4.1 Introduction

According to affect control theory, individuals define situations on the basis of their community’s “theory of people” (MacKinnon and Heise 2010), and social organization emerges as the individuals actualize their notions of the situation through interpersonal actions. Emotions enable sensing, communicating about, and control of the resulting social relationships.

This chapter presents affect control theory’s framework on emotions in the tradition of prior expositions (Heise 2007, Chap. 8; MacKinnon 1994, Chap. 7; Smith-Lovin 1990, 1994; Smith-Lovin et al. 2006). Our purpose, here, is to bring the earlier accounts up to date and to expand coverage of the affect control theory (ACT) emotion model by giving special attention to issues that have received relatively little attention in the past.

The chapter has three parts. We begin by introducing ACT’s core emotion model, which includes such basic ACT principles as fundamental and transient impressions, and emotional dynamics associated with the three fundamental dimensions of affective meaning: Evaluation, Potency, and Activity. We also explore the emotions of individuals enacting negatively evaluated identities (such as outlaws, bill collectors, or mourners) and how the emotions of stigmatized individuals differ from the emotions of individuals in conventional roles.

The second part attends to relations between ACT’s emotion model and existing scholarship on emotion. To begin, we focus on ACT’s treatment of social categories, which parallels work on status expectations states, and leads into consideration of how emotions might vary by gender, racial, and ethnic categorizations. We then discuss ACT and emotion management, suggesting that the notion of emotion norm can be identified with ACT’s unique construct of a characteristic emotion for an identity. The section includes an examination of how ACT scholarship aligns with Thoits’ four factor model of emotion (1990) and emotion management.

Finally, we discuss two relatively new areas in ACT and emotions scholarship: emotional stations and ineffable emotions. Emotion stations represent the locations in the three dimensional affective space where individuals are positioned as a function of their institutional obligations and self-processes, giving rise to recurrent emotional patterns. Ineffable emotions are feelings for which we, as a culture, have no labels, even

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1 We are grateful to Neil MacKinnon, Tobias Schröder, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Jan Stets for helping us expand our coverage of affect control theory’s approach to emotions.
though such feelings occur in everyday life and are observable in some of the world’s most powerful people.


4.2 Overview

According to affect control theory, emotions emerge from automatic and unconscious comparisons of the impression of self that has been created by recent events with the kind of person that one is supposed to be in the situation. Facial and bodily expression of emotion allows others to identify one’s emotion, and the link between physical expressions and particular emotions is dependable enough that individuals can recognize emotions of others even across cultures (Ekman 1971).

The relations between identity, impression, and emotion allow any one of these to be inferred, given the other two. To illustrate:

• Given a reading of someone’s emotion and knowing the emoter’s situational identity, observers can surmise how the individual must have interpreted recent events in order to arrive at the impression of self that generates the observed emotion. (The surgeon is aghast. He must’ve blundered while operating.)
• Given a reading of someone’s emotion and knowing what impression has been formed of the emoter in recent events, observers can surmise what identity the emoter must be taking in the situation. (He’s smiling while his crimes are recounted in court. He must be a devil.)
• Knowing a person’s identity and the impression of the person generated by recent events, observers might surmise what emotion the individual is feeling even if they cannot see the individual’s expressions, or if an individual is attempting to suppress or falsify emotional expressions. (The athlete feigns nonchalance as his accomplishments are recounted. But he’s got to be feeling proud.)

Similarly, individuals can make such inferences reflexively in order to deepen self-understandings.

• Recognizing a felt emotion and knowing one’s situational identity, an emoter can uncover a suppressed interpretation of what recent events have meant for the self. (Why am I embarrassed? They’re ridiculing me!)
• Recognizing a felt emotion and knowing the impression of self created by recent events, an emoter might arrive at a new understanding of the self. (I’m so pleased with this drawing I made. Maybe I’m an artist.)
• If one is confident about one’s identity and the current impression of self in a situation, one might use that knowledge in order to distinguish what emotion one really is feeling. (She left me for another. But this is not anger I feel. I’m lonely!)

While the relation between identity, impression, and emotion is deterministic internally, others’ readings of emotional expressions are non-deterministic because emoters can suppress physical expressions of felt emotions, or affect different expressions, in order to mislead observers about internal processes. Additionally, surmising an impression or an identity or an emotion from the other two is accomplished by processing available information, and individuals in different genders and cultures may apply somewhat different rules of inference. Thus emotion-related conjectures about others, or about one’s self, vary across individuals.
4.3 ACT Emotion Model

Like everything in affect control theory, the emotion model is grounded in three affective dimensions that have been cross-culturally validated in more than 20 societies (Heise 2010; Osgood et al. 1975). Evaluation contrasts goodness with badness. Potency contrasts powerfulness with powerlessness. Activity contrasts liveliness with lifelessness. Identities, behaviors, emotions, and other elements of social interaction are measured on the three dimensions using semantic differential scales that range from −4 for badness, powerlessness, and lifelessness, to +4 for goodness, powerfulness, and liveliness. Thus, for example, a grandparent has an EPA (Evaluation-Potency-Activity) profile of 2.96 1.76 −0.71, meaning that the identity is viewed as extremely good, quite potent, and slightly inactive. The behavior of mugging someone has an EPA profile of −3.61 0.03 1.48, meaning that mugging is an extremely bad behavior that is neither powerful nor powerless, though slightly active. Feeling enraged has an EPA profile of −1.89 0.76 1.98, meaning that this emotion feels quite bad, slightly potent, and quite active.

When plotted according to their evaluation and activity values, emotion labels more or less array in two bands, a positive one above the midpoint of the graph and a negative one below (MacKinnon and Keating 1989). ("Bands" is a more accurate description than the emotion “circle” reported repeatedly in the psychological literature—e.g., Fisher et al. 1985; Posner et al. 2005.) Positive emotions fall on a plane cutting through the EPA space (MacKinnon and Keating 1989). However, negative emotion labels vary in potency as well as in activity—e.g., rage versus terror—and thereby are positioned in all three dimensions (Fontaine et al. 2007; MacKinnon and Keating 1989; Morgan and Heise 1988).

4.3.1 Fundamental and Transient Impressions

A key notion in affect control theory is that each individual involved in social interaction carries two affective meanings, one that is stable, based on the individual’s identity in the situation combined with the individual’s salient traits and mood, and another affective meaning that varies with events. Behavior is directed at keeping everyone’s variable meaning—their transient impressions of self—aligned with their stable meanings—their fundamental sentiments about
self. Individuals achieve this control by enacting new events that move transients closer to sentiments, or by reappraising recent events so that the past events seem more supportive of fundamental meanings in the situation.

In affect control theory, transient affective meaning and fundamental affective meaning together determine the emotion that one is feeling (Averett and Heise 1988; Heise and Thomas 1989; Heise 2007), and the character of emotion varies directly with one’s transient affective meaning when one’s fundamental affective meaning is evaluated as positive or neutral. A different dynamic applies when the fundamental meaning of self is negatively evaluated. We discuss the emotional dynamics of those with positive identities first, and then consider the other side in a separate section on Emotions Among the Stigmatized.

Affect control theory’s emotion model is defined in terms of a set of empirically based equations predicting transient impressions of people from their identities and displayed emotions (Figure 4.1 shows some of the data on which the equations are based). We do not present the equations here, but the equations may be obtained from the program, Interact, using the instructions in the Interact guide (Heise 2014). Descriptions of emotion dynamics in ACT’s emotion model, as reported in the following sections, were derived by algebraically manipulating the equations so that emotions are expressed in terms of identity sentiments and transient impressions.

