Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations

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Abstract

Intergroup emotions theory seeks to understand and improve intergroup relations by focusing on the emotions engendered by belonging to, and by deriving identity from, a social group (processes called self-categorization and identification). Intergroup emotions are shaped by the very different ways in which members of different groups see group-relevant objects and events. These emotions come, with time and repetition, to be part and parcel of group membership itself. Once evoked, specific intergroup emotions direct and regulate specific intergroup behaviors. This approach has implications for theories of emotion as well as of intergroup relations. Because intergroup emotions derive from self-categorization and identification and because they strongly influence intergroup behavior, intergroup emotions theory provides an innovative framework for attempts to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations.

A series of riots leaves more than a thousand Muslims dead in the Hindu-led Indian state of Gujarat. An African nation whose citizens have lived in relative peace since 1963 is torn apart as Luo tribesmen battle Kikuyu. A European nation goes without government for nearly 6 months because its French-speaking and Dutch-speaking political parties cannot agree on constitutional reform. Political pundits of the US presidential elections suggest that the 40-something candidate Barack Obama should try to depict the 70-something John McCain as a ‘geezer’, while McCain should characterize Obama as a ‘kid’.

How are we to explain these diverse examples of a seemingly universal phenomenon, hostile intergroup relations? Most explanations of intergroup antipathy focus on the false or biased beliefs (or stereotypes) one group might have about another (Fiske, 1998), on external costs and rewards driving intergroup interactions (Campbell, 1965), and on the human tendency to see our own groups as superior to other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Despite their contributions, these traditional approaches to intergroup relations often seem both overly static and insufficiently passionate in the face of the typically fluid and often chilling ways in which groups treat
other groups. Why have the Luo and Kikuyu lived in peace for 30 years but now wage war? Surely biased beliefs about each group have not suddenly surfaced? Surely they both still share Kenyan nationality? And if dislike or competition for resources explains intergroup conflict, what explains the form that conflict takes: why is one outgroup shunned, while another’s political ambitions are thwarted, and yet another is systematically slaughtered? Even when the intensity of evaluations are taken into account, the answers offered by traditional approaches seem too cool for the often hot responses social groups spark in one another.

Intergroup emotions theory (IET; Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, forthcoming; Smith & Mackie, forthcoming; Smith, 1993) is part of a new emphasis on the role of emotions in intergroup relations (see also Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). According to IET, intergroup behavior is driven by emotions, but emotions of a uniquely social kind. Intergroup emotions are generated by belonging to, and by deriving identity from, one social group rather than another. They are shaped by the very different ways in which different groups see the world, and they come, with time and repetition, to be part and parcel of group membership itself. Once incited, such intergroup emotions direct intergroup behavior. It is the anger, anxiety, pride, and guilt that other groups evoke in our own that drive our social, political, and physical responses to them, and it is only by changing such emotions that intergroup behavior can change.

What are intergroup emotions? Who experiences them, and what triggers them? Why do we accord them such a critical role in intergroup relations? Before discussing these important questions, we start where intergroup emotions start: with group belonging.

**Belonging to and Identifying With Groups**

In addition to being unique individuals, people are simultaneously members of multiple groups. Groups can be small and meet face-to-face (such as quilting bees, school board committees, or a company’s sales force) or large and geographically far-flung social categories (such as national, ethnic, gender, or religious groups). Under certain circumstances, group belonging is psychological as well as demographic. That is, people think of themselves not as the (fictional) individual Michele Dubois, for example, but as French, a woman, a conservative, or a member of the sales team at Dupont, instead. This process, shifting from seeing oneself as a unique individual to seeing oneself in terms of a salient group membership, is called self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

Finding oneself among fellow group members, as when one joins a meeting of the sales team, is an obvious trigger of self-categorization. But any cues that bring a group membership to mind or make it stand out have the same effect. So hearing one’s school song, being targeted by an ethnic slur; donning a uniform, a turban, or a stethoscope; and seeing,
being with, or interacting with members of the outgroup can all activate a self-categorization. When many such factors conflate – think of fans watching Olympic competition, wrapped in the flags of their nations, painted with their country’s colors, singing their national anthem – it is easy to see what we mean by self-categorization.

