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# **China's Status and Influence in the Multilateral Trade System**

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## **中国在多边贸易体制中的地位和影响<sup>1</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> All viewpoints of the paper are those of the author alone and do not represent the stance of the WTO Secretariat.

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### **Abstract**

In December 2001, China joined the WTO and became the 143rd full member. In the last decade, China's international trade developed rapidly and it has consequently become the largest commodity exporter and the second largest importer in the world. Undoubtedly, China's international status has improved significantly. During this period, the pattern of international economy and trade are also undergoing profound changes. The changes of the balance of power between developing and developed countries, new forms of international trade barriers, a large number of bilateral free trade zones as well as some developed countries' rethinking of globalization are all consequences of the rapid rise of China and its interactions with the outside world. Simultaneously, all this contributes to the uncertainty of the future of China's foreign trade.

China's position and influence in the WTO depend not only on China's own development, but also its interrelationship with other countries. So far, China has taken safeguarding the interests of the core areas as a priority in the Doha Round of negotiations, and this negotiation strategy proved to be practical and effective. Since 2008, China has gradually taken a key role in decision-making in Doha Round negotiations, but its composition of influence is unbalanced. Huge market and the scale of imports is still the crucial source of China's influence, and the gap between China and other leading powers is mainly reflected in the soft power, such as agenda-setting capacity in multilateral negotiations, the dispute-solving skills and the power of guiding the public voice and so on. Whether China can exert the power of considerable leadership compatible with its position as a leading trader depends not only on China's political will, but also on its design of path to the multilateral trading system, professional training and the speed with which it enhances its soft power.

In December 2001, after 15 years of hard negotiations, China became a full member of the WTO, its 143rd. Over the past decade, China seized opportunities for development and basically realized initial strategic goals, which built the foundation of long-term development. China obtained permanent MFN treatment by the U.S., relative fair and stable international trading environment and the right to participate in the WTO dispute settlement and rules-making. Above all, the accession to WTO helped dramatically promote domestic reform and open and stimulate the economy.

Then how to see the function and influence of China in this multilateral trade system? Firstly, we should analyze the current situation of China's trade and its international background, which will help to understand China's choice of standpoint in the WTO negotiations and policy development's path.

### **Changes in China's international trade position**

In 2010 China's total exports reached \$ 1.57 trillion, six times of its accession to WTO in 2001, thus China became the world's largest commodity exporter and the second largest importer. Proportion in world trade rose from 4.3% in 2000 to the present 12%. China is the largest trading partner of Japan, Korea, Australia, and Brazil; moreover, the largest importer of least developed countries. In terms of trade

growth rate, in the past 10 years, China commodity trade exports and imports have been increasing at around 20% per year, which is two times that of the world average. With the expansion of economic output and trade's scale, China's status in the WTO significantly improves. Since July 2008, China has become one of the most important members in WTO Doha Round negotiations. We see China's participation in all decision making process, with the international community expecting more from China.

But China's trade development faces many challenges. For example, China is facing a lot of commodity trade protectionist measures. China has faced the most anti-dumping cases for many years. According to WTO data, in 2009, anti-dumping measures against China reached 77. The number of anti-subsidy cases against China was 13, far beyond other nations. In addition, the WTO dispute cases involving China are also growing rapidly. Over the past six years, there were as many as 19 lawsuits. With the growing competitiveness of products, more and more negative reports of China's products, industrial policy, trade policy and exchange rate policy emerged. Thus many developed and developing countries regard China as a hostile competitor to keep an eye on. On Oct. 4 this year, the U.S. Senate passed an act, the "2011 Currency Exchange Rate Surveillance Reform Bill", intending to impose punitive tariffs on imported products which cause the imbalanced exchange rate of the U.S. Obviously it is aimed at China. It is clear that although China has made great development, the sustainability of this kind of growth rate and scale is still uncertain.

Over the past decade, China's economic and trade power have been developing rapidly. At the same time, world trade's environment and pattern is also changing. The most obvious change is reflected in the balance of power between the WTO developed members and developing members.