### 4.3.2 Evaluation Dynamics

The positivity of one’s emotion varies directly with the valence of one’s transient impression in a situation. For example, you have positive emotions if events make you look very good, and negative emotions if events make you look very bad. Intensity of emotional pleasure or displeasure varies directly with the extremity of the positive or negative impression of self. On the other hand, one’s fundamental meaning in the situation adjusts emotions by setting expectations regarding appearances. For example, looking good provides a more positive emotion for someone with a modestly positive identity like a novice, than for someone with an esteemed identity like a doctor. Similarly, appearing deficient feels more shameful for someone with an esteemed role like a teacher than for someone with a modest role like a student.

The positivity of emotions also depends on the fundamental Activity of one’s identity, along with the transient impression of one’s activity as a result of recent events. Emotional pleasantness is somewhat greater when occupying quiet identities like librarian or retiree than when occupying lively identities like sports-fan or protester. Appearing more active than is warranted by one’s identity increases emotional positivity somewhat, and appearing less active than expected decreases emotional positivity somewhat.

### 4.3.3 Potency Dynamics

Emotion potency corresponds to emotions of dominance (e.g., pride and anger) versus emotions of vulnerability (e.g., awe-struck and fear). This aspect of emotion corresponds largely to the transient impression of the emitter’s powerlessness versus powerlessness. The emitter’s fundamental powerlessness sets expectations regarding how potent she or he is supposed to be, and thereby adjusts the impression effect.

For individuals with a favored but powerless identity, like an office boy, being confirmed in that identity leads to pleasant but vulnerable emotions, such as feeling awestruck or sentimental. Such individuals rarely appear even less powerless than they are, but events can make them seem pluckier than expected, in which case they feel relatively potent emotions such as contentment or happiness. An individual with a favored and powerful identity, like an authority, feels positive emotions like pride or elation when confirmed in that identity. Such powerful individuals rarely seem more powerful than they are, but when they appear less potent than expected they may feel less dominant emotions like exasperation or no emotion at all.
Besides the direct effects from potency fundamentals and transient impressions, emotion potency is affected by Evaluation and Activity processes, too. Someone whose fundamental goodness and activity is greater tends to have somewhat lower potency emotions, particularly if the individual looks less good than expected. Someone whose identity is fundamentally good and inactive but who seems more active than expected also feels a relatively impotent emotion. Individuals who are fundamentally good but quieter than expected experience more potent emotions. Summarizing roughly, favored and non-passive characters experience emotions of greater vulnerability when they seem undervalued or overly frenetic, and they experience more dominant emotions when events make them seem unexpectedly quiet.

4.3.4 Activity Dynamics

Emotional dynamics on the activity dimension involve simple comparisons of one’s transient and fundamental activation. Confirmation of one’s fundamental activity level generates a somewhat activated emotion. A high arousal emotion results when one’s impression of self is overly active, relative to one’s fundamental activity level. A quiet emotion results from the impression of self being excessively inactive, relative to one’s fundamental activity level.

Evaluation processes enter into emotion dynamics on the Activity dimension, but the impact is consequential only when individuals occupy deviant identities.

4.3.5 Emotions Among the Stigmatized

Figure 4.1 provides a graphic rendition of how identity and emotion combine to create an impression of an emoting individual, focusing just on the Evaluation dimension and displaying actual empirical results from the Heise and Thomas (1989) study that is the basis of the emotion model discussed in this chapter. The graph shows how transient evaluations of emoters (“Impression evaluation”) vary as a function of fundamental evaluations of emoters (“Identity evaluation”), and how emotional positivity varies as a function of both.

The right side of the graph shows that impressions of an individual’s goodness or badness vary widely when the individual’s identity evaluation is positive, and in this case pleasant emotions are associated with positive transient impressions while unpleasant emotions are associated with negative impressions.

However, the left side of the graph shows different processes when the fundamental evaluation of an individual is negative. In this case, the evaluative range of impressions narrows and follows a downward path as impressions are partially generated by more and more negative identities. The graph indicates that evil characters never create a positive impression, no matter what emotions they display. The positivity of transient impressions still correlates with emotional positivity on the left side of the graph, but pleasant emotions arise from less negative impressions rather than from positive impressions, while unpleasant emotions arise from especially negative impressions. Thus, for example, a happy robber is one that seems quite bad instead of extremely bad. Were a robber to be confirmed as extremely bad, her emotion would be depression or misery.

Negative identities also impact emotional dynamics on the potency and activity dimensions. In the case of potency dynamics, scorned identities undo and slightly reverse the impact of activity disconfirmations. That is, seeming more active than expected produces emotion potency for a scorned individual, and seeming less active than expected increases emotional vulnerability. Thus, for example, a racist is essentially neutral on potency, but a busy racist may experience dominant emotions like ecstasy, happiness, and pride. In the opposite direction, a quieted racist inclines toward vulnerable emotions like depression, misery, and unhappiness.

In the case of activity dynamics, individuals with scorned but active identities experience less arousal in their emotions when their identity activity is confirmed or when they seem too quiet
for their identity. For example, a bully whose activation level is confirmed by events might feel merely displeased or aggravated (as opposed to a more active emotion of rage), whereas seeming less active than a bully is supposed to be disposess the bully to feel depression, unhappiness, and disheartenment. On the other hand, individuals with scorned and quiet identities experience relatively high levels of arousal when their activity level is confirmed or when they seem too activated for their identity. For example, events confirming one in an invalid identity might yield embarrassment or regret (as opposed to less active emotions like depression and misery). On the other hand, events making an invalid seem overly active could make the invalid feel alarmed, mad, or lustful.

Scorned identities generate chaotic emotion dynamics, wherein small changes in impressions produce large differences in emotions, so an individual with a deviant self-identification might rapidly flip between cheeriness and fury. Theoretically, this process gets more and more extreme as evaluation becomes more negative. In fact, the predicted emotion of a deviant with an identity evaluation of \(-3.5\) is indeterminate mathematically because a denominator in the prediction equation goes to zero at that point. The emotions of such a deviant theoretically are unpredictable, and incomprehensible to an observer.

The most evaluatively negative identity in the Heise and Thomas (1989) study was pimp, evaluated \(-2.88\) by females. Thus, we have no empirical instances to examine in order to see what kinds of impressions actually emerge when emotions are attributed to extraordinarily evil characters. Identities scorned to the point of theoretical indeterminacy do exist, though, and other studies have recorded them. For example, females in a study by Francis and Heise (2006) evaluated eight identities at \(-3.5\) or less: child molester, terrorist, rapist, wife abuser, serial murderer, murderer, racist, and murderer and a male evaluated four identities at such low levels: rapist, wife abuser, murderer, and child molester. Research is required to determine if such characters really are viewed as emotionally incomprehensible.

Affect control theory’s predictions about deviants’ emotions have some empirical support. First, the prediction of chaotic emotionality among those maintaining a stigmatized self is remarkably similar to descriptions of emotional lability and over-responsiveness among individuals diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (Sansone and Sansone 2010). Second, inmates in prisons are notoriously labile, attacking others at the mildest provocation or without any provocation at all (Gambetta 2009). Indeed, Gambetta argues that inmates purposely display senseless emotional behavior in order to establish their credentials as evil characters who are best left alone. For example, displaying deliberate self harm “signals ‘madness’ or dangerousness and thereby induces fear in the receiver: If I am crazy enough to do this to myself, imagine what I can do to you” (Gambetta 2009, p. 119).

### 4.4 Social Categories

Individuals’ emotional experiences are shaped not only by the social identities they occupy, but also by their social categorizations.

