Union participation. We asked union or association members eight yes or no questions regarding participation in various union activities in order to derive their relative levels of union participation. Each employee's union participation score was a simple sum of yes answers.

Analysis

Including several separate organizations in the research and employing separate questionnaires for managers, labor leaders, and rank-and-file union members enabled use of independent data sources for measuring independent and dependent variables. We assessed labor-management relationship climates by means of the managers' and union leaders' questionnaires. Dual commitment, sole commitments to union or employing organization, and union participation were measured through questionnaires administered to the rank-and-file. This approach eliminated the problem of single-source contamination of independent and dependent variables for all analyses except those relating union participation to commitment.

Administration of transit-manager questionnaires was limited to general managers and other managers who had been directly involved in labor-
management relations. We gave the labor-leader questionnaires to their counterparts on the union side. Accordingly, the measure of each organization's ambient labor-management relationship climate derived from reports of persons best able to make that assessment. This procedure resulted in our obtaining from 4 to 11 usable returns per organization.

To derive scores for labor-management relationship climate for each organization, we first aggregated the scores within each organization for (1) labor-leaders and (2) managers. We then assigned the mean of these two scores as an organization's score on labor-management relationship climate. All rank-and-file members then received one of 22 climate scores that were based on the consensus of the labor leaders and managers from their own organizations.

Constructing organization-level variables by aggregating individual perceptions is problematic, but under the right conditions this approach can yield valid indices of organizational properties (Lincoln & Zeitz, 1980). In order to justify our assigning a single climate score to each organization, we considered it essential that there be high degrees of interrater agreement within each organization. In particular, union and management sources should report highly similar perceptions of the labor-management climate at given locations. Historically, however, the evidence for such consensus has been mixed. Rim and Mannheim (1964) found a significant correlation ($r = .30, p < .05$) between selected labor-management attitudes of general managers and union representatives. But Stagner, Chalmers, and Derber (1958) concluded from the Illini City data that relationships above the level of the rank-and-file are too complex to permit consensus regarding a labor-management relationship climate.

In the present research, the Pearson product-moment correlation of these pairs of scores for the 22 organizations was .84 ($p < .001$). To ascertain whether this ostensible agreement might have resulted from a washing out of within-group variance through the averaging process, we conducted a one-way analysis of variance across the 22 organizations, with the identities of the organizations involved treated as the categorical variable. The individual scores of all labor and management respondents comprised the dependent variable. The $F$-ratio obtained was 6.25 ($p < .0001$). We repeated this analysis twice: once using only labor leaders' scores, and once using only managers' scores. Again, in each instance, the $F$-ratio was statistically significant ($p < .001$).

Hierarchical regression analysis was performed in order to assess the relationship between the labor-management climate and dual commitment and to test for the moderating influence of union participation. We followed Arnold's (1982) procedural recommendations and used dual commitment as the dependent variable. This procedure was designed not only to measure each independent variable's unique influences on dual commitment, but also to test for the presence of a true moderator variable that altered the form of the relationship between dependent and independent variables. As we had hypothesized that the main effect would be the relationship between
climate and dual commitment, and that union participation would moderate this effect, we entered three independent variables into the regression in the following order: (1) labor-management climate, (2) union participation, and (3) a multiplicative interaction term (climate × participation).

RESULTS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and the intercorrelation matrix for the variables of interest in this research. For the overall sample, the correlation between labor-management relationship climate and dual commitment was .32 (p < .001). Although, not surprisingly, the correlation between union participation and commitment to a union was statistically significant (r = .22, p < .001), the correlations between union participation and dual commitment and between union participation and organizational commitment were approximately zero.

There was no apparent relationship between labor-management relationship climate and recent strike-related activity. The one organization that had experienced a strike was near the median of the labor-management climate rank ordering, and the seven that had voted to strike were distributed nearly evenly across three-quarters of the range of scores.