First, the proportion of trade has changed. From 1990 to 2010, developed countries' proportion of total world trade fell from 75% to 59%, while that of the developing countries increased from 23% to 38%. In 2011, WTO predicted global trade was expected to grow at 5.8%, with 8.5% growth rate in developing countries. China, India, Brazil who represented the developing members continue enhancing the impact in the WTO, and the United States, Europe, Japan and other developed members of the traditional leadership will be challenged. The new balance of power to some extent results in difficulties in global trade governance and decision-making, especially in the Doha Round negotiations. Requirements by major developed countries like taking on more obligations, more open markets aren't uncommon issues while developing countries insist common but differentiated obligations.

Second, the form of trade barriers in international trade has changed. Non-tariff measures like technical standards, the quarantine of animals and plants, rules of origin, anti-dumping and anti-subsidies measures have replaced tariffs and quantitative restrictions to become the most important international trade barriers.

Third, the accelerating development of the bilateral free trade agreements and regional trade integration has become a big challenge of the multilateral trading system. In 1990 the number of effective global free trade arrangements was only 70, while there were 300 in 2010. WTO members have an average of 13 FTA

arrangements. 60% of EU trade and 50% of American trade is with regional or free trade partners. FTA arrangements deal with not only tariffs, but also investments, standards, competition policy, intellectual property, to some extent causing troubles to the Doha Round negotiations on market access and rules.

Fourth, with the extension of the global industrial chain and the refining international division of labor, the identification of products' national origins becomes increasingly blurred. Products are often produced in different countries, how to define the profit in chain of distribution and its effect on national welfare and employment rate has become increasingly difficult and sensitive. In some major developed countries, governments' and public's support for globalization and trade liberalization was dropping and even made the open policy an excuse of the domestic economic downturn, high unemployment rate and lower industrial competitiveness. At the same time, some developing countries did not benefit from globalization, therefore, they questioned the WTO principles of free trade.

According to the above four main reasons, it can be implied that in the last decade sustainable external environment to support the rapid development of China's trade is full of uncertain factors.

### **China's position in the WTO**

The level of China's market opening is higher than most developing countries in the WTO, but China has slowed down the process. After accession to the WTO, China's market access conditions continue to improve. And this is reflected in industrial and agricultural tariffs and the level of service sector. China has the highest degree of market opening among developing members. In some areas, China's tariff level is even lower than some developed members.

In the market access of industrial products, bound tariffs are at a relatively low level. China's current average restrictive level of industrial products is 9%, much lower than other major developing countries and some developed countries such as India, Brazil, Australia and South Korea (see Table I). Second, China's tariffs are more effective which means bound tariffs and applied tariffs are the same. Market access conditions are with high transparency and predictability, which is consistent with the developed countries.

In agricultural tariffs, China has made greater concessions in agricultural trade policy, allowing China's agricultural tariffs lower than the majority. China's average agricultural tariffs decreased from 23.1% in 2001 down to 15.6% in 2009, lower than countries such as Japan and India (Table 2). In addition, China has completely eliminated agricultural export subsidies.

In terms of trade in services, China's GATS schedule covers 93 sub-sectors, open services sectors is higher than average (about 41) in developing countries, closing to the average level of developed members (108).

Although China in the WTO market-opening commitments level (bound tariff level) is much higher than other major developing countries, but some countries lowered tariffs autonomously, the gap of actual degree of market opening with China

is smaller. For example, the average bound tariff ceiling of Indian industrial products was 34.4%, while the actual implementation of the tariff level in 2009 was only 10.1%, meanwhile, Brazil was 14.1%, Australia was 3.8%, Korea was 6.6%, while China's industrial average applied tariff was 8.7%. In addition, although China in recent years has expanded the targeted imports from least developed countries, or has imported irregularly from the United States and Europe. However, China's market access conditions didn't make major changes and release no further laws and regulations of opening up new services. Relative to the stage of fulfilling accession commitments, further opening China's market has slowed down.

In different historical periods, core countries in the GATT and the WTO are different. The United States, European Union, Japan and Canada, then known as the QUAD played a leading role in Uruguay Round (1986-1994). But India and Brazil were spokesmen for developing countries, replacing Canada and Japan, to attend the Seattle conference in 1999 and the mini-ministerial meeting in Postan in 2007. U.S., EU, India and Brazil became the new core in WTO Doha negotiations, the so-called Group of Four (G4). In July 2008, China participated fully in Geneva "Green House" mini-ministerial meeting which involved only seven WTO members (the United States, China, European Union, India, Brazil, Japan and Australia), which indicated that for the first time China was formally admitted into the core group of WTO negotiations. The WTO has thus formed a "Group of Seven" (G7) or the Group of Five (G5, excluding Japan and Australia). We can say that after 10 years of efforts, China's important position in the WTO is widely recognized and China has won the substantive right to speak in making international trade rules.