One reason for this is that privileged individuals often occupy unmarked identities (Stanley 1977), while individuals in disadvantaged categories occupy marked identities that lead to different actions and different emotions. For instance, women and racial and ethnic minorities often are seen not simply in terms of their operative identities (e.g., a physician), but as an amalgamation of their status characteristics and their identities (e.g., a female physician, or a Black physician), and these amalgamations produce different behaviors and emotions than do the unmodified identities because the status characteristics have unique affective meanings (Rogers et al. 2013; Schröder et al. 2013).

Affect control theory deals with marking as a form of attribution, and a separate model provides predictions of the fundamental sentiments that result when an identity is amalgamated with a status characteristic. Heise (2013) demonstrated that marking the juror identity with “female” in mid-Twentieth Century juries caused the women
in the juries to participate less than men and to produce relatively expressive actions compared to the men's more instrumental actions.

Marking often reduces the fundamental potency of a targeted individual. Reduction of an individual's fundamental potency tends to reduce impressions of the individual's potency during social interaction, and thereby the individual tends to experience less dominant, more vulnerable emotions. So, for instance, for contemporary U.S. females, the emotion EPA of a "physician" that perfectly confirms the physician identity is 2.54 3.40 1.41, whereas the emotion EPA of a perfectly confirmed "female physician" is 2.70 2.31 1.43, and emotion EPA of a perfectly confirmed "Black physician" is 2.25 2.27 1.19. The emotions of the "female physician" and "Black physician" have lower potency than the emotion of the "physician," and consequently individuals with a marked physician identity do not enjoy the feelings of invincibility of individuals with the unmarked identity.

A second reason social classifications shape emotional experiences is that individuals in a category may share distinctive sentiments. For example, among contemporary U.S. females the EPA profile for physician is 2.48 2.74 1.49, whereas the profile among males is 2.01 1.67 – 0.10. Even without marking this would lead a woman who is a physician to enact the role in a friendlier fashion than a man, for example, by chatting up a fellow physician, as opposed to a man who would be inclined to counsel a fellow physician. The woman chatting up a fellow physician would have an emotion with EPA profile 2.45 0.08 1.74, whereas the man counseling a fellow physician would have an emotion with profile 2.26 0.65 0.51. So in this professional situation, the woman's emotion would be slightly less dominant and more activated than the man's.

Heise (2010) tested for gender differences in sentiments among the 1500 concepts in the Francis and Heise (2006) study of contemporary Americans, and found some differences significant at the 0.001 level. "More than males do, females condemn violence (gunfight, hurting, clubbing, slaughterhouse, slugging) and unrestrained sexuality (whorehouse, following, peeping at), while approving more of femaleness (female, feminist, feminine), female concerns (boyfriend, beauty salon), and concepts related to affiliation (roommate, relative, restaurant)... Females see a sexual predator (rapist) as more potent than males do, as well as femaleness (female, feminine), and some standard institutional activities (sermon, grading)" (Heise 2010, pp. 177–178).

Sentiments differ across racial groups, too. Sewell and Heise (2010) used legacy data to examine the matter. "Our study of data from atlases of affective meanings compiled in the 1960s and 1970s showed that Black youths in Chicago maintained a distinct subjective culture—as different from White subjective culture as White culture was different from the subjective culture of another nation. ... Blacks rated females as more potent than males whereas Whites rated males as more potent. Additionally, Blacks rated grandmother as more potent than mother whereas Whites rated mother as more potent. ... We found that Blacks evaluated conjugal aspects of family less positively and attributed more activity (or effort) to them than aspects related to lineage. ... The atlas also revealed Black–White differences for a great variety of concepts beyond those associated with the family" (Sewell and Heise 2010, p. 409).

Distinctive sentiments are also maintained by individuals who mature in different cultures, though the differences are more subtle than one might expect. Heise (2001) examined EPA data from the U.S.A., Canada, Ireland, Germany, Japan, and China, and he found evaluations of identities and behaviors in these six cultures always correlate 0.67 or more. Potency correlations were 0.65 or more for identities, and 0.18 or more for behaviors. Activity correlations were 0.37 or above for identities, and –0.14 or above for behaviors (with a median value of 0.44 for behaviors). Heise concluded: "There is considerable cross-cultural agreement in assessments of identities' goodness and power. Of course, the high correlations do not mean that the six cultures necessarily are the same in this regard. [For example, in the family] ... Japanese evaluate family members less positively than people in the other cultures, and a child actually is felt to
be neither good nor bad in Japan. Chinese evaluate family members most positively; and the Chinese are different from people in the other five cultures in feeling that mothers are more powerful than fathers. Generally, parents are evaluated more positively than children, but not in Germany where fathers are felt to be less good than either children or mothers. Mothers generally are felt to be nicer than fathers, but this difference is negligible in the U.S.A. The power difference between fathers and mothers also is negligible in the U.S.A. These differences among societies are sufficient to create substantial variations in the affective tone of family life. For example, computer simulations based on these data suggest that fathers are supportive to children in both Japan and China, but when situations get tense Japanese fathers turn into disciplinarians while Chinese fathers turn into coaches.”

A third basis for distinctive emotions among people in different social categories relates to the processing of information about people and actions. Several studies in different nations (Smith-Lovin 1987; Smith et al. 1994; Schröder 2011) suggest that there are few gender differences in affective processing of events. So far, no studies have examined racial differences in affective processing. On the other hand, studies (Cai 2001; Mackinnon 1985; Schröder 2011; Smith et al. 1994) have documented cultural differences in the processes by which cognizance of social events leads to transient impressions of the interactants. Thus, what ostensibly is the same event could lead to different emotions in different cultures as individuals in each culture process the event in their own indigenous ways.

Affect control theory’s emotion model extracts emotions from transient impressions and identity sentiments. We tested for gender differences in the extraction process using the Heise and Thomas (1989) data. No significant differences were found for the Evaluation and Activity dimensions, but we did find significant gender differences on the Potency dimension. Mainly males compose emotional potency by giving a bit more weight to identity potency than females do, and the net effect is that males feel slightly less emotional dominance when they are in powerful identities, and less emotional vulnerability when they are in powerless identities. Thus females might be prone to somewhat more vulnerable negative emotions when altercast into a weak and scorned identity like victim.

Smith et al. (2001) found substantial gender differences in emotion equations among Japanese respondents. “Among the Japanese, in contrast [to Americans], we find consistent statistical support for male-female differences in the principles underlying cognitive judgments of the evaluation, potency, and activity of attributions of trait, emotional, and status characteristics. Japanese men and women appear to give different answers to: What kind of person would display that emotion?” (Smith et al. 2001, p. 191).

No study has examined racial differences in the processes relating identity sentiments, transient impressions, and emotions.

So far, cultural differences in emotion equations have been examined only by Smith et al. (2001). They found substantial differences between Japanese and Americans, which they summarized in terms of three generalizations (Smith et al. 2001, p. 193). First, “Japanese men and women occupy different social worlds to a greater extent than American men and women”; second, “Japanese view emotional expression, trait dispositions, and status characteristics differently, whereas Americans do not make such distinctions.” Third, the appearance of many more interaction terms in Japanese equations suggests that “Japanese are particularly attuned to the psychological consistency or congruency of particularizing modifiers and role-identities.”

### 4.5 Emotion Norms

A foundational idea in the sociology of emotions is that emotion norms govern the display and experience of emotion (Clark 1997). Affect control theory proposes that emotion norms emerge from culturally shared sentiments regarding identities, behaviors, person modifiers, and settings. People have similar emotional reactions to events because they share affective meanings of the concepts that are deployed to comprehend events.
Adopting a similar perspective, Ridgeway (2006) argued that the cultural norms driving status expectations states originate in culturally shared sentiments.