Figure 1 portrays the overall relationship between labor-management climate and dual commitment. Each data point represents one organization, plotted at its members’ mean level of dual commitment on the ordinate and at the organization’s score for labor-management relationship climate along

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dual commitment</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Union commitment</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,035)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organizational commitment</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,051)</td>
<td>(1,052)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Labor-management relationship</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>climate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,057)</td>
<td>(1,056)</td>
<td>(1,205)(^b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Union participation</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,038)</td>
<td>(1,027)</td>
<td>(1,076)</td>
<td>(1,098)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Figures below each correlation coefficient in parentheses indicate N for the correlation.

\(^b\) Organizational commitment measure included employees who were not union members.

\(^c\) Mean and s.d. are based on 1205 cases, each of which was assigned one of 22 possible labor-management climate scores. These scores were derived from 155 responses of managers and labor leaders; the mean of that distribution was 4.48, with a standard deviation of 1.10.

\(\ast p<.05\)

\(\ast\ast p<.01\)

\(\ast\ast\ast p<.001\)
the abscissa. The correlation between dual commitment and climate, with organizations as the units of analysis, is .73 (p < .001).

Table 2 summarizes the results of the moderated regression analysis. The labor-management relationship climate explains about 10.3 percent of the variance in dual commitment (p < .001). When union participation is entered next, there is virtually no change in $R^2$ and the $F$-to-enter is a nonsignificant 0.1. Finally, when the interaction term, climate $\times$ participation, is entered, explained variance climbs to 13.4 percent (p < .001). Thus, union participation appears to meet the test of a true moderator variable; it accounts for a significant increment in variance explained in interaction with the designated independent variable, labor-management relationship climate (Arnold, 1982).
TABLE 2
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Testing the Moderating Effect of Union Participation on Dual Commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps/Variables Entered</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>( F^a )</th>
<th>( p )</th>
<th>( R^2 ) Change</th>
<th>Cumulative ( R^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Labor-management relationship climate</td>
<td>.535</td>
<td>118.4</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participation</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interaction term ((1 \times 2))</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( F \) to enter or remove.

The effect of the interaction term, which had a positive regression coefficient, was to amplify the relationship between the labor-management relationship climate and dual commitment; the relationship covaried with activity. To illustrate this effect, we performed extreme-groups regressions for subsamples one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the mean for union participation. Whereas the regression coefficient for climate on dual commitment had been .535 for the entire sample, it increased to .603 for the high-participation subgroup and decreased to .446 for the low-participation subgroup.

Because there were large variations in organizations' sizes, we were concerned that either the labor-management relationship climate or its relationship with dual commitment might somehow be a function of size. However, the Pearson correlation between size and labor-management climate was only -.03 (n.s.). Furthermore, the Pearson correlation between dual commitment and the labor-management relationship climate \( (r = .32) \) was not changed by partialling out organization size.

In order to illustrate the monotonic nature of the relationship between the labor-management relationship climate and dual commitment, a subsidiary analysis was conducted. We divided the sample of organizations into subgroups and performed a one-way analysis of variance with dual commitment as the dependent variable. For this purpose we arbitrarily selected five climate categories, though the point could be illustrated with fewer or more categories.\(^2\) We partitioned the rank-and-file sample into categories by dividing it at the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th percentile points of the distribution for labor-management relationship climate.

Table 3 illustrates the results of that analysis. Dual commitment was strongest in organizations and bargaining units that coexisted in the most cooperative relationship climate and weakest in the least cooperative climate, with a nearly linear progression in between. However, only two of the four intercell contrasts were statistically significant.

