Beyond the Racial State

Rethinking Nazi Germany

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Racial Discourse, Nazi Violence, and the Limits of the Racial State Model

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It seems obvious that the Nazi regime was a racial state. The Nazis spoke a great deal about racial purity and racial difference. They identified racial enemies and murdered them. They devoted considerable attention to the health of their own “race,” offering significant incentives for marriage and reproduction of desirable Aryans, and eliminating undesirable groups. While some forms of population eugenics were common in the interwar period, the sheer range of Nazi initiatives, coupled with the Nazis’ willingness to kill citizens they deemed physically or mentally substandard, was unique. “Racial state” seems not only a powerful shorthand for a regime that prioritized racial-biological imperatives but also above all a pithy and plausible explanatory model, establishing a strong causal link between racial thinking, on the one hand, and murderous population policy and genocide, on the other.

There is nothing wrong with attaching “racial state” as a descriptive label to the Nazi regime. It successfully connotes a regime that both spoke a great deal about race and acted in the name of race. It enables us to see the links between a broad set of different population measures, some positively discriminatory, some murderously eliminatory. It reminds us how strongly the Nazis believed that maximizing national power depended on managing the health and quality of the population. The problem lies rather with “racial state” as an explanatory category that provides the key to Nazi actions and their appeal.

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This essay seeks to sketch the broad contours of an argument that race thinking, while pervasive, was not as coherent, distinct, or purposeful as the model suggests; the roots of Nazi thought were far too eclectic to be subsumed under the label of biological racism. Second, it argues that, even when more loosely defined, racism does not explain Nazi violence. The sources of the Nazis' inclination and capacity for massive violence lay elsewhere. As part of this argument, this essay challenges the idea that a distinctively racial (as against, say, ethnically inflected nationalist) ideology was the primary cement binding the population to the regime or the force that unleashed popular energy.

In offering an introductory survey of these themes, this essay has two goals. It seeks to capture important elements of discourse and policy in the Third Reich, and to question on a more general level the distinction between a racial state, on the one hand, and the radical nationalist policing and elimination of difference, on the other. It believes that racial discourse has a more distinctive and determinative political and social role when it is not merely adding an edge to radical nationalism but has the primary function of maintaining societal inequality, as in, say, the Jim Crow South or apartheid regimes. It is because of the legacy of that function that “race” continues to be such a powerful analytical tool in North American academia. By contrast, Nazi racial policy aimed to reinforce the unity and exclusivity of the German people. The Nazis did not want to create an endurably segregated society by racial classification. “Others” would be present only as a temporary expedient. Even when they conquered new territory and thus engaged in what might look like a colonial endeavor, they in fact aimed at Germanizing land through settlement and expelling or eliminating the original occupants. The language of race accompanied the Nazis' domestic and expansionary policies, but those policies resemble closely the radical nationalist pursuit of unity and world power by (biopolitically minded) regimes that did not primarily speak the language of race. Where Nazi policies were distinctive, as in the Holocaust, it is not clear that racial ideas account for the difference.

Given the limited space available here, this essay can make only a few first moves toward teasing apart the strings holding the racial state model together. After some preliminary observations about language, the first three sections discuss the content of race-thinking before and during Nazi rule. They show that Nazi racial ideology was far more heterogeneous and far less rooted in (pseudo-)scientific knowledge about race than we have been wont to assume. The essay turns first to the character of racial science and racial hygiene; then to the cultural assumptions that continued to blur the boundaries between racial, ethnic, and national thinking; and finally to the peculiar characteristics of Nazi anti-Semitism, which cannot be subsumed under the idea of race. It then moves to consider another central idea that competed with, and often sat uneasily alongside, race in Nazi discourse, namely the idea of the Volk. That idea, the framing and connotations of which cannot be reduced to an ideology of race, was critical for the Nazis' ability to mobilize their following. The final section takes a more comparative and more functional approach, considering the Nazi state in relation to other “racial states” and other modern genocides, and identifying a diffuse ethnic nationalism as the common core ideology of ethnic cleansing and genocides.

RACE TO REIFICATION

If it is true, as is argued here, that in recent years we have overemphasized the strength and cohesion of past discourse and ideologies of race, this is the paradoxical result of our lack of belief in them. From our twenty-first century perspective, biological racial theory is so obviously based on bogus assumptions that we find it difficult to make sense of past generations who believed in it. Our difficulty is compounded in the Nazi case by the regime's utterly murderous actions in the name of this chimera. It is not surprising that after the war, European intellectuals rapidly moved to disavow the whole apparatus of race-thinking. Eugenics virtually disappeared from the intellectual and political scene. The Nazis' pursuit of racial policies was consigned to a chamber of horrors and seen as the product of Hitler's own manic obsessions — obsessions that were tragically translated into action by cadres mesmerized by the Führer or opportunistically pursuing their own careers. In the 1980s, however, the rediscovery that many experts and scientists had been centrally involved in race and eugenic thinking on both sides of the Atlantic meant that racial politics could no longer be consigned to the fantasies of a Hitler or a Himmler. Shocked by this new knowledge but even more doubtful of any real substance to biological race thinking, we switched from marginalizing a crazy coterie of cranks to emphasizing the disturbing wrong-headedness of an intellectual generation, foregrounding the sincerity and intellectual coherence of a much larger body of experts and power holders. But in doing so, we refined racial language and lost sight of its flexibility, heterogeneity, multifunctionality, and instrumental character.

In the conversation between English language and German scholarship on Nazi policy, this problem of determining race's reality has been exacerbated by two problems of translation: Volk as used in interwar Germany has connotations that are not immediately transparent in the English
“people”; “race” as used now in English-language scholarship no longer easily translates to Rasse. Richard Evans’ magisterial survey of Nazi Germany, for example, translates the title of the Nazi newspaper as the “Racial Observer.” We can see why the translator went there: there’s something about Völkischer Beobachter that “The People’s Observer” doesn’t catch. “Racial Observer” reminds us that the Nazis did not accept everyone as part of the people’s community and that völkisch conveyed both representation and program, both being of the people and advocating a particular definition of who belonged to the people. But in the translation to “racial” something has flipped; the national-popular-element has gone, and with it crucial elements of what gave the Third Reich its cohesion and élan. In a small way, this renaming reflects some of the conceptual costs of the racial state paradigm, which lie above all in the obscuring of the popular, the national, and the social by the biological.  