### **China's influence in the WTO**

Although China has entered WTO core decision-making circles, the influence of composition is imbalanced. The following are the three main factors determining the influence in WTO. First, market size and trade volume; the second is soft power like the experience in the multilateral affairs and negotiation power. Third is the width and depth of participation and determination to exercise.

Firstly, China's growing influence is mainly reflected in the large scale of trade and domestic markets. In WTO negotiations, the larger the import scale of an economy, the greater power of the right to speak. Imports mean importers' demand and dependence on exporters, therefore, market owners have undoubtedly more chips. China's import proportion increased from 3% in 2000 to 9% in 2010, over \$ 1 trillion. China has become the world's second largest single importer following the US. China's current import size is twice that of Japan, 10 times India and Brazil. This is the material foundation to support China's current status in WTO.

Second, the imbalance of China's influence is mainly reflected in the "soft power." The WTO "soft power" includes: leadership in the multilateral negotiations, the ability of appealing and persuasion, agenda-setting and proposal-drafting skills, the ability to resolve the dispute and guide public opinion. For example, if you come up with a proposal, then how many countries will be willing to sign in and support in

the conference and how much of this proposal can be included in the final text of the agreement; also whether you can lead a larger number of countries and organize an interest group to exert its bargain power and so forth. This kind of influence is not necessarily directly connected with trade size, but often the professional skills of the participants. At present, China's number of proposals in the Doha negotiations isn't that big; we lack high-level lawyers in dispute settlement although we have made considerable progress. In terms of soft power, there is still a considerable distance between China and other countries like United States and Europe, India, and Brazil.

Third, China has entered into the core decision-making circles in the Doha Round negotiations, but not yet a leader role. We intend to focus on preserving core interests. China is a staunch supporter of the multilateral trading system, and participates fully in the Doha Round negotiations. But we focused on areas of agriculture, industrial goods, trade in services, and rules-making.

In agriculture, China is a member of the agricultural G20 and G30. We promote the developed countries to slash agricultural subsidies and high tariffs and promote the establishment of the special safeguard mechanism for agriculture in developing countries; in area of rule-making, China supports tightening present anti-dumping rules to prevent abuse; in area of industrial tariff negotiations, China supports the use of the Swiss Formula for tariff reduction, emphasizing a larger gap in equation coefficients between the developed and developing members. Also we adhere to the principle of voluntary participation in tariff concessions, against forcing emerging countries to participate in chemicals, industrial machinery, electronic appliances and other sector negotiations; in the service sector, China in 2003 and 2005, respectively, proposed initial and improved bid and offer, new bid in business services, air ticketing and road passenger transport; in area of trade and environment negotiations, China participated actively in the discussion of environmental goods list, and submitted a joint proposal with India in April this year, emphasizing the impact on environmental products market access for developing countries.

Overall, China takes the safeguarding of its core interests as a priority in the negotiations. China expresses less in negotiations not involving its core interests. And we convey our concern via groups holding similar standpoint. This is different from the independent claims and comprehensive participation of members like the United States, European Union, India and Brazil.

But we should say it's an effective and practical way for China in the Doha Round of negotiations though in different form of expression. This interacts with diplomatic concept and cultural traditions, and some other objective factors, including: first, the commitment level was higher for China when it joined the WTO than for other developing countries, which reduced the space to further concessions in Doha Round. Second, China's accession to WTO and the Doha Round took place both in 2001. In the first five year, China had to not only prepare fully being a full member but also focus on how to fulfill WTO commitments and deal with the impact on the domestic economy aspects. These two tasks brought enormous pressure and challenges to the relevant departments of the Chinese government simultaneously. In the case of limited resources, the Chinese government still focused on fulfilling

commitments until 2006. Third, China required a process of adaptation to accumulate experience in multilateral trade negotiations. After all, we had only 10 years of practical experience compared with 60 years of the United States, Europe, India and Brazil and other major members. We had to learn history of negotiations and internal operations in GATT / WTO ahead of work.