Empirical research has demonstrated that affect control theory’s predictions about emotional responses in various circumstances are accurate, for individuals in either the actor or object position of a social action, and for both females and males (Heise and Calhan 1995; Heise and Weir 1999). Moreover, the studies show that individuals mostly share the same emotion when involved in the same social circumstance, as expected from affect control theory. Taking the two points together, affect control theory defines statistical norms of emotions. Additionally, the Heise and Calhan (1995) study showed that affect control theory also accounts for prescriptive norms regarding what emotions one should feel in particular circumstances, because prescriptive norms parallel statistical norms of emotional reactions in most circumstances.

Circumstantial emotion norms—what Kemper (1978) called structural emotions—dynamically shift as actions change impressions, thereby changing interactants’ emotions. For example, analyses in affect control theory suggest that two mourners in the U.S. feel glum as they begin interacting, but work upward through melancholy, then sentimentality, and may reach mutual compassion, even relief if they interact long enough. The transition to pleasant feelings predicted by affect control theory seems validated by the smiles and even laughter that commonly surface at a wake. Yet only the starting emotions correspond to emotions typically attributed to mourners.

The static notion of emotion norms, such as sadness for a mourner or happiness for members of a wedding party (Hochschild 1983), does not describe ongoing feelings but rather defines an idealized emotional state for individuals in a particular position. Social position may refer to identities—for example, attorney versus paralegal (Pierce 1995), mother versus father (Seery and Crowley 2000) or bill collector versus debtor (Sutton 1991). Social position also may be conceptualized in terms of status characteristics, such as men versus women (Lois 2003; Martin 1999) or whites versus African Americans (Harlow 2003; Wingfield 2010). As elaborated by Heise (2013), status characteristics combine with identities, thereby creating different emotions for people enacting the same role.

### 4.5.1 Characteristic Emotions

Each identity (or modified identity) can be viewed as having a characteristic emotion that theoretically would emerge when impressions of an individual enacting that identity exactly confirm the identity’s fundamental affective meaning (Heise 2002). Characteristic emotions might be viewed as goal states that individuals try to attain during interactions involving specific identities. Characteristic emotions also are useful theoretically in that they correspond to the notion of static emotion norms so often mentioned by emotion scholars, such as sadness for mourners, or happiness for brides.

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show how characteristic emotions vary with identities’ fundamental EPA profiles. Each emotion is described verbally if a named emotion is no more than one unit distant from the computed characteristic emotion. A computer-drawn facial expression is provided as well because not all states can be described with an emotion label, and because drawings communicate more nuances than words can, even though these drawings of emotional expressions are created of social actions, and it may be possible thereby to predict emotion norms for settings, especially if combined with interactant identities that institutionally match the setting—e.g., worshippers in a church.

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3 Some scholars have discussed emotion norms associated with particular settings such as work (Wharton 2009), home (DeVault 1991), or school (Jackson 2013). Affect control theory can incorporate settings into the composition of social actions, and it may be possible thereby to predict emotion norms for settings, especially if combined with interactant identities that institutionally match the setting—e.g., worshippers in a church.

4 The Euclidean distance between two profiles is “the square root of the sum of squared differences on each of the EPA dimensions” (Heise 2007, p. 146).
Fig. 4.2 Characteristic emotions of some valued identities with differing potency and activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Potent</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Impotent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active</strong></td>
<td>Friend 3.5 2.5 2.0</td>
<td>1970s Flight Attendant 1.4 0.5 1.3</td>
<td>Toddler 2.6 -1.2 2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8 2.7 1.6: euphoric, glad</td>
<td>2.0 0.6 1.2: delighted, elated</td>
<td>2.8 -2.6 2.0: unnamed emotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither</strong></td>
<td>Minister 2.4 1.8 -0.2</td>
<td>Guest 1.8 0.0 0.0</td>
<td>Schoolgirl 1.4 -0.8 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 2.8 0.3: self-satisfied, moved</td>
<td>2.0 0.2 0.5: contented</td>
<td>1.9 -1.0 0.7: unnamed emotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inactive</strong></td>
<td>Grandparent 3.0 1.8 -0.7</td>
<td>Librarian 1.6 -0.3 -1.7</td>
<td>Beginner 0.9 -1.2 -1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 3.0 0.0: self-satisfied</td>
<td>1.6 0.5 -0.7: nostalgic, humble</td>
<td>1.3 -1.1 -0.2: unnamed emotion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same visage is used in all cases to facilitate comparisons, without distracting differences in physiognomy.

An identity's characteristic emotion can be viewed as the target emotion being sought by individuals enacting that identity. For example, if you are with a friend and you yourself are enacting the friend identity, then you behave with the other in such a way as to try to feel the euphoric, glad emotions indicated for friend in Fig. 4.2. You are trying to feel like a friend, and you are trying to show your friend the corresponding emotional expression on your face. Moreover, according to affect control theory, you try to confirm the other's identity along with your own—an idea that resonates with Goffman's (1959) notion of teamwork in social interaction. So you are trying to produce the same euphoric, glad emotions for your friend, and you are working to see the corresponding emotional expression on your friend's face. According to affect control theory analyses of friend-friend interaction, these mutual goals actually are unattainable as each individual tries to keep the other empowered, so the individuals feel less dominant emotions than indicated by the characteristic emotion. Nevertheless, feeling euphoria and gladness seem like the proper target emotions for friends.

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5 "Facial expressions are formed from the EPA profile computed for an individual's emotion, according to the following rules: (a) open eyes with positive activity; (b) arch up brow with positive evaluation; (c) raise brow with negative potency, lower brow with positive potency; (d) move mouth higher with positive potency, and move upper lip higher with positive potency; (e) drop lower lip and narrow mouth with positive activity; (f) curve lips up with positive evaluation, down with negative evaluation." (Heise, 2007, p. 140).
As mentioned previously, when mourners interact with other mourners, affect control theory predicts their emotions will drift away from the characteristic emotion for mourner, moving toward fairly positive and active feelings. But melancholy is the paradigmatic emotion for mourners, their idealized emotional state, and the static emotion norm for the mourner identity.

In sum, a characteristic emotion is a theoretical construct corresponding to the emotion that would be experienced if an individual perfectly confirmed the sentiment associated with his or her situational identity. The actual emotions experienced in a social relationship often do not match the characteristic emotion because individuals try to maintain the affective meanings of others' identities as well as their own. However, characteristic emotions usefully define with precision the idealized emotion norms typically invoked in studies of emotion management.

### 4.6 Emotion Management

Sociological accounts of emotion management suggest that individuals change their emotions by changing the emotional label, the emotional expression, the somatic experience, or the meaning of the situation (or the situation itself (Thoits 1990)). Since most sociologists view these factors of the emotional experience as interconnected, it follows that a change in one may automatically trigger a change in the others (Thoits 1995).
According to many sociologists, emotion management refers to the attempts that an individual makes to align his or her feelings with feeling norms. From an ACT perspective, feeling norms relate to the idealized characteristic emotions associated with identities, rather than to statistical norms describing shared emotion dynamics. For example, the feeling norm for a (1970s6) flight attendant is feeling delighted and elated (Fig. 4.2), and the emotion norm for a mourner is melancholy (Fig. 4.3). Emotion management occurs when an individual’s emotion deviates from the norm, and someone (perhaps the individual herself) exerts pressure to correct the deviance, prompting the individual to employ strategies that move feelings toward the norm, or to appear to have done so. Emotion management, from this perspective, refers to attempts individuals make in order to bring their feelings closer to the characteristic emotions associated with their social identities.

Characteristic emotions are idealizations, and the teamwork involved in trying to confirm others’ identities as well as one’s own may interfere with experiencing characteristic emotions. For example, very few brides are happy every moment of their wedding day, although many feel the internal desire and external pressure to be glowing with happiness from dawn to dusk. Indeed, as soon as the bride interacts with a groom, her expected emotions (that is, those that arise out of her structural relationship with her intended) are typically much different than the feeling norm for a bride.