By contrast, contemporary Anglo-American use of race blunts our ability to analyze race’s coherence as a biological theory and its difference from other taxonomies of human difference. When David Theo Goldberg, for instance, dubs all modern states racial states, this does not imply that all states are run by people who believe in race as a biological category or that all states preside over societies whose subjects have that belief. It does not even imply a claim about discourse in such cases, that is, that all states are run by people who use the term “race” or that explicit talk about race is present in the societies over which they preside. Goldberg is instead making a claim about the state’s central involvement in generating or reproducing difference on the basis of national origins, religion, or ethnicity; for Goldberg and for analysts of the contemporary United States such as Michael Omi and Howard Winant, these differences of origin and communal identity are seen as having played a central role in shaping the character of the state itself. They use race as a catch-all phrase to capture all of them.

This flexible usage of race can be useful in the North American context because it highlights awareness of the continuing reality of inequality even when the overt terminology or legal framework of race has gone. But as a category of analysis, race in this modern sense cannot clearly establish the distinctive character and implications of, say, religious difference as against tension between groups of different national origins, by contrast with more biological views of different groups of people. In relation to interpreting the Nazi state it thus elides key distinctions, above all the question of whether Nazi eliminatory violence arises from a coherent and particular set of racial theories as against, say, resentments against other national minorities or hatred of other religious groups. Moreover, if every state is a racial state, the term loses any explanatory value for the Nazis’ distinctive violence. In fact, as will be argued below, when considered comparatively, race performed such a different function for Nazi Germany than, say, for the US that we wonder whether the racial state provides a useful and apt explanatory model to understand the Third Reich at all.

**RACE SCIENCES**

Recent research has demonstrated the striking degree to which racial science enjoyed acceptance both inside and outside Germany in the early part of the twentieth century. A broad array of scientific experts talked of race as a biological fact. It is clear that it will not do to discount this simply as bogus science, even if it was based on assumptions that are no longer tenable. For one thing, much that was discussed under the heading of race connected with the growing knowledge of and interest in genetic inheritance. Unaware of the disastrous potential implications, contemporaries perhaps understandably believed that genetic selection would provide the key to engineering healthier populations in the future. Starting with its 1910 edition, the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s entry for “Civilization” declared that the future of humanity would probably be ruled by the “biological improvement of the race” and by man applying “whatever laws of heredity he knows or may acquire in the interests of his own species, as he has long applied them in the case of domesticated animals.” Unsurprisingly, this text was quietly deleted from the 1945 edition.

In Germany, eugenics, often practiced under the title of Rassenhygiene, was advocated by many who hoped to protect the health and enhance the quality of the German race or races. Yet even here, as Richard Wetzell’s piece in this volume argues at much greater length, we will not find easy foundations for the Nazi project. For one thing, when racial biology was given what has been dubbed its “second chance” at scientific status as a result of developments in evolutionary biology at the end of the nineteenth century — some of the classic assumptions that had characterized biological racism’s earlier incarnations were no longer tenable. For example, empirical observation of variety within species and, above all, Mendel’s observations that a variety of genes might present in any given case against a backdrop of underlying potentiality overturned the platonic notion that races had a simple and characteristic appearance. As Pascal Grosse notes elsewhere in this volume, racial experts were increasingly of the view that establishing descent was the
The “racial” in “racial hygiene” also often did not refer to a distinctive German race but was the term used by scientists to describe the given population whose genetic pool was subject to study and policy (the Vitalrasse) or sometimes humanity as a whole, as in the Encyclopedia Britannica entry cited above. In that sense, race was a bio-buzz word that did not necessarily imply a hierarchical ranking of different human races. Moreover, serious scientists who did believe in the notion of discrete races argued that modern societies were characterized by complex racial mixtures, and indeed many scientists thought that mixtures were the source of social health. This was true even of the founder of Rassenhygiene, Alfred Ploetz, and certainly of an important research figure in the Third Reich, Eugen Fischer. (Fischer did however believe that it was harmful to interbreed races that were too far apart.)

André Pichot has found similarly that of the thousands of articles published in the four major German anthropological periodicals between 1890 and 1914, there are only six on the subject of Jews—five written by Jews and the sixth a critique of anti-Semitism. This does not mean that there were not anti-Semitic subtexts. In the Weimar era, racial scientists sometimes trimmed their sails to the prevailing demands of Weimar funding bodies; hence Eugen Fischer’s support for a 1930 proposal to change the Berlin Racial Hygiene Society’s name to Eugenics Society. So the absence of overt anti-Semitism or anthropological racism in the 1920s is not always a reliable guide to underlying beliefs. Even so, it is significant that while Fritz Lenz praised Hitler’s program in Ploetz’s Archiv in 1931, “he was embarrassed by Hitler’s racial antisemitism which he blamed on pseudo-scientific ideologies such as Chamberlain and Frisch.”

Paul Weindling has demonstrated the complex and ambivalent relationship between the Nazis and eugenicists and racial scientists that resulted. As Richard Wettell reminds us in this volume, shortly after the Nazis assumed power, even Eugen Fischer ridiculed current expressions of racial anti-Semitism, a fact that almost cost him his position as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. Perhaps even more striking, by the time the Nazis came to power, serious racial scientists had discarded the notion of an Aryan race.

Thus the key protagonists of racial hygiene stood at some remove from many of the popular claims made by the Nazis, and the Nazis themselves held extraordinarily varied views on race. Populist ideologues were influential, such as Hans F. K. Günther, whose two volumes Humanitas and Platon als Hüter des Lebens could be found on many bookshelves. Günther offered up an aesthetic image of racial purity that racial scientists had largely discarded. In the hands of a “Rassengünther” or a Rosenberg, race became almost a spiritual quality. It certainly mattered, however, that Fischer, Lenz, and others actively supported the new regime and opportunistically embraced its rhetoric. From one point of view, they were, in Benno Müller Hill’s words, “useful idiots”; from another, they were canny and unprincipled opportunists. Despite his earlier criticism of racial anti-Semitism, Fischer was willing to provide hundreds of expert racial opinions on individuals’ Jewish descent in race-related court cases. Arguably the most sinister cooperation between science and the regime lay in scientists’ use of living or dead tissue taken from victims of Nazi murder policy. This ruthless discounting of the rights of others could be based on a notion of differential racial quality, but it did not need to be. It simply depended on the acceptance that the state had made some lives dispensable and put them at the researchers’ disposal. And as Christopher Hutton has shown, once the Jewish question had been largely “solved” within Germany through deportation and murder, racial scientists lost interest in much of the anthropological racism they had opportunistically embraced in the early years of Nazi rule.

