Collective Intentionality IX
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PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS
(Alphabetical order by first author)

Facundo Alonso (Stanford)
A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention

The dispute about the nature of shared intention is, as usually understood, a dispute about the relative significance, for understanding what the phenomenon of shared intention really is, of structures of attitudes of individuals and of interpersonal obligations. For the “psychological” view (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela), psychological structures have primary explanatory significance; for the “normative” view (Gilbert, Darwall), interpersonal obligations do. In this essay, I argue for an alternative view of the nature of shared intention. According to this view, each of psychological structures and of interpersonal obligations has central and independent explanatory significance for shared intention. Shared intention involves a socio-psychological structure that includes intentions and attitudes of reliance of individuals. I argue that this structure is in large part responsible both for the practical thought and action of participants in joint action and for the creation of interpersonal obligations between them. This tells us that shared intention has two main aspects: a psychological aspect and a normative one. In arguing that shared intention has these two aspects, in this essay I will be proposing what might be called a “dual aspect theory” of shared intention.

Adam Arnold (Warwick)
The Importance of Group Agency for Understanding and Justifying Authority

The idea of authority is difficult to conceptualise and in fact gives rise to a dilemma. This dilemma involves the tension between the ideas of autonomy and authority, in the sense that we must either give up some of our autonomy, or we must give up on the idea of authority. Both horns accept an inadequate understanding of the relations between authority, autonomy, and reasons for action. With an adequate understanding this dilemma will be dissolved and the tension between autonomy and authority reduced. I will argue that in order to fully understand the relations between authority, autonomy and reasons for action we need to move to the level of group agency. Further, I will argue that the best understanding of group agency is a normative one. By normatively characterising the constitution of group agency, autonomy and authority are naturally reconciled.

Caroline Arruda (Univ. of Texas, El Paso)
Sharing Goals and Sharing Intentions

In this paper, I would like to explore whether it is possible to build an account of shared intention that does not depend exclusively on the attitudinal states of agents with regard to the activity of sharing an intention. As Frederick Stoutland (1997) makes clear in his challenge to Bratman’s view, these accounts tread close to vicious circularity by introducing these attitudinal states toward sharing an intention—such as “I intend that we act together”— as necessary conditions for intentions to be shared. Although Bratman provides a thorough response to this objection on the grounds that his account of joint action tries to show how jointly acting, given other states of affairs that
obtain, can bring about shared intention, my suggestion in this paper is that the worry about circularity is sufficiently serious to warrant trying to build an account that lacks these sorts of attitudinal states as necessary conditions for shared intention.

To do so, I will build an account of shared intention on the grounds of agents’ possessing intersecting and interdependent goals under conditions of common knowledge. As Seumas Miller (2001) makes clear, the ends of actions, whether individual or shared, are those that make it possible for individuals to share an intention, where sharing an intention is no more than jointly engaging in the pursuit of an that each individual understands as a collective end. Similarly, Cohen and Levesque (1991) take the possession of a goal that is shared by a group of individual agents—which they consider to be instances of teamwork—to be the necessary glue that holds together individual beliefs, intentions and commitments such that they can act as a group together. While I will not evaluate the merits of these two approaches, I take the notion of a goal to provide a prima facie way around the circularity discussed above. In what follows, I will develop such an account and evaluate the extent to which it is consistent with our aims in accounts of shared intention.

**Olle Blomberg (Sweden)**

**Joint Action and Aspectual Shapes**

What is required for several agents to share an intention, for them to intentionally act together? I argue that each party of a shared intention must believe or assume that there is a single end that each intends to contribute to. I draw on three different analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action to show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature that is at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just like several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if the agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each action is directed to, so the actions of several agents are only unified into an intentional joint activity if each agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Somewhat surprisingly, some of the most influential accounts of shared intention and intentional joint action fall short because they do not include or imply this condition.

Consider the following "Frege-style case": You and I are out hunting in the forest. You intend to contribute to us bringing it about that a certain prey is caught, and I intend to contribute to us bringing it about that the same prey is caught. You and I both represent the end that you intend that we bring about as "that the prey that casts the shadow (Shadow) is caught". In addition, you and I both represent the end that I intend that bring about as "that the prey that rustles the leaves (Rustle) is caught". Now, suppose that each of us falsely believes that Rustle and Shadow are two distinct individuals. Furthermore, suppose that you intend to contribute to us catching Shadow partly on the basis of your expectation that I (will) intend to contribute to us catching Rustle; you expect that my pursuit of Rustle will distract Shadow so that Shadow will be easier to catch. Likewise, I pursue Rustle partly on the basis of my expectation that you (will) pursue Shadow and that this pursuit will distract Rustle and make Rustle easier to catch.

Cases such as this will only be ruled out according to many accounts if it is assumed that each agent must aim at the single end under the same aspectual shape or manner of presentation (this assumption is explicitly made by Bratman 2014, p. 42 and Miller 1995, p. 53). However, with such a same-aspect constraint, the accounts fail to accommodate cases intentional joint action that they ought to be able to accommodate. For example, suppose that neither of us is mistaken about whether there is a single end that each intends to contribute to in the case above. Furthermore, suppose that you are almost deaf and I am almost blind, so that we represent the single end under different aspects. There appears to be no good reason for ruling such a case out as a case of intentional joint action.

In the talk, I demonstrate how Christopher Kutz’s (2000) minimalistic account of "joint action as such" as well as Michael Bratman’s (2014) maximalistic account of "shared intentional activity" face this dilemma. To provide collectively sufficient conditions, each needs to incorporate the doxastic single end condition. Arguably, many other accounts must do so too.
Help as a Form of Control

Help is not much considered in the literature of analytic social philosophy. According to Tuomela (2000), when A helps an agent B (1) A contributes to the achievement of B's goal, and (2) B accepts A's contribution to the goal. We take a rather different tack. Our notion of help is one-sided and triggered by an attempt. It is one-sided because we can provide our help to someone without her accepting it. She could be unaware of our actions, or she could be unwilling to receive it. Helping is based on trying because it is agent B (supposedly) trying to do something that triggers A's action of help. This is something supported for instance by Warneken and Tomasello's experiments with toddlers (Warneken and Tomasello 2006, 2009).

Help is interesting in its own right, but also because it allows us to reconsider the philosophical underpinnings of the central notion in this field that is the notion of control. Help is seen here as a kind of weak interpersonal control, where an agent A's agency guides an agent B's agency.

When possible, we evaluate our framework on chosen scenarios taken from the literature in philosophy and psychology. The analysis is driven by a formal, logical approach. In particular, we make use of the modal logics of agency. This assists us in taking sensible philosophical choices, avoiding blatant inconsistencies. Moreover, the resulting formalism has the potential to serve as a computational engine for implementing concrete societies of cooperating autonomous agents.

'S Real' Collective Moral Responsibility Without Groups With Minds of Their Own

Discussions of collective moral responsibility are plagued by the concern that ‘real’ collective moral responsibility requires the existence of group agents or groups with minds of their own. In this paper, I develop a case of ‘real’ collective moral responsibility which does not require group agents or group minds. I argue that this concern is unwarranted, and emerges from a general mistake in how we model collectives after individuals.

What We Together Ought to Do

There are things, I believe, that we together ought to do and not to do, distinct both from what we each ought to do, and from what groups may be held responsible for doing. Groups, like individuals, have duties and reasons for action.

In this paper, I argue that if some feature of *my* acting in some way gives *me* a reason to do so, then the same feature of *our* acting in some way gives *us* a reason to do so. I next argue that if we together have a reason to act in some way, then I may have a reason to do my part, but only if others will do theirs. Finally, I show that my views have some significant implications. These include a new refutation of Egoism.

How Groups Choose their Words: Deference as a Collaborative Process

One of the most striking ways in which the community affects our intentionality is found in the phenomenon Burge (1979) called ‘deference’: it seems that we often allow experts in our community to decide the meanings of the words in our own utterances and thoughts. If I approach my doctor and tell her that I have arthritis in my ears, she will tell me that what I have just said can't be true, because the word ‘arthritis’ I used refers to a disease that cannot occur in your ears. If I accept this response, it seems
that I allow my doctor to decide what my utterance meant – since I clearly initially believed that I had referred to a disease that could affect my ears. One way to explain this is to suppose that when we say ‘arthritis’, what we really mean is something like ‘whatever the experts mean by ‘arthritis” - a view that could be called ‘blind deference’. However, it is not always the case that we allow the opinions of experts to decide the meaning of our words. The recent controversy over the meaning of ‘planet’ illustrates this nicely – many ordinary speakers fiercely resist the proposed demotion of Pluto from planet to ‘transneptunian object’ by the International Astronomical Union. If what ordinary speakers mean by ‘planet’ is simply ‘whatever the experts mean by ‘planet”, as the blind deference accounts holds, then it wouldn’t make sense for them to resist this change. So what is going on here? Why do we accept the opinions of experts in some cases but resist it in others?

Here we explore work from developmental psychology on concept formation that shows how some ways of categorizing objects in a domain are more efficient for making generalizations and predictions about those objects than others. This work implies that when we use our lexicon to categorize objects or kinds in our environment, some ways of naming will be preferable to others. We suggest that when we defer to experts or to our community’s use of a word, what is happening is that we are using these individuals’ or groups’ opinions to improve our own categorization of the kinds and objects in our environment. However, since we are using their opinion to improve our categorization, it also makes sense to resist their opinion if we do not think it helps. On the resulting view, we are not ‘blindly’ deferring to experts, but rather deference is a process in which members of the linguistic community collaborate on refining their categorization of the objects and kinds in their environment.

Hamid Ekbia & Dan Quarooni (Indiana)

Extended Minds and Mediated Actions: The Case of Drones

The Extended Mind (EM) thesis can be summed up as the still-radical proposal that the cognitive capacity of an agent is not delimited by the skull or even the skin, but is spread out into the environment to include external resources and artifacts as well. When contemplating minds, then, EM proponents typically endorse a variant of the claim that some external resources can play a constitutive role, similar to biological brains and bodies. In place of conservative, clear, and crisp boundaries between the agent and the environment with which it interacts, EM proposes looking at such interactions as a set of mediations through which subjects/minds and objects/artifacts emerge as stable entities.

Apart from elevating the importance of agent-environment mediations, however, perspectives on EM can differ on how they understand the nature of mediated interactions. Broadly speaking, functionalist EM (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Rowlands, 2010) lays down the parity principle as a criterion according to which cognitive states are said to be extended whenever some part of the outside world functions similarly to a recognizably cognitive process in the head. A revisionist reading of the functionalist perspective (Sutton, 2010), however, rejects functional isomorphism as criterial, arguing instead for complementarity between inner and external resources. Focusing on functional isomorphism is, on this view, not only misguided but potentially harmful, as it might obscure the all-important differences between the cognitive significance of external scaffolds and inner states.

These different understandings of EM fall on a spectrum of agent-environment mediation that is more representational at one end and more situated at the other. Thus, for instance, even though EM, as originally conceived by Clark and Chalmers (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), is understood in part as a reaction to representational theories of cognition, it is sometimes criticized for clinging tenaciously to the goings-on “in the head” when deciding what counts as cognitive. Situationalist critics observe that, even as it shifts focus away from the brain, functionalist EM maintains a residual Cartesianism in stipulating the parity principle. Such a situationalist critique does not seek to attach greater importance to the environment per se, despite arguments to the contrary. Rather, it proposes a tight agent-environment mediation, according to which interaction with an artifact is best understood in relation to a plurality of situational factors (bodily postures, intersubjectivity, contextual cues, institutional norms, and social
stereotypes, to name a few.) It is in this sense that the artifact complements the agent, rather than duplicating one of its biological capacities, as one reading of the parity principle might suggest (Sutton, 2010).

We propose to test this typology of mediated relations against a set of cases that can be broadly described as “Action at a distance” (AaaD). By AaaD, we mean actions that are decoupled from their object on at least one of two dimensions of space and time. By this understanding, AaaD is necessarily tool mediated, and provides, as such, useful examples of “mediated agency” (Wilson, 2000) and, hence, test cases for various theories of EM.

In this paper, we use the example of weaponized drones as a special case of AaaD. Drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), belong to AaaD because they allow the surveillance, (mis)identification, and targeting of individuals from remote distances across the globe. The remote operation of drones provides a particularly interesting case for testing the tenets of various perspectives on EM. First, as an embodied act, drone piloting already involves Merleau-Ponty’s “operative intentionality” (Gallagher & Miyahara, 2012). At the same time, by incorporating a chain of embodied and disembodied actions, drone operation challenges some of the entrenched notions of embodiment as having to do with direct sensory-motor interaction. Secondly, as a distributed activity involving multiple actors, artifacts, and mediums, navigating drones provides an interesting case of collective intentionality as well. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the issue brings in sociocultural dimensions, the accounting of which has proved to be a key challenge for the extended mind thesis (Hutchins, 2011).

To elucidate these topics, we draw on the limited but telling published accounts and testimonies of drone pilots. These accounts provide detailed descriptions of the phenomenological experiences of these pilots. Lt. Colonel Matt Martin, for instance, has provided a close-up view of his thoughts, decisions, and actions as a drone pilot (Martin, 2010). His account, along with those of others, present lucid examples of collective agency, mediated by a host of advanced visual, surveillance, targeting, and weapon technologies.

Our analysis of these accounts vis-à-vis current perspectives on the extended mind thesis leads us to some of the conceptual gaps in understanding AaaD. We are particularly interested in understanding the embodied and sociocultural dimensions of mediated action (Hutchins, 2011; Anderson, 2003). To this end, we introduce the framework of pragmatic sociology developed by Thévenot (Thévenot, 2001), according to which human interaction with the world takes place within various regimes of engagement. To cover the full gamut of human activity, Thévenot introduces three “regimes of pragmatic engagement.” The regime of familiar action belongs to the very personal and individualized space (such as home) where people structure their environment according to their own idiosyncratic tastes and conveniences. The regime of planned action, on the other hand, belongs to the immediate environment, where you deal with those actors in your environment that are known, but not necessarily familiar, to you. Finally, the regime of collective action is focused on how people behave in collectives that include unknown agents and environments. We discuss the implications of this thinking for understanding the types of mediated actions involved in drone operations and, more broadly, for dealing with some of the conceptual gaps of the extended mind thesis.

Brian Epstein (Tufts)

How Many Kinds of Glue Hold the Social World Together?

