THE DYNAMICS OF
PREJUDICE

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Allport’s Views About Emotion

Although Gordon Allport’s *The Nature of Prejudice* is probably best known for its prescient emphasis on cognitive factors such as stereotypes, chapter 22, entitled “Aggression and Hatred,” presents Allport’s analysis of some of the “hotter” factors in prejudice. First, Allport believed that aggression stems from general frustration. He rejected a simplistic quasi-Freudian metaphor of a “steam boiler” in which pressure (frustration) builds up until some outlet (aggression) is necessary. However, Allport was very clear that aggression is often displaced – that is, directed against some target other than the source of the original frustration. “When we meet an individual who is full of complaints, resentment, and has many out-group prejudices, we can safely assume he has much unresolved reactive aggression, undoubtedly built up through a long series of chronic frustrations” (1954/1979, p. 357). Allport discussed in particular middle-class Americans, hypothesizing that they face many frustrations due to cultural pressures, for example, to achieve status and wealth. These frustrations are ready for displacement as aggression against convenient outgroups (see Glick, ch. 15 this volume).

Second, in addition to frustration, Allport identified socialization, particularly for boys, as an additional source of aggression. Despite the initial closeness of a young boy’s ties to his mother, he must learn to be a man, which often involves expressing toughness and aggression. These are certainly part of the cultural definition of maleness, and may be specifically taught by the father, worried about the possibility of his son being regarded as a “sissy.”

Both general frustration and socialization for aggressiveness thus set the stage for people to experience hostile feelings toward outgroups. What
form do those feelings take? Allport distinguished two, anger and hatred. Anger is a transitory emotion that is ordinarily directed toward individuals; thus, a person might be angry at a driver who irresponsibly cuts her off on the highway. Hatred, in contrast, is more longstanding than anger, involving bitter feelings as well as accusatory thoughts that serve to rationalize these feelings. It is held without compunction or guilt because it is viewed as justified. Finally, hatred is more often directed at groups than individuals. Allport, citing Aristotle for this point, argued that people more readily empathize with individuals (even those who are members of a hated group) than with groups (see Sternberg, 2003).

Citing Fromm, Allport further distinguished rational hatred (for those who pose severe, realistic threats to one’s life or values) from “character conditioned” hatred arising from a lifetime of disappointments and frustration (see Duckitt, ch. 24 this volume). In the latter case, hatred is not meaningfully connected to the source of the frustration; rather, the individual “thinks up some convenient victim and some good reason. The Jews are conspiring against him, or the politicians are set on making things worse” (1954/1979, p. 364). In other words, hatred of this type is a function of personality abnormalities rather than being rationally targeted at groups that pose realistic threats.

Closing the chapter, Allport asks a deeply philosophical question: since people need and want to love and be loved, why do they so often end up hating? He gives three answers to this riddle. First, because of the many frustrations of life, Allport noted that people seek “an island of security” (1954/1979, p. 365) by psychologically excluding most others, defining them as outgroups. Second, children brought up in rejecting homes, or learning prejudices directly from their parents, will naturally develop negative outlooks on other people or groups. Finally, Allport held that there is “a kind of economy in adopting an exclusionist approach” (1954/1979, p. 365) to other people. For example, if one thinks of all members of a particular group as inferior and unworthy, there is no need to bother to distinguish among them, or to decide how to act toward any individual group member.

**Developments Since Allport**

Allport’s emphasis on the emotional component of prejudice was shared by several lines of theory and research during the 1950s. In particular, the highly influential Authoritarian Personality approach (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), based in psychodynamic thinking, also emphasized inner psychic conflicts as the fuel for negative emotional reactions to outgroups, similar to Allport’s description of “character conditioned” hatred. With the decline in this perspective’s popularity due to conceptual and methodological critiques in the late 1950s (see Duckitt, ch. 24 this volume), other viewpoints came to the fore.