In other words, Nazi ideas and policy were not driven forward by a concerted and coherent body of knowledge that was understood as racial science. Indeed, as Herwig Czech shows elsewhere in this volume, Nazi euthanasia was not tied to contemporary notions of genetic conditions; instead, it was above all those who were unable to work who were murdered. This was a form of lethal biopolitics to be sure, prioritizing collective needs over individual rights, but it was at most loosely legitimated by contemporary understanding of race. The paradigm of a racial state thus does not explain these policies.

**RACE CULTURE**

Since race is not a mere word, but an organic living thing, it follows as a matter of course that it never remains stationary; it is ennobled or it degenerates, it develops in this or that direction and lets this or that quality decay. This is a law of all individual life. But the firm national union is the surest way to protect against going astray; it signifies common memory, common hope, common intellectual nourishment; it fixes firmly the existing bond of blood and impels us to make it ever closer.

Houston Stewart Chamberlain
Like the previous one, this section is principally concerned with the ideas that helped give energy and momentum to the Nazi project. If the previous section argued that the science of race as it developed in the early twentieth century was not particularly helpful for the Nazis, this one argues that their language of race was as much about performing nation as turning biological knowledge into action. In *The Origins of Nazi Violence*, Enzo Traverso, echoing Roger Chartier's dictum that the French Revolution had invented the Enlightenment, argues that Auschwitz "invented" anti-Semitism. Auschwitz had conferred "the appearance of a coherent, cumulative, and linear process on a body of discourse and practices that, before Nazism, had been perceived in the various European countries as discordant, heterogeneous and in many cases decidedly archaic." An analogous line of argument could be made that Auschwitz or, more broadly, Nazi racial laws and practice "invented" our view of biological racism. In the short term, the Nazis made overt racism utterly unrespectable in Western Europe and allowed much of its prewar perversiveness to disappear from view. Yet when scholars began to knit this web of knowledge back together in the 1980s, it was easy to overemphasize the coherence of contemporary expert knowledge and forget just how diffuse, multifaceted, and rhetorical race-thinking had been. It is remarkable, in fact, just how far even many of the influential classics of racial thought were from what we would see as a narrowly biological approach – indeed, how the very historical function they ascribed to race often mitigated against a narrowly biological understanding of its character and formation, and blurred into notions of national culture.

The distinction between ethnic (as pertaining to different cultural groups) and biological ways of understanding difference was made in English only in 1935, and "ethnicity" as a noun was coined only in 1950. Julian Huxley's explicitly cultural deployment of the adjective "ethnic" in 1935 was in response to what he saw as the Nazi biologization of the race concept. To that extent, Huxley affirms the idea that the Nazis were departing from common ground and advocating a distinctively biological concept of race. Yet the fact remains that in the discourse of the day that provided Nazi Germany with its vocabulary and plausibility, the language of race did not connote by definition a repudiation of cultural notions of ethnicity, even if ideas of blood were present too. British interwar discourse was full of pronouncements like that of Arthur Keith, president of the Royal Anthropological Institute, who in 1919 linked a strongly racial view to the cultural proposition that, in the case of Britain, "statesmanship has succeeded in raising up in the minds of all the inhabitants of the British Isles – all save a greater part of Ireland – a new and wider sense of nationality, a spirit of British nationality."28

To be sure, German discourse about race differed from its British counterpart. Yet classic German racial texts often emphasized culture over biology every bit as much as Arthur Keith had. Eugen Dühring, in some senses the father of racial anti-Semitism, had anything but a clearly defined concept of race. As Shulamit Volkov has pointed out, he used the terms people, nation, race, and culture interchangeably. *Judenhaftigkeit* was deployed to refer to non-Jews behaving like Jews; those "Jewish" in style and conduct but not in race were, according to Dühring, just as abhorrent as Jews. Dühring was in any case a marginal figure – but that is a point about the history of anti-Semitism to which I must return. As indicated by the quotation with which this section opens, Houston Stewart Chamberlain saw races as constantly changing. The Germanic world, or *Germanenwelt*, was for Chamberlain absolutely not a clearly delineated tribe or grouping. In forging that world, two elements were at work: "social processes" and "ideas." The Germans had not defeated the French by being the true Germanic people; their victory had made them such. In the words of Christian Geulen, this was "a kind of Renanian plebiscite: the 'assertion' of race through the deeds of the nation." The key task for the nation-state was precisely to give the race an enduring self-consciousness.

If the term "ethnicity" emerged in the English language to wrest culture away from race's shoulders only in 1950, it is equally noteworthy that the concept of sociology entered the German language in the context of racial theory via Ludwig Gumplowicz's *Der Kassenkampf: Soziologische Untersuchungen* (1883). For Gumplowicz, race could not be purely an anthropological concept but also had a historical dimension. "Race as a unit has emerged in the course of history through social development. Its origins lie in the world of the spirit (language, religion, ethics, law, culture, etc.) and only then does race find its way to the powerful physical forces, the veritable glue, the unity of blood, that holds it together." Here again, just as for Keith and for Chamberlain, race was the product of long years of collective interaction via religion and language; here again, the state and politics had a key role in cementing ethnic consciousness.

Many historians, while conceding the plasticity of race-speak for the pre-World War I period, have identified a change in the interwar years. The cauldron of war, defeat, and postwar chaos served to melt, reforge, and rework Wilhelmine discourse and politics. Though the German
student movement, to take just one example, was already characterized by mounting anti-Semitism in the prewar period, its stance on German descent rapidly hardened thereafter. Two strands of völkisch nationalism initially competed within the new Deutsche Hochschulring; it was the more biological wing, with its unrelenting belief in the incompatibility of Germans and Jews, that won out in the end. As Ulrich Herbert and Michael Wildt have shown, this intellectual climate created a body of like-minded figures that would help to police the racial state in the 1930s. Werner Best, after all, was one of the Hochschulring's hard men.