Among the most useful skills we have, as humans, is our ability to anchor new social kinds. We do this routinely. The furniture of today’s world includes brands like Nike, Budweiser, and Blackberry; financial instruments like variable annuities, CDOs, and swaptions; technologies like screwdrivers, smartphones, and web services; dances like the lindy hop, jitterbug, and krump; textiles like gabardine, herringbone, and bouclé, subcultures like hipster, gopnik, and cybergoth; jobs like professor, President, barista, and climatologist; and so on. All of these are social creations, populating the world more densely than it once was before their introduction.

Many philosophers endorse what Guala has called “the Standard Model of Social Ontology,” i.e., the view that social kinds exist in virtue of our having a particular sort of reflexive collective attitude. (The most widely held view is Searle’s, taking institutional facts to be put in place by our holding collective acceptance (or recognition) attitudes toward constitutive rules.) Other philosophers have proposed less intellectualist pictures, in which properties of
tokens in the world – not just our attitudes – figure into determining the instantiation conditions of social kinds. (E.g., Millikan 1984, Elder 2009).

In this paper, I argue against the idea that social kinds are anchored in one uniform way. Rather, there is a variety of “anchoring schemas” by which new social kinds are generated. I explain the distinction between a kind’s grounding conditions and the anchors for that kind’s grounding conditions – i.e., the facts that determine that the kind’s grounding conditions are what they are. I then consider the materials available for anchoring social kinds in different circumstances.

I describe three different social kinds, each with a different sort of instantiation conditions. One kind is plausibly “teleofunctional” in Millikan’s sense, with historical grounding conditions. The second kind has, as its instantiation conditions, performance of a causal role and possession of certain qualitative characteristics. And the third kind has purely qualitative instantiation conditions. Yet all three of these have similar reproductive histories, with slight variations. I argue that each of these kinds, in being anchored as it is, makes very different use of reproduced tokens, their relations to one another, and other features of the environment.

Millikan has argued that kinds that are “glued together” in ways like the latter two are not “sticky enough” to support inductive generalizations. I show that her criticism is misplaced, and indeed, that even kinds anchored according to her favored story are not guaranteed to support inductive generalizations. Rather, the normal success of any given anchoring schema depends on contingent circumstances in the environment.

These observations about anchoring schemas are only the first step in reconstructing a social ontology free of magical thinking about the secret sauce that makes the social world exist. Slogans like “for something to be a social object, it must be thought of as a social object,” or “for something to be a social object, it must be created with some functional intention in mind,” are widely repeated. But they are frankly incredible, given the immense diversity of the social world and the scanty understanding we have of it. An inquiry into the anchoring of the social world, I suggest, might better begin with broad investigation of diverse cases of social kinds, and investigation into the purposes social kinds may play. With these, we have a better hope of finding the various practical schemas by which social objects, properties, and kinds are set up, such that they — as a practical matter — tend to fill their roles and purposes.

Anika Fiebich (Ruhr University), Nhung Nguyen (Bielefeld) & Sarah Schwarzkopf (Albert-Ludwigs University)

Cooperation with Robots? A Two-fold Dimensional Approach

In this paper, we aim to characterize cooperation in human-robot-interaction. Therefore we provide a two-fold dimensional approach to cooperation that allows (1) determining where precisely a specific phenomenon that is called ‘cooperation’ lies on the axis of a ‘behavioral dimension’ opposed to the axis of a ‘cognitive dimension’ and (2) showing what this implies for the robustness of cooperation. This approach does not only enable scientists from different disciplines and traditions to locate themselves in the debate when investigating what they call ‘cooperation’, it also provides a framework to spell out the cognitive preconditions that being engaged in cooperation on either dimension involve. Identifying such preconditions serves as a fruitful means to address the main aim of the present paper. The analysis shows that robots are capable of being engaged in human-robot cooperation on either dimension. However, the implications of having a shared intention with respect to joint commitments being involved are only partly implemented in the robotic systems so far.

Brian Flanagan (National University Ireland)

Collective Action under Disagreement

The paper has two objectives: to establish a taxonomy of theories of contested collective action and to defend their evaluation by reference to the practical ascription of legislation.
Agreed collective action is what happens when, ‘one says “Let’s…” and the others manifest their willingness to go along’, Anderson 2001, 31. It may be explained as a function of shared plans or ‘we’ intentions. Contested collective action, in contrast, is collective action that happens when one says, ‘Let’s…’, and the rest manifest their unwillingness to go along. Actions that some members believe to be worse than the status quo are not function of shared plans. The paradigm contested collective action (henceforth, simply, ‘collective action’) is policy making, notably, legislation.

Today, all agree that collective action is a function of member input; the basic division is between those who seek a definition, such as Kenneth Arrow and Donald Saari, and others, notably Philip Pettit and Christian List, who consider definition unavailable. Whereas most theorists assume that member input consists in policy preferences, to overcome objections levelled at traditional definitions, some propose a broader understanding, e.g., Robert Dahl and David Copp. The resultant taxonomy may be represented as a map of the logical space of collective action (following List’s ‘logical space of democracy’ 2011).

A simple definition of collective action specifies a set of conditions regarding member policy preferences that are necessary and jointly sufficient for collective action. Since controls on the voting agenda obscure policy preferences, a simple definition of collective action implies that only voting on an open agenda is representative. By dropping either, a) the premise that collective preference is definable or, b) the premise that member input consists in policy preferences, we relax this constraint.

![The Logical Space of Collective Action](image)

The paper’s second aim is to establish the relevance to the theory of collective action of the practical ascription of legislation. Those seeking a simple definition of collective action appeal to shared intuition to establish necessary conditions, ‘axioms’. If attending to our practical ascription of legislation is valuable, it is because it helps reveal that shared intuition. Many assume that practical ascriptions of legislation fail to realise this purpose, however, because they overlook the effect of agenda controls: ‘Politics is the dismal science because we learned from it that there are no fundamental outcomes to predict.’ (Arrow 2010, 27 (quoting Riker 1980, 443)). When collective legislation is ascribed on the basis of voting, the true workings of legislative assemblies are neglected. Proponents of non-definitional theory seek in general to save the appearance of intentional action, e.g., List and Pettit 2011, but they do not repudiate concerns that appearances of intentional legislative action may be misleading.

Unlike members of the legislature, non-legislators lack vested interest in ascribing legislation in exchange for control over policy areas or help with re-election. To assess whether ascriptions of legislation overlook the effect of agenda control, we examine the plausibility of supposing that non-legislators, including lawyers, are generally unaware of such controls. We then consider why non-legislators might accept agenda controlled voting as indicative of the

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exercise of authority which the constitution reserves exclusively to the collective. One possibility is that they are untroubled by whether the specified collective or some number of its members exercise authority. This appears unlikely, however. Great doctrinal controversies in every jurisdiction include debates about the validity of rules made by ministers or agencies in pursuance of powers purportedly delegated by the legislature (e.g., Rose- Ackerman 2012). Lawyers aggressively question the statutory authority of executive officers and agencies to make rules that affect their clients’ interests. It would be remarkable, therefore, if lawyers were uninterested in the possibility that rules affecting client interests had been made by an entity other than that to which the constitution reserved the authority.

Compare voting on a controlled agenda with the declaration by the agenda controller and his allies that they are enacting the statute in their own name. The declaration would be immediately interpreted as an attempted coup d’état. The response to such a declaration illustrates our sensitivity to the question of whether voting reveals an action of the specified collective or merely that of some of its members. That, in turn, suggests that any feature of voting to which we are insensitive is one we perceive to be unproblematic. It is salient, then, that neither the civilian nor common law legal tradition proscribes the ascription of legislation on the basis of agenda controlled voting (MacCormick and Summers 1991).

The practical ascription of legislation may accordingly be taken to reveal that, intuitively, collective action is not obscured by agenda controls. The conclusion implies that collective action cannot be defined in terms of member policy preferences, which, ex hypothesi, agenda controls obscure.

Sergio Gallegos (MSU Denver)

Searle and the Analysis of Collective Intentionality

It is a truism that our lives are immersed in a rather complex fabric made up of different social facts and institutions such as marriage, banks, political parties and corporations, just to name a few. Providing a systematic account of how there can be such things is particularly pressing task considering that, if we agree that ‘we live in a world made up entirely of physical particles in fields of force’ (Searle 1995: 7), the very existence of social facts and institutions cries out for an explanation. Now, one of the most remarkable accomplishments of Searle in some recent works (1995, 2010) has been articulating a comprehensive account that aims to explain how social institutions arise within a physical world. In particular, within the account he proposes, there is a certain notion that plays a crucial role, which he labels collective intentionality.

But what is exactly collective intentionality? And what role does it play in the emergence of the social ontology in which our lives are embedded? In order to make clear how he understands the expression ‘collective intentionality’, Searle stresses a distinction traditionally drawn between mental states that are about something (e.g., my belief that the US real estate market is recovering) and mental states that have no object (e.g., a state of anxiety), and observes that intentionality is use to describe that feature of minds by which mental states are about objects and states of affairs in the world. This aboutness of collective intentionality is crucial according to him to explain why the notion plays a key role in the account he proposes of the creation of social facts and institutions.

To appreciate this, let us consider another crucial component in the account that Searle provides, which is the assignment of functions. For Searle, the $20 bill that he has in his pocket has a certain role in the society where we live, but there is no intrinsic feature to the piece of paper that endows it with its role: no physical or chemical property of the piece of paper makes it be part of a social fact. What makes it be part of a social fact is that we assign to it a particular function –namely, to stand for a certain economic value that can be used to obtain certain goods or services. In light of this, if we accept, following Searle (1995: 14), that ‘functions […] are never intrinsic but always observer relative’ and that we could never assign a function to an object unless we could somehow think about it in certain specific ways, it is clear that the assignment of functions presupposes intentionality.

To further characterize the notion of collective intentionality, Searle remarks that, even though human beings often have intentional states that are unique to each individual, they have also have the capacity to exercise collective intentionality, which consists in the fact that ‘they share intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions.’ (1995: 23) Now, given that collective intentionality involves several individuals sharing intentional states, one might
be tempted to explain the notion in terms of each individual having a certain intentional state (and perhaps some beliefs about the intentions of others). However, one of Searle’s central theses (1995: 24) is that ‘collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon that cannot be reduced or eliminated in favor of anything else.’ When two persons, say, Edith and Charles, intend to sing a duet, their intention cannot be reduced to Edith’s intention to sing with Charles and Charles’ intention to sing with Edith, even supplemented with mutual beliefs about what each other intends to do.

Though Searle has defended with several arguments his thesis that collective intentionality is irreducible to anything else in virtue of its primitive character, his view has met resistance from several critics. In particular, Meijers (2003), Zaibert (2003), and Pacherie (2007) have raised a number of objections to Searle’s thesis. My aim in this paper is to set up a defense of Searle’s thesis against these objections. As we will see in detail further down, a recurrent theme in the writings of Searle’s critics is that either (a) he does not provide an analysis of the notion of collective intentionality or that (b) the analysis he provides of it is unsatisfactory in virtue of the fact that it is inconsistent with Searle’s philosophy of mind. My main contention here is that Searle’s critics misunderstand his view because they expect Searle to provide a reductive analysis of the notion of collective intentionality. However, since Searle explicitly maintains that the notion is primitive, he cannot provide the kind of analysis they expect from him. But Searle does provide an analysis of the kind that Strawson (1992) labels ‘connective’, which sheds light on certain crucial features of collective intentionality –or so I will argue here. And I will also argue that, once we see the analysis of collective intentionality that Searle puts forward as connective rather then reductive, we can also answer the objection that it is inconsistent with his philosophy of mind.

Here is how I will proceed. First, I will rehearse briefly what I take to be the key features of Searle’s account of collective intentionality, putting particular emphasis on highlighting certain constraints that, according to Searle, a satisfactory account should meet. Having done that, I will present briefly the main objections that have been raised against Searle’s account of collective intentionality, which are that he presents no analysis at all or that his analysis is at odds with his philosophy of mind. Subsequently, I will argue that Searle in fact presents an analysis of collective intentionality (thus defusing the first objection), but that his analysis is connective rather than reductive. And, finally, I will argue that, once we understand Searle as putting forward a connective rather than a reductive analysis, the second objection can be also be dealt with.

Brian Gordon (USA) & Georg Theiner (Villanova)

Scaffolding Joint Action as the Foundation of Organizational Capabilities

Organizational Routines and Capabilities - An Introduction

Scholars in the social sciences who study organizations as economic actors (King, Felin & Whetten, 2009) often invoke the constructs of organizational routines and organizational capabilities (Felin & Foss, 2009) in explanations of what makes organizations unique and what factors drive differences in performance (e.g., growth, profitability, etc.) over time (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1992; Conner & Prahalad, 1996). In this literature, routines and capabilities are typically understood as larger-scale units of analysis supervening on - though not necessarily reducible to - the people, artifacts, processes, and their interactions that comprise the organization’s basic elements (Felin & Foss, 2005; Felin, Foss, Heimeriks & Madsen, 2012; Barney & Felin, 2013). Routines and capabilities, therefore, are congruent with emergentist frameworks forwarding multilevel social ontologies proposed by ‘new mechanists’ in the social sciences (Sawyer, 2004, 2005).

In general terms, routines and capabilities are typically understood as patterns of interdependent action among individuals that are learned over time and oriented toward accomplishing some ‘larger’ unit of work that requires the coordination of multiple individuals (Winter, 2003; Felin and Foss, 2009), often bringing together people with very different knowledge, skills, and experiences (Felin et al. 2012), in flows of activity that can occur over varying stretches of time and that, potentially, can involve action that takes place at many different locations and which relies upon various sociomaterial ensembles (Orlikowski, 2000, 2007). It is sometimes argued that capabilities are composed of routines (e.g., Winter, 2003), implying that an organization’s capacity to engage in more complex lines of action is built up from inventories of more basic building blocks, assembled hierarchically. In practice, however, the line distinguishing a routine from a capability is often vague and hard to define with any rigor or consistency.
(Pentland & Feldman, 2005); just how these constructs are operationalized in empirical research often depends on the questions of interest of the researcher.