Numerous studies have focused on how individuals alter different aspects of the emotional experience (Lively 2000; Pollack and Thoits 1989; Ritchie and Barker 2006; Simon and Nath 2004; Thoits 1995), with the vast majority focusing on the cognitive component—that is, how individuals frame or, in some cases, reframe situations so that their desired feelings follow naturally (Hochschild and Machung 1989; Lois 2013; Mullaney and Shope 2012; also see Heise 2007). We organize this material by examining each of Thoits’ (1990) four factors of emotion management and situating related studies in terms of the existing ACT literature.

4.6.1 Label

According to the four-factor model of emotion management (Thoits 1990), the label that individuals apply to their physiological arousal shapes their emotional experience. In a recent study of a polyamorous community, for example, Ritchie and Barker (2006) revealed that members routinely avoided using the word “jealousy,” because the emotion itself threatened fundamental aspects of their lifestyle. Instead, they substituted the word “wobbly,” an emotion that sounds, at least, less negative and socially disruptive.

One way that ACT has contributed to the study of emotional labels, as they pertain to emotion management, is through the introduction of emotional sequencing (Lively and Heise 2004). In an attempt to quantify the process of emotion management, particularly emotion management that requires transitioning through multiple named emotions, Lively and Heise (2004) created a map of emotional experience consisting of emotion labels distributed throughout the emotional space. The labels identify socially-constructed emotions that are readily available for mentation and interpersonal communication.

Based on the assumption that small shifts between similar emotions are more easily made than large leaps between dissimilar emotions, Lively and Heise (2004) used structural equation modeling and shortest path analyses to determine the remoteness between nine different emotion labels (distress, fear, anger, rage, shame, pride, hope, joy, and tranquility) and the shortest paths between them. Consistent with many qualitative studies of interpersonal emotion management (Britt and Heise 2000; Francis 1997; Thoits 1995), they found that the shortest path between

6 The 2004 sentiment associated with flight attendant is a bit nicer and notably less active than the sentiment for flight attendant in 1978 (1.79 0.53 0.62 versus 1.40 0.48 1.33, female sentiments). Thereby the feeling norm (characteristic emotion) for a contemporary flight attendant is feeling contented or charmed, rather than delightful and elation.
distress and tranquility involved transitioning first through fear and then through anger.

Lively and Heise (2004) referred to those emotions comprising the shortest paths as segueing emotions, because they facilitate movement between positive and negative feeling states. The very act of segueing is dependent upon one’s ability to name an emotional destination, such as anger (as was the case of those grieving the loss of their spouse (Francis 1995)) or pride (as was the case of gay and lesbian activists (Britt and Heise 2000)). Thus the culturally available labels for emotions matter to individuals’ ability to segue from one emotion to another. The map of segueing emotions that Lively and Heise offered was constrained by the nineteen named emotions used in the survey data that they analyzed. However, maps of all emotion labels (MacKinnon and Keating 1989) reveal the same kinds of constraints in moving between positive and negative emotions via named emotional states.

In a subsequent analysis of sex differences in emotional segueing, Lively (2008) reported women’s shortest paths between positive and negative emotions were less efficacious and more complex than comparable shortest paths for men. In an attempt to address this finding, we reconsidered the Francis and Heise (2006) data. We found that females evaluated pleasant emotions more positively than males, and females evaluated unpleasant emotions more negatively. This gender difference in variability of evaluations of all emotions is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tail variance ratio test), even though gender differences in evaluating any particular emotion are not significant. Mean ratings of emotion Activity also are significantly more variable for females than for males (p < 0.05, two-tail variance ratio test). Females’ mean ratings of emotion potency are more variable than males, but not significantly so. The significant gender differences mean that the plot of emotion labels on Evaluation and Activity axes is larger for females than for males, and therefore females have further to go than males in transitioning from negative to positive emotional states. Thus distances between emotions in the three dimensional affective space also matter to individuals’ ability to segue from one emotion to another.

Moreover, women’s emotional segues tended to involve emotions that have been classed by those who study emotional culture as stereotypically feminine emotions (Cancian 1987; Simon and Nath 2004) or what affect control theorists would classify as more pleasant, less powerful, and slightly more active feelings that are consistent with fundamental sentiments about women, females, and most social identities typically held by women (i.e., waitress, nurse, teacher, mother, daughter, grandmother, etc).

In an attempt to address how emotional segueing worked, Lively (2008) suggested that individuals are able to move between experientially distant positive and negative feeling states by transitioning first through emotions that are experientially near and have similar levels of either potency or activation. If this assumption is correct, it would suggest that emotional segueing occurs along the fundamental dimensions of affective meaning upon which ACT is based (also see Francis 1997 and Lively and Heise 2004). As noted above, ACT views emotions as inextricable from actions in situated identities, which explains the use of female emotions by women who spend much of their lives either in gendered identities (such as mother or waitress) or in social identities in which they are routinely marked as female (such as a female professor or female police officer).

In short, emotion labels are socially constructed locations in the three dimensional emotion space that the culture recognizes and names as emotions. The named emotions facilitate mentation and communication about feelings, and accordingly movement from one emotional state to another requires transitioning through the named emotions.

Although Lively and Heise’s original analyses were constrained by the named emotions captured in the GSS (1996) emotions module, we assume that therapists (Francis 1997), teachers (Pollack and Thoits 1989), ministers (Wasielewski 1985), social movement organizers (Britt and Heise 2000), salespeople (Leidner 1993) and the like use emotional segueing in nuanced and so-
phisticated ways, drawing on the full range of named emotions. Yet, even these interpersonal emotion management specialists are limited in what they can do because whole regions of the emotion space are devoid of named emotions, as we discuss below in our section on ineffable emotions. Theoretically it is impossible to lead someone, even oneself, into these emotion regions via interpersonal or internal conversations.

4.6.1.1 Expression

In her seminal work on emotion management, Hochschild distinguished between two forms of emotion management: surface acting and deep acting. Surface acting is the cheapest form of emotion management in that it simply feigns emotion: the individual changes emotional expression without attempting to change actual feelings. Deep acting is a more psychologically expensive endeavor that requires the actor to change overt expression of emotion by actually changing one's felt emotion, usually by changing impressions of a situation or event.

Altering one's emotional expression or demeanor can serve as surface acting or, to use Goffman's terms, putting on a mask. Ironically, Ekman's work (1971) reveals that the very act of smiling has the capacity to directly affect one's physiology, as does simply leaning forward as opposed to shirking back (also see Thoits 1990), so surface acting sometimes might feedback and produce the emotion being simulated.

One way that affect control theory addresses the role of emotional expressions is by considering the effects of demeanor in conjunction with interpersonal actions. Rashotte (2001a, 2001b) examined the effects of demeanor on transient impressions generated by actions. For example, how are the effects of agreeing with someone affected by simultaneously grinning, or speaking softly, or speaking quickly, or rolling one's eyes? Her exploratory analyses revealed that such expressive behaviors do contribute to impressions of actions and of actors. For instance, performing interpersonal actions with a smile makes the actions seem significantly nicer, and adding low potency expressive behaviors like blinking and leaning back makes the actions seem even nicer.

Similarly, potent mannerisms like making a fist and sticking out one's chin make an action seem more powerful. However, Rashotte found that an amalgamation model, in which demeanor changes the meaning of the behavior being enacted and then the amalgamated act produces impressions in the usual way, does not work as a way of incorporating demeanor into ACT analyses. Expressive acts impact on impressions independently of instrumental behavior.