### **China's major challenges in participation in games of WTO**

First, China has become the world's major trading country and an important member of the WTO, the international community expects China to act actively in the multilateral trading system. At the beginning, China's main consideration was the rules and how to obey and adapt to them. Now China has to think more about what kind of international rules is consistent with China's own development, and China's function in the WTO or other strategic problems. Then we need to actively put forward solutions. Other WTO members also want to know our claims on major issues like future development of China, institution building, the reform agenda setting and decision-making and so on.

Second, due to historical, cultural and other reasons, China often does more and says less in international communication. How to effectively improve the transparency of policy and let the international community have a clear and accurate understanding of the goals and direction of Chinese policy, and to objectively evaluate and judge China, is a tough problem to solve. China needs to actively use the media to convey our views and claims on international trade issues, and then improve transparency and to seek the initiative. This played an important role in creating a stable and friendly international environment, improving the strategic mutual trust with other countries and establishing a positive image of the country.

Third, China should speed up talent training process since WTO professionals in China is relatively lacking currently. To a large extent, the negotiation in the WTO is a talent contest. Dealing with trade disputes, as well as negotiating to form new multilateral rules needs professionals to procure national interests through international rules. Trade volume of a country can be caught up in a short time, yet it is a long process for personnel training and reserve, and multilateral accumulation of experience, which is the real gap between the developing and the developed in the WTO. In the future, the competition with other countries will be mainly reflected in the international rule-making power and voice in competition. If China wants to play a leading role in the multilateral arena, a large number of multilateral compound talents are needed. They have to be familiar with international law and international trade rules, have foreign language proficiency, and have practical experience in international negotiations.

### **Conclusion**

The great historical significance of China's accession to the WTO is putting impetus to China's reform and opening to a new height, keeping China's development

closely linked with the world. China already has adequate material basis for more influence in international affairs nowadays. The world is looking forward to China playing a greater positive effect for the multilateral trading system and making solutions to global economic governance. As a great power, China has inescapable historical and international responsibilities.

Table I: comparison of average bound tariff rates and implementation of the tariffs on industrial products of WTO key members

Members of the WTO	Average Bound tariff rates (%)	Average Implementation of tariff rates in 2009 (%)
the U.S	3.3	3.3
EU (27)	4.0	4.0
Japan	2.5	2.5
Canada	5.3	3.5
Australia	11.0	3.8
New Zealand	10.8	2.2
Republic of Korea	10.2	6.6
China	9.2	8.7
India	34.4	10.1
Brazil	30.7	14.1
Indonesia	35.5	6.6
South Africa	15.8	7.5
Mexico	34.9	9.9
Malaysia	14.9	7.6
Argentina	31.8	13
Egypt	27.7	9.2

Source: *WTO Trade Profile 2010*, WTO Secretariat, 2010

Table II: Comparison of average bound tariff rates and implementation of the tariffs on agricultural products of WTO key members

Members of the WTO	Average Bound tariff rates (%)	Average Implementation of tariff rates in 2009 (%)
the U.S	5.2	4.7
EU (27)	13.5	13.5
Japan	22.2	21
Canada	15.4	10.7
Australia	3.4	1.3
New Zealand	5.9	1.4
Republic of Korea	56.1	48.6
China	15.7	15.6
India	113.1	31.8
Brazil	35.4	10.2
Indonesia	47.1	8.4
South Africa	39.5	8.9
Mexico	44.2	22.1
Malaysia	73.0	13.5
Argentina	32.4	10.3
Egypt	95.4	70.7

Source: *WTO Trade Profile 2010*, WTO Secretariat, 2010

## 摘要

2001年12月中国加入世界贸易组织 (WTO), 成为该组织的第143个正式成员。过去十年中, 中国的国际贸易取得的快速发展, 已成为世界上最大的商品出口国和第二大进口国, 国际地位显著提高。在此期间, 国际经济贸易格局也在发生着深刻的变化。发展中国家与发达国家间力量对比的改变、国际贸易壁垒形式的新变化、双边自由贸易区安排大量产生以及部分发达国家对全球化的反思等既是中国快速崛起与外部世界相互作用的产物, 也将构成中国未来贸易发展的不确定性因素。