Self-categorization causes people to think of themselves less as unique individuals and more as relatively typical members of the group, and they act accordingly. They see themselves as having the characteristics associated with group membership; they hold the attitudes and beliefs associated with group memberships, and they act as they believe group members should act, a process called self-stereotyping. So Michele Dubois, sales team member, may feel herself to be more assertive and persuasive, agree more vehemently with free enterprise laws, and even speak more rapidly than she might when she thinks about herself as Michele Dubois, individual (Guimond, Chatard, Martinot, Crisp, & Redersdorff, 2006; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Because of this, self-categorization increases similarity within the group. Since every member of the group adopts the attributes characteristic of the group, everyone ends up having the same qualities. Adopting group characteristics like this is not intended only for public display. On the contrary, when tested in ways that prevent dissembling, it is clear that group members actually see themselves as like the group (Smith & Henry, 1996). In a very real sense, the group has become part of the self.

Although everyone belongs to groups, some groups are more central, important, and emotionally significant to some individuals than to others. The more central and important the group is to the self, the more an individual identifies with, or derives his or her identity from, it (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Perhaps being a woman is of central emotional importance to Michele Dubois, for example, compared to being a member of the sales team. Highly identified group members are more likely to chronically think about themselves in terms of group membership, to become socially categorized with weaker or fewer cues, and to display the consequences of categorization more strongly. Michele may think about herself as a woman most of the time, and it might take only a small comment or cue to activate that group membership for her. When thinking about herself as a woman, Michele is likely to whole-heartedly adopt the characteristics, attitudes, and actions she believes representative of her group; to feel at one with the group; and to feel as protectively about the group’s good name and good standing as her own.

Self-categorization Dictates Emotion

The emotional consequences of belonging to and identifying with social groups are the focus of IET. Simply put, IET holds that emotional experience depends on self-categorization. We are used to thinking of people having
unique individual emotions about events and objects around them. But IET argues that people can experience different emotions depending on whether they see themselves as unique individuals or whether they see themselves, through processes of self categorization, as members of a group. Furthermore, they experience different emotions when thinking about themselves as members of one group than when categorized as belonging to another group.

Imagine, for example, that we first ask people to think about themselves as unique individuals and to tell us how happy, angry, anxious, proud, and so forth, they feel. Suppose we then ask those same people to think about themselves as members of different groups – asking them to first think about themselves as Americans, for example, and then as students from the universities they attend, and then as Republicans or Democrats, and so forth. After focusing them on each particular group membership, we again ask how happy, angry, anxious, proud, and so forth they are feeling.

We have conducted studies using this procedure (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007) and when we look at people's responses, three things stand out. First, although there is some overlap among all their answers, people report feeling quite different emotions as members of each group, and those differ in turn from the emotions they experience when they think about themselves as individuals. So, for example, an individual might report feeling a high level of happiness as an individual, but much less happiness as American, or considerable pride as a student at Indiana University, but much less pride as a Republican. Thus, self-categorization, by influencing which group membership is salient, dictates the emotions people report feeling.

Second, people's responses as members of a group are not idiosyncratic but are shared with other group members – if you are thinking about yourself as American, you report feeling about the same amounts of anger, hope, fear, and pride, for example, as other individuals thinking about themselves as Americans. Members of a group converge in their emotional responses, so that individuals thinking about themselves as members of the same group share the same emotions far more than those same individuals thinking about themselves as unique individuals. People categorized as group members share emotions as well as attributes, attitudes, and actions.

Third, individuals for whom the group is central and important experience the emotions their group is feeling more intensely. If the group feels angry, highly identified members report feeling angrier than less identified members do. If the group feels proud, highly identified members feel greater pride than less identified members do. There is one exception to this rule. When shared emotions reflect badly on the group, such as when an ingroup transgression elicits guilt, highly identified members are less likely to share such emotion (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2007). Because the ingroup is important and central to their selves, highly identified individuals are loath to accept the negative implications that such feeling imply.
Self categorization also influences people’s emotional reactions to specific events and objects that affect their group. For example, people thinking about themselves as university students react more angrily to a proposed rise in tuition at a state-run college (which would hurt students), than they do when they think about themselves as members of a group helped by the proposal (for example, as state taxpayers who subsidize the college; Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006; see also Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). In the same way, categorization influences emotional reactions to other groups. People thinking about themselves as students, for example, often react with considerable anger and little respect for the police. Changing the perceivers’ self-categorization, however, from say students to American citizens, can also change emotional reactions to the police, decreasing anger and increasing respect. Such changes in emotion do not depend on re-categorizations that make the target part of the ingroup. People categorized as students react to Muslims with less anger and more respect than do those same individuals when categorized as Americans, even though both students and Americans see Muslims as outgroup members (Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith, 2008).