Schröder et al (2013) tested whether the ACT model for predicting interpersonal behaviors also predicts expressive behaviors. They coded the expressive behaviors of multiple dyads engaged in a simple task and found a substantial negative correlation between the frequency of different kinds of expressive behaviors and the extent to which the behaviors deflected impressions away from sentiments. The authors concluded, "This result corroborates the validity of affect control theory to account for the display of nonverbal behavior" (p. 53). Moreover, they found that ACT also predicted the interpersonal sequencing of expressive acts,—"the contingencies between the expressions of two interacting persons at consecutive points in time" (p. 55). Schröder et al (2013, p. 55) concluded that the "overall principle of affective consistency is as valid for nonverbal action as it is for the verbal interpretation of action."

Finally, we note that Interact's predictions disclose authentic emotional expressions, that is, the expressions that occur as a result of confirming (or disconfirming) an identity, apart from surface acting. Indeed, Interact's visual displays of emotion states might help guide individuals who want to change their own expressions in recurrent relationships so as to overcome, say, affective consequences of non-standard socialization. Rashotte (2002b, p. 272) observed that expressive behaviors might be used for management of interpersonal relations and emotions. "Doing powerful acts in nice, non-dominant ways makes those acts seem nicer. Therefore, it might be possible to plan a demeanor for a power struggle that, while still using powerful acts, maintains one's reputation as a nice person. Perhaps when negotiating a
new contract with an employer, one should speak softly, lean back and tilt one's head.”

4.6.1.2 Physiology
At the core of emotional reactions lies a physiological response (Schacter and Singer 1962), and probably no individual thinks that he or she is feeling an emotion without some degree of physiological arousal. Fontaine et al. (2007) had 531 respondents in three nations rate the likelihood that each of 144 emotion features can be inferred from 24 terms describing emotional experiences. The features included 18 bodily experiences—such things as muscle tension, feelings of weakness, going pale, rapid breathing, and shivers—and nine facial features like frowning, smiling, and weeping. The physiological features were found to be integral components of emotion, on all three of the EPA dimensions of emotion.

The close linkage between physiology and emotion opens the possibility of changing emotion by changing one's physiological state, and individuals managing the emotions of others or of self do develop strategies for effecting desired changes in physiology. For example, in their study of emotionally disturbed children, Pollak and Thoits (1989) report that teachers routinely had angry and unruly children run around the playground as a way of changing their emotions; and many of Hochschild's flight attendants learned to take a deep breath before responding to an unruly passenger. Simon and Nath (2004) found some people take a drink or a pill in order to manage angry feelings, men more often than women.

Affect control theory contains no conceptual apparatus for treating physiology as an independent variable in emotion management. However, the theory does specify how individuals can work backward from a recognized emotion in order to understand impressions they have created, or the identity they are enacting, and that allows some theoretical understanding of why individuals sometimes manipulate their own or others' physiologies. For example, tiring the body through physical activity, or increasing oxygen to the brain by deep breathing, or slowing heart rate with medication allow individuals to recognize different emotions in themselves, which in turn allow them to arrive at different impressions of troubling events, or to understand their social participation in terms of desired identities. The same causal pathway—physiology to emotion to impression or identity—might be used to analyze use of psychedelic or other powerful entheogenic drugs: the drugs stimulate emotional experiences that the individual interprets as uncovering hidden identities, thereby changing the individual's self in fundamental ways that alter future actions (Grob 1980).

4.6.1.3 Meaning
The component of emotion management receiving the most attention from sociologists is meaning or, to use Goffman's term, framing (1974). Sociological studies have documented how individuals make meaning of their emotions (Chamraz 1997; Karp 1996), and how individuals make meaning of their situations in order to change their emotional reactions (Hochschild 1983, Hochschild and Machung1989).

This component of emotion management aligns with Hochschild's (1983) notion of deep acting (1983). According to Hochschild, deep acting refers to drawing on one's own emotional memories in order to experience the emotion in the present that was felt in the past (Stanislawski (1965)). In her study of the airlines industry, Hochschild found that flight attendants were trained to look for characteristics that a rude or aggressive passenger had in common with an old friend or family member and to focus on those commonalities, rather than on the rudeness or the aggression. Flight attendants also were encouraged to think of unruly passengers as children or to see them not as obnoxious, but as frightened or scared. Flight attendants additionally were asked to change their own identity. Instead of seeing themselves as harried, overworked flight attendants, they were encouraged to think of themselves as gracious hostesses. Moreover, they were encouraged to think of the airplane not as a vessel hurrying through the sky at high speeds, but rather as a living room. Flight attendants who successfully sustained such reframing were better equipped to maintain corporately desired emotions. For
instance, while it is difficult for a harried, overworked flight attendant to be patient with a rude, obnoxious passenger, it is easy for a gracious hostess to be patient with a frightened child, especially when the interaction occurs in a living room as opposed to an airplane cabin.

In a more recent study of emotion management, Lois (2013) documented the strategies that homeschooling mothers use in order to manage the stress, frustration, and sense of being overwhelmed often associated with homeschooling. She found that homeschooling mothers who were struggling in their alternating roles of mother and teacher learned to reframe themselves as a “good mother,” and instead of seeing their behavior as teaching, they reframed their efforts as an educational extension of mothering. This reframe allowed them to go from “a struggling teacher teaching a reluctant student” to “a good mother mothering a child.” The first framing involving deviant situational identities often results in negative emotions, whereas the second framing with its positive identities typically results in positive emotions for both parties (also see Mullaney and Slope’s (2012) study of Direct Home Marketing).

The meaning component of social interaction is essentially what ACT is about. Affect control theory focuses on how impressions emerge from events defined in terms of identities, behaviors, settings, and attributes, with emotions emerging from identities and impressions produced by behaviors. Additionally, ACT posits that individuals reidentify elements of the situation—behaviors first, then perhaps identities Nelson (2006)—if salient sentiments cannot be confirmed through social interaction. Thus ACT provides valuable technology for explaining what is happening when individuals work with meanings in order to manage emotions.

Studies of emotion management and affect control theory converge with respect to meaning because of a shared reliance on symbolic interactionism (see Hochschild 1983; MacKinnon 1994), which posits that individuals make meaning in the course of their daily interactions with others and that these meanings determine the identities, behaviors, settings, and human attributes that in turn shape emotions. From both perspectives, emotional and behavioral responses follow from defining a situation in a certain way.

The major difference between the approaches is that qualitative studies of emotion management often view situational understandings as emergent, whereas ACT presumes that definitions of the situation are primarily in terms of culturally-given categories. The distinction was described by Heise (2010, p. X) as follows: “Two standpoints characterize studies of culture and meaning. One standpoint presents culture as continuously produced and reproduced by fluctuating and yet recurrent processes of meaning-making, conducted by concrete individuals in particular contexts. Another standpoint highlights the persistence of culture over time, focusing on an enduring system of meanings that organizes people’s shared experiences.” (See also Kashima 2002.)

4.7 Emotional Station

Lively and Heise (2004) introduced the notion of emotional station as follows: “Recurrent emotions reflect an individual’s station in life in terms of prevailing roles (like being a spouse) and ongoing processes (like getting a divorce).” Theoretical bases for emotional station have been elaborated since then, and we review that material next.

MacKinnon and Heise (2010) added self-sentiments as a level of affective control above identity and role processes. An individual maintains a self-sentiment, typically somewhat different at different stages of life, by embodying identities whose affective meanings match the self’s meaning. Non-confirming identities may be imposed during institutional experiences, but the individual compensates for any resulting inauthenticity by choosing other identities that pull the average embodied meaning of self back into alignment with the self meaning, so self-actualization is achieved over a period of time, such as a day or two. Thus one basis of emotional station is the selection of identities and roles to correspond with one’s current self-sentiment. These identities and
Fig. 4.4 Ineffable (unlabeled) emotions with various EPA profiles. The center position corresponding to an EPA of 0 0 0 is absence of emotion.

roles yield structural emotions that reflect one's self-sentiment, and simultaneously signal that one's self-meaning is being confirmed.