中国在 WTO 中的地位和影响不仅取决于中国自身的发展, 也体现在和其他国家的相互作用过程中。中国迄今在多哈回合中以维护核心领域的谈判利益作为工作重点, 这种谈判策略被证明是实用和有效的。自 2008 年起中国逐步进入了 WTO 多哈回合谈判的决策核心, 但其影响力的构成并不均衡。巨大的市场和进口规模仍是中国影响力最重要的来源, 中国与其他主要大国的差距则主要体现在软实力要素方面, 如多边谈判中制定议程的能力、争端解决的能力和引导舆论的能力等。未来中国能否在 WTO 中发挥与其贸易地位相当的国际领导力, 不仅取决于中国的政治意愿, 还取决于其对多边贸易体制未来发展路径的设计、专业人才的培养以及软实力水平提升的速度。

2001年12月，经过15年努力谈判，中国成为世贸组织第143个正式成员。过去十年，中国在WTO体制内部，积极抓住发展机遇，最初确立的战略目标基本实现，发展态势良好。中国获得了美国的永久最惠国待遇、相对公平和稳定的国际贸易环境、参与WTO争端解决和规则制订的平等权利。最重要的是，加入WTO极大推动了国内改革开放，使其经济释放出巨大活力。

如何看待中国在多边贸易体制中发挥的作用和影响？首先应分析中国贸易的发展现状和国际贸易大环境的变化特点，这将有助于理解中国在WTO谈判中的立场选择和政策发展轨迹。

## 一、中国国际贸易地位变化的背景

2010年中国出口总额达1.57万亿美元，是2001年刚加入时的六倍，成为世界第一大商品出口国和第二大进口国。在世界贸易中的比重由2000年的4.3%上升到现在的12%。中国不仅是日本、韩国、澳大利亚、巴西等最大的贸易伙伴国，也是进口最不发达国家商品最多的国家。从贸易增速看，过去10年，中国商品贸易出口和进口均以每年20%左右速度增长，是世界平均增速的两倍。随着经济总量和贸易规模的不断扩大，中国在WTO中的地位和影响力也显著提升。自2008年7月起，中国已成为WTO多哈回合谈判最核心成员之一，WTO做出任何重大决策，都有中国的积极参与，国际社会对中国的期待在增加。

但中国贸易发展也面临诸多挑战。例如，中国商品面临大量贸易保护主义措施。中国已连续多年成为WTO被反倾销最多的成员。据WTO统计，2009年针对中国的反倾销措施高达77件。针对中国的反补贴案为13起，也远高于其他国家。此外，涉及中国WTO争端案件也快速增长。过去六年中，中国被诉案件就高达19起。随着产品竞争力的不断增强，国际上对中国产品、产业政策、贸易政策以及汇率政策的负面报道也越来越多，许多发达和发展中国家视中国为竞争对手而加以防范。今年的10月4日，美国国会参议院程序通过“2011年货币汇率监督改革法案”，拟对造成汇率失衡国家的输美产品征收惩罚性关税，矛头直指中国。不难看出，虽然中国贸易取得巨大发展，但增长的速度和规模是否可持续仍有不确定性。

过去十年中，中国经济贸易实力不断增强。与此同时，世界贸易的大环境及格局也在发生变化。最明显的变化体现在WTO中发达成员和发展中成员的力量对比。

首先，贸易比重发生了改变。1990~2010 二十年间，发达国家占世界贸易总量的比重由 75% 下降到 59%；而发展中国家由 23% 增加到 38%。2011 年，WTO 预计全球贸易增长 5.8%，其中发展中国家增速达 8.5%。以中国、印度、巴西为代表的发展中成员在 WTO 中影响增强，而美、欧、日等发达成员的传统领导地位受到挑战。新旧力量的对比在一定程度上造成全球贸易治理决策上的困难，这一点在多哈回合谈判中尤为明显。主要发达国家要求新兴发展中国家承担更多义务，开放更多市场，向发达国家看齐，而发展中国家则坚持共同但有区别的义务。

其次，国际贸易中贸易壁垒的主要形式发生了改变。技术标准、动植物检疫，原产地规则以及反倾销反补贴等非关税措施已经取代关税和数量限制，成为目前国际贸易中最主要的贸易壁垒。

第三，双边自由贸易协定和区域贸易一体化发展进程加速，对多边贸易体系的发展构成挑战。1990 年全球只有 70 个生效的自由贸易安排，2010 年已增至 300 个。平均每个 WTO 成员有 13 个 FTA 安排。欧盟 60% 以上的贸易，美国 50% 的贸易是在区域内或自由贸易安排伙伴国之间展开。自贸区安排不仅涉及关税，还涉及投资、标准、竞争政策、知识产权等规则领域，一定程度上对多哈回合市场准入和规则谈判造成了干扰。