The evidence is unequivocal: self-categorization determines emotional reactions, and identification with the group by and large heightens its impact. Such findings do not rely on heavy-handed reminders of group membership or social pressure to get people to think like a group member. Shifts away from the emotions people experience as unique individuals, and convergence on the emotions shared with other group members, are just as readily triggered by the sound of a school song or national anthem, or by subtle exposure to group symbols (Seger, Smith, & Mackie, 2008).

Why Does Self-Categorization Dictate Emotions?

Why does thinking about themselves as women, Americans, or Democrats change how people feel? How can the same person experience quite different emotions about the same object depending on how he or she is categorized? We have explored two processes that contribute to this outcome. The first depends on the fact that people in different groups see the world in very different ways. Self-categorization leads individuals to interpret the world with the ingroup’s outcomes in mind, so that they evaluate outcomes or events in terms of what is good or bad for the ingroup, regardless of their consequences for the individual (or for any other group). We call this the intergroup appraisal route to intergroup emotions. The second process produces emotions as a direct consequence of group membership, parallel to the changes in group-typical traits, thoughts, and actions that occur with self-categorization. We refer to this as the emotional self stereotyping route to intergroup emotions: it is as if a group member says: ‘I am an American, Americans feel proud, and I feel proud too’.
Intergroup appraisal route to intergroup emotions

Psychologists have long assumed that interpretations of events or objects, called appraisals, are crucial to determining emotional responses (for a review, see Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). Appraisals of whether an object or event helps or hurts the self, and whether the self has the resources to deal with the event or not, are thought to be crucial to the distinct emotions individuals experience (in conjunction with other more specific interpretations such as whether objects and events are intended or unintended, justified or unjustifiable, and so forth; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990). Unique combinations of appraisals produce the wide range of distinct and specific emotions that individuals experience.

When people are categorized as group members, however, they see the world not in terms of the implications of events and objects for them personally, but in terms of the implications for their ingroup. Events or objects (including ingroup and outgroups, and their members) that negatively impact the ingroup or any of its members are appraised negatively (even if the self is personally unharmed). Similarly, people or circumstances that benefit the group as a whole or any of its members (although not necessarily the self) are positively appraised. So the murder of an ingroup member because of his or her group membership evokes fear or anger in other group members, despite the fact that they remain physically unharmed. Similarly, the ascendancy of one’s national team in a sporting competition produces pride and joy, although only a few team members participated in the victory. Just as with individual emotions, unique combinations of group-based appraisals produce the same wide range of distinct and specific intergroup emotions.

Situations that benefit an individual at the ingroup’s expense, or harm an individual to the ingroup’s gain, provide insight into how completely people change their interpretation of events as self-categorization changes. Imagine, for example, that the stellar performance of an individual Russian sportswoman spoils the chances of America winning a coveted gold medal in swimming. Or that America wins the medal but at the cost of the individual Russian’s hopes and dreams. People who naturally adopt an American perspective, as well as those induced to do so, view the first event as a failure and the second event as a success. Indeed the more strongly people identify with Americans, the more strongly they cling to the ingroup’s perspective. And they do so despite the fact that when encouraged to embrace an individual perspective on the events, they see the events in exactly the opposite way (Maitner, Claypool, Mackie, & Smith, 2008).

Emotional self-stereotyping route to intergroup emotions

When people see themselves in group terms, they also come to see themselves as having characteristics typical of the group. This process also
leads people to experience general emotions, or emotional reactions to certain objects and events, that are typical of or associated with the group. Whenever group membership is salient, so too are the group-typical emotional reactions. Part of being a Yankees baseball fan, for example, is to experience anger and disgust at Boston Red Sox victories, just as part of being an Arsenal fan is to feel anger and disgust about Manchester United fans.