Three ‘Stylized Facts’

While routines and capabilities have become commonplace in the theoretical and empirical literature on organizations, accounts detailing just what an organizational routine or capability actually is, and how these macro-level entities and processes relate to each other and to micro-level constituents, like individual people, material resources, and work tasks, remain heavily contested (Felin & Foss, 2009; Hodgson, 2012; Felin & Barney, 2013). While methodological individualists, for example, tend to take a reductionist stance to these higher level constructs, focusing attention on ‘more fundamental’ notions like individual knowledge, skill, choice, and belief, methodological collectivists remain committed to non-reductive accounts stressing the independent causal contributions of these organizational level entities in their accounts of organizational performance (Felin & Foss, 2006, 2009). More generally, over time, numerous theoretical lenses have been brought to bear in studies of capabilities and routines. They range from Neo-Carnegie school perspectives based on bounded rationality and notions of the programmatic nature of organizational behavior (March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982), to Latourian notions of organizations as ‘quasi-objects’ (Spender, 1996), practice-based frameworks (Feldman & Pentland, 2005; Orlkowski, 2007) and notions of habit and deliberation drawn from Dewey (Winter, 2013).

While individually coherent, taken together, these different theoretical lenses do not appear to be compatible. In part, this reflects the fact that capabilities and routines have been invoked to play different explanatory roles in the context of these theoretical traditions. Notwithstanding these differences, there are several notable, and as of yet unresolved, tensions within the literature taken as a whole (Becker, 2004; Pentland and Feldman, 2005). In particular, those include:

(i) the relative importance of more programmatic, or rigidly canaled versus more ad hoc, or improvisational modes of action;

(ii) the relative importance of ostensive representations of routines and capabilities – the abstract, generative patterns participants invoke to conceptualize and guide their actions – versus the actual performances by specific people, at specific times, in specific places;

(iii) the relative importance, of the different micro-level, meso-level, and macro-levels of analysis.

One way to resolve these tensions is to assume that, in each case, one side of the debate must represent a more accurate account of reality. We take a different tact in this paper. Instead we consider them to be things that cry out for explanation in their own right – in effect, outlining a set of ‘stylized facts’ (Helfat, 2007; Miller, 2007) that need to be accommodated. Siding with the microfoundations approach (Felin & Foss, 2009; Barney & Felin, 2013) we find extant accounts of organizational routines and capabilities to be lacking in this regard. Parting with the overtly reductionist thrust of the recent microfoundations approach, we first sketch an alternative framework that is grounded in the literature of collective intentionality and extended cognition. Then, we show how our framework can naturally accommodate the above set of stylized facts.

Foundations, not Microfoundations

Theories built on a framework of methodological collectivism have been quite common in the organizational capabilities and routines literature (Becker, 2004; Felin & Foss, 2009). In their seminal treatment, Nelson and Winter (1982), for example, explicitly introduced the notion of an organizational routine as a macro- or organizational level analog of skill at the individual level. Nelson and Winter’s approach, along with subsequent work in the literature rooted in methodological collectivism, however, has been criticized as of late for two reasons: (i) for not explaining the origins and historical emergence of routines and capabilities, and (ii) for not explaining how macro-level phenomena such as routines and capabilities are assembled from a heterogeneous network of entities, processes, and interactions operating at lower-levels (Felin & Foss, 2005, 2006, 2009; Barney & Felin, 2013; Salvato & Rerup, 2011).

We are sympathetic to this critique. At a minimum, one doesn’t have to be a reductionist to see the legitimacy of inquiry into the microfoundations of macro-organizational phenomena. But perhaps more importantly, if the goal is to understand what factors drive organizational level dependent variables, we think it is reasonable to look for
explanations wherever they may be found, without concern for where in the hierarchy of levels they are located. At the same time, we remain cognizant of critiques of the reductionist approaches, which have long noted the challenges, practically and conceptually, of skipping directly from action, choice, and knowledge at the individual level to organizational-level descriptions and outcomes (Becker, 2004; Pentland, 2011; Winter, 2012). What is needed is a proper articulation of foundations - which may or may not require a ‘microfoundational’ approach (Ross & Spurrett, 2004).

The framework we sketch here is foundational, in the sense that it seeks to explain how organizational level phenomena, while real, arise out of more basic constituents, but without the implication that these constituents are located exclusively at the level of individuals. Rather, organizational level phenomena emerge from an assemblage of heterogeneous elements occupying multiple levels (cf., Archer, 1995; Sawyer, 2004). More specifically, we propose that they are built out of capacities for joint or collective intentionality (Tomasello, 2009; Bratman, 2010) that reside ‘in the heads’ of individuals in conjunction with multiple layers of cognitive scaffolds that encompass material resources and sociocultural practices (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Hutchins, 1995; Wilson, 2004; Clark, 1997, 2008; Menary, 2010; Theiner, 2011). Scaffolds create new modes of action and cognition by providing us with resources that complement our biologically more basic collective-intentional capacities. In particular, they enable novel forms of organizationally dependent joint actions that are pervasively distributed in time, across space, and among people working together in abstract task environments (Daft & Weick, 1984).

Matti Heinonen (Helsinki)

A Model-Based Approach to Collective Intentional Action: a Platform for Conceptual Negotiation and Interdisciplinary Collaboration

This paper discusses contemporary philosophical accounts of collective intentional action from a meta-theoretical perspective, and argues for an interpretation of their theoretical status according to which they should be seen as models of hypothetical unified or distributed agential systems that can serve to represent the social cognition and behavior of suitable kinds of real agents acting together in complex social environments, but that do not by themselves make truth-valued claims either about how such agents actually function or about the cognitive mechanisms underlying their behavior. The model-based approach to collective intentional action is defended by its ability to subsume various different philosophical accounts of collective intentional action under a common and more comprehensive framework, to negotiate the conceptual commitments and ontological construals of different philosophical accounts with one another, and to provide a feasible platform for philosophically informed interdisciplinary research on collective intentional action.

Kendy Hess (Holy Cross) & Gunnar Bjornsson (Umea)

Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporations

Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents with their own (equivalents of) beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of such “corporate” or “collective” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what the agent has done, and they might jointly intend or be jointly committed to feel remorse, or to express regret on part of the collective. But just as an entity needs to have its own beliefs, desires, and intentions to qualify as a bona fide agent, the required capacity for reactive attitudes is a capacity to have one’s own reactive attitudes. If fully-fledged moral agency requires reactive attitudes, the corporate agent must itself be capable of guilt and indignation. In this paper, we argue that at least certain corporate agents are. Or, more precisely, we argue that these agents have the capacities that are associated with guilt and indignation and plausibly required for moral agency, in particular certain epistemic and motivational capacities. Their expressions of indignation need not be mere strategic aggression, and their expressions of guilt and sorrow for what they have done need not be mere crocodile tears.
Johannes Himmelreich (LSE)

Agency: A Propositional Framework

I put forward necessary and sufficient conditions for the relation "a is an agent of x" which holds between an entity a and an action x. The aim in doing so is to provide a framework to clarify cases of collective agency, in which several individuals are involved in bringing about a state of the world. I formalise the intuitive idea that agency is a form of intentional control. In other words: a is the agent of x if her intentions are the difference-maker for whether or not x. Departing from other proposals, I require that two conditions are necessary for a to be the agent of x. First, in all situations in which a intends that x, x is the case. Second, in all situations in which a does not intend that x, x is not the case. These can be called the positive and negative condition respectively. After motivating and developing this proposal, I will illustrate it with applications to cases of collective agency.

Raul Hakli (Aarhus University)

Groups Can Lie

According to non-summative accounts of group beliefs, group beliefs are formed by the group members agreeing on the content of the group's belief. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that non-summative accounts are false because they entail that groups cannot lie, although intuitively they can. I will defend non-summative accounts by arguing that if agreement-based group beliefs are understood as acceptances instead of proper beliefs, groups can lie even under a non-summative understanding of group beliefs.

Paul Hammond (Memphis)

A Critique of Margaret Gilbert's Account of Political Obligation

Margaret Gilbert is well known for promoting a theory of the intentional states of social groups which relies on the two interrelated concepts of "joint commitments" and "plural subjects." In her 2006 book A Theory of Political Obligation, Gilbert applies this account of collective intentionality to give an answer to the question of why citizens have an obligation to obey the law simply by virtue of their membership in a political society. In this paper, I will argue that Gilbert's account of political obligation fails because it assumes that citizens have an unrealistically high level of awareness of the content of their obligations. I will further argue that a distributed cognition approach, which allows us to maintain the concept of a plural subject without connecting it to the requirement of joint commitment, can provide a better solution to the problem of political obligation.

I will first give a recapitulation of Gilbert's general account of plural subjects, drawing on her earlier book On Social Facts. According to that view, a social group can have intentional states, and therefore constitute a plural subject, if and only if each member of the group is a party to a joint commitment to believe, intend, do, etc. something as a body. According to this account, the acceptance of this joint commitment by each member of the group is necessary and sufficient to constitute the group as the plural subject of a belief, intention, action, etc. I will show that it follows from this view that each member of a group understands the content of the intentional state to which the group is committed.

I will then turn to the way that Gilbert uses this account of plural subjects to answer the question of political obligation, which she refers to in A Theory of Political Obligation as the "membership problem." According to Gilbert's view, political societies are plural subjects which are constituted by their members' acceptance of certain joint commitments. Gilbert argues that these joint commitments are the source of social rules in the sense of the term introduced by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law. Therefore, she says, members of a political society have an obligation to obey social rules of the political society to which they belong, of which laws are a subset.
After outlining the way in which Gilbert’s account answers the membership problem, I will turn to my criticism of her view, which is that it requires citizens to have an implausible level of understanding of the content of the social rules they are obligated to follow. Because, on Gilbert’s view, political obligation is grounded in each individual’s acceptance of a joint commitment to the rules which prescribe norms for members of the group, it requires that each individual understand the content of the rules he or she is obligated to follow. This would mean that for any citizen to be obligated to obey the law he or she must understand the content of the law and what it requires. However, this is clearly not true in the case of many laws and other social norms. It would seem to most observers, I will argue, that an individual can have an obligation to obey the law without knowing what the law requires. Therefore, Gilbert’s plural subject view cannot be a necessary condition for having political obligations.

Once I have explained my criticism, I will respond to an objection that political obligation does not require understanding of the specific content of all social norms or rules, but only of some general norms which every member of a political society can plausibly be supposed to understand. It might be thought that political obligation requires only a joint commitment to certain general social rules or to an institutional structure for determining rules and that the specific obligations in a particular case can be derived from these general principles, even if each citizen is not aware of specific content of his or her political duties in a particular case. This objection fails, I will argue, because what is specifically required by the law in many particular cases cannot be derived directly from general principles that any citizen can plausibly be expected to have accepted a joint commitment to. Disputes over the proper interpretation of laws show that each citizen cannot plausibly be expected to have the capacity to derive his or her specific legal obligations from his or her commitment to general social norms.

Because of this objection, I will argue that we should take an approach to political obligation that maintains the view that the intentional states of plural subjects are the source of social norms, but that the content of these intentional states are not determined by joint commitments which each member of a social group can be supposed to have accepted. Instead, I will argue, we should take a distributed cognition approach which explains the content of social rules as being grounded in cognitive processes taking place among members of a social group. I will appeal to the account of distributive cognition adduced by Bryce Huebner in his recent book Macro cognition to illustrate how such a theory of political obligation would work. According to this view, it is not the joint acceptance of intentional states which is constitutive of collective intentionality, but social processes taking place among members of the group. Therefore, this view does not require that every member of a group understand the content of all collective intentional states. A view such as this would therefore be able to explain why members of a social group have obligations to obey all social rules, including those of which they may be unaware.

Frank Hindriks (Groningen)

Corporate Responsibility Without Phenomenal States

Experimental philosophers report that people attribute intentional states to groups, but not phenomenal states. I ask what implications this has for the ascription of moral responsibility to group agents. Both rationalist and sentimentalist conceptions of moral agency involve states of consciousness. If the folk are right and group agents do not possess such states, group agents cannot be moral agents, and it does not make sense to praise or blame them. In response to this line of argument, I propose and defend what I call ‘the substitution strategy’ for moral group agency, which is premised on the idea that the way in which moral agency is realized in groups might differ from the way in which it is realized in human beings. Having criticized the idea that rationality might suffice for moral agency, I go on to argue that the ability to form evaluative group judgments or the formation of group policies of valuing can turn a rational group agent into a moral agent.

Marcus Hedahl (Annapolis)

Collective Cats: Irreducibly Joint Actors that Lack the Full-fledged Moral Agency of their Members

In this paper, I defend a novel understanding of how individual agents can act together. In short, I argue that a collective can perform an irreducibly joint action while lacking the requisite moral capabilities to be morally
responsible for that action – even though the members of that collective are themselves paradigmatic moral agents. As others have noted, if we are deceived into believing that individuals are the only causal agents, we run the risk of staggering through the world blind to the momentous influence collective actors can wield. I argue that we face an equal danger if we fail to recognize the fundamental moral inadequacies that some of those irreducibly collective actors possess. At times, even when a group is capable of irreducibly joint intentional action, appealing to the collective itself to be just and righteous can be as sure a sign of misapprehension of the moral domain as asking the gods to be merciful or begging the wind to be kind. Irreducibly collective causal actors can, and often do, lack the full-fledged moral agency of their members.

Säde Hormio (Helsinki)
Culpable ignorance in collective responsibility: institutional practices and social (ir)responsibility

Control, freedom, and autonomy are aspects of responsibility usually considered when discussing blameworthiness of an agent. In this paper, I will explore the epistemic dimensions of collective responsibility. More specifically, I am interested in the ways institutional practices - bureaucracy especially - can affect the knowledge we have about the causes and effects of our actions. If one does not know what one is involved in, and cannot be reasonably expected to know either, then one cannot be praiseworthy or blameworthy. However, it is not always easy to draw a line on when a situation in systematic, and our failures are not ours anymore but due to “circumstances”.

I will argue that some of our institutions need reshaping for us to take personal responsibility seriously again. Before we are able to prescribe the changes necessary, however, we need to have a clearer view on how institutional practices affect the evidence available to us. Furthermore, I will argue that our prevailing everyday attributions of praise and blame tend to be too lenient when it comes to the collective institutional setting. I will bring together recent discussions on epistemic responsibility (Zimmerman 2008, Code 2013) and organisational ignorance (Roberts 2012) with the on-going debates about collective responsibility found in social ontology literature (May 1996, French 1998, Copp 2006, Kutz 2000). I take epistemic responsibility to refer to not only the agents’ status of beliefs but also their actions.