Yet this transformation, vital as it was, is not quite what it seems. For one thing, most members of the völkisch movement eschewed or downgraded the language of Rasse. There was, according to Herbert, a widely shared awareness that science and anthropology had not come up with any convincing evidence for the existence of races. This awareness was to persist and in part to deepen in the 1930s as intensive research failed to deliver the goods. The language of race could still be heard, but often in the shadows of the discourse of Volk and völkisch. Völkisch was an interesting term because it simultaneously presented itself as the mere adjectival counterpart to the given entity, the Volk, and yet knew itself to be much more than that. It contained a specific set of assumptions and values challenging Weimar's state form, the inclusive character of its citizenship, the postwar borders, and the primacy of representational democracy as a way of establishing national will. In other words, its power lay in its ability to carry the national with it even while adding exclusions and political emphases. It was a power that vastly exceeded the language of race.

What is important about this process is, moreover, the particular national and international political constellation that gave the emphasis on the Volk its meaning. Völkisch ideology was a clarion call for a patriotism that stayed loyal to Germandom while rejecting the responsibility of loyalty to the new Reich authorities. To be völkisch meant to be anti-Versailles and anti-Weimar. Ernst von Salomon captured the subtle separation of völkisch nationalism from the existing national framework in a 1929 article for the NS Monatsshefte:

Yes we were patriotic, and it seemed to us self-evident to be so.

Until even we began to make fun of such grand notions as “Fatherland” and “loyalty to the Kaiser. Until even we – and we above all – turned away from the banner-carrying and drum-beating, from the hero’s courage and the field of honor … By then the word “Fatherland” had taken on a deeper meaning for us, by then we sensed that it belonged to us, and to us only. But

As this quotation implies, what it was to be völkisch was defined as much in competition with other groups within Germany – the competition between Germans and true Germans – as it was distinguishing between what was German and what was foreign. Völkisch nationalism, seemingly the language of national unity, was in fact the language of political conflict. It is within that context that we should understand the unseemly scramble among the student corporations to fly the völkisch flag and prove themselves more German than the next – a scramble that, as Michael Wildt has shown, had only one target. One could establish a claim to true Germandom, as against the mere superficial citizenship identity of Weimar, by calling for the exclusion of one, and only one, group. That group was the Jews. I want to return later to anti-Semitism’s defining place, which far more than in the pre-World War I period became the touchstone differentiating the völkisch from the Volk. But even ignoring that for a moment, it is clear that, rather than biological thinking driving the debate, biological racism was the kind of demonstrable hard-edge – the cultural code, in fact – for laying claim to true nationalism. Both Volk and Rasse were narratives of origins, as Alon Confino has argued, but the foregrounding of Volk showed that what was at stake was establishing true nationalism. The acceptance of biological language reflected a belief less in the proven biological character of race than in the performative value of demanding purity in order to demonstrate one’s national credentials. And, as noted above, the idea that making this kind of demand would strengthen national consciousness in fact fitted well with the surprisingly culturalistic account of the state’s role in creating race that was offered by theorists of the stamp of Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

The vehement assertion of biological difference thus often reflected in the first instance less a deep-seated belief in race science than confidence in the binding and strengthening power for the Volksgemeinschaft of enforcing and policing ethnic exclusion. It is hard, of course, always to distinguish the bioracial speech act made from straightforward belief in race’s power from the one made, or assented to, because of belief in the cultural efficacy of bioracial language and enforcement. Yet something of the latter can be found in Claudia Koonz’s account of the early years of Nazi Germany, as intellectuals and officials made sense of the new regime. When Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick proposed an ambitious program to evaluate “our Volkskörper according to its genetic value,” he did so explicitly “as one dimension of a comprehensive moral revolution that would revive communal values.” A memorandum from Frick's
subordinate, Arthur Güt, operates on similar terrain, if adding a spiritual dimension: “A person practicing racial hygiene and racial science is religious, and a religious person must practice racial hygiene and strive towards ennobling his race.”44 Indeed, the remarkable lack of consensus in the Ministry of Interior over the simplest terminological or scientific racial questions makes the participants look utterly unprincipled unless we ascribe to them belief in the cultural value of biopolitics. This helps too to explain Justice Minister Gütter’s emphasis on the importance of not moving too fast for the people. At stake was less the resistance that a nonconsensual race policy might engender than the basic point that one of race policy’s prime functions was to cement the national spirit.

ANTI-SEMITISM, RACE, AND PEOPLE

For many Germans in the pre- and post-World War I period – and indeed for large parts of the völkisch movement, including large sections of the Nazi party – the issue of racial purity of ethnic homogeneity was reducible to a single relationship: Germans and Jews. For Weimar’s right, the defining issue in discussions of the Volksgemeinschaft was who did not belong to it, and the answer was first and foremost: the Jews. The term “Volksgemeinschaft” surfaces in Hitler’s rhetoric for the first time in his speech “Why we are anti-Semites.”45 Yet if Jews figured heavily in thinking about Volk and Rasse, neither before nor during the Third Reich could anti-Semitism itself be reduced to the question of race. In the late nineteenth century, as Peter Pulzer has observed, “Historians of racism tend to yield to the temptation of overestimating its importance in the general development of anti-Semitism, simply because it was such a central component of National Socialism and the Shoah.”46 Avowedly racial anti-Semites such as Dühring, as we have seen, had shown anything but a clearly biological understanding of race. Moreover, they were far from the mainstream in a broad cultural movement that combined nationalist, Christian, and more narrowly economic components.47