第四，伴随全球产业链延伸，国际分工细化，制造业产品的国别属性日益模糊。一个产品往往在多国进行生产，如何界定产业链各国间的利益分配，以及各国带来的福利和就业影响，变得愈加困难和敏感。一些主要发达国家政府和民众对全球化和贸易自由化支持度降低，甚至将国内经济低迷、高失业率和产业丧失竞争力归咎于贸易开放政策。无独有偶，一些较为落后的发展中国家贸易状况也没有随着全球化的深入而得到改善，他们对 WTO 倡导的自由贸易原则也提出了质疑。

鉴于以上四个主要原因，可以说，过去十年支撑中国贸易快速发展的外部环境是否可持续，存在很多不确定因素。

## 二、中国在 WTO 中的地位

中国的市场开放度高于 WTO 绝大多数发展中国家，但自加入 WTO 以来，中国的市场开放步伐有所放缓。加入 WTO 以来，中国市场准入条件不断改善。从工业品和农产品关税，到服务部门开放水平，中国已成为市场开放度最高的发展中成员之一。在一些领域，中国的关税水平甚至低于一些发达成员。

在工业品市场准入方面，其一表现在约束关税水平较低。中国目前的工业品平均约束水平是 9%，大大低于其他主要发展中国家和部分发达国家，如印度、巴西、澳大利亚和韩国等（见表一）。其二表现在中国关税没有“水分”。即约束关税与实施关税相同，市场准入条件具有较高的透明度和可预见性，这一点与发达国家一致。

在农产品关税方面，中国在农业贸易政策上做出较大让步，从而使得中国农产品关税水平低于多数成员。中国农产品平均实施关税由 2001 年的 23.1% 降至 2009 年的 15.6%，低于日本和印度等国家（见表二）。此外，中国已完全取消农业出口补贴。

在服务贸易方面，中国的服务贸易减让表涵盖 93 个次部门（Sub-sectors），高于发展中国家服务业开放部门的平均水平（约 41 个），接近发达成员的平均水平（108 个）。<sup>1</sup>

尽管中国在 WTO 中的市场开放承诺水平（约束关税水平）远远高于其他主要发展中国家，但一些国家近年来施行自主降税计划，它们的实际市场开放度与中国差距并不大。例如，印度工业品平均约束关税上限为 34.4%，而 2009 年实际实施关税水平只有 10.1%，巴西同期执行的实施关税为 14.1%，澳大利亚为 3.8%，韩国为 6.6%，而同期中国的工业品平均实施关税为 8.7%。<sup>2</sup> 此外，虽然中国近年来有针对性地扩大了从最不发达国家的进口水平，或不定期赴美欧等地进行采购，但中国的市场准入条件并没有出现大的变化，也没有推出关于服务业进一步开放的新法律法规。相对于履行加入承诺的阶段，中国市场进一步开放的步伐有所减缓。

不同历史时期，关贸总协定和 WTO 核心国家有所不同。乌拉圭回合（1986-1994）中发挥引领和主导作用的四个缔约方是美国、欧盟、日本和加拿大，当时被称为 QUAD。而从 1999 年西雅图会议到 2007 年波斯坦小型部长会期间，印度和巴西成为发展中国家代言人，取代了加拿大和日本的地位。美国、欧盟、印度和巴西组成了 WTO 多哈谈判的新核心，即所谓的四国集团（G4）。而到 2008 年 7 月日内瓦小型部长级会议，中国全程参与了仅有七个 WTO 成员（美国、中国、欧盟、印度、巴西、日本和澳大利亚）参加的“绿屋”小范围部长级会议，这标志着中国第一次被正式接纳进入 WTO 核心谈判集团。WTO 也由此形成了以“七国集团”（G7）或五国集团（G5，除日本和澳大利亚外）的新谈判核