Institutions sometimes deprive individuals of their capacity to make good moral judgements by fragmenting available information. Bureaucracy is the administrative system that governs large institutions. Bureaucracy in its purest form is characterized by attention to detail, a legalistic objectivity, procedures, orders, documentation, impersonality, rationality and efficiency. Weber already was worried about the implications of bureaucratization for individual’s freedom and control, although he was supportive of bureaucracies as rational and efficient ways of humans to organise themselves. Bureaucracy breaks work and knowledge into pieces, and bureaucratic compartmentalization and the secrecy that often comes with it prevents information passing on from one department to another. This fragmentation of consciousness provides rationales for not knowing about problems, and for not trying to find out. Rational bureaucracy can, in this sense, stimulate irrationality. Bureaucratization is therefore never simply a purely technical matter, just a system of organisation, but a power system with privileges and domination. Arendt described bureaucracies as “rule by Nobody”. May similarly argues that institutional socialization in bureaucracies can make people see themselves as anonymous cogs of a machine, who do not have the need to develop a sense of responsibility in relation to what they do.

In addition to fragmentation of information, institutional frameworks also affect the way we think. Our minds both organize and censor our experiences through a conceptual scheme. Werhane (1999) describes how all our activities are framed by mental models - our perspectives on things - and embedded in conceptual schemes. Our interests, desires, biases, intentions, and points of view operate as selective filters that restrict what we see in the world. Through the models, we make sense of our experiences, and interpret and clarify events to ourselves. Mental models are influenced by socialization, culture, education, upbringing, art, media, and workplace. Different mental models lead to different expectations, which can cause misunderstandings in communication. Ignorance also undermines the voluntarism required for moral responsibility. Withholding some important information, or the tendency to only communicate the positive news, is common among corporations and other large modern bureaucratic institutions. Naturally not everyone can know everything, and not all information is even relevant for all. Yet it is hard to draw a
clear line on what information should be available to whom. Wolgast (1992) argues that “[l]ack of information and lack of responsibility go hand in hand, and both are built into the organizational structure.”

Due to our complicated social and economic structures, we might even be involved in collective actions that we do not know of. Kutz’s observes that we live in a morally flawed and complicated world, where we are associated with regrettable things and connected to harms not brought about by us intentionally or individually. Kutz argues that whenever we act in collectives, we should expect that there are aspects involved that we do not know about, but will have to reckon with. This is the price we pay to participate in group action. Acting collectively allows us to expand our powers beyond what we could achieve alone, but there is always the risk that what we are involved in does not align with our moral interests, and we should keep these moral “agency costs” in mind. When then do our harmful actions done in an institutional setting fall under culpable ignorance and when are they blameworthy? Holly Smith (1983) argues that the problem of culpable ignorance arises only when the unwitting wrongful act falls within the known risks of the earlier act that infects the later act. I will discuss how this idea goes with the precautionary principle, which is about anticipating harm and being cautious. I will argue that in the information age, these known risks have multiplied.

I do not think that philosophy can (or should) offer us clear guidance on what to do. However, it should aim to clarify what we should be aiming at, individually and collectively. Zimmerman distinguishes three views on the nature of moral obligations: the Objective, Subjective and Prospective Views. Under the latter, we should choose what is under the circumstances the most reasonable option to choose, not what would in fact be the best, or what we believe to be the best option. According to the Prospective View, one ought to base one’s actions on evidence. One of the conclusions Zimmerman draws is that justifying an agent’s behaviour is not the same as exculpating the agent: our moral inquiries should continue. I will show why this approach is the most promising one when it comes to institutional setting.

Marija Jankovic (Davidson College)

Assertion and Joint Commitment

In the paper “Sincerity and Joint Commitment,” I explore the prospects of a collectivist account of assertion. I show that our ordinary judgments of sincerity uncover features of our practice of asserting that are surprising from the perspective of many popular accounts. For example, we judge that utterers ought to be sincere even when the epistemic status of the asserted content is independent of whether the utterer believes it. We also judge that the obligation to be sincere is owed to the addressee of the assertion and not to everyone whose belief state was expected or intended to be changed as a result of the assertion. I argue that these observations support an account on which an obligation to be sincere is a directed obligation one can enter into as a result committing to a shared intentional activity. This is turn supports an account of assertion on which it is a move in a collective intentional activity.

Alexander Jeuk (Cincinnati)

Embodiment, Communication and Joint Action. Against a Symbolic View of Concepts

Some proponents of a linguistic-symbolic conception of conceptual cognition (LC) (cf. Fodor and Lepore 1992, Gauker 2007) argue that non-symbolic approaches to conceptual cognition like the embodied account of conceptual cognition (EC), particularly simulationist accounts (cf. Barsalou 1999, Gallese and Lakoff 2005, Goldstone and Barsalou 1998, Grush 2004, Landy and Goldstone 2009, Prinz 2002), fail to account for linguistic communication. The argument is that if (i) concepts are not linguistic-symbolic or highly similar to linguistic-symbolic representations and if (ii) concepts are not representationally projectable onto linguistic entities that are used to perform speech acts, then linguistic communication between speakers is impossible, because (a) speakers do not use the same utterances to communicate the same thoughts or (b) do not possess the entities that can be socially shared and thereby be the subject of shared communication, i.e. linguistic concepts. Embodied simulators are representationally different from speaker to speaker and not representationally projectable onto words. Accordingly they are not concepts, because if they were concepts, we could not linguistically communicate, which we clearly can.
The intuitive pull of this argument is based on the assumption that concepts, conceived of as representations of knowledge about the world, need to be the same in different speakers in order to allow for linguistic communication. The implicit assumption behind this intuition presupposes that only if the same thoughts, housed in concepts, are conveyed through words, on which concepts are projected and which are representationally corresponding to concepts, that then communication is achieved. This assumes that the function of linguistic communication is to share same thoughts, where sameness of thought is defined by the possession of identical concepts. These presuppositions are problematic though. They presuppose that sameness of conceptual thought is necessary for linguistic communication and that next to perfect linguistic communication is achievable in all conceptual domains qua identical concepts, where identify is defined by the sameness of content which is atomistically denotable by a word (cf. Fodor 1998). Both of these assumptions are not argued for.

Contrary to these two core intuitions of the LC approach I present two conceptions derived from the EC account which are naturalistically and phenomenologically more adequate than the LC intuitions.

1) Sameness of concepts is not necessary for linguistic communication, but the structure of embodied concepts, environmental situatedness and linguistic-communicative skills allow to ground linguistic communication in successful joint action.

2) Linguistic communication is imperfect in many cases. That is the case because concepts are not the same in every speaker (cf. Allen 2014) and because the conceptual competency varies for speakers from conceptual domain to conceptual domain.

First, it is question begging whether sameness of concepts is required for successful communication as long as successful communication is not unwarrantedly identified with sharing same thoughts. Rather, we can and should conceive of successful communication, in accord with naturalistic and embodied approaches to cognitive science, as that what enables successful shared action (cf. Prinz and Clark 2004).

Though this does not constitute a classic counterargument to the LC approach, conceiving of success criteria for linguistic communication along the lines of successful actions has the advantage of conceiving of communication in terms of factors that are naturalistic, empirically observable and for which linguistic communication probably evolved. The grounding in action aspect has the further advantage that it does not run into systematic problems faced by linguistic-symbolic accounts like the symbol grounding problem or the problems highlighted by the Chinese room experiment (cf. Harnad 1990, Searle 1980). In a similar way in which linguistic-symbolic concepts are not grounded in perception and action, linguistic communication is not grounded in perception and action according to LC: sameness of concepts is as much a non-empirical and non-efficacious criterion for joint action and communication as a referential account for content.

Second, LC theorists assume that linguistic communication works in most cases error free by means of the use of the same words and their corresponding concepts. If it is assumed that a linguistic representational format underlies conceptual cognition and if it is further assumed that these linguistic representations receive their content through stable causal reference relations or use or other traditional modi of reference, then it is likely that error free communication is the standard case. However, it rather seems that communication, particularly about abstract conceptual domains or in cases in which the speakers do not share a common environment, breaks down easily. An EC account of conceptual cognition predicts exactly these breakdowns. Abstract concepts, that have no proper grounding in concrete situations that pertain to action or perception and concepts that are situationally coupled to diverging environments will vary strongly from speaker to speaker and accordingly linguistic communication about these domains is hard to achieve. These domains will require effort and elaborate embodied communication skills to reach a higher level of understanding in different speakers.

Communication about conceptual domains that are grounded in action and perception and which pertain to concrete objects or situations, will be those in which linguistic communication will succeed most easily by causing joint action. In this respect communication about acting on an object that is perceptually present to the speakers will be more successful than communication about atoms or the moral good.

The points mentioned above pertain only to a small set of problems and phenomena with regard to which the EC account seems superior to the LC account. I hope I have shown though that the intuitive pull behind LC arguments in not as forceful as it seems on first glance. I hope I will also have convinced the reader that to conceive of linguistic
communication along the lines of an EC approach is more fruitful for the explanation of joint action and communication than applying a LC approach to these phenomena.

Todd Jones (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

Microsoft is Considering: Mental States and Mental Agency in Groups

We often speak as though collections of people can not only have mental states, but that they can perform mental actions such considering, deciding, and strategizing. In this paper I argue that on a plausible model of mental states and mental actions, groups can, indeed, perform the kinds of mental actions that one might think only individuals are capable of.

J. Scott Jordan (Illinois State)

The 'Self' as a Collective Intentionality

Theories of social interaction often conceptualize the 'self' as a centrally located decision making system (i.e., executive function) that engages with others by generating cognitive inferences (i.e., a theory of mind—ToM—Lieberman, 2013; Nettle & Liddle, 2008; Premack & Woodruf, 1979; Rameson & Lieberman, 2008) about the mental states of others via direct observation of their behavior. It is assumed that the 'self' then uses the resultant ToM to generate social behaviors that take into account the intentionality of others.

In contrast to ToM approaches, recent findings in cognitive neuroscience, social psychology, and developmental psychology indicate we perceive others in terms of plans, not behaviors. For example, humans unconsciously and automatically develop resonances, or entrainment, with others’ actions in a variety of ways (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Kinsbourne & Jordan, 2002), examples being the gait synchronies that spontaneously emerge as people walk together, or the smooth, rapid turn-taking that occurs during conversation. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience reveal that these resonances occur because the neural systems that are involved in planning actions are involved in perceiving them (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Rizzolatti Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese 2002). Data further reveal that we perceive the pattern of body movements another person makes to achieve a goal (e.g., the pattern of arm movements made while slicing a piece of bread) via the same neural systems we use to unconsciously plan those same movements ourselves (i.e., area PF of the parietal cortex—Iacoboni et al., 1999; Miall, 2003). Collectively, these findings indicate that humans perceive each other at conscious and unconscious levels simultaneously; both at the level of consciously specified, external goals (e.g., grasping a raisin) and at the level of the unconscious, automatic body movements by which goals are obtained (i.e., the movements necessary to grasp the raisin). The notion that humans perceive each other at the levels of actions and goals simultaneously, and that both levels are in terms of planning, is consistent with research on imitation and observational learning (Byrne, 1995; Rizzolatti et al., 2002).

Data from developmental psychology indicate that we also generate resonances with others at the level of cognition. For example, it has been known for decades that neonates spontaneously imitate the actions of others, as long as the action, such as a tongue protrusion, is within their behavioral repertoire (Melzoff, 2002). In addition, toddlers between the ages of 18 months and 30 months spontaneously imitate each other’s goal-directed interactions with objects (e.g., placing a hat on one’s head), and they recursively influence each other, in that they spontaneously take turns playing the roles of leader and follower (Nadel, 2002). After 30 months however, when language has become an increasingly large component of social interaction, spontaneous, reciprocity-driven imitation with objects comes to be replaced by spontaneous, reciprocity-driven communication episodes involving words.

Collectively, across these three age groups (i.e., infants, 18 month olds, and 30-month olds) we see the spontaneous emergence of entrainment episodes that developmentally begin with body movements and then expand outward, from the body, to objects, to abstract entities such as words. At each level, two persons are interacting by simultaneously, contingently influencing each other’s planning states. And once words become an aspect of entrainment, one could argue that thoughts (i.e., cognitions) are being entrained as well.
Given the discovery that interacting humans continuously and simultaneously constrain each others planning states, at the levels of action, perception, and cognition, simultaneously, Kinsbourne and Jordan (2009) conceptualize human interaction in terms of multi-scale entrainment (MSE). An immediate implication of MSE is that resonance is the default value in human interaction. Support for this implication derives from the fact that adults with damage to prefrontal inhibitory centers find it difficult to inhibit the production of perceived actions. Specifically, patients who have bilateral prefrontal lesions automatically imitate perceived movements. This disorder is known as echopraxia (Luria, 1973). They have also been observed to handle objects within reach according to their affordances rather reflexively with no obvious purpose; a disorder known as utilization behavior. Lesions in the left hemisphere can give rise to transcortical aphasia; a speech disorder in which patients repeat, involuntarily and without understanding, another’s spoken words. This behavior is known as echolalia. When taken together, these findings indicate (Kinsbourne & Jordan, 2009) that inhibitory cortical structures that develop over the life course normally suppress the default activation of goal and action planning that takes place when we perceive others.

The notion of MSE leads to a rather different approach to human interaction than that proposed by ToM accounts. Instead of directly perceiving behavior, from which we then generate inferences regarding others’ intentional states, MSE indicates we perceive each others’ intentional (i.e., planning) states directly, because we perceive them via systems we use to plan ourselves. From this perspective, human interaction entails intentionality from the bottom up, and collective intentionality is a form of multi-scale entrainment (2013). This implies that our sense of being an independent, deciding agent emerges developmentally out of our persistent interactions with others. That is, our sense of self emerges contextually and contingently out of the pattern of approach/avoid dynamics we learn over our lifetime, such that the action-goal dynamics of some people will be allowed to influence our individual planning states (i.e., approach), while the action-goal dynamics of others will not be granted such access (i.e., avoid) (Jordan & Wesselmann, in press). From this perspective, the ‘self’ is a pattern of ‘embodied others.’ In short, the ‘self’ is a collective intentionality.