It is a story that is told many times in the chapters in this volume: the cognitive revolution of the 1960s and 1970s in North American psychology (especially social psychology) changed everything. In the area of prejudice and intergroup relations, the most prominent change was an intense focus on the nature of perceivers’ beliefs about outgroups (i.e., their stereotypes) and on the consequences of those beliefs for prejudice and discrimination. Research in this tradition has led to great advances in psychology’s understanding of how stereotypes and prejudice are acquired, activated, applied, and (sometimes) altered. In many ways, the focus on such processes in this approach reflected Allport’s allusion to the resource “economy” of categorization and generalization. Attitude theory proved a natural source of conceptual tools and research methods to investigate these issues, and so “prejudice” came to be defined as an attitude – the perceivers’ evaluation, positive or (more often) negative – of a group as a whole or of its members. Although attitude theory is flexible enough to accommodate emotions as determinants of attitudes, research on stereotyping and prejudice clearly shifted away from emotion.

Around the same time (the late 1960s and early 1970s) another approach emerged, originally in Europe. Inspired by Henri Tajfel (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), Social Identity Theory has spawned its own descendants and variants, including self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). But in all versions, the emphasis is on the effects of social context – specifically, important and salient group memberships – on the ways people think, feel, and act toward themselves and others. Both laboratory studies using temporary groups and real-world investigations of live, interacting social groups generated broad support for Social Identity Theory’s predictions (see Brown & Zagefka, ch. 4 this volume). This tradition has produced tremendous insights into the ways that group membership shapes perceptions and actions toward other people. In fact, its key tenets are reminiscent of Allport’s ideas about the psychological benefits of seeking “an island of security” distinct from outgroups. However, although Tajfel’s original definition of social identity included a reference to the “emotional significance” of group membership, emotions received relatively little emphasis in the research generated by Social Identity Theory.
The change in theoretical focus from the 1950s to these newer perspectives stemmed in part from an implicit shift in the focal phenomenon under study. Both Allport (in his chapter on aggression and hatred) and the Authoritarian Personality researchers focused on the overt bigot – the Nazi, the Ku Klux Klan member – one who hates without compunction while feeling his hatred to be justified. Emotions, culturally viewed since the days of the ancient Greeks as irrational, naturally seemed an important part of explanations for these people’s disturbed thinking and despicable behavior. However, through the 1960s the research focus shifted gradually toward less extreme types of prejudice and more seemingly “normal” psychological processes. Learning stereotypes of outgroups from the surrounding culture and desiring esteem for one’s ingroups are processes that affect virtually all people, not only a handful of extreme bigots. In fact, one of the chief points of emphasis of both the stereotype-based and social-identity approaches was the normality of the psychological processes underlying prejudice, and the corollary fact that most people (even those who are fundamentally well-intentioned and liberal-minded) are at risk of succumbing to them. Emotions may have fallen out of favor in theories of prejudice in part because of this shift in focus from the extreme bigot to the more “normally” prejudiced person.

Beginning in the late 1980s, though, and continuing with ever greater momentum into the early and middle 1990s, researchers rediscovered the importance of emotions in intergroup relations. One early example is research by Dijker (1987) on the specific emotions (such as irritation and resentment) that people feel in encounters with individual outgroup members. Around the same time, Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) developed “aversive racism” theory, which posits that many Whites avoid interaction with Blacks or other minorities not because they hate them, but simply because interacting with outgroup members arouses negative emotions of unease, anxiety, and uncertainty (see also the concept of intergroup anxiety, Stephan & Stephan, 1985, and ch. 26 this volume). Also in the 1980s, Sears (ch. 21 this volume) developed “symbolic racism” theory, which holds that early-socialized negative affect toward outgroups is an important component of current forms of prejudice. Within a few years, Mackie and Hamilton (1993) edited a volume collecting numerous chapters on the theme of affective-cognitive interactions in stereotyping and prejudice. A new area for investigation had clearly opened up, and new theoretical ideas began to emerge, which considered a broader range of emotions – such as irritation, anxiety, guilt, and even positive emotions – and not only the anger and hatred that Allport had discussed.
A New Framework: Integrating Current Research and Theory on Emotions