<sup>1</sup> 作者根据 WTO 秘书处资料统计。

<sup>2</sup> 数据来源《WTO Trade Profile 2010》。

心圈。可以说，经过 10 年的努力，中国在 WTO 内的重要地位得到广泛认可，中国第一次获得了国际贸易规则制定中实质性的话语权。

### 三、中国在 WTO 中的影响力

虽然中国已进入 WTO 核心决策圈，但影响力构成不平衡。构成 WTO 影响力的主要因素有三点：一是市场规模和贸易量；二是多边经验和谈判实力等软要素；三是参与的广度、深度和行使力量的决心。

首先，中国影响力的提升主要体现在巨大的贸易规模和国内市场。WTO 谈判中，一个经济体的进口规模越大，就越有发言权。进口意味着其它国家对它的需求和依赖，谁拥有市场，谁在谈判中就拥有更多筹码。2000 年中国进口占世界比重为 3%，2010 年上升到 9%，超过 1 万亿美元，成为仅次于美国的世界第二大单一进口国。中国目前的进口规模是日本的近两倍，是印度和巴西的近 10 倍。可以说，这是支撑中国在 WTO 中地位的物质基础。

其次，中国影响力的不平衡主要体现在“软实力”的差距。所谓 WTO “软实力”主要包括：多边谈判中的领导力、号召力、说服力、制定议程的能力、起草提案的能力、解决争端的能力和引导舆论的能力等。例如，你拿出的提案有多少国家愿意联署，有多少国家在大会上支持和呼应，有多少被纳入最后协议文本；你能否领导一群国家，构建一个利益集团并对谈判整体进程产生影响等等。这种影响力并不一定和贸易规模直接挂钩，而往往取决于整个国家的 WTO 参与能力和专业水平。目前来看，中国在多哈谈判中的提案数量还较少；在争端解决方面，近年来虽然取得了长足的进步，但中国高水平 WTO 律师仍然缺乏。在“软实力”方面，中国和美欧、印度、巴西相比还是有一段差距。

第三，中国在多哈回合谈判中虽已进入核心决策圈，但尚未发挥领导力，侧重将确保自身核心利益作为谈判主要目标。中国是多边贸易体制的坚定支持者，并全面参与多哈回合各项谈判。但中国对于谈判领域各有侧重，其谈判重点放在农业、工业品、服务贸易、规则谈判等领域。

在农业领域，中国是农业 20 国集团、农业 33 国集团的主要成员，推动发达国家大幅削减农业补贴和高关税，推动建立发展中国家农业特殊保障机制；在规则谈判领域，中国支持加严现有的反倾销规则，防止滥用；在工业品关税谈判领域，中国支持利用瑞士公式进行关税削减，强调发达成员和发展中成员公式系数保持较大差距。坚持部门关税减让的自愿参与原则，反对迫使新兴发展中国家参

加化工品、工业机械、电子电器等部门的部门谈判(sectoral negotiations); 在服务业领域, 中国于 2003 年和 2005 年分别提出服务业初步出价和改进出价, 在商业服务、航空订票和公路客运等三个部门提出新的出价; 在贸易与环境谈判领域, 中国积极参与环境产品清单的讨论, 今年 4 月与印度提交了一份联合提案, 强调环境产品市场准入对于发展中国家发展的影响。

总体上看, 中国在谈判中以确保自己的核心利益作为工作重点。在不涉及其核心利益的谈判内容则较少独立发表意见, 在立场表述方式上更多地采取参加立场相近国家组成的谈判集团, 通过集体方式表达关注。这与美国、欧盟、印度和巴西全面参与、在几乎所有议题上都提出自己主张的参与方式有所不同。

可以说, 中国在多哈回合谈判中采取的谈判方式是有效和实用的, 但在外在表现形式上与其他贸易大国通常采取的谈判方式有所不同。这既有各国在外交理念、文化传统方面的差异, 但也存在一些客观的因素。主要包括以下几方面: 一是中国加入时承诺水平高于所有发展中国家, 严重压缩了中国在多哈回合的进一步减让空间。二是中国加入 WTO 与多哈回合开始的时间均在 2001 年 12 月, 加入之初的五年, 中国不仅作为正式成员参与新一轮多边贸易谈判, 同时还需要将主要精力放在如何履行 WTO 承诺以及应对加入可能对国内经济造成的冲击方面。这两项工作同时展开给中国政府相关部门带来的压力和挑战巨大。在资源有限的情况下, 直到 2006 年, 中国政府参与 WTO 活动的重点一直都在履行承诺上。三是中国积累多边贸易谈判经验, 熟悉 WTO 运作需要一个适应的过程。毕竟中国加入 WTO 才 10 年, 而美、欧、印度和巴西等主要成员已有 60 年的实践经验, 并全程参与了以往几个回合的谈判, 熟悉 GATT/WTO 的谈判历史和内部运作, 而这却是中国目前所不具备的。