If emotions are associated with a particular group membership, people thinking about themselves as members of that group should experience those emotions. As we have already seen, this happens: the mere activation of group belonging can cause members of a group to report experiencing shared anger or joy or disgust, even when other group members are not present. If experiencing such emotions results from the adoption of group-typical emotions, then finding out that the group norm is different from what one imagined should also change the emotions group members experience. It does. To demonstrate this point, we first asked individuals how much fear they were currently feeling, without mentioning their nationality (Moons, Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2008). They were then led to think of themselves as Americans, and as a result reported a different, slightly higher level of fear than they did as individuals. Some time later, they were told that in a recent survey Americans reported feeling considerable levels of fear (among other emotions). If the participants were again reminded of their nationality, they now reported experiencing the higher level of fear said to be typical of Americans. But if the same people were led instead to think about themselves as unique individuals and asked about their fear, their responses were unchanged from the very first assessment. People thus adopt what they believe to be the ingroup’s typical emotion, but only if they are thinking about themselves as group members. Some people converge on the group’s emotion more than others: People who identify more strongly with the group, and people given some reason to believe that their group membership is in doubt, are even more likely to adopt the typical group emotion than are others.

Belonging to a particular group thus entails experiencing emotions quite different from the emotions one feels as a unique individual, or as a member of a different group. The two psychological forces that contribute to this effect — intergroup appraisal and emotional self-stereotyping — probably work in conjunction. Adopting a group perspective changes how the world is appraised, and appraisals dictate emotions. To the extent that specific events and objects are appraised differently by different groups, members of those different groups will experience different emotions. If such group-relevant appraisals and the intergroup emotions they generate are repeated often enough, they may become strongly linked to being a group member, and thus are experienced as part of the same process of overlap between self and group that categorization itself entails (Paolini, Hewstone, Voci, Harwood, & Cairns, 2006). As in our Arsenal–Manchester United example,
a particular ingroup identity might result in habitual generation of anger toward a long-time rival outgroup, anger that would not be experienced if a different social identity or an individual identity was active.

Regardless of how they arise, intergroup emotions are experienced by individuals on behalf of the ingroup. It is not simply that group members feel empathy for other ingroup members who encounter good or ill fortune. On the contrary, intergroup emotion is emotion experienced as others: because ingroup members and the self are psychologically one, what befalls other group members befalls the self. When their national team wins the world cup, people are not thrilled because they believe the team members feel good. They are thrilled because (it is as if) they themselves won.

What Are the Consequences of Intergroup Emotions?

We assume that intergroup emotions feel pretty much the same as individual emotions do. If other members of the ingroup (but not the self) are insulted, for example, people feel anger on behalf of the group, and this anger involves physiological arousal. Just as being personally insulted makes people feel tense and upset, so too does having one’s ingroup insulted. And just as individual anger can be dissipated by attributing some of the attendant upset and anxiety to another source (such as unpleasant physical surroundings, Schachter & Singer, 1962), so too can the arousal caused by an ingroup insult (Rydell et al., forthcoming). Such findings indicate that physiological arousal is an inherent component of group-based anger, just as it is of individual anger.

Individual anger also has the consequence of increasing confidence, which in turn affects how an angry person deals with his or her environment. Angry people tend not to process information in the environment particularly carefully (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Levine, 1996) and their confidence leads them to greater levels of risk taking than those experiencing fear, for example (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Intergroup anger aroused by insult or threat of harm to the ingroup carries the same consequences. People experiencing intergroup anger both fail to carefully analyze the content of a persuasive message and opt for more risky solutions to dilemmas than do people not so affected (Rydell et al., forthcoming). Although research has not yet examined them in detail, we assume that other intergroup emotions, like group-based pride and sadness and guilt, also have the same phenomenological and psychological consequences as their individual counterparts.

Thus, whether generated in response to appraisals of actual events or activated by association with group membership, intergroup emotions have consequences for arousal, perception, information processing, judgment, and decision-making. Identifying such consequences helps answer questions about whether group members truly experience emotions on behalf of
their group or whether they merely rely on general knowledge to report experiencing them, perhaps to please other group members or even the experimenter (Robinson & Clore, 2002). When anger at a group insult leaves people aroused, detracts from their information processing, and prompts them to take risks they otherwise would not, it is unlikely that the anger is just for public display or just the result of activated theories about emotion. In the same way that group members actually take on typical group characteristics as part of self-categorization, they actually experience typical group emotions as part of the same process.

By far the most important consequence of intergroup emotions, however, is their influence on behavior. Particular emotions have a privileged association with motivation to act (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). That is, anger involves the impulse, desire, or intention to take action against the source of the anger, just as fear involves the tendency to move away from the source of the fear. As with individual emotion, so too with group-based emotion: specific intergroup emotions produce specific action tendencies. Because intergroup emotions are group-level, so too the behaviors they motivate often are as well (Smith et al., 2007). Thus, anger toward an outgroup increases desire to confront or attack or harm an outgroup, perhaps by physical force but also by opposing governmental policies that benefit the group, excluding them from opportunities to get ahead, and so forth. The group-based appraisals that lead individuals identified with an ingroup to see them as threatening us lead to intergroup emotion (we feel angry at them) which motivates intergroup behavior: We support policies designed to prevent their immigration to our country.