The rediscovery of emotions in the field of prejudice and intergroup relations has involved contributions from numerous researchers and groups, operating from several theoretical perspectives. At least three general approaches can be conceptually distinguished. First, some researchers focused on the effects of “incidental” affect – affect arising from outside of the intergroup encounter itself – on stereotyping, prejudice, or related processes (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1993; Mackie, Queller, Stroessner, & Hamilton, 1996). Studies of incidental affect are important in demonstrating how general emotional processes influence thoughts, judgments, and behavior, including those in intergroup situations. However, these studies leave open the question of whether emotion in an intergroup context operates in the same way when it is caused specifically by that context (Bodenhausen, 1993).

A second approach stays at the individual level but investigates the causes and consequences of individuals’ emotional reactions, for example, in face-to-face encounters with members of outgroups. A number of approaches have emphasized different emotions that can arise in intergroup encounters. These emotions are assumed to be largely negative, but can include several distinct emotions (beyond just anger and hate). Dijker (1987), for example, found that irritation often resulted from personal encounters with outgroup members (especially those who are culturally different). For example, in one study, Dutch respondents reported feeling irritation especially in encounters with Turks and Moroccans, the minority groups most culturally different from the Dutch themselves. The aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) and the intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) approaches both focus on feelings of unease and anxiety in intergroup interaction. These emotions arise from more or less “innocent” (at least nonracist) causes, such as a lack of knowledge about the outgroup, fear of unintentionally giving offense, and general lack of necessary interational skills for intergroup interaction. In a related vein, Devine and Monteith (1993) and others have studied the ways in which individual emotions (such as guilt) aroused by one’s own stereotypic thoughts might motivate people to work to change their stereotypes. All these approaches have added immeasurably to our understanding of emotions that might be caused by intergroup concerns and actions, and have also contributed to the more general issue of how emotions affect thoughts, judgments, and behavior.
Table 22.1 Summary of current models of emotion in intergroup relations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theory and key citations</th>
<th>Emotions experienced by</th>
<th>Specific emotions assumed</th>
<th>Key points of emphasis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Emotions in intergroup interaction (Dijker, 1987, others)</td>
<td>An individual (individual-level emotions)</td>
<td>Irritation, resentment</td>
<td>Emotions experienced in personal encounters with outgroup members</td>
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<td>Aversive racism (Gaertner &amp; Dovidio, 1986); intergroup anxiety (Stephan &amp; Stephan, 1985)</td>
<td>An individual (individual-level emotions)</td>
<td>Anxiety, unease, discomfort</td>
<td>Emotions experienced because of lack of knowledge or skills in intergroup interaction, not because outgroup is hated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup Emotions Theory (Smith, 1993; Mackie, Devos, &amp; Smith, 2000)</td>
<td>An individual who identifies with a social group (group-based emotions)</td>
<td>Any and all emotions can be experienced at group as well as individual level</td>
<td>Draws on appraisal theories of emotion to understand conditions under which group-based emotions will be experienced and their consequences for action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, &amp; Xu, 2002)</td>
<td>An individual taking the perspective of the societal mainstream (group-based emotions)</td>
<td>Pride, pity, envy, contempt</td>
<td>Relates emotions to 2 dimensions (warmth, competence) of stereotypes of groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biocultural model (Neuberg &amp; Cottrell, 2002)</td>
<td>An individual who identifies with a social group (group-based emotions)</td>
<td>Fear, anger, contempt, disgust, guilt</td>
<td>Evolutionary analysis of why people identify with groups and respond emotionally to group threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated threat theory (Stephan &amp; Stephan, 2000)</td>
<td>An individual responding either as an individual or as a group member</td>
<td>Fear, anger</td>
<td>Integrates individual and group-level threats; analysis of preconditions for threat perceptions</td>
</tr>
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</table>
While dealing with emotions generated as a direct result of intergroup relations, these theories nevertheless continue to treat such emotions as individual-level phenomena. A third approach, and the one on which we focus predominantly in this chapter, borrows the general assumptions of Social Identity Theory and assumes that emotions can be experienced by people on behalf of their ingroups—that is, that the “collective self” defined by a group identification can trigger emotional reactions (Smith, 1993). From this perspective, emotions can be group-level as well as individual-level phenomena. The distinction between the group-based and individual emotion approaches is analogous to the distinction drawn by Runciman (1966) and others between “fraternal” (group-based) and individual or “egoistic” relative deprivation—the sense that one’s group in society or oneself as an individual has relatively poorer outcomes compared to other groups or individuals. From this group-based, perspective, emotion can arise because of group belonging, and thus emotions can be group-level as well as individual-level phenomena. All of these approaches are summarized in table 22.1.