\(^2\) Walton and McKersie's (1965) well-known scheme contains five categories, although we make no claim that our subgroups accurately reflect their classifications.
TABLE 3
ANOVA Results: Dual Commitment and Sole Commitments to Union and Management with Labor-Management Relationship Climate as the Categorical Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Category (N =)¹⁾b</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Cell Contrasts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual commitment</td>
<td>1 (142)</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>30.72 ³***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (333)</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>1–2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (321)</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>2–3**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 ( 32)</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>3–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (229)</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>4–5*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>1 (159)</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>11.74 ³***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commitment</td>
<td>2 (374)</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>1–2*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (347)</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>2–3***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 ( 34)</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>3–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (266)</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>4–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union commitment</td>
<td>1 (145)</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>8.60 ³***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (335)</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>1–2***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (317)</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>2–3***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 ( 28)</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>3–4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (230)</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>4–5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁾ Labor-management relationship climate, the categorical variable, was divided into 5 categories at the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles. The most cooperative climate is category 1 and the least cooperative is category 5.

*b Union commitment and dual commitment Ns include only union members; organizational commitment N includes all rank-and-file employees.

*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001

Table 3 also contains equivalent one-way analyses of variance of organizational commitment and union commitment across the same five categories of labor-management relationship patterns. Although commitment to employing organizations followed a pattern similar to that of dual commitment, there was a slight departure from monotonicity in one cell. In the case of union commitment, a sharp departure from monotonicity occurred, with the extreme groups showing nearly identical levels of commitment to unions. Whereas dual commitment had shared 10.2 percent common variance with the labor-management relationship pattern, common variance was only 3.6 percent for organizational commitment and less than 1 percent for union commitment. We performed no moderated regression analyses for these two independent variables because the analyses were exploratory; interpretation of any significant interaction effect is legitimate only where there has been an a priori theory suggesting such an effect (Arnold, 1982).
DISCUSSION

Using independent measures of labor-management relationship climate and dual commitment, this study confirmed that the extent of dual commitment expressed by rank-and-file members is related to the ambient relationship between labor and management within their organizations. The likelihood of simultaneous commitment to two interacting systems such as a union and an employing organization appears to grow where the relationship between the systems is cooperative. Although this finding is both intuitively reasonable and congruent with some of the earlier research cited in this paper, we are unaware of any other research on this topic in which data have so thoroughly supported theory.

The finding of a significant interaction between the quality of a union-management relationship and the extent of members' union participation is consistent with our fundamental argument. We stated that simultaneous commitment to two social systems is problematic to the extent that those systems are not cooperative and may force members to make either-or choices. To review the basic premise, we posited that an ambient relationship climate would establish the extent to which members would face choice dilemmas in forming loyalty attachments to the two systems. Yet it has long been known that people are imperfectly rational and can often compartmentalize their logic so as to hold simultaneously incompatible opinions (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1976). That is, they may be able to do so until they must confront inherent incompatibilities. The effect of member participation, then, is to make any existing incompatibility salient and thus to amplify the fundamental effect of climate on dual commitment. In effect, where two systems tend toward the low-cooperation end of the labor-management climate continuum, the inherent choice dilemma is most salient to union activists.

In combination, these two variables—labor-management relationship climate and union participation—seem to go a long way toward clarifying the mixed findings of earlier research on dual allegiance that failed to resolve the question of whether workers can be loyal to both their employing organizations and their unions. Perhaps earlier researchers were asking the wrong question. A more appropriate question might be, "What are the factors that enhance or decrease the likelihood that workers will develop dual commitment?" The research reported here has provided at least a partial response to that question by implicating labor-management relationship climate and member participation in union affairs as factors that influence the extent of dual commitments.

Some methodological observations are in order. We admit that measuring an organizational attribute by aggregating self-reported data from members, as we did to create the variable for labor-management relationship climate, is controversial. Indeed, the study of organizational climate has endured much debate as to whether there is any such thing as an organizational climate (James & Jones, 1974; Schneider, 1975). The criticism is essentially that
researchers using survey methods have simply combined disparate perceptions into fallacious averages.