Joubert Lucas, Ashley Walton, Michael Richardson (Cincinnati)

Behavioral Dynamics of Joint-Action and Social Movement Coordination

Self-organization provides new ways to understand the dynamics behind the emergent, spontaneous exchanges of musical performance. In biological self-organization, energy is expended to maintain order in a system in the form of work that constrains the possible behaviors of the components of the system. When two self-organized systems become closely coupled they compose a teleodynamic system where each does work to maintain one another’s constraints. The semiotic exchange between two improvising jazz musicians forms a teleodynamic system where musicians expend energy that constrains each other’s sign behavior, and each allows their sign behavior to be constrained by the work of the other. This self-organization framework allows for new insight into developing theories of musical semiotics to address spontaneous, emergent musical performances, and non-linear time series analyses can provide the tools necessary for explicating the processes of these complex social exchanges.
Marylauren Malone and Michael Richardson (Cincinnati)

Conversation and coordination: What is the role of behavioral dynamics in social interaction?

Human behavior is deeply rooted in the interpersonal activity that permeates daily life. Much of what we do is dependent on the perceptions and actions of others in our social environment. Successful navigation of this environment requires interpersonal behavior that is contingent upon a mutual awareness of how actions are identified and understood. For example, it is suggested that general feelings of dissatisfaction or confusion during an interaction may demonstrate disengagement between socially-situated individuals as a function of decreased coordination in behavior such as posture, movement rhythm, or word use. Investigating how individuals successfully perform and understand communicative gestures is important for understanding effective interaction. In order to establish how people successfully navigate the social world, it is of vital importance to first understand the foundations of effective gestural production and interpretation. Few studies, however, have explored the basic dynamic structure of the behavioral processes that support successful engagement in gestural interactions.

Traditional research has focused on the neuro-cognitive processes that might underlie social phenomena, and points to imitative behavior as a reflection of a shared neural system for both observation and action. Specifically, it is suggested that observing the activity of a co-actor affects an individual’s concurrent actions and increases the likelihood that the individual will perform the same action. A result of emphasizing this shared observation and action integration, however, is that no research conducted from this perspective has examined the time-evolution or behavioral dynamics of actors’ responses during social interaction tasks. Alternatively, the dynamical systems perspective suggests that effective social behavior and understanding emerge from the physical, informational, and task goal constraints that lawfully ground social interaction and intentional states. Research within this paradigm attempts to uncover the lawful behavior of the coupled person-environment system, wherein the ongoing mutual interaction of each person with the social and physical environment shapes the time-evolving, emergent behavior. In particular, changes in environmental constraints during an interactive task have been linked to the degree of interpersonal movement coordination between subjects.

Though the methods utilized in much of the behavioral dynamics research provide evidence for the importance of investigating the principles that organize social behavior, most interpersonal studies conducted from this perspective have typically involved incidental, non-goal directed tasks (e.g., rhythmic limb movement), or limit subjects to virtual contact. As such, socially contextual interactions of real communicators are uncommon and it remains unclear to what degree previous research can explain how people successfully interpret the meaningful actions of others and convey their understanding effectively. A more comprehensive investigation into the lawful behavioral dynamics underlying successful gestural interaction, grounded in a controlled, real-world context, is therefore required in order to better understand the complexities of nonverbal interpersonal behavior and communicative action in general.

Here, we present data from several structured conversation tasks that investigated meaningful changes in the coordinative movement of interacting individuals and their role in successful communication. Using an Xbox Kinect and a Polhemus motion-tracking system, we examine the full body movements of participants during a range of tasks that vary in terms of the task goal: a picture guessing game, a lie-detecting game, and a coordinated action game. In order to examine the effect of constrained visual information on coordination, participants are unable to see each other in some experimental conditions. Additionally, the effect of constrained physical information is manipulated by implementing a series of experimental conditions in which participants wear various combinations of ankle weights. This type of physical manipulation in particular has been previously demonstrated as affecting the temporal coordination of co-acting individuals. Constraining the informational, physical and task-goal properties allows us to capture the pattern of correlations between participants’ movements across different time scales, as well as examine the complex synchronization that occurs in the whole body activity of interacting individuals.

Employing various linear and nonlinear measures, we examine the structure of the interpersonal movement dynamics and assessed the degree of interpersonal coordination between pairs. The correlational structure of participants’ movements (i.e., how and when participants were coordinated) is quantified by cross correlation analysis, cross-recurrence quantification analysis, and coherence analysis. These analyses all address certain aspects of coordination (e.g., amount, strength, duration, and manner) between participants’ movements and are used to analyze both the Kinect and Polhemus data. Finally, the relationship between movement coordination (as described
above) and social coordination (e.g., task success and estimations of confidence) are submitted to a standard
regression analysis.

The results are discussed in terms of the low-level dynamical processes involved in social interaction that function to
stabilize behavioral performance and shared understanding, with a particular emphasis on the differences in
interpersonal movement coordination during collaborative action.

Russ McBride & Robert Wuebker (Utah)
Social Emergence and the Cognitive Divide

Introduction

There are three fundamental debates about the nature of social structures, two of which have been well-known since
the adolescence of sociology and one which has only risen to prominence recently. The first debate is between the
methodological individualists and the structuralists: Can we explain social institutions solely in terms of descriptions
of individuals without relying on social level descriptions? The second debate concerns the causal powers of social
institutions: do institutions possess real causal powers above and beyond those of individuals and, if so, how should
we understand such causation? The third debate stems from divergent explanations of social phenomena: Are social
phenomena essentially cognitive or not? It is this third question that I want to investigate here.

‘Cognitive’ is a notoriously tricky term but I shall sidestep subtleties and simply assert for the duration of this paper
that by ‘cognitive’ I mean “involves intentional states”. The question that confronts us can then be reframed as the
following: Do socially emergent phenomena essentially involve intentional states?

In what follows I want to look more carefully at the cognitive divide in the answers to this question between those
philosophers on the one hand who advance cognitive–rich explanations of social emergence, and the biologists (and
other physical scientists) who are offering attempts (roughly based on Turing’s original Morphogenesis paper), at
accounts of social emergence that are non–cognitive and more continuous with the rest of the physical sciences. I
shall argue is that there is, as it turns out, a potential bridge between the two sides—a third option—but such an
option requires that the cognitive approaches abandon much of their rationality requirements implicit in them.

Current philosophical answers to our question sit apart from the other two debates in that, unlike them,
philosophers do not see their discussion as continuous with the historically rich discussions of physical emergence.
Approaches to physical emergence typically assumed, at least, that emergent properties: exist at a level above the
properties from which they arise; are non–reducible; and are in some sense unpredictable. Emergence was seen as a
middle–path between the reductive materialists who believed that life could ultimately be reduced to a collection of
lower–level biochemical processes and the vitalists who advocated the existence of an essential entelechy or life force.
As emergence gained recognition through Mill, Broad, and Alexander, its features came under question and two
debates came to the fore: Are emergent properties really non–reducible or can they be reduced to phenomena at the
lower level? Does the emergent level possess distinct causal powers beyond those at the lower levels?

Such questions eventually found their way into sociology and evolved into the two debates about whether social
structures can be explained solely in terms of, and reduced to, their component individuals; and whether social
institutions have distinct causal powers. Unlike these two questions, the third fundamental question about whether
social phenomena are essentially cognitive has been seen as irrelevant to physical emergence. Indeed, it would be
quite peculiar to wonder whether, e.g., the manifestation of the emergent property of liquidity from a collection of
H2O molecules depends in any way on human cognition. Or whether Bénard convection cells emerge from heated
oil because of one’s belief or hope that they will. What spurred the advancement of contemporary science was
precisely such de–anthropomorphization of the physical world.

But social phenomena are distinct from physical phenomena and their unique nature is reflected in the
intentionality–oriented approaches of philosophers like John Searle and Michael Bratman. As Searle (2005) says,
“collective intentionality is the basis of all society, human or animal” (p.6, italics mine). Society is built on the ability to
represent some X counting as Y in a context, C. And the act of creating a chunk of social reality rests on
the very same logical structure required for the declarative speech act—representing, e.g., an obligation, as existing and it coming into existence by virtue of an individual representing it that way.

So the bar for the requisite intentionality is no easy bar to clear and most of the animal kingdom, apparently lacking speech–acts and the ability to represent duties and rights, is excluded from the golden realm of the truly social. Searle says, “animal groups can have an alpha male and an alpha female, and other members of the group can make appropriate responses to the alpha male and the alpha female, but this hierarchy is not constituted by a system of rights, duties, obligations, etc.” (2005, p14).

Bratman’s approach (2014), though quite different, nonetheless also demands an intentionality-rich skill set. Bratman’s arc of argument moves from individual agency to planning-specific agency which in turn provides the necessary foundation for full-fledged sociality. Planning is of course an advanced, intentionality-rich, cognitive skill. As Bratman maintains, “my proposal is to understand our shared intention by appeal, inter alia, to my intention” (2014, p14). Bratman’s theory does afford the possibility of a “modest sociality” for apes and children that is just shy of moral obligations and rights, but, “the appeal here is to intentions; and intentions are distinctive” (p153).

On these philosophical approaches socially emergent phenomena are deeply intentional and hence clearly cognitive. The answer to our question then, ‘are social phenomena cognitive?’, is clear. Obviously they are, per Searle and Bratman.

But to many of the physical scientists studying social emergence, this is all just so much philoso-babble. The physical and biological sciences have taken an entirely different approach to socially emergent phenomena, one that’s embraced their ancestry and continuity from historical discussions of physical emergence.

An example. In conditions of plentiful food, slime mold spends its life as thousands of individual single-celled units but in harsher conditions these cells coalesce into a single organism that moves and forages as a whole. The discovery of the mechanics of the aggregation behavior of slime mold has become the seminal case of “social emergence” in the physical sciences.

So social phenomena, for these sciences, extends well beyond humans and even apes and children to dogs, spiders, termites, ants, and, yes, even slime mold and amoeba. Unless you’re willing to acquiesce to the idea that slime mold is capable of robust intentional states then the answer, in contrast to Searle and Bratman, is that social phenomena is obviously not essentially cognitive and further, that the intentionality-centric approaches to social reality are far too discontinuous with the rest of the physical world. They might be radically mischaracterizing the structure of social reality.

I shall argue for a third option, one with the phylogenetically permissive interpretation of social behavior held by the physical scientists, but retaining the importance of the cognitively-driven rights and duties held to be critical by the social cognitivists. The crux move is to make plausible how the removal of the rationality requirement of the cognitivists opens the door to a more naturalistic account of social emergence.

Seumas Miller (Charles Sturt University & Delft University)

Collective Responsibility Revisited: Chains of Institutional and Moral Responsibility

Collective moral responsibility is a contested notion, e.g. by individualists and those of a more collectivist bent. However, individualists and collectivists alike have tended to frame collective responsibility synchronically (so to speak) rather than diachronically. Collective responsibility has been viewed as the responsibility of a group qua group - or (alternatively) of the members of a group - at a given time. By contrast, my concern here is with collective responsibility conceived of as unfolding over time. More specifically, I discuss (what I have elsewhere referred to as) chains of institutional and moral responsibility. Let me illustrate the phenomenon with a criminal justice example. Let us assume that it is the institutional and moral responsibility of detectives to determine the factual guilt or innocence of a suspect. This is a proximate end of the criminal justice system. For there is a further end, let us assume, namely, that the factually guilty be found legally guilty (and the factually innocent not be found legally guilty). The realisation of this further end involves judges and juries discharging their institutional (and in some cases moral) responsibilities.
Here there is evidently an institutional division of labour and segregation of roles which involves each type of institutional actor, e.g. investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury-member etc., making a contribution to the further end of identifying and appropriately punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent. However, unlike many institutional arrangements, the criminal justice process is predicated on strict adherence on the part of institutional actors to the segregation of roles on pain of compromising this further end.

I emphasize that this segregation of roles is consistent with all of these actors, each with their own different and segregated role, having a common further aim; agents can have a common aim and yet it be a requirement that each is to make a different and separate contribution to that aim, and not perform the tasks assigned to the others, and do all this in the service of that common aim.

In respect of this segregation of roles, the relationship between the different categories of institutional actors, (e.g. investigators, jury members) in the criminal justice process is unlike that which holds between a manager, a waiter and a barman in a small bar. There is no reason why, for example, the manager and the waiter might not assist the barman in doing his job of pouring beers during a rush period or even stand in his place when he is called away. But there is good reason why the prosecutor should not also be the judge or the investigator the jury; in an adversarial system any such conflation of roles would constitute a structural conflict of interest and, as such, would be likely to undermine the administration of justice.

Institutional arrangements such as this in which there is a segregation of roles (and associated responsibilities) but, nevertheless, a common further end involve a chain of institutional and moral responsibility in my sense.

Arguably, in chains of institutional and moral responsibility all the participants aim (or should be aiming) at the further end in addition to undertaking their own roles (and, therefore, aiming at the end definitive of their own particular role). Moreover, if this is right then all the participants (at least, in principle) share in the collective responsibility for achieving that further end (or for failing to do so). Let us work with the example of Peter Sutcliffe, the Yorkshire Ripper, who was ultimately convicted of thirteen counts of murder (the victims being prostitutes working in Yorkshire in the UK).

The detectives involved were collectively morally responsible for gathering and analysing the evidence which identified Peter Sutcliffe as the Yorkshire Ripper; they acquired the required knowledge of Sutcliffe’s factual guilt and, thereby, realised the collective end of their institutional role as detectives. On the other hand, the court and, in particular, the members of the jury were collectively morally responsible for finding Sutcliffe legally guilty and, thereby, realised the purpose of their institutional roles as jury members. So far so good; but what was the ultimate end that was realised by the detectives and the jury (as well as the other actors involved in the institutional process, e.g. the judge)?

Presumably the end in question is for the factually guilty to be found legally guilty (and the factually innocent not to be found legally guilty) and this is an end that is realised by the detectives and the members of the jury (and the other relevant institutional actors). It is not an end that the detective could achieve on their own; they can only arrive at knowledge of factual guilt. But equally it is not an end that the members of the jury could realise on their own; for they rely on the knowledge (or, at least the evidence) provided by the detectives.

Evidently chains of institutional and moral responsibility consist of a process in which the completion of one stage institutionally triggers the commencement of the next stage, e.g. arrest is followed either by the suspect being charged or released within a specified time-frame.