Among group-based approaches, Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993, 1999) follows the Social Identity Theory approach in taking the notion of a socially extended self as its starting point. When a group membership is salient, people think of themselves as interchangeable members of the ingroup, rather than in terms of their unique personal identities. This “depersonalization” process in turn makes group membership function in all the ways that the psychological self does, as several studies have demonstrated. For example, people tend to think of themselves in terms of attributes that characterize the entire ingroup (Smith & Henry, 1996). That is, the person responds to the world in terms of a collective rather than an individual self. Importantly, this makes the group play a role in the regulation of emotional responses.

To the fundamental postulate of the socially extended self, Intergroup Emotions Theory adds the assumptions of appraisal theories of emotions. Intergroup Emotions Theory posits that when a group membership is salient, people appraise the effects that events, objects, and groups have on the ingroup (not just the individual self). Appraisals, which may be conscious or nonconscious, have two significant characteristics. First, they are subjective interpretations of objects or events. Thus, two different people (or one person at different times) may appraise the identical event differently—say, as a dangerous threat versus an energizing challenge—leading to different emotional reactions. Second, appraisals are not perceptions of an object’s inherent characteristics, but rather of the object’s implications for the perceiver (or the perceiver’s group), so that a generally positive object
or event may still give rise to negative emotions if it is appraised as impinging negatively on the perceiver. Intergroup Emotions Theory holds that group-based emotions are generated by this appraisal process, in exactly the same way as individual emotions are generated by appraisals of objects or events that impinge on the individual self (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984). For example, if someone who thinks of himself or herself as a group member perceives that the ingroup is threatened by an outgroup’s goals or actions and believes that the ingroup is strong, he or she may experience group-based anger (Mackie et al., 2000). Consequently the individual may desire to attack or confront the outgroup. Group-based emotions may be directed at the ingroup as well. For example, people may feel collective pride if they see their group as responsible for an important accomplishment, or collective guilt if they appraise their group as having violated important moral principles (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998).

In summary, Intergroup Emotions Theory postulates that when people identify with a group, they will appraise social objects or events in terms of their implications for the group. These appraisals generate group-based emotions and, in turn, collective action tendencies. Emotions are predicted to mediate the effects of the appraisals on the action tendencies, demonstrating that the emotions play a functional role in the overall process. We sketch some of the existing evidence supporting Intergroup Emotions Theory here; fuller summaries are available elsewhere (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004).

Yzerbyt and his colleagues (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2002) showed that when a particular self-categorization is salient, people experience emotional reactions to events that affect other ingroup members – even if the events have no direct effect on the perceiver personally. Participants read about an event that harmed another person with whom they shared one group membership (a fellow psychology student) but differed on another (a student at a rival university). Only when a subtle manipulation made their common group membership with the victim salient did participants experience anger and unhappiness, reactions based on the collective self (group membership) shared with the victim.

Evidence also suggests that identification with, rather than mere cognitive categorization in, the group produces intergroup emotions. Shortly after the September, 2001, attacks on the US, Mackie, Silver, Maitner, and Smith (2002) measured students’ identification as “Americans” and asked about their emotions in reaction to a hypothetical future terrorist attack on their country. Group identification with “Americans” strongly predicted both fear and anger responses. As suggested by Intergroup Emotions Theory,
increased identification with the group led to more intense emotions experienced on behalf of the group.