In this instance, however, we are confident that our measure of the labor-management relationship climate represents a meaningful attribute of each organization, not a spurious consensus. The scale's reliabilities were themselves high. Moreover, the high correlation between the perceptions of managers and their labor counterparts indicated that labor and management appeared to see ambient labor-management relationship climates in much the same way. One-way analyses of variance showed that within-organization variance on perceptions of climate was relatively low when compared to between-organization variance. Moreover, the uniformly strong relationships between these managers and labor leaders' perceptions of climate and the commitment levels of other members of the same organizations add further evidence that labor-management relationship climates, as measured in this study, have real meaning. In sum, we believe that the data justify our treating labor-management relationship climate as an organizational attribute.

Regarding causality, cross-sectional research of this type obviously cannot establish whether ambient labor-management relationship climates actually result in varying levels of dual commitment or whether other factors codetermine climates and commitments. We believe a logical case can be made that role dilemmas imposed by membership in conflicting systems must necessitate a loyalty choice between adversaries. However, it remains to more elaborate, perhaps longitudinal, designs to have the final say.

Assuming the correctness of the causal relationship identified in the preceding discussion, we see these findings as having important implications for both labor and management, especially in light of current contextual developments. Deregulation of heavily unionized sectors—airlines, trucking—and increasing internationalization of competitive markets are two examples of such developments. Adapting to these changes will increasingly require both parties to make strategic choices about appropriate mixes of conflict and cooperation in their relations. This research suggests that both substantive strategies concerning extent of conflict or cooperation and unions' processes for implementing them will bear on members' subsequent attachments to unions and to employing organizations. These attachments are, in turn, of consequence because of their relationships to organizational performance. For example, previous research has shown that decertification is more likely for unions where dual commitment is low (Angle & Perry, 1984). Leadership efforts to improve a climate, rather than to hold firmly to an adversarial position, would appear to be the only rational strategic choice, particularly when the survival of one or both parties is problematic and members' loyalties are essential. Although this implication from the research is somewhat speculative, it is ripe for additional study.

Dual commitment to unions and employing organizations has been studied only in the context of ongoing labor-management relationships. It may be equally or more important in relation to union efforts to organize new employers. The labor movement's current organizing difficulties give some
credibility to this view. Employees’ perceptions that labor is too adversarial are among the causes to which these difficulties have been traced. Employees’ tolerances for role dilemmas imposed by membership in conflicting systems and their expectations about the likelihood of encountering such dilemmas influence their votes in union representation elections. A no-union vote may reflect employees’ preferring to avoid the problem of divided loyalties. Again, if this conjecture is correct, it implies that it will be necessary for unions to change their adversarial images and to develop cooperation-oriented strategies.

Bakke (1946) delivered the message that unions and management share a superordinate goal of mutual survival. As Whyte (1949) pointed out, labor unions and their management counterparts comprise “two social systems made up of highly interdependent parts . . . one is mutually dependent upon the other” (1949:13). In a similar vein, Drucker (1949) predicted that management and unions might someday destroy each other unless they could establish conditions under which their shared members could be loyal to one without having to abandon loyalty to the other. We believe that the data reported here substantiate the views of these eminent scholars.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX
Scales and Included Items

Labor-management relationship climate, managers' form
In general:
1. The union is reasonable in dealing with management.
2. The union weakens employee discipline.\textsuperscript{b}
3. The union will give in to management when management is right.
4. The union deals openly with management.
5. The union abuses its power.\textsuperscript{b}
6. The union tries to cooperate with management.
7. The union doesn’t understand management’s problems.\textsuperscript{b}
8. Management’s relations with the union are satisfactory.
9. The union and management are natural enemies.\textsuperscript{b}
10. In this organization, relations with the union are better than they used to be.
11. I expect a strike at this organization within the coming year.\textsuperscript{b}
12. There are many rules which tend to dictate the settlement reached on specific issues.\textsuperscript{c}

In negotiations:
13. The union uses pressure tactics.\textsuperscript{b}
14. The union and management are hostile toward each other.\textsuperscript{b}
15. The union makes concessions to avoid problems.
16. The union won’t listen to new ideas.\textsuperscript{b}
17. The union and management share most information.
18. The union won’t give in on anything unless they are forced.\textsuperscript{b}
19. Both sides are willing to try new solutions.
20. The union and management work together to try to find creative solutions to problems.