Notwithstanding this above-described mandatory segregation of roles (in the context of a chain of institutional and moral responsibility), detectives have been known to try to pre-empt the outcome of the criminal justice process, e.g. by ‘loading up’ suspects they believe are guilty and deserving of severe punishment, rather than remaining within the confines of their designated role of evidence gathering in the service of truth and being content to rely on prosecutors, judges and juries to undertake their different (albeit, ultimately interlocking) roles in relation to assessing the case against suspects, determining guilt, passing sentence, and so on. In so doing they are, of course, compromising the integrity of the chain of institutional and moral responsibility, not by virtue of failing to pursue its ultimate end on the occasion in question, but rather by over-reaching their institutional role and by violating a central institutional rule, both of which are in place to ensure that the ultimate end is in general realized.
Anna Moltchanova (Carleton)

“We” does not Refer: Anscombe’s “The First Person” and Shared Emotions

In this paper, I will not question the views of those who argue for the existence of non-distributive collective subjects of conscious states. Instead, I will explore whether Elizabeth Anscombe’s view that, in certain circumstances, “I” does not refer can be extended to collective subjects, meaning that in non-distributive uses, “we” does not refer, in Anscombe’s sense. She considered statements like “I am leaving” as unmediated, non-observational descriptions that can be verified. I will first present her view, then identify why her view can be extended to we-subjects. I will also consider how to handle those of her points about “I”-reference that may present difficulty when extended to plural subjects. Then I will consider how her account can be extended, in case of plural subjects, to the statements she did not want to consider, such as “I fear.” Anscombe deemed such statements to be mediated, observational and not descriptions that can be immediately verifiable. I will focus on shared emotions and show that statements about shared emotions with “we” as a subject are similar, in terms of reference, to action-statements Anscombe considered. I will then deal with a potential complication that being verifiable, in case of statements with “we” as a subject, may undermine that “we” does not refer and explain how to overcome this complication.

Timothy Oakberg (Washington University, St. Louis)

Sharing Responsibility Without the Shame: A Revision of Larry May’s Social Existentialism

Some of the greatest harms in the world—mass murder and famine, for example—are directly caused by few if any individuals, yet indirectly contributed to by many. In response to this issue, Larry May (1992) argues that we ought to hold people more morally responsible for their indirect contributions to harm. More specifically, we ought to cultivate shame in those whose mindset, inaction, or participation in a group contributes even indirectly to a transgression. My goal in this paper is not to challenge the claim that we ought to assume greater moral responsibility for our indirect contributions to harm. Rather, my goal is to clarify and then challenge May’s claim that we should move towards a shame culture, and to argue that we ought to focus on cultivating other-oriented emotions such as guilt and empathy instead. An established research program spearheaded by June Tangney (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) has shown that individuals who are disposed to feel shame are more likely to conceal transgressions, withdraw from others, blame others inappropriately, have anger issues, and have conduct problems including aggression. Thus, it is counterproductive to use shame as a general tool to promote moral behavior.

Robert Osborne (Illinois)

A Social Approach to Naturalizing Epistemic Normativity: Justification as Doxastic Entitlement

Despite the success and popularity of naturalized approaches to epistemology, many operating via psychology and cognitive science, epistemic normativity still stands as an obstacle to any naturalized approach that wishes to maintain a normative conception of the epistemological enterprise. One of the dominant naturalistic approaches to epistemic normativity, instrumentalism, holds that we should see epistemic norms as hypothetical imperatives linking means with ends. Such instrumental normativity is generally taken to be unproblematic for the naturalist. The other dominant approach, expressivism or non-cognitivism, holds that epistemically normative claims are not strictly factual, but rather express non-cognitive (e.g., evaluative or affective) states. Thus there is no serious metaphysical issue associated with accounting for epistemic normativity. This paper develops an alternative approach to naturalizing epistemic normativity—a form of normative pragmatism—that incorporates limited aspects of these two approaches, and holds that such normativity comes about in virtue of certain social practices with the right structure, and that facts or properties can become normative when they play the right role in such a practice. The primary project of this paper is to provide a model of the relevant kind of social practice, and demonstrate how a consideration of social practices that fit this model can give rise to epistemic normativity that is naturalistically acceptable.
Mark Phelan (Lawrence)

Believing Qua Member

Casual reflection on the daily news reminds us that we often talk as though groups have intentional states, such as beliefs and desires. But what is the status of such verbal ascriptions? Are these to be given a realist interpretation and understood as attributions of mental states to groups, over and above the individuals that constitute them? Or should they be understood individualistically, as involving shorthand references to the mental states of the individual persons that comprise groups? As I will argue, neither approach conforms entirely to our practice of mental state attribution. Careful reflection on an array of mental state ascriptions favors a third approach. People generally interpret group mental state ascriptions distributively, as attributions of mental states to group members, whose mental states constitute a subset of the mental states of individual persons.

Valentina Petrolini (Cincinnati)

Delusions, Rationality and Emotions: Moving forward from Bortolotti’s Proposal

In her recent book Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (2009) Bortolotti puts forward two arguments about delusions. On one side she offers reasons for prying apart the criteria for belief ascription and the criteria for rationality (Rationality Constraint Thesis or RCT). On the other she defends a modest doxastic view, arguing for some form of continuity between delusions and other beliefs (Continuity Thesis or CT). This paper is divided in two parts: the first argues that Bortolotti’s main theses – although correct – should be pushed further. The second part takes up the challenge and attempts to investigate the nature of delusions on different grounds, focusing on the role played by emotions and executive functions in the reasoning of delusional subjects. On the view proposed here, the onset of delusions and thus the main distinction between delusional (DS) and non-delusional subjects (NDS) rests on some disturbance in the ability to detect relevance (or salience) in a context.

§1. In order to support the RCT Bortolotti argues that ordinary beliefs often share crucial epistemic features with delusional ones: indeed, many of them fail to meet the standards of procedural – e.g. good integration, coherence – and epistemic rationality – e.g. resistance to counterevidence. Through the discussion of several examples Bortolotti successfully shows that deviations from the norms of procedural and epistemic rationality “are not the exception to the rule, but widespread and systematic” (2009, p. 78. Italics mine). Thus, the rationality constraint on belief ascription should be abandoned because many cases of ordinary beliefs fail to satisfy those norms. As a consequence, Bortolotti maintains that the difference between delusions and ordinary beliefs should not be regarded as a difference in kind, but rather as a difference in degree (CT). As she puts it: “clinical delusions are typically irrational to a greater extent or irrational across more dimensions than non-delusional beliefs, but they are irrational roughly in the same way.” (2011, p. 39. Italics mine). Here I offer two reasons to think that Bortolotti’s theses should be pushed further. First, once granted that delusions cannot be distinguished from other beliefs (only) in virtue of their irrationality, we are still left with the problem of identifying what it is that is pathological or abnormal about them. Second, if we accept the idea of delusions being on a continuum with ordinary beliefs, we still need to explain in what sense they are “irrational to a greater extent” or “across more dimensions” than non-delusional beliefs. These two issues arise from a common source: once established that the standards of rationality are at most desiderata for belief ascription, it is hard to see the rational/irrational divide as the (only) candidate to make finer-grained distinctions within kinds of beliefs. In a nutshell, if the appeal to rationality constraints does not determine what counts as a belief (RCT) and delusions are particular kinds of beliefs (CT), rationality (alone) should not work as a criterion to decide whether something is a delusion.

§2. This section aims at showing that Bortolotti’s proposal would benefit from a broader definition of rationality, one involving more than the following of procedural and epistemic norms. More specifically, I argue that delusions should be characterized in terms of emotional and executive dysfunctions arising from some disturbance in the process of relevance detection. First, I show that the ability to detect relevance in a context plays an important role within our cognitive makeup and cannot be successfully reduced to the traditional norms discussed by Bortolotti. Second, I offer both theoretical and empirical evidence in support of the connection between emotions, executive functions...
and relevance detection (Elgin 2007; Damasio 1996; Pessoa 2009 and 2013). Drawing on various studies and case reports, I then stress the particular role played by emotions and executive functions in the reasoning of DS (see Kapur 2003; Reina 2009). In particular, I outline a working hypothesis according to which DS display particular difficulties in the executive domain and more specifically in the functions of shifting, updating and inhibition (see Miyake et al. 2000). Finally, I offer some good reasons to think that the connection between delusions and executive functions – although still controversial in the neuropsychiatric literature (see Guillem et al. 2008) – should be explored further. Indeed, both an analysis of patients’ reports and recent empirical studies suggest that some typical delusional traits (e.g. lack of flexibility, resistance to counterevidence) can be better understood if fleshed out in terms of emotional and executive dysfunctions (see Ibanez Casas et al. 2013).

Guillermo Puebla & Mark Nielsen (Queensland)
Conventionality and Original Intent in Children’s Reasoning about Malfunctioning Tools

When primed with social information suggestive of a ‘true’ use for a tool, adults persist in identifying that as its ‘proper’ function, even when confronted with evidence that the tool does not actually perform this function well. The present study investigated whether young children show this same tendency. Sixty children aged 4– to 5 years were presented with a series of storybook vignettes introducing characters using tools identified as having two possible functions, with one function noted as being the ‘proper’ use of the tool (by either its conventional use or its intended use). Critically, in these conditions a subsequent malfunction episode suggested that the tools weren’t able to perform the clued function. The tendency of the children to choose the clued function as the proper use of the tool was compared with children who were presented with information (intentional or conventional) about the proper use of the tool without a malfunction episode and children in a baseline condition that featured a malfunction episode but did not contain information about the tool’s proper function. Results showed that similar to adults, children persisted in choosing the clued function as the proper function in spite of evidence contrary to it, although the information that triggered this effect was different.

Matthew Rachar (Vienna)
Group Responsibility for Dissident Action

This paper is concerned with the important practical concerns brought out by dissident action in the context of a group agent, especially for the relationship between individual agency and group agency, and the ascription of responsibility to group agents based on their institutional design. I use a thought experiment to highlight a problem for some accounts of group control over, and responsibility for, group member dissident action. I then offer a diagnosis of why this problem arises in certain theories and put forward some initial suggestions for what a full account of group responsibility for dissident action would require.

Katherine Ritchie (City College of New York)
Group Persons and Normative Individualism

List and Pettit argue that groups can be persons, but that they should fewer rights than individual persons. They argue for the view by (1) adopting normative individualism, the view that something is good just in case it is good for individuals and (2) presenting an argument utilizing the Rawlsian view of the original position. I challenge their views. I argue that if groups are persons, they should have the same rights as individual persons.
Robert Rupert (Colorado/Edinburgh)

Group Mind and Generic Kinds; or When are Group-level Cognitive Processes and Individual-level Cognitive Processes of the Same Natural Kind?

A plausible enough requirement on the existence of a group mind is that the group be capable of cognitive processing; moreover, it is a matter of independent interest whether groups engage in cognitive processing and, if so, what might qualify those processes as cognitive. Thus, this talk focuses on the question “What is required for a group of individual humans to engage in cognitive processing?”

The talk consists of three primary sections. First, I argue for a systems-based view of cognition. We discover what is distinctively cognitive by successfully modeling paradigmatic cases of intelligent behavior (modulo certain methodological complications, to be noted). Paradigmatic cases of intelligent behavior involve individual human organisms. Various successful approaches to the modeling of the intelligent behavior of humans (e.g., computationalist, connectionist, evolutionary-robotics based, and dynamicist approaches) consistently deliver one central distinction, between causal contributors to the production of intelligent behavior that lie inside the boundary of the relatively stable, integrated, persisting architecture and those that lie beyond that boundary. Thus, it appears that the boundary between the relatively persisting and integrated cognitive system and what lies beyond that system offers the most plausible grounds for the distinction between what is genuinely cognitive and what is not.

In the second part of the talk, I argue for a certain view of natural kinds (or properties), in particular, of what it is for two states or processes that appear dissimilar to be of the same kind. The proposed view derives from modeling-based practices central to the scientific enterprise: two processes are of the same kind if and only if our best models of them bear a “tweak-and-extend” relation to each other. The gist is of the view is this: models cluster naturally into families; one model is constructed by the addition of a term to an existing model, by the change in a parameter value of an existing model, or by structure to an existing model (think, for example, of various models of harmonic oscillators or of artificial neural networks), and thus the two models – a base-model and an extension of it – become members the same family. Put in slightly less procedural, and slightly more metaphysical, terms, then, a process c is of the same natural kind as, or exhibits the same natural property as, all other processes successfully modeled by models in the same family as the one(s) that successfully models c. This view is brought to bear on the argument of the first section. To the extent that there is a property, being cognitive, it is, apparently, highly abstract, perhaps so abstract and thin that a tension appears: many pairs of its instances don’t seem to meet the requirement of the tweak-and-extend-based theory of sameness of kind!

In the third section, I describe substantive aspects of typical group processes absent in cognitive processing typical of the individual human. I ask whether we should conclude that (a) extant groups do not engage in cognitive processing at all, (b) they engage in cognitive processing but the form of cognition involved differs significantly from normal human cognition, (c) they engage in the same kind of cognitive processing as individual humans, but only by being cognitive in the same way, not in virtue of engaging in the same kinds of specific cognitive processes (e.g., remembering, learning, or exercising executive function) as individual humans engage in, or (d) they manifest the same kind of cognition as humans, qua cognition, and also engage in the same specific kinds of cognitive activity as humans. Our conclusion at this point depends, to some extent, on the way in which we resolve the tension noted at the end of the second section: if being cognitive is a highly abstract and thin property, this suggests either (c) or (d); but, if that same abstractness and thin-ness precludes the existence of a genuine, overarching natural kind, cognition, one that subsumes the various processes in question, (c) and (d) would seem to offer only hollow consolation to fans of group-level cognition and mentality.

Kevin Ryan (Memphis)

From Joint Action to Group Minds: A Case Study in (Improvised) Jazz

Humans are born and raised as social animals. Understanding ourselves as social, however, includes going beyond our need to be around others for basic survival purposes. Throughout life we work as group members to complete a variety of basic and complex tasks. From scientists in labs to construction workers on highways, from a family raising children to a hospital staff caring for the sick, and from air traffic controllers to conference organizing committees,
there are many situations where groups of people work together to reach goals far removed from what any single individual can achieve. In the realm of philosophy, a common term for capturing what occurs in these multiple agent activities is joint action (Gilbert 2009; Schweikard and Schmid 2013).