Additional studies (Mackie et al., 2000) investigated the nature and impact of intergroup appraisals, as well as the distinctiveness of specific intergroup emotions and their action tendency consequences. Specifically, we examined the appraisal of the ingroup’s relative strength or weakness, which is hypothesized to determine whether perceived threats create anger or fear. Participants identified themselves as members of one of two opposing groups. Perception of ingroup or outgroup strength was manipulated by having participants read alleged newspaper headlines, which appeared to reflect popular and political support either for their own group or for the out-group. We then assessed emotions toward the out-group. Analyses of emotion responses revealed three distinct factors representing fear (fearful, anxious, worried, frightened), anger (annoyed, irritated, angry, mad), and contempt (disgusted, contemptuous, repulsed). Perceived ingroup strength increased anger toward the other group, whereas ingroup weakness led to less anger. Moreover, these emotions were associated with distinct action tendencies. Participants who reported feelings of anger were more likely to want to take action against the out-group (e.g., confront or argue with them), while anger had no impact on behavioral tendencies to avoid the out-group. Importantly, the relation between appraisals and action tendency was significantly mediated by experienced emotion.

In summary, several types of evidence currently support the central claims of Intergroup Emotions Theory that intergroup appraisals (appraisals of other groups or intergroup situations as they affect the perceiver’s ingroup) can trigger group-based emotions and, in turn, group-based action tendencies. Intergroup Emotions Theory, as well as other current approaches, postulates that a wide range of emotions, and not just anger and hatred, can be experienced with respect to people’s group identities and can have consequences for intergroup relations.

Other approaches also consider that emotions can be based in perceivers’ group memberships, and directed at other distinct groups in society. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002) developed the Stereotype Content Model, which links two dimensions of group stereotypes (warmth and competence) to emotional reactions to groups (see also Fiske, ch. 3 this volume). A group’s perceived competence is closely connected to its societal status, and warmth to the degree of competitive relationship between the perceiver’s own group and the target group. Warm and competent groups (e.g., middle-class Americans) elicit pride, while groups attributed competence plus a lack of warmth (e.g., Asian Americans, Jews) are targets of envy. Incompetent (low-status, helpless) groups may elicit warm feelings
of pity (e.g., the elderly), whereas incompetent groups that are perceived as competing for resources and therefore as cold (e.g., welfare recipients) elicit contempt. Importantly, the Stereotype Content Model posits that some subjectively positive feelings toward disadvantaged groups (e.g., pity and sympathy) may nevertheless reinforce inequality by casting these groups as incompetent (worthy only of pity rather than respect). Jackman (1994; ch. 6 this volume) provides a general analysis of paternalistic aspects of racist, classist, and sexist prejudices and their effects on undermining disadvantaged groups’ resistance to social inequality. Glick and Fiske’s (1996) ambivalent sexism theory presents an in-depth analysis of one such paternalistic prejudice, benevolent sexism (the notion that women are “wonderful but weak”). Benevolent sexism involves positive feelings toward women, but is nevertheless associated across nations with gender inequality that disadvantages women (Glick et al., 2000).