True enough, racial anti-Semitism grew in significance as movements such as the Pan-German League radicalized during the war. Concepts from colonial racial policy were self-consciously applied to Jews, as would be evident in the Nazi policies against Jewish Mischlinge.48 The furor about the “black shame” on the Rhine would spill over into right-wing protests against mixed marriages between Aryans and Jews.49 Racialized black caricatures in advertising and popular culture helped to prepare the way for the racialized images of Jews that circulated in the 1920s.50 Yet despite these racist trappings, important though they were, the immediate postwar constellation makes us question whether the Jewish question can really be designated a racial one.51 War, revolution, and postwar treaties together contrived to produce a dramatic confluence of Jewish issues just as new political identities were being formed in Germany’s postwar crisis. So much came together. The strains of war exacerbated tensions against the outsider, while the shortages in many cities added bitterness against the speculator.52 The huge exodus of Jews from Russia before and during the war, coupled with the unfamiliar image of Eastern European refugees in every European capital, produced in the postwar world a sense of global Jewry as never before.53 The wartime competition between London and Berlin for Russian Jewish support had, among other things, helped give rise to the Balfour Declaration. After the war, Jews were nominally the beneficiaries of the minority rights elements in the postwar treaties, toothless though they often really were.54 All this reinforced the view that Jews had become a global force capable of manipulating international policy. The overrepresentation of Jewish leaders among the left-wing revolutionary movements lent credence and color to the idea of Jews as fomenters of internal sedition. The visibility, global character, and intersection with class conflict (with Jews cast now as capitalist, now as revolutionary leaders) of the Jewish question was thus remarkable. Brigitte Hamann concluded that it was not prewar Vienna but postwar Munich that made Hitler’s anti-Semitism existential.55 The striking global prevalence of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in the aftermath of World War I shows how distinctive this epochal moment was. In the second half of the 1920s, true enough, conditions changed. Global anti-Semitism subsided, at least until the slump hit hard. But by then, political movements had been forged for which the Jewish question was central.

Of crucial importance in Germany was not just Jewish hypervisibility but the distinctive ways in which Jews could be seen as opposed to the nation. Be it in revolutionary St. Petersburg or the Paris of Allied deliberations, Jews appeared to be influential actors wherever there was an international stage that could affect life in Berlin. Zionism’s newfound prominence suggested Jews’ loyalties lay overseas, while success in extracting the Balfour Declaration pointed to their ability to influence foreign Cabinets.56 The resonance from Dearborn to London to Bern to Grahamstown of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion suggests that this discovery of Jewish internationalism was no German invention.57 For the
Nazis and other members of the radical right, another peculiarity of the time reinforced the sense of Jews as the antithesis of the Volksgemeinschaft. The unity of the Volksgemeinschaft sought by the right, after all, was a weapon in, and designed to supersede, the bitter internecine conflict of class war. Jews, uniquely and peculiarly to this moment, could be linked both with wartime profiteering and with international Marxism. For the radical right, to be national was thus to be anti-Semitic in every sense. To be sure, Hitler's explanation for Jewish predilections was couched in racial language. Thanks to their blood, they could do no different. But the power of his j'accuse lay in the ostensible evidence of an organized international conspiracy against the German Volk.

In the racial language after 1933, Jews, as we know, were lumped with many other "parasites" and "bacteria" to be removed from the bloodstream of the body politic. The handicapped were sterilized, the asocials and other misfits interned and segregated, and Sinti and Roma became subject to their own "Nuremberg Laws" and brutal harassments. But already in the boycott campaign in April 1933 and with increasing vehemence in the second half of the 1930s, the Jewish danger was construed differently from the others. The danger was less one of substandard individuals threatening the health of the Volk than of an international conspiracy, one now with its capital in Moscow, now operating through intermediaries in London and Washington. Initially, this fantasized international web of Jewish power gave the Nazis reason to be somewhat cautious in the Jewish question. As Hitler grew more confident and allowed the assault on the Jews to mount, so the perceived reasons for linking Jews to foreign enemies strengthened too. There was, of course, an element of self-fulfilling prophecy about this, as influential Jews in London, Washington, and Hollywood did indeed - though often with little result - urge their governments to be aware of the German threat. It is striking how little energy the Nazis expended in the 1930s on imagining international conspiracy on the part of any expatriate groups on German soil. The country embraced a surge in foreign tourism with seemingly no anxiety that spies were sneaking from the Black Forest to Berlin. It was only Jews who inspired paranoia about links between inner insurgency and outer international machinations. Though the language continued to be racial, the real core of the argument was that Jews constituted an insidious foreign power.

It may well be argued that Hitler's anti-Semitism had still deeper roots. Saul Friedländer famously highlighted Nazi anti-Semitism's distinctively redemptive character. Philippe Burrin has recently cogently emphasized the inherited power of Christian anti-Semitism, though here fused with the idea of national defense and racism. The transmogrification of an older Christian Manichean image is plausible. Alon Confine has shown how early and clearly the Nazis imagined a world without Jews, and how many older cultural tropes were refashioned and deployed in the Nazis' violent practices in the 1930s. Race-thinking provided some kind of formal language to describe this religious group's prescriptive ills (though with the previous section of this essay in mind, the ascription of enduring evil fitted poorly with racial theorists' emphasis on racial evolution - a contradiction already present in Chamberlain's own writings.) Yet, as Richard Steigmann-Gall reminds us, there were widely held doubts about whether the Jews really were a race. Jews were attacked as an organized conspiracy, a transnational community that threatened the integrity of the nation.

THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNITY

"The enduring popularity of the Nazis rested on the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft, the people's community. It was not a Nazi idea and it was not perceived as something imposed or something strange." Thus Peter Fritzsche, who notes, too, that many of the Nazis' achievements were cherished by Germans who did not identify with Nazis. The heart of the Nazis' appeal, and the reason they could be construed as being a "dictatorship by acclamation" (Zustimmungsdiktatur), lay in the ethically inflected national community they invoked. Space prevents me from doing justice to this issue, and this section can do little more than pencil in the briefest of points. National community meant in the first instance dissolving class divisions in the balm of nation (and crushing the communists with its hammer). In 1933, national unity meant the triumph of order over the threat of Bolshevism. It meant surmounting the party divisions of a faltering democracy and establishing strong unified leadership. It meant finding common purpose to overcome the ravages of the depression. It meant bringing youthful energy and traditional values together.