According to Heise (2007), institutional commitments take up significant amounts of normal life, in large part because individuals participate in a variety of institutions on a regular and ongoing basis. Consider, for instance a hypothetical adult living in a city suburb. Every weekday the individual gets up early and shares some time with family members, then commutes to work in the city, stays a full workday, and commutes home for a few more hours with family. Weekends are spent with family, with some time devoted to entertainments like socializing with friends, sports, TV, and, often, religion. This weekly pattern repeats for most of the year, but for a few weeks—typically during the summer or the holidays—when weekday time is reallocated to family, travel, and entertainment. Time committed to specific institutions varies at different stages in the individual's lifetime. For example, a youth is engaged with education instead of work, whereas an elder frequently is engaged with the institution of medicine. Such scheduled allocation of time to institutions is the norm for nearly everyone, though time committed to specific institutions varies from one individual to another (Heise 2007).

As suggested above, certain institutional commitments take up especially large amounts of an individual's time, and those commitments change during the life course. Thereby daily structural emotions experienced by an individual can change as the individual's primary role varies—e.g., from student to worker to patient. Moreover, people pursuing different life patterns will be involved in different institutions and roles, giving them different emotional experiences. Such dominant institutional experiences are another basis of emotional station.

Unique but prolonged life transitions such as divorce, death of a loved one, or a serious medical exigency also can keep one in unique identities that generate particular emotionalities for a period of time. These too provide bases for emotional station.
4.8 Ineffable Emotions

Early surveys (MacKinnon and Keating 1989; Morgan and Heise 1988) of sentiments for the hundred or so "pure" emotions (Ortony et al. 1988) discovered that no emotion labels in English refer to states of pleasant vulnerability (positive Evaluation and negative Potency), that very few emotion labels are available for evaluatively neutral feelings, and labels for unpleasant emotions are limited to feelings with only moderate levels of dominance. Indeed, MacKinnon and Keating (1989) described the domain of emotions as "a potency surface in three-dimensional EPA space" with three-dimensional expansion only for very unpleasant feelings. Absences of labels for emotions of pleasant vulnerability also were discerned in surveys in Germany (Schneider 2006; Schröder 2007), Japan (Smith et al. 2006), and China (Smith and Cai 2006).

Morgan and Heise (1988) postulated that only unpleasant feelings and feelings of potent pleasure are interpreted as emotions, and other kinds of feelings go unlabeled because they are not understood to be emotions. However, the face-drawing function added to affect control theory’s simulation program in the 1990s undermined the Morgan-Heise interpretation by showing that facial expressions of feelings expand seamlessly into all regions of the EPA space. Some examples of facial expressions representing unlabeled feeling are presented in Fig. 4.4. The top row of Fig. 4.4 shows feelings of pleasant impotence with varied levels of activation. The middle row shows feelings that are neutral on Evaluation and Potency, with varied levels of activation. The bottom row shows feelings of unpleasant potency at various activations. The center position is empty because it corresponds to an emotion EPA of 0.0 0.0 0.0 which constitutes no emotional feeling at all.

Here we take the position that feelings anywhere in the EPA space can be emotions if they are responses to events and linked with corporeal manifestations. Thus the facial expressions in Fig. 4.4 do signal emotions albeit unnamable or ineffable emotions.

Facial expressions of ineffable emotions appear in real life. For example, the expression in Fig. 4.4 corresponding to EPA values of 2.5 –2.5 –2.5 sometimes is seen in paintings of saints or Buddha, and such an expression is evident in the photograph of Associate Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, Jr., applauding President Barack Obama’s arrival to deliver the 2010 State of the Union address. The expression corresponding to EPA values of 2.5 –2.5 2.5 is seen on young children, and a similar expression is evident in a photo of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin confronted by a topless female protestor. We have less confidence in the ineffability of the negative emotions in Fig. 4.4—the bottom row—because ACT analyses suggest that social interactions rarely produce such emotions, and because the drawings themselves suggest that these emotions may be absorbed into named emotions like contemptuous and outraged even though their EPA profiles are much more extreme.

Why are ineffable emotions, which do appear in social life, unnamed in multiple language-culture communities? Some of the ineffable emotions are associated with children, and it is possible that they are unacknowledged verbally by adults as a form of adult-centered social control. Indeed, the few studies that we have of childhood emotional socialization suggest that adults (usually parents or teachers) not only model appropriate behaviors but also link emotion labels to expressions, situations, and feelings. For instance, Pollak and Thoits (1989) found that teachers would often name students’ emotional displays, tying them specifically to particular feeling (i.e., sadness or anger) and attributing it to a reasonable situational cue (i.e., saying to a child who commented that her mother was late to pick her up, Does that make you mad? Sometimes kids get mad when their moms are late to pick them up. (p. 26; emphasis in the original)).

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7 Alito is second from left in the photo published at www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse/4311877812/.
Other ineffable emotions seem similar to the feelings experienced by religious figures. Unwillingness to name these emotions may stem from a desire to draw boundaries between those with authentic spiritual experiences and those without. Individuals with authentic experiences perhaps prevent others from talking about such experiences under the assumption that such feelings are impossible to understand without firsthand experience. (Such a strategy of exclusion is practiced by mothers, who seem unwilling to name their emotions regarding motherhood to non-mothers, who in their words, “couldn’t possibly understand” (Lois 2013)).

However, such explanations are merely speculations, and admittedly it would be amazing if ineffability of some emotions resulted from successful social control over periods of decades in multiple countries. Research is needed regarding the nature of ineffable emotions, and we return to this matter in the next section.

### 4.9 Prospects

Rogers et al. (2014) proposed that affect control theory is an especially useful medium for cross-disciplinary collaborative studies of emotion, because ACT rests on an empirical base, links individual and social aspects of emotion, and describes how emotion is affected by social mechanisms operating at the interaction, relationship, and cultural levels. In support of their argument, they illustrated how the ACT emotion model corresponds with major theories of emotion construction at four different levels of analysis: cultural, interactional, individual, and neural.

Affect control theory links to emotion theories at the cultural level in three ways. First, ACT posits that emotional experiences depend on the positions of self and other within the larger social structure, and this can be connected to individualist-collectivist (or socio-centric-egocentric) forms of culture which correlate with distinct patterns of emotion causation and perception. Second, ACT proposes that institutional and relational structures constrain individuals’ interpretations of a situation and thereby constrain experienced emotions, which is compatible with some views in cultural psychology that a culture’s association with mental organization of information regulates individual and collective behaviors and emotions. Third, ACT allows that diverse acts are acceptable in a situation while, on the other hand, all acts that disrupt fundamental meanings instigate corrective action, which addresses the concern in cultural approaches to emotion of reconciling spontaneous individual meaning-making with macro-level consensus.

At the interactional level of analysis Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve related ACT to social exchange theory, which focuses on patterns of interaction and the status and power endowments of interaction partners. The outcomes of interactions and how those outcomes compare to expectations determine emotions, and in turn, emotional experiences can shape the structures influencing interaction. Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve noted that ACT might make a useful contribution to the approach with its insight that disruptive behaviors producing negative emotions may or may not be controllable by others, depending on whether the disrupter is embodying a cooperative or conflictual (negative) identity. Another convergence might relate the exchange theory finding that positive emotions during sequential exchange are associated with increasing behavioral commitment and group cohesion to Heise’s (1998) argument that shared emotion is a key element in solidarity. Heise’s (2006) ACT analysis of assimilation-accommodation processes might help understand transitions toward sustained conflict or cooperation. Additionally, according to Scholl (2013), the three affective dimensions underlying ACT relate to basic characteristics of the payoff matrices used in exchange theory studies.