Although both the Stereotype Content Model and Intergroup Emotions Theory postulate emotional reactions to other groups, there are at least two major distinctions between these perspectives. One is that the Stereotype Content Model conceptualizes emotional reactions to specific groups from the viewpoint of “society as a whole.” Indeed, studies testing this approach have typically asked respondents to describe how society in general reacts to various groups such as welfare recipients, rather than how those respondents themselves react emotionally (either as individuals or as members of their own particular ingroups, which is the focus of Intergroup Emotions Theory). Second, the Stereotype Content Model focuses specifically on the two dimensions of warmth and competence, and on four specific resulting emotions, while Intergroup Emotions Theory assumes that any and all emotions that can occur to individuals can also occur in intergroup contexts, based on a wide range of possible appraisal dimensions. Neuberg and Cottrell (2002) developed a biocultural model of intergroup threat and the resulting discrete emotions. They emphasize the group context in which humans evolved, and hypothesize that people are tuned by evolution to respond emotionally to group-level as well as individual-level threats. This model distinguishes different types of threats; for example, directed at the ingroup’s resources versus the group’s integrity, which may elicit systematically different emotions. Neuberg and Cottrell (2002, see p. 272) hypothesize a wide range of emotions that could be experienced in group contexts, including anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and pity. Their approach is generally consistent with Intergroup Emotions Theory, while also offering a further evolutionary analyses of functionality that explains why people tend to psychologically identify with ingroups as well as to respond emotionally to group-level threats.
Similar ideas are part of Stephan and Stephan’s (2000) Integrated Threat Theory. This hypothesizes a number of antecedent factors such as prior intergroup relations, individual differences, and cultural and situational contexts, which result in either symbolic or realistic group threats. These threats in turn predict the psychological (e.g., prejudice) and behavioral (e.g., discrimination) responses of groups and group members. Integrated Threat Theory is both a group-level and an individual-level theory of emotions in that group members can perceive that they as individuals, their group, or both are being threatened. Similarly, responses can be at either the individual or the group level.

Other investigators have looked at specific emotions in group contexts. For example, Doosje et al. (1998) investigated collective guilt, an emotion that people experience when they regard their ingroup as having morally transgressed in an important way. Notably, the research shows that the most highly identified group members may be the least likely to experience this emotion, because they are motivated to find ways to reinterpret events and evaluate the ingroup’s actions as morally acceptable. This finding indicates that experiencing emotions as a member of a group is not inevitable for an individual; people may seek to reinterpret or reappraise the situation, or even to disidentify with a group, if the resulting group-based emotion is unwelcome.

Has Allport Been Supported?

We have summarized and briefly reviewed current research on the role of emotion in prejudice and intergroup relations. The work of the past half-century shows that Allport was right on several key points. Hot emotions are part of the picture of intergroup reactions – this is perhaps the key idea of his chapter and, surprisingly, it was neglected until the last decade or so. Notably, recent research (e.g., on aversive racism and on Intergroup Emotions Theory and the Stereotype Content Model) establishes that emotions are important components of even the more “normal,” everyday types of stereotyping and prejudice that afflict so many of us, not only for understanding the Nazis or other extreme bigots who were the focus of research attention in the 1950s.

Allport was also right about some of the causes of aggression. Angry feelings and aggression, we now know, can be induced or intensified by negative affect stemming from frustration or discomfort (from pain, high temperature, etc.) that have no connection to the target of the aggression.
Smith and Mackie

(Berkowitz, 1998). Whatever their causes, aggression and anger are often rationalized by beliefs adopted after the fact (Alexander, Brewer, & Hermann, 1999). As Allport also held, emotional reactions can have different time courses; recall his distinction of episodic anger from more enduring feelings of hatred. We discuss the time-dependent nature of intergroup emotions in detail elsewhere (Smith & Mackie, in press). Finally, Allport was correct that researchers need to distinguish feelings about individuals from feelings about whole groups. Allport’s idea that it is easier to hate groups than individuals anticipated later research by Sears (1983) on the "person positivity bias."

Allport missed some things, however. Perhaps the most important new insight is that many emotions, not only hatred, are involved in intergroup relations. Moreover, these differentiated emotions have distinct causes and effects. Allport’s model focused on hatred and considered negative emotions to be largely interchangeable, driven by a single inner “pool” of frustration that seeks an expression, even against a displaced target. However, current thinking on emotion distinguishes anger from fear, disgust, contempt, guilt, and other possibilities, as distinct emotions with different determinants (people’s appraisals of intergroup situations) and different effects (action tendencies). The current focus on the antecedents and consequences of differentiated emotional reactions provides predictive power beyond Allport’s more narrow focus on hatred. Recent work even demonstrates that prejudice can involve subjectively positive emotions; as noted earlier, research on the Stereotype Content Model shows that women, the elderly, and the handicapped often elicit sympathetic reactions that coexist with stereotypes of these groups’ incompetence (Fiske et al., 2002).