To be sure, this pride went hand in hand in many people's minds with some kind of downgrading of Jews' place. Even on this point, though, the evidence is contradictory. A case can be made that anti-Semitism played a relatively limited role in the Nazis' electoral success before 1933. The Nazis were also more than disappointed with the resonance of their April boycott. It is true that the imagined people's community was an ethnic
one, in that the sense of Germaness reached beyond the boundaries of
the existing nation-state and excluded some current citizens — above all
the Jews. Yet much of the pride was old-fashioned pride in the nation-
state, its order, its resurgence, its growing international prestige. National
unity, national strength, and national revival were key. More than almost
any other event in these years, the power of Potsdam Day and May Day
speaks through the diaries Fritzche examines in his study of the popular
appeal of Nazism.79

The evidence of how responsive Germans were to racial grooming
following the Nazi seizure of power is contradictory. Where Nazis
reinforced existing prejudices — as in attacks on asocials, Sinti and Roma,
homosexuals — they did well. In other areas, the regime was less convinc­
ing. As Claudia Koonz reminds us, because of public concern, the Nazis
rapidly learned to suppress the statistics regarding forced sterilization.
Save for those of some youngsters at school and Hitler Youth, the diaries
Fritzche uses are often not very revealing here, whereas their responses
on national triumphs are unambiguous. National spectacle and foreign
policy success continued to touch the hearts of even those alienated from
the regime. The German-Jewish patriot and passionate Zionist Willy
Cohn, who was murdered in Kovno in 1941, noted in his diary on March
14, 1938:

You have to admire the forceful way all this was accomplished. It is going to be
difficult for the Jews heavily concentrated in Vienna who were — as so often —
backing the wrong horse and convinced that a union with the clerics' party
[Klerikalen] would bring them salvation ... Perhaps we Jews in Germany should
not join in this welling up of national emotion, but one does so nevertheless, and
anyone with feelings for his country can relate to this!

He added, "We Jews should be just as unified."71

In any case, whatever successes the Nazis had in racial grooming, the
six-year period before the war was not long enough to change hearts and
minds. When war broke out, security, power, and prestige were again the
dominant emotions, with popular responses oscillating between fear of
war, relief at success, and pride in grandeur. Again, despite exhaustive
new studies, a surprising lack of clarity and agreement remains about the
degree to which Germans bought into the Holocaust.72 There is no doubt
that the population knew of atrocities and feared reprisals. To that extent,
as Nicholas Stargardt argues in his contribution to this volume, percep­
tions of national survival became linked to the Jewish question. Yet this
implied the acceptance less of a racial concept than of the political idea of

international Jewish power. No doubt fear of this international force was
magnified for many by inner unease at the knowledge of having so
excluded other nations’ interests from the national vision.

RACIAL STATES, NATION-STATES, AND GENOCIDE

It is noteworthy that the first attempt to describe the “racial state” in
relation to Nazi rule did not believe Nazi Germany itself qualified for
this title. Gerhard Jacoby’s Racial State, published in 1944, was about the
“Protectorate” Germany established in the Czech lands, not about the
Third Reich per se.73 As Jacob Robinson explained in the foreword, it
was the Protectorate that constituted the first racial state because it was
there that for the first time three stable racial classes were created and
administered by the state. Nazi Germany itself was not a racial state
because it had so rapidly sidelined and expelled its tiny Jewish
population and thus did not preside over a racially divided society.

Robinson, of course, suffered from the myopia of his age: describing
Nazi-ruled Bohemia and Moravia as the first racial state meant com­
pletely disregarding European colonial rule!74 But he does lead us to an
important insight: that Nazi Germany lacked an element normally inte­
gral to definitions of a racial state, namely, the administration of a racially
stratified society.

For many racial theorists, such as Gobineau, Gustav Klemm, or the
sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz, modern European states were “racial”
in that they owed their origins or development to racial struggles.75 More
common now are definitions that assume states are “racial” when they
administer, and interact with, racially stratified societies. Thus David
Goldberg’s comparative study The Racial State and also recent scholar­
ship by Moon-Kie Jung, Michael Omi, and Howard Wynant characteriz­
ing the United States as a racial state.76 All of these authors take the
existence of races (or of social groups that are the legacies of race­
thinking) for granted; the racial state presides over and interacts with this
stratified or conflicted society. It might be argued that Burleigh and
Wippermann are talking about such a relationship between state and
society in its infancy. The “races” were not yet there, but they were being
created by the state out of the preexisting clay of religions and classes. In
fact, however, the Nazis were clearly not tolerant of multiple races. Jews
and Gypsies were being stigmatized and demarcated as the prelude to
exclusion. Foreign forced labor was disciplined and regulated during the
war as the price for the unpleasing and temporary fact that it needed to be
employed on German home soil. Even in imperial zones to the east, the more seriously the Nazis envisaged German population settlement, the more provisional became the right of non-Germans to live there.

This underlying intolerance of racial difference alerts us in turn to an important distinction in race's relationship to nation. We have become very aware over the past few decades that racial "knowledge" and ideology was transnational, and that metropolitan societies drew from and deposited ideas in the "colonial archive." But we have perhaps not always remembered that race's function varied quite markedly. In many contexts, racism performed the function of social stratification, often buttressing massive economic inequality, including slavery; in others, it emerged as an effort to capture the quintessence of national identity. In the context of social stratification, race served to enforce the rules of unequal coexistence; as hyper-nationalist ideology, it marked the boundaries of the national community and was always in that sense a secondary attribute to nation. This distinction between socially stratifying racism and nationally demarcating racism does not equate to the difference between domestic and international conflict. The dividing line of racial social stratification could be global, as in the global color-line, but it did not run along national boundaries. By the same token, the national line of identity - as between "Germans" and "Jews" - could exist within the boundaries of the state if, as in the German case, the line of exclusion was being drawn between those who had "true" national identity and those "aliens" who had somehow managed to be citizens.

The distinction I am drawing here is similar in some respects to Pierre-André Taguieff's notions of hétéroracisation and autoracisation. Taguieff sees the search for exclusivity that characterizes the latter as the extreme form of racism. The ethnoracism of national exclusiveness is, however, very often far less brutal and destructive than the oppressive, segregating violence of an apartheid system. Taguieff may well be right that, of the two, it is the racism seeking to achieve national exclusivity that is more likely to result in ethnic cleansing and genocide. But as Mark Levene and others have shown, this is because of a goal of national exclusivity that can be equally lethal in the absence of biological or racial language (e.g., in the many cases of lethal violence targeting minorities who differ from the mainstream in both ethnicity and religion, such as the Turks' targeting of the Armenians), and not because of the specific dictates of the racial-biological, or indeed of any explicitly racial language. We will return to this in a moment.

Seen with these distinctions in mind, Nazi Germany's outlook was ironically as much a symptom of Germany's "post-racial" condition as it was that of a racial state. Until the end of World War I, Germany had been a participant in the European domination of the world and, as a latecomer to the world scene, keenly conscious of sharing in white superiority. In 1918, however, it was kicked out of the colonial system. As Hitler's thinking about world power concretized, it became clear, as Gerhard Wolf writes in this volume, that Nazi rule would not in fact tolerate the coexistence of races that had characterized the major colonial empires, albeit under unequal and segregated conditions. Instead, a new kind of national land-settlement policy and ethnic Flurbereinigung (reordering) was to be the Bodenpolitik (territorial policy) of the future.