#### **四、中国参与 WTO 运作面临的主要挑战**

首先, 中国已成为世界主要贸易国家和 WTO 重要成员, 国际社会期待中国多边贸易体制中发挥更大的积极作用。最初加入 WTO, 中国主要考虑“规则是什么, 我们应如何遵守和适应规则”。现在中国则更多地思考什么样的国际规则更符合中国的发展需要? 中国到底应该在 WTO 中发挥什么样的作用? 哪些新议题可以成为 WTO 未来工作的重点? 如何提高 WTO 决策的及时性和代表性等带有前瞻性的战略问题。中国需要在战略层面上对这些问题进行深入思考, 并积极提出解决方案。其他 WTO 成员也希望了解中国对 WTO 的未来发展、机构建设、

未来议程设定以及决策机制改革等重大问题的主张。

其次，由于历史、文化等原因，中国在国际交往中往往做的多，说的少。如何有效地提高政策透明度，让国际社会清晰准确地了解中国政策目标和走向，并予以客观评价和判断是中国亟待解决的问题。中国需要积极地利用媒体，通过媒体阐述中国企业界、学术界对重大国际贸易问题的观点和主张，从而提高政策透明度并争取国际话语权。这对于中国营造稳定和友善的国际环境，提高与其他国家的战略互信，树立积极正面的国家形象具有重要的意义。

第三，加速培养和贮备高水平 WTO 专业人才。目前中国这方面人才相对较少。WTO 谈判中各国间的博弈，很大程度上就是各国间人才的较量。无论是处理贸易争端案件，还是新多边规则谈判，都需要专业人员按国际通行规则来争取国家利益。一国贸易量可以在较短时间实现赶超，而人才培养和贮备，以及多边经验的积累则需要一个漫长的过程。这才是发展中国家与发达国家 WTO 实力的真正差距。未来中国与他国竞争将主要体现在国际规则制定权和话语权的竞争。中国如果想在多边舞台发挥引领作用，就必须拥有一大批熟悉国际法、国际贸易法，熟练掌握外语，具有国际谈判实战经验的多边复合型人才。

## 五、结论

加入 WTO 的重大历史意义在于将中国的改革开放推向一个新的高度，将中国发展与世界紧密联系起来。今天中国已具备了在国际事务中发挥更大影响力的物质基础。世界期待中国对多边贸易体制发挥更大的积极作用，对全球经济治理提出自己的解决方案。中国作为大国，负有不可推卸的历史和国际责任。

附表一：WTO 主要成员工业品平均约束关税和实施关税水平对比

WTO 成员	约束关税税率(%)	2009 年平均实施税率 (%)
美国	3.3	3.3
欧盟 (27)	4.0	4.0
日本	2.5	2.5
加拿大	5.3	3.5
澳大利亚	11.0	3.8
新西兰	10.8	2.2
韩国	10.2	6.6
中国	9.2	8.7
印度	34.4	10.1
巴西	30.7	14.1
印度尼西亚	35.5	6.6
南非	15.8	7.5
墨西哥	34.9	9.9
马来西亚	14.9	7.6
阿根廷	31.8	13
埃及	27.7	9.2

资料来源：WTO Trade Profile 2010, WTO Secretariat, 2010.

附表二：WTO 主要成员农产品平均约束关税和实施关税水平对比

WTO 成员	约束关税税率(%)	2009 年平均实施税率 (%)
美国	5.2	4.7
欧盟 (27)	13.5	13.5
日本	22.2	21
加拿大	15.4	10.7
澳大利亚	3.4	1.3
新西兰	5.9	1.4
韩国	56.1	48.6
中国	15.7	15.6
印度	113.1	31.8
巴西	35.4	10.2
印度尼西亚	47.1	8.4
南非	39.5	8.9
墨西哥	44.2	22.1
马来西亚	73.0	13.5
阿根廷	32.4	10.3
埃及	95.4	70.7

资料来源：WTO Trade Profile 2010, WTO Secretariat, 2010.