Allport also neglected the role of identification with an ingroup, and instead considered emotions as experienced by an isolated individual toward other individuals or groups. In current thinking, people have “selves” at several levels (individual, collective, possibly relational) and any or all of these selves can be activated in specific contexts, arousing emotions. In a comment that may anticipate this idea, Allport noted that hatred never arises without love, meaning love for the values or other objects that are threatened by the hated other (see Brown & Zagefka, ch. 4 this volume). This love may be equivalent to ingroup identification, which attaches value and emotional salience to the ingroup, and is therefore a necessary although not sufficient cause for hate and other negative reactions to the outgroup (Brewer, 2001). In general, however, Allport’s analysis was profoundly individualistic.
Considering prejudice and intergroup relations as involving emotion opens up several new research directions. First, emotions are time-dependent states. Self-evidently, they ebb and flow across time, over scales ranging from seconds to perhaps hours or days. This contrasts with stereotypes and prejudice (conceptualized as an attitude), which are notoriously stable and therefore difficult to change even when change is desired. Emphasizing the role of emotion suggests measuring reactions to groups across time, perhaps using daily diary measures or experience-sampling methods (Smith & Mackie, in press). People may be particularly likely to perform emotion-driven behaviors or to show biases in judgment processes precisely when they are experiencing intense group-based emotions.

Second, the line between emotions experienced with regard to the individual and collective selves can be difficult to draw. (Even an interaction between two individuals can be intergroup rather than interpersonal, if the individuals construe themselves and each other as representing their groups.) For this reason, lines of research that focus primarily on individual-level determinants of emotional reactions very likely have implications for group-based emotions as well. As one example, we suggest that feelings of guilt and compunction due to unwanted stereotypic thoughts could be experienced not only as an individual (Devine & Monteith, 1993), but also as a member of a dominant group (e.g., a White American might feel a sense of collective guilt for that group’s general tendency to stereotype ethnic minority groups). The latter would be a group-based emotion (Doosje et al., 1998).

Third, much research will be required to work out the relations of intergroup emotions to more traditional concepts such as stereotypes and attitudes. Certainly these can all affect each other on many different time scales. For example, a stereotype that portrays an outgroup as both capable and threatening may well contribute to emotional reactions of fear and hostility toward that group (Fiske et al., 2002). However, as Allport claimed, stereotypes can also emerge as rationalizations, constructed after the fact to justify the emotions that one experiences toward a group. Another possibility is that prejudices are of different types. Reactions to some groups may be more stereotype-driven and others more emotion-driven, depending on the particular circumstances and the nature of the target group.

Fourth, considering the role of emotion in prejudice and intergroup relations opens up a new set of approaches to the goal of prejudice reduction. Traditional approaches emphasized the need to change negative stereotypes.
to reduce prejudice. However, we now know stereotypes are resistant to change as a result of psychological mechanisms such as subtyping (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Rothbart & John, 1985). Changing emotions present a different set of challenges. Drawing from the clinical literature and research on emotional self-regulation, researchers might apply such strategies as reappraisal, misattribution, or desensitization to the emotions involved in intergroup relations. Misattribution (being led to interpret one’s emotions and feelings as due to extrinsic causes, such as medication or the music that is playing) has been shown to reduce the effects of those feelings on judgments and behaviors. Desensitization, or systematic and repeated exposure to an object that arouses strong emotions, can diminish those emotions and their effects.

Obviously these strategies may or may not succeed if applied to emotions experienced with respect to social groups and their members, but at least they offer a novel set of approaches to the difficult yet supremely important goal of reducing prejudice. We can obtain some encouragement in this regard from Pettigrew and Tropp’s meta-analysis of intergroup contact and prejudice (ch. 16 this volume), which revealed that contact is most effective in prejudice reduction when it has positive affective consequences (e.g., by building friendships). This pattern may indicate that prejudice is more effectively undermined by changing emotions than by changing stereotypes. These and other research directions indicate the potential fruitfulness of the idea that emotions are a key part of prejudice and other intergroup phenomena.

REFERENCES


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