The Nazis were not seeking to recreate a racially stratified society. The reader who has accepted the difference posited here between nationally demarcating and socially stratifying racism might nevertheless argue that Nazi Germany should still be seen as a racial state because its racialized construction of German national identity was an essential prerequisite of its murderous policies. We have already raised doubts that the lethal nature of Nazi anti-Semitism can really be designated as racial. But the widely shared view that it took the Nazi biological vision to perpetrate the Holocaust can be tackled on a more general level too. For Zygmunt Bauman, the Holocaust was unthinkable without the confluence of three modern forces usually flowing in different riverbeds: race thinking, medical thinking, and an engineering approach to society. The argument is powerful, as is the claim that it took the racial component to make anti-Semitism so murderous. It is striking when we look more closely at Bauman's argument, though, that the issue of Nazism's relationship to other genocides, which did not necessarily involve race-thinking, is fudged. "No doubt the Holocaust was another episode in the long series of attempted mass murders and the not much shorter series of accomplished ones," he writes: "It also bore features that it did not share with any of the past cases of genocide. It is these features which deserve special attention. They had a distinct modern flavor. Their presence suggests that modernity contributed to the Holocaust more directly than through its own weakness and ineptitude."

Despite his avowed commitment to comparison, Baumann quickly buries the issue under a comparison between the Holocaust and its "alleged pre-modern equivalents." Bauman makes the Holocaust thus stand out as the "modern" case without explicitly making the comparison with other recent genocides.
In fact, as Michael Mann, Norman Naimark, Donald Bloxham, Mark Levene, and others have shown, in the modern era murderous population policies were often pursued by nations thinking nationally, without any very clear biologization of their identity beyond, perhaps, some strong narrative of descent. The Turks pursued the Armenians with a religious-cultural sense of their separateness and malevolence. This antagonism had long been reinforced by the great powers' pro-Christian diplomatic maneuverings, which had turned minorities such as the Armenians into an excuse for encroaching on the sovereign prerogatives of the Ottoman Sultanate. Now it was exacerbated by wartime worries that the Armenians represented a fifth column. The mass killings in the Balkans before and after World War I saw similar religious-cultural-ethnic identities at stake. For Michael Mann, who looks at Armenia and Nazi Germany as well as Rwanda and post-1989 Yugoslavia, if there was a common ideological theme to many of the killings he surveyed, it was a more diffuse kind of organicist nationalism, a nationalism intolerant of difference. Norman Naimark's study of ethnic cleansing begins with some warm but rather careless citations from Bauman but proceeds to describe an eclectic set of ethnicist ideologies and concludes by using the vocabulary of integral nationalism. Donald Bloxham, one of the most careful and historically precise of these authors, shows that that one did not need a racial theory “in order to treat other peoples as collectively dangerous or disposable. As a legitimation for genocide, biological racism is only at the extreme of a continuum of exclusionary beliefs that have the potential to attribute malignant characteristics to all members of another group. Often these exclusionary beliefs constituted the “cultural inheritance of collective identity bequeathed by religion and woven in the modern period into newer forms of political identity, whether extant or desired.” Often, too, the explosions of violence took place in time of war or acute international stress, when ethnic minorities became tainted (often without real justification) by association with the interests and machinations of foreign powers.

Identifying such patterns does not preclude a specific Nazi commitment to biological thinking or deny that the Holocaust still commands a special horror, even when arrayed against the other contestants in this grisly league table. All the authors cited in the previous paragraph recognize features that distinguish the Nazis from other murderous regimes. Mann in particular has difficulty fitting the Holocaust into some of the generic features of his model, notably his observation that the danger zone in ethnic cleansing is reached when two old ethnic groups lay claim to the same state. Yet it must give us pause that biological racism is not necessary for such wholesale ethnocide. It prompts us to look anew at the national-popular roots both of Nazi ideology and of the murderous energy the Nazis mobilized. Moreover, though again there is no space to explore this here, the Nazis’ remarkable propensity for violence, which was evident already in their war with the Communists in the 1920s, and the energy and reach that they brought to their murderous projects, which had to do with their harnessing of the resources of an advanced state and military and their ability to mobilize popular commitment to defending a beleaguered nation, were clearly not a function of racial ideology.

CONCLUSION

For the victims of racial policy, it probably made little difference what the protagonists believed. Whether used performatively, instrumentally, or sincerely, the biological language of race took on a life of its own. Those stamped as of lesser value were left with the puzzle of trying to make sense of ideas and practices that marked them out as less than human. (As we have seen, many of these policies and practices were not founded in any racial doctrine.) For the perpetrators too, believers in “race” were valorized, and others learned to use the code. Yet for us, seeking to understand the advocates and participants, it surely matters that even many leading Nazis remained unsure how sincerely that code was being used. Walter Gross, the head of the Office for Racial Policy, certainly worried about it and suspected that many of the ambitious young physicians applying to his institute to carry out our race projects did not really believe. At a deeper level, he was not sure of the reality of race himself. This is not to belittle the importance of rhetoric and codes, or to return the historiography to the de-ideologized categories of obedience and ambition characteristic of the older intentionalist-functionalist debates. But we do need to think in more complex, differentiated, and performative terms about policies, speech acts, and participatory gestures in Nazi Germany.

Moreover, instead of locating Nazi violence and genocide in a world of early twentieth-century biological knowledge (even of biological knowledge twisted and skewed by the aggressive ambitions of a radical regime in a hurry), we should be thinking of a broader context of violent state projects. This is not to say that this essay is offering a single paradigm to replace the racial state; indeed, it is clear that no single paradigm will capture the different impulses at work in the Third Reich. It inherited radical nationalist ideas of unity and exclusivity that evolved before and
in the aftermath of World War I. As Roberta Pergher has pointed out, the interwar epoch added distinctive ingredients, discrediting conventional imperialism and prompting the Nazis, like their Italian and Japanese counterparts, to reconcile the desires for inner homogeneity and outer growth by pursing a new kind of settler-colonialism-cum-national expansion.94 And, more than any other powerful regime before or since, the Nazis allowed the Jewish question and global Jewry to become the touchstone symbols of internal and external threats and obstacles. In all of this, "race" played rhetorical functions, reinforcing national difference and the rejection of internal and external races within. 