Indeed, anger and disgust toward an outgroup predict both unwillingness to engage in contact with the group (Esses & Dovidio, 2002) and desire to attack that group (Mackie et al., 2000). Other studies have shown that intergroup fear uniquely motivates desire to move away from an outgroup and reduces desire to confront or attack the offending outgroup (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Intergroup guilt, guilt suffered because of an ingroup’s historically exploitative actions, increases the desire for the ingroup to apologize to the outgroup (McGarty et al., 2005; as recently happened when the Australian governmental issued a formal apology for some official policies and practices regarding the indigenous Aboriginal people), and for reparations to be made (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Muller, & Muller-Fohrbrödt, 2000; Swim & Miller, 1999). Intergroup emotions can direct behavior in quite a fine-tuned manner. Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2006) recently found that guilt explains support for reparations but only (ingroup-directed) anger explains willingness to actually take political action to bring about reparations. In fact, if groups feel satisfaction rather than guilt after acting aggressively, support for similar aggression goes up (Maitner et al., 2007).

Although many barriers intervene between desire and actuality, intergroup emotional reactions predict not only the desire for intergroup behavior
but its actual occurrence as well (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). The close relation between intergroup emotions and the behaviors they motivate can also be seen by looking at what happens when emotions and behaviors mismatch. For example, if an attack on the ingroup produces anger and a corresponding desire for retaliation, people experience satisfaction following retaliation. But if an attack against the ingroup instead produces fear, retaliation further increases fear, and brings no satisfaction. Similarly, anger caused by an insult to the ingroup dissipates if the ingroup successfully retaliates, but does not do so if appropriate action is not taken. And intergroup guilt is diminished when the ingroup makes reparations, but is exacerbated when the ingroup aggresses again (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006).

Thus, a wealth of evidence supports the idea that specific intergroup emotions produce both desires for and actual intergroup behaviors. Intergroup emotions are a powerful force for both directing and regulating interactions between social groups. Their effects are highly specific: knowing whether a group regards another with anger, fear, disgust, guilt, or even admiration and respect tells you whether to expect confrontation, avoidance, exclusion, a desire to repair past wrongs, or actions of affiliation and support. This is why we accord intergroup emotions such a crucial role in intergroup relations.

An understanding of intergroup emotions is also of practical importance because it suggests strategies to help reduce prejudice. For example, psychologists have long known that increased contact with members of another group – at least under the right conditions – decreases prejudice against them. We have demonstrated that intergroup contact has this beneficial effect when it produces certain kinds of outgroup-directed intergroup emotions (Miller, Smith, & Mackie, 2004). It is feeling the right emotions about the outgroup (warmth, pride) and not feeling the wrong ones (anger, irritation, anxiety) that makes the ingroup start to tolerate and like them, and only the kind of contact that produces those emotions will make that difference. Of course interventions other than intergroup contact might also produce equally effective intergroup emotions. For example, focusing on alternative group memberships that ingroup members and outgroup members have in common reduces mutual antipathy (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Hewstone, 1996). Sometimes those shared memberships are superordinate – as when antipathies between nationalities might be eradicated by forming a continent-wide economic and political union. Other times such shared memberships can be cross cutting – as when antagonism between Muslims and Christians is moderated because Christian women feel positively toward Muslim women. The difference in religion is not erased, but shared gender provides common ground (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). We suspect that both these interventions generate positive intergroup emotions, and that it is these emotions that drive better intergroup relations.
Interventions like these that alter the psychological salience of the many group memberships that people simultaneously enjoy appear to be powerful tools to reduce prejudice, and may be especially useful because they do not depend on explicitly changing perceptions of the target of prejudice. Rather, they rely on the automatic shifts in people’s perceptions of themselves and others that come about as part and parcel of seeing oneself as belonging to a group. And as we noted earlier, a myriad of external cues or events can activate one or another categorization. Of course, such alterations in self-definition need not be imposed from outside: individuals who wish to regulate their own possible prejudice might do so deliberately by changing their current psychological group affiliation (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002).