Several paradigmatic examples of joint action in the philosophical literature include multiple people moving a table, a group taking a walk together, and a dyad singing a duet (cf. Tuomela 1995; Gilbert 1996; Bratman 1999). While intuitions point to further cases of note for philosophical and empirical analysis, they do little to clarify the epistemological or ontological standing of joint actions and joint intentions. This problem is further compounded if we conceptualize elements of joint action as distinct from instances of individual action. A question is then raised as to whether, in this regard, an analysis of joint action necessarily reduces the ontological standing of groups to the intentions of individual group members (Searle 1990; Bratman 1999; Tuomela 1995, 2007) or if it must appeal to something like "supraorganisms" (Pettit 2003) or "group minds" (Theiner et. al. 2010).

In this paper I shall examine joint intentions underlying improvised jazz performances, along with related joint actions necessary for performing improvised group music (IGM). In turn, I suggest that potential results of this search support the existence of ontological and conceptually distinct group minds. I develop my argument in light of Raimo Tuomela's account of joint action. Since Tuomela's work has seen a number of revisions over the past several decades, my primary focus is on his 2007 book The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. While there is no intrinsic reason why one should choose Tuomela as the conceptual lens for an analysis of IGM, I have decided to do so, in part, because his work hasn't been given a full treatment in the context of joint artistic actions. Moreover, several core conceptual elements in Tuomela's account offer an enlightening way for approaching IGM and provide further, independent reasons for defending an ontologically realist approach to group minds.

In what follows, I shall use the term "group minds" to refer to the group minds hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, "Groups of individual organisms can have or can be thought of as having minds in something like the way in which individual organisms themselves can have minds" (Wilson 2004, 207). There are two main rival positions in the debate about group minds: the literalist position and the metaphorical position (Wilson 2004, Chapters 11-12). Although approaches that grapple with the hypothesis go by a variety of different names, including redundant vs. non-redundant group agency or single entity vs. nonentity approaches, the core debate boils down to whether or not group minds exist as an independent ontological category in the world or if they are nothing more than useful conceptual abstractions.

In regards to Tuomela's work, the terms are cashed out on the difference between thin and thick realism. Tuomela's epistemological approach is an example of thick group realism. In his words, "Distinguishing between conceptual and ontological issues…I can say that my theory is conceptually rather anti-individualistic" (Tuomela 2007, 120). This epistemological claim notwithstanding, his ontological standpoint is notably closer to the metaphorical or thin realism position. Again in Tuomela's words, "it is [ontologically], if not individualistic, at least interrelationist and eschews collective agents and actions in a literal ontological sense" (2007, 120).

Following Tuomela, I suggest causality is an important element in distinguishing different ontological levels. While multiple accounts of causality are on hand in philosophy (e.g. Chakravartty 2007, chap. 4; Dowe 2009; Psillos 2009), I shall bracket the need to accept a particular account in what follows. Instead, the main issue of causality for present purposes concerns the ability to reduce and explain it to the level of individuals or their aggregation. If such reduction is possible, it would support the idea that, at most, the higher-order phenomenon's existence - i.e. group minds - is referenced in a metaphorical way. In contrast, if the causal story cannot be fully cashed out via reduction or redescription at the “interrelated-individualistic” level, it would offer support for the existence of group minds.

This paper is broken into three sections. In section one, I offer a brief overview of the group mind debate by appealing to List and Pettit’s (2011) taxonomy of the field. In section two, I present an overview of Tuomela’s ontological account for groups. Finally, in section three, I present the case for why, assuming causality as a mark of ontology and accepting Tuomela’s account as presented in section two, we should conclude, pace Tuomela, that group minds are ontologically distinct from individual minds, at least in the case of IGM. Furthermore, my argument will be bolstered by a comparative analysis of two different performance situations: the first being a performance of a classical piece and the second being an improvised jazz performance. I conclude that only the latter situation contains the necessary features for being an example of an ontologically irreducible group mind. The primary reason for this conclusion stems from the differing nature of performance practices, as well as the inability...
to capture the jointness inherent in IGM without appeal to group intentions and responses irreducible to any given performer or combination of score plus performers.

Alessandro Salice & Mads Gram Henriksen (Copenhagen)

Schizophrenia and We-Intentionality

Recent empirical studies on early, non-psychotic anomalous self-experiences in schizophrenia have demonstrated that the majority of first-admission patients complain about profound feelings of dissimilarity vis-à-vis other human beings (‘I feel like an alien’), excessive self-monitoring tendencies (e.g., observing one’s own mental states rather than being spontaneously engaged and immersed in worldly activities), difficulties in establishing and maintaining emotional relationships with others, and lack of ability to grasp or disinterest towards societal norms and tacit rules of social interaction (i.e., perplexity).

In various ways, schizophrenia seems to involve an anomalous form of we-intentionality—e.g., deluded patients may firmly believe that the nurses in the ward are trying to poison them but nonetheless happily eat the food the nurses’ serve them, or they may believe that others are robots but still interact with them as if they were real humans (this peculiar phenomenon is called ‘double bookkeeping’). In short, in psychosis patients with schizophrenia may be absorbed in their delusional world but at the same remain inconspicuously adapted to the shared social world. Moreover, many patients report that they have major problems with basic everyday social interactions like ‘small talk’ (there may be many reasons for this, including experiences of perplexity, anxiety, transitive or solipsistic grandiosity), whereas they often function much better socially in situations where there are explicit and codified rules (e.g., playing games).

The aim of this talk is to shed light on schizophrenia, we-intentionality, and their relation. Our main hypothesis is that we-intentionality comes in different forms and that especially two of them play a particularly relevant role in schizophrenia. Based on this hypothesis, the socially instable behavior that is so typical of schizophrenic patients, and usually is an unfailing source of loneliness and isolation, could be interpreted by arguing that patients often are impeded to activate the most basic of these two forms, but not the other. In order to characterize these two forms of we-intentionality, we rely on works done in social identity theory and in phenomenology.

Phenomenology (mainly Max Scheler, but almost all phenomenologists converged on this view) stresses the existence of two kinds of groups, so-called communities and societies. Societies (e.g., corporations, associations, etc.) are future-oriented groups, the existence of which is tied to a shared goal that generally the individuals would be unable to reach if acting alone by themselves. Hence, their members serve (and are used by other members) as means to a given end and they can be said to engage in collective intentionality only to the extent that they pursue a joint goal and that they coordinate to reach that goal. By contrast, shared goals seem not to be necessarily required for the existence of communities (think of friendships or of love-communities). As communities are not unified primarily by shared goals, the individuals do not primarily conceive of each other as means to an end. The form of rationality governing communities is hence not (or at least not exclusively) a ‘means-to-an-end rationality,’ rather communal bonds mainly rest on in-group solidarity. According to Scheler, communities are bearers of collective intentionality in the genuine sense in which the members co-experience the same mental state (the same emotion, volition or cognition) or co-issue the same action. These mental states are taken to constitute a stream of experiences whose subject is a we.

The phenomenological approach to the we can be supplemented and supported by insights developed in the framework of social identity theory. One of the ideas advocated by this theory (and esp. by Marilynn Brewer and colleagues) is that individuals do not have only a personal identity, they also have a social identity (and, typically, several social identities). Social selves, it is argued, generally are the result of a process of self-categorization. Self-categorization is triggered by the fact that individuals perceive themselves sharing certain properties with other individuals (i.e., they perceive themselves to be similar to others in some relevant respect). More precisely, if certain circumstances make salient the fact that the individual share some (social or non-social) properties with other individuals, then the individual could group-identify, i.e., it could conceive of herself as member of a group. The property that she shares with other individuals is then the category that is employed to define that particular social self. Note that, since it is a social self that is at stake here, it is, by assumption, not a private or individual self; rather,
it is an identity that she shares with others. This is, what we may call, a ‘depersonalization-enhancing’ factor for the group members.

In line with these two approaches, it seems to us that an important distinction could be drawn between being member of a group and sharing a social identity with others. The latter property would then imply the former, but the contrary would not necessarily be the case: being a member of a group does not imply sharing a social identity with that group. Indeed, it seems that a we “exists” only in the case in which individuals share a social identity (this being the quintessence of the phenomenological concept of a community).

This distinction enables us to mesh these two approaches and provide a possible explanation for the anomalous we-intentionality in schizophrenia. Patients with schizophrenia do not seem to fall short when it comes to the goal-oriented form of collective intentionality—and this is especially so if the coordination that it requires relies on a set of explicitly formulated rules. However, they often appear to display notable difficulties with the establishment of social identities. Indeed, we will argue that the very process of group-identification seems to be unstable and fragile in their case: not only is group-identification impeded by their profound feelings of being radically different from others, the “depersonalization-enhancing” factor important for group formation is often counteracted by the patients’ frequent inability to be spontaneously engaged with others and by the recurrent and related tendencies to hyper-reflect and self-observe.

In the concluding part of our talk, we will briefly discuss some psychotherapeutic implications of a better understanding of we-intentionality and its possible distortions in schizophrenia.

Mikko Salmela & Michiru Nagatsu (Helsinki)

Collective Emotions and Collective Action

In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, affective states such as emotions, moods, and sentiments, have not been invoked in the explanation of collective action. Instead, the joint intentional action of social groups has been modelled in cognitive and voluntaristic terms, emphasizing the role of high-level states such as goals, commitments and intentions that are shared in some way (Tollefsen & Dale 2012). Different theorists disagree on the details of accounts that typically include cognitively complex intentions, common knowledge about the interconnected structure of those intentions, and – in most accounts also – voluntaristic commitment that creates obligations and entitlements to the parties (see e.g. Gilbert 1989, 2003; Searle 1995, 2010; Tuomela 2007, 2013). These theorists purport to give necessary and sufficient conditions for joint action on the basis of shared intentions, and their main disagreements concern the details of their conceptual analyses.

Recently, this cognitive paradigm has been challenged by various developments in philosophy and empirical research. One broad criticism central to these developments is that the conceptual analysis of joint actions (in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for some mental states to generate a joint action) is of little use in systematically organising and accounting for a wide variety of psychological mechanisms underlying joint actions. Minimalist accounts of joint action, for example, thus instead seek to articulate/model a minimal architecture of representations and processes that is capable of accommodating joint action in its various forms, of which cognitively and normatively complex adult human cooperation is only a special case (Vesper et al. 2010).

Thus, Tollefsen and Dale (2012) emphasise alignment and “surface synchrony” produced at lower-level coordinative structures as a foundation for “deep commitments” that can serve the distribution of labour in cases where complementary and reciprocal actions are required. Pacherie (2011) in turn draws on Bacharach’s (2006) notion of “framing” in her account of shared agency that allows individuals to conceive themselves as team members, to engage in team reasoning, and to intend to do their parts of a shared intention without representing each others’ participatory intentions and other attitudes or being normatively tied to them by obligations and entitlements. Yet minimal accounts of joint action neglect the role of affective states as much as the cognitively complex models even if the former argue that “philosophical theories of joint action should be informed by what is actually taking place within and between individual cognitive agents” (Tollefsen & Dale 2012, 388; Godman et al. forthcoming).

The situation in philosophy is in a stark contrast with empirical research and theorizing in which the role of affective states in motivating and coordinating collective behaviour is widely accepted. Interactionist and enactivist theories of
social cognition regard dynamic encounters of individuals as units whose behaviour is not reducible to that of individual agents (e.g. De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007). In these encounters, several implicit processes entrain and synchronize the interactors’ bodily and mental states. These states include motor representations (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004), body postures and gaze patterns (Shockley et al. 2009), speech patterns (Fowler et al. 2008), and facial expressions (Chartrand & Bargh 1999). Entrainment and synchrony, in turn, associate with interpersonal liking, affiliation, and rapport between the interactors (e.g. van Baaren et al. 2009; Hove & Risen, 2009), which together with aligned representations and processes pave the way for joint action. These affective effects associate also with typical cases of joint action such as singing a duet or carrying a table that by definition require synchronization or coordination of individual actions.

Moreover, ritualistic sociological theories argue that people engage in social interaction for the intrinsic affective rewards that emerge from the synchronous and coordinative micro-level aspects of joint action. The action need not have any ulterior purpose, as is the case in such rituals as plays, games, dancing, singing, and worship, but even when it has, the explicit goal of joint action is partially instrumental in engaging in the intrinsically rewarding collective action (Summers-Effler 2007; Collins 2004; Durkheim 2001). More affective rewards emerge from shared emotions that interactors experience during their joint action, whether ritualistic or goal-oriented. Adam Smith, in his classic The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), calls correspondence of emotions “fellow-feeling”, arguing that consciousness of it is pleasant irrespective of the valence of the original emotions. Later research has specified that positive fellow-feelings and affective solidarity ensue especially if the shared emotions are hedonically positive rather than negative, with anger at outgroups as an exception (Collins, 2004; Spoor & Kelly, 2004; Smith et al. 2007; Knottnerus, 2010). Further affective rewards attributed to shared agency and its fellow participants accrue in the course of successful joint action, motivating it along with other benefits (Lawler et al. 2008). Shared emotions also provide motivation for joint action. Religious, political, ideological, and identity groups often arise when the emotions of several individuals converge on an important topic, urging them to act in accordance with their emotion (e.g. Goodwin et al. 2001).

Philosophical research on collective action faces then the challenge of integrating evidence on the motivating and coordinating roles of affective states into theories of collective action. Trends toward this direction exist in Schmid’s (2009) account of shared feelings and Godman’s (2012) social motivation theory of joint action but neither of them elaborates the role of shared affects in joint action in detail. Michael (2011) points out some roles of shared emotions in minimalistic accounts of joint action, especially Vesper et al. (2010). He highlights affective alignment and rapport emerging from emotional contagion and unconscious behavioral mimicry as facilitators of joint action. However, Michael does not discuss the contribution of affective affiliation from “surface synchrony” (Tollefsen & Dale 2012) to “we-framing” (Pacherie 2011), nor does he address the roles of emotions in more sophisticated, cognitively complex cases of joint action. Instead, Salmela’s (2013) account of shared emotions has two dimensions, intentionality and embodiment, both of which can be shared at different levels of collectivity. Thus we argue that thinner forms of shared emotion underlie minimalistic types of joint action, which are causally fundamental to the emergence of cognitively complex types of joint action that associate with thicker forms of shared emotions.