94 From the 1960s to the 1990s, the term "race" was used to describe biological differences between broad population groups. See Charmaine Royal and Georgia Dunston, "Changing the paradigm from 'race' to human genome variation," Nature Genetics 36 (2004), S5-S7.


6 Veronika Lipphardt, "Isolates and crosses in human population genetics: or, a contextualization of German race science," Current Anthropology 53(5S) (2012), S69-S82.

7 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 12th edn., s.v. "civisligatata.

8 Ibid.

9 At times, the two labels Rassenhygiene and Eugenik had distinct connotations, as is clear below in the discussion of Fischer's name-change proposal.

10 Christopher Hutton, Race and the Third Reich: Linguistics, Racial Anthropology and Genetics in the Dialectic of Volk (Cambridge, 2005), 25.


12 Hutton, Race and the Third Reich, 17, 30; Lipphardt, "Isolates and crosses."

13 Weiss, The Nazi Symbiosis, 153; Wulf D. Hund, Rassismus: die soziale Konstruktion natürlicher Ungleichheit (Münster, 1999), 98.

14 Lipphardt, "Isolates and crosses.

15 Hutton, Race and the Third Reich, 30.


Notes

1 This is of course not to deny that today's scientists identify certain genetic differences between broad population groups. See Charmaine Royal and Georgia Dunston, "Changing the paradigm from 'race' to human genome variation," Nature Genetics 36 (2004), S5-S7.


6 Veronika Lipphardt, "Isolates and crosses in human population genetics: or, a contextualization of German race science," Current Anthropology 53(5S) (2012), S69-S82.

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14 Lipphardt, "Isolates and crosses.

15 Hutton, Race and the Third Reich, 30.


39 In addition to Herbert, _Best_, see now Michael Wildt, _Volksgemeinschaft als Selbstvermächtigung: Gewalt gegen Juden in der deutschen Provinz 1919 bis 1939_ (Hamburg, 2007), 65-8.

40 For much of the pre-World War I period, Polish nationalism was probably just as important in shaping approaches to German identity politics. On this, see Rogers Brubaker, _Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany_ (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 126-32; Dieter Gosewinkel, “Citizenship in Germany and France at the turn of the twentieth century: some new observations on an old comparison” in Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski (eds.), _Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany_ (Stanford, 2008), 27-59, particularly 34-5.

41 The reference in this sentence is to Shulamit Volkov, “Anti-Semitism as a cultural code,” _Leo Baeck Institute Year Book_, 23 (1978), 23-45.


43 Koonz, _The Nazi Conscience_, 103.

44 “Wer Rassenhygiene und Rassenkunde treibt, ist religiös und wer Religion hat, muß auch Rassenhygiene treiben und eine Veredlung seiner Rasse anstreben”: quoted from Cornelia Essner, _Die „Nürberger Gesetze“, oder, Die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns 1933-1945_ (Paderborn, 2002), 145. See also Jürgen Matthäus’ chapter in this volume.

45 Wildt, _Volksgemeinschaft_, 64-5.


49 Przyrembel, _Rassenschande_, 62ff.

50 David Ciarlo, _Advertising Empire: Race and Visual Culture in Imperial Germany_ (Cambridge, MA, 2011), 323.


52 Ibid.


56 Fink, _Defending the Rights of Others_, is excellent on this.

57 On the Protocols, see B. W. Segel and Richard S. Levy, _A Lie and a Libel: The History of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion_ (Lincoln, 1995). Dearborn was of course the home of Henry Ford’s _Dearborn Independent_, while the London _Times_ briefly also believed in the forgery. Bern and Grahamstown both saw spectacular trials in which advocates of the genuineness of the Protocols were successfully able to defend their position.

58 Philippe Burrin, _Nazi Anti-Semitism: From Prejudice to the Holocaust_ (New York, 2005), 55.

59 On the growth of foreign tourism, see among others Hans Dieter Schäfer, _Das gespaltene Bewusstsein: über deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit, 1933-1945_ (Munich, 1982).

60 On all this, see now Jeffrey Herf, _The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust_ (Cambridge, MA, 2006).

61 Saul Friedländer, _Nazi Germany and the Jews_ (New York, 1997).

62 Burrin, _Nazi Anti-Semitism_, 46ff.

63 Confino, _A World Without Jews_.


65 Peter Fritzschc, _Life and Death in the Third Reich_ (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 38.


67 See Moritz Föllmer, “The problem of national solidarity in interwar Germany,” _German History_ 23(2) (2005), 202-31. Even more than they espoused the language of the “people’s community” per se, the population welcomed the emphasis on placing the national good above that of the individual (provided of course that they as individuals were doing all right too). On the striking lack of reference to _Volksgemeinschaft_ amid continuing powerful patriotism in German POW conversations, see Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, _Soldaten: Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben_ (Frankfurt, 2011).


69 See the documents in Jürgen Matthäus and Mark Roseman, _Jewish Responses to Persecution, 1933-1946_ (Lanham, 2009).

70 Fritzschc, _Life and Death in the Third Reich_, 44.

71 Translated from Willy Cohn and Norbert Conrads, _Kein Recht, nirgends: Tagbuch vom Untergang des Breslauer Judentums, 1933-1941_ (Cologne, 2006).


75 See Eric Voegelin’s still under-appreciated Rasse und Staat (Tübingen, 1933), 167-81.


80 Here I would part ways with Heide Feihrenbach and Rita Chin’s otherwise admirable attempt to situate Nazi racism in longer-term continuities of German racial thinking. They see parallels between anti-Semitism’s and anti-black racism’s functions as consolidating the nation-state. I do not think this is true of anti-black racism. Being anti-black was about establishing one’s place in society but not in nation. Rita C. K. Chin and Heide Feihrenbach, “Introduction” in Rita C. K. Chin, Heide Feihrenbach, Geoff Eley, and Atina Grossmann (eds.), After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe (Ann Arbor, 2009), 1-29, 11.


82 For a discussion of Taguieff, see Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown, Racism (London, 2003), 85.

83 Mark Levene, The Meaning of Genocide (London, 2005), 204. See also below p.19 [will need to change this cross-reference in page proofs].