What Does the Intergroup Emotions Approach Contribute?

In summary, IET argues that self-categorization determines emotional responses, especially for highly identified group members. As we have seen, the emotions you feel when you consider Muslims, gay men, immigration policies, or cultural practices depend on how you are thinking about yourself. And as we have seen, those emotions then determine the way you and your group behave. IET’s emphasis on social emotions in intergroup relations is provocative in a number of ways.

First, IET claims that emotions are connected with categorizations and identities, rather than single biological entities. Emotion is not restricted to the individual level, but is also a social phenomenon, with collective antecedents and collective consequences.

Second, IET moves beyond the idea of a simple positive evaluation of ingroups and negative evaluation of outgroups, to focus on the distinct and differentiated emotional reactions that both ingroups and outgroups provoke. Different consequences follow depending on whether an outgroup is feared or despised or hated (rather than merely negatively evaluated), requiring a rethinking of traditional views of prejudice. Ingroups can evoke pride, satisfaction, or joy (any of which might have differentiated consequences), requiring a rethinking of traditional views of ingroup favoritism.

Third, IET assumes a variety of intergroup emotions can be associated with a multitude of intergroup identities. This variability resonates with the variability – and often inconsistency – of intergroup behavior. Are there individuals who get along fine with outgroup members at work but will not socialize with them after hours? Since self-categorization determines emotions, and since individuals might identify with any of multiple group memberships, individuals are capable of multiple, often contradictory emotional reactions to other social groups. Are minority groups that used to be tolerated now the target of hate crimes? Since self-categorization determines emotions, and since a single outgroup may come to have
different appraisal implications for the ingroup over time, that same outgroup can evoke quite different emotions over time.

Fourth, IET focuses on action toward or against groups, rather than thoughts and beliefs about groups. Emotion is readiness for action, and intergroup emotion is readiness for intergroup action. Although names may often hurt, it is sticks and stones that break outgroup bones.

Finally, IET regards intergroup emotions as integral to adaptive functioning at the group level (perhaps inevitably so given our species history of group living). Intergroup emotions are not solely events that disrupt intergroup relations; rather, they are events with group-sustaining functions. This does not mean that anger and hate for an outgroup are good things just because they might be functional for an ingroup. But it does mean that we need to understand them as central to a process that regulates actions in the context of important group memberships.

Many centuries ago the Roman philosopher Cicero argued that people decide more problems by emotion – by hate, love, lust, rage, sorrow, joy, hope, and fear – than by rationality, reason, or reality. A less well-known but clearly well-read social commentator recently echoed what social psychologists have long argued in suggesting that ‘human beings’ ... identities have moved to the core ... It is why people fight and what they will die for’ (Zakaria, 2008). We believe that to truly understand intergroup relations, both these ideas need to be combined. It is the emotions evoked by human beings’ social identities that explain why people fight and what they die for.

**Short Biographies**

Diane M. Mackie is Professor of Psychology and Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She received her BA from the University of Auckland, New Zealand, and her PhD in Social Psychology from Princeton University. She is particularly interested in the interplay of affective and cognitive processes in all aspects of intergroup relations. The author of more than 100 articles and chapters, she also co-edited (with David Hamilton) *Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception* (1993) as well as *Beyond Prejudice: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups* (2002; with Eliot Smith). A fellow of APS (Association for Psychological Science) and SPISSI (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues), she also has research interests in evaluation, persuasion, and social influence.

Eliot R. Smith is a Professor of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Indiana University, Bloomington. He also has a special chair position at the Free University in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He received his PhD from Harvard University and is a fellow of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, the Association for Psychological Science, and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. His work has been funded extensively by the National Science Foundation and the National...
Institute of Mental Health. Much of his current research focuses on the role of emotion in intergroup relations. With Diane Mackie, he has edited a book (*From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions*) on the role of emotion in prejudice and intergroup conflict. Other research interests include situated/embodied cognition, a perspective reflected in a forthcoming book (*Embodied Grounding*) edited with Gün Semin.

Devin Ray’s research interests focus on what happens when people draw on social categories (nationality, occupation, sports affiliations, and so forth) to inform their self-concepts. Devin is particularly interested in how recruiting different social categories to inform the self-concept can lead people to behave in different, sometimes contradictory, ways. Devin received his BA in psychology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, his MA is psychology from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and is currently a PhD candidate at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

**Endnote**

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**References**


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