At the individual level, Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve related ACT to appraisal theory in psychology. Appraisal theory comprises a family of frameworks, with one of the prominent versions postulating that emotions develop from

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* Readers should consult the Rogers, Schröder, & von Scheve (2014) article for references to the various theories of emotion construction.
processing several types of information about an event: relevance (How relevant is this event for me?), implications (What are this event's implications or consequences), coping potential (How well can I cope with the consequences?), and normative significance (What is the significance of this event for my self-concept and for social norms and values?) According to some renditions of appraisal theory, universal psychological mechanisms link appraisals to affective feelings on dimensions of valence, power, and activation. Thus, in appraisal theory as in ACT, emotions result from subjective interpretations of events rather than from the events themselves. Also, some versions of appraisal theory position relevant affective meanings in a space defined by essentially the same three dimensions as are used in ACT. A main contrast between the theories is that appraisal theorists relate interpretations of events to individual goals, needs, and beliefs, whereas affect control theory relates conceptualizations of an event to culturally-normative affective meanings. Exploring relations between individual appraisals and culturally shared affective meanings could inform both theories by showing how norms of affective meaning enter into individuals’ emotion generating appraisals, and by tracing how personalized information processing unfolds into the emotions predicted by ACT. This lode of potential research is rich since “there have been virtually no attempts in the sociology of emotion to account for the multitude of empirical findings and concepts inspired by appraisal theory” (von Scheve 2013, p. 36).

Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve connected affect control theory’s emotion model to neuroscience via psychological constructionism. Emotions are constructed through the interaction of functional neural networks as individuals conceptualize core affect—inner representations of bodily states and sensorimotor experience—in terms of culturally derived categories. The associations of emotion categories with physiological reactions, facial and gestural muscle movements, and appraisal patterns constitute the deep meanings of emotions. As elaborated by Thagard and Schröder (in press), conceptualizations of core affect correspond to “semantic pointers,” which are patterns of neural spiking that provide compressed representations of bodily states. Compression involves loss of information as lower level embodied representations are bound into higher level, more symbolic representations, though the compressed neural representations can expand recursively to represent bodily states in a more realistic fashion. Semantic relations among compressed representations can be described as their proximity on dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity (see Schröder and Thagard 2013 for an example). Together, affect control theory and the semantic pointer framework explain the role of culture in shaping the interpretation and categorization of core affect. Affect control theory contributes a formal operationalization of the cultural construction of identity, behavior, and emotion labels in terms of their evaluation-potency-activity structure, and the semantic pointer hypothesis explains how these structural relations are represented by interrelated patterns of spiking activity in populations of neurons.

Materials discussed in this chapter relate to numerous other areas for future research. Some possibilities are elaborated below.

The description of emotion dynamics (i.e., relations between fundamental sentiments, transient impressions, and emotions) presented here is based on American data. Emotion dynamics differ in other cultures, such as Japan, and studies need to be conducted in still other cultures in order to assess the human variability in emotion dynamics. Gender differences reported here indicate that emotion dynamics also vary sub-culturally, and studies of additional sub-cultures, such as racial, class, and age groupings, are needed to examine the importance of such differences between groups in emotion formation. According to ACT, emotions also vary in sub-cultures because of unique sentiments attached to identities, behaviors, and other concepts, and future ethnographies might examine how these differences contribute to different emotional responses across groups, as was accomplished by Hunt (2008, 2013) in researching a music community.

Our discussion of Fig. 4.1 indicated that individuals enacting stigmatized identities experience
anomalous emotion processes. Several kinds of work would be valuable in future research on this topic. First, studies need to determine if ACT’s predictions of emotional liability among deviants are correct. Such studies must differentiate individuals who truly adopt a stigmatized identity from those who reject being ascribed to evil identities by others, such as jihadists who view their own acts of violence as heroism rather than terrorism. Second, studies should examine how ACT’s insights into the emotions of the stigmatized can benefit treatment regimens in psychotherapy, social work, and prison management. Third, studies might examine incomprehensible emotionality as a side function of labeling deviants. That is, evil identities may be assigned partly in order to make targets emotionally incomprehensible thereby making it easier to process these targets of justice and vengeance without emotional empathy (Heise 1998). Fourth, the mathematical form of the emotion model needs further examination in light of Fig. 4.1. One of the terms in the emotion model multiplies identity evaluation with emotion evaluation in order to predict impression evaluation, and this term is the basis for hypothesizing a point of indeterminacy in the emotions of deviants. The model with a multiplicative interaction reproduces the shape of the empirical data in Fig. 4.1 well ($R^2 = 0.83$), but the distribution of point in Fig. 4.1 permits a possible alternative framing, with one model applying for positive identities and a different model applying for negative identities. In the alternative approach, neither model would have an interaction term, and therefore there would be no point of indeterminacy, though emotional liability still would apply to deviants. Empirical studies are needed to determine which formulation is correct.

We argued that characteristic emotions in affect control theory correspond to ideal emotional states for individuals in particular identities or relationships (such as sadness for a mourner), and thereby the theory specifies the prescriptive emotion norms associated with different identities. The identification of emotion norms with characteristic emotions needs to be confirmed for a variety of identities. Studies showing that the emotion norms specified by characteristic emotions change when identity sentiments change also would be valuable. The identity of flight attendant is a good prospect for examining such change in emotion norms, given Hochschild’s (1983) rich description of early norms associated with this identity, and the substantial change in sentiment that occurred from 1978 to 2004 (see note 6).

In this chapter we proposed that emotional segueing depends on the emotion labels that are available in a culture and on their positioning in EPA space. This idea needs to be confirmed by additional studies showing that segueing varies culturally and sub-culturally as a function of available emotion labels and their affective meanings. Studies might also examine the impact on segueing of reformulated emotions, like the emotion of jealousy in a polyamorous community (Ritchie and Barker 2006).

Our review of ACT-related research on emotional expression suggested that demeanor affects impressions of an actor in parallel with instrumental action, with essentially the same model applying to expressive activity as to regular behaviors. Studies are needed to specify exactly how expressive actions bind with the identities of actors and objects, and how the impressions created by simultaneous expressive actions and instrumental actions meld into a unified impression of each interactant.

ACT research reveals whole domains of emotions that can be recognized in facial expressions but that have gone unlabeled in multiple languages. These ineffable emotions cannot be referenced easily in interpersonal communication relying on the spoken word, so they are difficult to control via some methods of emotion management. Moreover, their ineffability also makes them difficult to deal with scientifically. Yet these are among the positive emotions of religion and of childhood, so studies of this domain of emotions would contribute to important areas in sociology. Ineffable emotions also are among the agreeable emotions of objectification—e.g., of an employer who is forewarned by an employee (Heise 2014)—so research could clarify the emotional experiences that occur when one is the object of
others' helpful agency. As mentioned in our section on inexpressible emotions, we are not positive that unpleasant dominating emotions are among the inexpressible emotions, so studies addressing this issue would be valuable. Research also is needed to understand why verbal labeling of emotions is constricted cross-culturally to little more than a single plane through the three-dimensional affective space. Methodologically, research on inexpressible emotions seems to be an opportunity to employ visual sociology effectively, using photographic data to track emotions, as pioneered by Schneider (2009), or software that allows respondents to draw emotional expressions easily (de Rooij et al. 2013).

Working on such topics would help scholars who already frame their work in terms of ACT to think more clearly about the implications of their scholarship for the sociology of emotion. Other sociologists of emotion might pursue some of these topics to appreciate the usefulness of a general, precise, and well-validated social psychological theory in their own work.

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