In dealing with grievances:
21. The union tries to understand management’s side.
22. The union uses pressure tactics.\textsuperscript{b}
23. The union is more interested in supporting its members than in “what is right.”\textsuperscript{b}
24. Management shares relevant information with the union.\textsuperscript{c}
25. The union shares all relevant information with management.

Labor-management relationship climate, union form

The union form was an adaptation of the management form. We reworded 24 of the items in a straightforward manner so that union leaders could indicate their perceptions of management. Example: Management is reasonable in dealing with the union. For item 2, however, simple rewording was not feasible. The item was rewritten as: Management tries to interfere in union matters.\textsuperscript{b}

Union commitment
1. I am loyal to the union.
2. I talk up this union to my friends as a great union to belong to.
3. I find it hard to agree with my union’s policies.\textsuperscript{b}
4. I don’t care if the union survives.\textsuperscript{b}

Dual commitment
1. It is easy to be loyal to both the union and management.
2. The management makes it easy to conduct union business.
3. The management makes it difficult for me to talk to my group representative or job steward.\textsuperscript{b}
4. You can’t be a union member and support management at the same time.\textsuperscript{b}
5. The union helps me deal effectively with management.
6. Union members don’t like it if you try to help management improve work effectiveness.\textsuperscript{c}
Union participation
Are you currently serving, or during the last five years, have you served in any of the following union offices?
1. Local president, secretary, treasurer, etc.
2. Local steward or group representative.
3. Local member of a committee.
4. District elected official.
5. District appointed committee.
6. Did you vote in the last union election?
7. Have you read the union contract?
8. Do you read the union newsletter?
9. Have you filed a grievance in the past two years?

*Adapted from the University of Michigan Organizational Assessment Package.*
*Reverse-scored item.*
*Item deleted from scale to maximize reliability.*

**Harold L. Angle** is Associate Professor of Strategic Management and Organization in the School of Management, University of Minnesota. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of California, Irvine. His current research interests include attachment to work and work organizations, psychological contracts, and organizational innovation.

**James L. Perry** is Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University. He received his Ph.D. degree from the Maxwell School, Syracuse University. His current research interests include organizational structure and performance in the public sector.
Dual Commitment and Labor-Management Relationship Climates
Harold L. Angle; James L. Perry
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4273%28198603%2929%3A1%3C31%3ADCALRC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

References

Notes on the Concept of Commitment
Howard S. Becker
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9602%28196007%2966%3A1%3C32%3ANOTCOC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U

Review: [Untitled]
Reviewed Work(s):
Prediction of Organizational Behavior by Norman Frederiksen; Ollie Jensen; Albert E. Beaton; Bruce Bloxom
Paul C. Buchanan
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28197406%2919%3A2%3C287%3APOOB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0

Union Activity and Dual Loyalty
Lois R. Dean
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0019-7939%28195407%297%3A4%3C526%3AUAADL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E
Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles
Alvin W. Gouldner
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28195712%292%3A3C281%3ACALTAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X

Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change
Herbert C. Kelman
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0027%28195803%292%3A1%3C51%3ACIAITP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

Organizational Properties from Aggregate Data: Separating Individual and Structural Effects
James R. Lincoln; Gerald Zeitz
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28198006%2945%3A391%3AOPFADS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

Adult Socialization, Organizational Structure, and Role Orientations
George A. Miller; L. Wesley Wager
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28197106%2916%3A2%151%3AOSOSAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0

Role Conflict and Ambiguity in Complex Organizations
John R. Rizzo; Robert J. House; Sidney I. Lirtzman
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28197006%2915%3A2%150%3ARCAIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U

Assessing Personal, Role, and Organizational Predictors of Managerial Commitment
John M. Stevens; Janice M. Beyer; Harrison M. Trice
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-4273%28197809%2921%3A3%3C380%3AAPRAOP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V