**Susanna Salmijärvi (Gothenburg)**

**The Material Constitution of Organizations**

It has been suggested that stone walls are constituted by stones, the statue of David is constituted by a piece of marble, and flags are constituted by pieces of cloth. But are organizations such as Amnesty, IFMA or UN constituted entities? If they are, is the relation between an organization and its members, buildings and other related objects the same kind of constitution relation as the relation between a statue and a piece of clay? Are organizations materially constituted?

In metaphysics, the material constitution view is popular when it comes to analyzing objects such as stone walls, ships, statues, cats, persons and flags (L. R. Baker, P. Simons, J.J Thomson, D. Wiggins. See Wasserman 2004). Proponents of the constitution view claim that objects such as stone walls, statues and flags are not identical with the material bases which make them up, rather the constitution relation is a relation between two distinct but co-located...
objects (Wasserman 2004). The main attraction of a constitution without identity-account is that it can explain how entities such as statues and pieces of clay can differ in important aspects but still remain very closely related.

It has recently been claimed (explicitly by Hindriks (2011, 2013) and Baker (2000, 2007)) that entities which seem very different from the objects investigated in the debate on material constitution, are also constituted entities. It is claimed that organizations, universities and other everyday objects are related to entities such as people (workers, members etc.) and other objects by a relation of constitution. In this paper, the potential prospects of applying a material constitution view on organizations will be critically discussed.

There is an initial attraction of applying the relation of constitution to institutional entities such as organizations. Above it was pointed out that constitution could explain how two objects could differ in important aspects but still remain very closely related. The differences amount to such things as existence and persistence conditions, and other properties which can be ascribed to the constituting object but not to the constituted object or vice versa. For example, a statue can remain the same statue through (gradual) loss of or changes in the clay constituting it, but the clay cannot remain the same piece of clay if parts of it are removed or replaced. At a general level, it seems that the same kind of reasoning could equally well be made of an organization and entities related to it: an organization can remain the same organization through (gradual) loss of, or changes regarding its members, employees, buildings and addresses, but the sum of members, employees, buildings and addresses would not remain the same if parts of it were removed or replaced. If it could be shown that organizations are constituted in the same way as statues are constituted, we could use the already established material constitution account in metaphysics in order to understand (at least parts of) the ontology of organizations.

Despite the apparent similarities, there are also important differences when it comes to statues and organizations. For example, the metaphysical discussion on material constitution concerns the relation between material objects and the material stuff which compose the objects in question. In other words, the debate concerns objects and their material bases. However, it is controversial if organizations are really objects, and also if the constitution base for organizations (if they have one) is (entirely) material (See Jansen 2009). Another point of difference regards the number of entities involved in the constitution relation. In the case of a statue and a clay, there seems to be a one-one relation between two objects. However, an organization (whatever ontological status it has) seems to be related to many different kinds of entities such as people, buildings and documents, so there seems to be a many-one relation in the case of an organization.

Against the background just presented, this paper aims at discussing potential prospects of applying a material constitution account on organizations. Two aspects on such an application will be taken:

First, it will be argued that given what is taken to be a standard account of material constitution (see Wasserman 2004), organizations cannot be said to be constituted entities in the same way as statues are constituted entities. This argument is based on pointing at one very accepted feature of the material constitution relation applied on statues and other material objects, which is lacking when it comes to organizations. The feature in question is the idea of two objects being co-located.

Second, for the sake of argument it will be assumed that the argument in the first part fails. In other words, it will be assumed that material constitution could successfully be applied on organizations. The critical question now becomes what metaphysical job the relation of material constitution is supposed to do (in the standard case)? What, if anything, can the relation of constitution contribute with concerning the ontology of organizations? The conclusion of the second part, and the main conclusion of this paper, is that even if organizations would be constituted by one or some of the entities related to it, the relation does not provide with answers to the metaphysical questions we are interested in, such as conditions for existence and persistence of organizations.

Hans Bernard Schmid (Vienna)

Groundless Group Self-Knowledge

An influential view argues that in order to act intentionally, the agent needs to know what he or she is doing. Such self-knowledge, it is claimed, is epistemically distinctive in that it is "groundless" - non-observational and non-inferential. This paper investigates how this view relates to the theory of intentional joint action. Is our knowledge
of what we are doing together with others – collectively, as a team or a group – of the same groundless kind? The paper is divided in three sections. The first section unpacks the idea of groundless (individual) self-knowledge, as developed by E.G.M. Anscombe, and in more recent philosophical research. Plausible features of self-knowledge include first-person identity, first-person perspective, first-person commitment, and first person authority (1.). The second section plays the part of the individualist’s advocate. In order to know what we are doing, I need to know what my partners are doing, too, and it seems that observation and inference are the only sources of knowledge of other people’s actions (2.). The third section defends a moderate version of groundless group self-knowledge. The knowledge in question is plural prereflective and non-thematic self-awareness of what it is the participants are doing together (3.).

David Schweikard (Muenster)

Bootstrapping and Cooperators’ Obligations

Does cooperation give rise to specific obligations between the agents involved? And if so, how exactly do they come about, of what kind are these obligations and how are they justified? – These are the questions I discuss in this paper. The discussion is framed within the more recent debate about the structure of joint action. In this debate, there seems to have emerged a consensus supporting the view that the performance of a joint action requires, and is guided by, a complex nexus of conative and cognitive attitudes. (I set aside reflections on shared affective attitudes, without thereby denying that they can play important motivational roles in joint action.) According to this view, joint actions such as going for a walk together or painting the house together typically require that the contributing agents refer in their intentions and beliefs to the joint activity and to the intentions and beliefs of one another.

However, this consensus breaks down (not altogether unexpectedly) with respect to the details of the analysis, e.g. regarding the structure of the relations between the attitudes involved, the indexical “we” or the alleged requirement of common knowledge of others’ attitudes. In this context, the debate about the normative implications of cooperation is particularly heterogenous. The aim of this contribution is to suggest an analysis of the normativity of cooperation in terms of social obligations that are grounded in mutual commitments. In particular, I shall specify a bootstrapping-mechanism that explains the genesis of cooperators’ obligations and a justification of these obligations within the structure of cooperation.

Setting the stage, I shall first (in section I.) narrow down the discussion to what I call necessarily joint actions as the scenarios in which social obligations play significant roles. As I define them, such actions can only be performed successfully if a number of agents do their bit, so that the potential contributors depend on one another and may have (at least) legitimate expectations that the respective others contribute. The ensuing discussion will be limited to small-scale cases involving only a few (mostly two) agents. In a second step (section II.), I sketch a relational analysis of joint intentions as complexes of specifically interwoven intentions and beliefs on the part of, and among, the participating agents.

In the third section (III.), I briefly review Margaret Gilbert’s account of the normative structure of cooperation which treats so-called ‘joint commitments’ as constitutive of ‘plural subjects’ and as involving mutual obligations and entitlements between cooperators. I note that among the most discussed features of Gilbert’s account, the coming about of the normative infrastructure of cooperation deserves special attention. In taking a closer look at how agents enter a joint commitment, I turn to counter-proposals (against Gilbert) that refer to contralateral commitments (A. Roth), and specific notions of reliance (F. Alonso) and trust (H.B. Schmid).

In the fourth section (IV.), I identify a bootstrapping-mechanism all of these proposals incorporate, at least on my reading. For the practical attitudes referred to in those proposals – contralateral commitments, reliance, and trust – can only be regarded as reasonable and they can only be constitutive of joint action, if the agents who form (any example of) these attitudes presume the social connection they thereby constitute. For instance, in relying on B to do his bit of a two-person-activity, A may be held to presume that B likewise relies on A – thus one-sided reliance may be regarded as effective only insofar as it presumes mutual reliance which in turn only comes about through one-sided reliance. Structurally the same kind of bootstrapping can be made explicit with regard to the attitudes of contralateral commitment and trust. – Now, is this a bootstrapping-problem for these accounts? I will argue that it is not.
The account I then go on to develop in the fifth section (V.) seeks to integrate (not only) the structural features of the aforementioned accounts. That is, it seeks to account for the genesis of cooperators’ mutual contributory obligations in terms of a bootstrapping-mechanism that accompanies the agents’ social commitments. I suggest analyzing this kind of practical commitment as an attitude with which an agent refers both to the cooperative action in question and to their cooperation partner (or co-agent). In an important sense, the socially committed agent is – on this account – committed both to doing their bit and to the other agent(s), where the presence of such social commitments on all sides grounds mutual obligations at least in cases in which the contributions of a number of agents are necessary for a successful performance of the joint action in question. The justification of these obligations needs to, as I shall show briefly in conclusion, answer the question as to how one agent’s social commitment can change another agent’s normative situation.

Emily Sullivan (Fordham)

Understanding Without Epistemic Credit

Gaining understanding about the world is no doubt a collective activity. Scientists work together to solve large problems and draw on findings made by others in the relevant fields. Philosophers now draw on scientific studies to gain a better understanding of particular philosophical claims and theories, as well as the world around us. What does this say about the nature of understanding? How does understanding transfer from one individual to another? Can one gain understanding through the testimony of another alone? Put differently, does the receiver of testimony deserve the epistemic credit for understanding or is the epistemic credit primarily attributable to the one giving the testimony?

In this paper I explore these questions and argue that one can acquire understanding through testimony alone; the epistemic credit is attributable to the one giving the testimony, not the one receiving it. I conclude by suggesting that in the case of collective understanding the epistemic credit is attributable to the collective and not to the individuals. Nevertheless, I argue, each individual does indeed have understanding.

There has been a lot of work done on how knowledge is transferred through testimony. Virtue epistemologists, for example, have argued for a credit view of knowledge. The credit view can be formulated as follows:

Credit view of knowledge:
If S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. (Lackey, 2009)

There has been several convincing arguments against this view of knowledge, e.g. Jennifer Lackey (2009) and Duncan Pritchard (2010, forthcoming). These arguments center around cases of gaining knowledge through testimony. It is argued that when someone gains knowledge through the testimony of another, the epistemic credit is attributable not to the receiver of the testimony, but to the one giving the testimony. After all, it is the informant’s true belief that explains the receiver’s true belief.

Pritchard (2010, forthcoming) argues against the credit view of knowledge, but promotes a credit view of understanding. We can change the above formulation to represent a credit view of understanding as follows:

Credit view of understanding:
If S understands that p, then S deserves credit for truly grasping that p.

To make things simple, the kind of understanding considered here is understanding of a causal or dependence relation. Pritchard argues that when one understands, she does not merely have a belief regarding what the cause is; rather, she grasps the cause. In other words, one needs to see the connections and interrelations which explain why something is the case. Pritchard (forthcoming) argues that this “seeing” requires significant cognitive work. This is supposed to make the epistemic credit attributable to the one receiving testimony. Pritchard thinks the agent needs a sound epistemic grip on the cause. A sound epistemic grip is demonstrated by having the ability to provide an explanatory story. Pritchard claims that one cannot get a sound epistemic grip though testimony alone. This is the claim that I want to reject.
Consider a simple case of knowing that \( f=ma \). Knowledge of this equation is fairly easy to obtain. A reliable physics teacher simply needs to tell you that it is true for you to know it is true. Understanding the equation is a different matter. It seems right to say that in order to understand the equation one needs to know why the relation obtains and how the equation can be manipulated and applied to particular situations. It is also plausible that a smart student—call her Donna—will be able to see how the equation can be manipulated and applied without much more instruction. In this case, the understanding Donna has is no doubt primarily creditable to her. Donna has completed significant cognitive work over and above the initial testimony. However, not all cases of understanding through testimony require this kind of extra cognitive work.

Consider another student, James. James is not as bright as Donna. He does not understand \( f=ma \) on the original testimony of his physics professor. James knows that \( f=ma \) and knows the dependence relation because he knows mathematics, but that is it. James does not understand why \( f=ma \). Say James seeks out help from his professor. The professor proceeds to explain the equation and point out the connections and interrelations which explain why the relation holds. James now has received further testimony, testimony about the interrelations and how the equation can be manipulated and applied to particular situations. It stands to reason that James now does understand, even on Pritchard’s model. James is now able to provide an explanatory story when asked. It is the story that was told to him by his professor. When James is now asked why force equals mass times acceleration, he is able to give an answer because of the testimony. Just as in the testimonial knowledge case, the epistemic credit is attributable to the professor, not to James.

It is true that there may be further questions that James is not able to answer; however, Pritchard does not want to close off the possibility that understanding comes in degrees. James does indeed have some understanding as to why \( f=ma \) and this understanding is gained through testimony. However, the grasping relation on my view does not amount to additional cognitive work. Grasping is a different phenomenological state than believing. Grasping feels different from believing, but this phenomenological difference does not mean there is additional cognitive work that transfers the epistemic credit in the way that Pritchard claims.

Given that the credit view of understanding is false, what does this mean for cases where understanding is gained through collective activity? It seems right to say that when each individual completes a task, she has understanding of that part of the problem and the epistemic credit is attributable to her. But, what about understanding the whole problem? I want to suggest that in this case the credit is attributable to the collective. Each individual does gain understanding of the whole through the testimony of others, but the epistemic credit is not attributable to each individual.

Ásta Sveinsdóttir (San Francisco State)

Social Properties

In this paper I introduce conferralism about social properties and show why it is preferable to a Searlean constitution account.

Timothy Syne (Brown)

Social Justice and Collective Action

Philosophical analyses of social activity tend to focus on the elaboration of the ‘collective intention’ shared by the individual members of a group. Prominent accounts differ on their specification of this collective intention, both with respect to its content – is it a belief, a plan or a commitment? – and over whether collective intentions are brute and basic features of individual agency or can be given a reductive analysis in terms of their component individual intentions. A feature shared by these accounts, however, is that they require individual group members to in some sense be aware of and endorse the collective activity to which they intentionally contribute, at least for the paradigm or central cases of collective action with which these theories are most immediately concerned.
In this paper I shall introduce into this debate some considerations from moral philosophy, specifically the idea that social justice has a distinctively institutional domain, namely the ‘basic structure’ of society, which is collectively enacted by all of its participants. The basic structure is a morally and sociologically foundational form of collective action. The moral demands of social or more strictly societal justice apply, I assume, to everyone in a society in virtue of their membership in the group that collectively enacts a basic structure.

This is true, most pertinently, of actual societies, most of which are presumably more or less unjust. But many people in actual societies are oblivious or ignorant of the true character of their basic structures; are alienated from their society’s basic norms and goals; or participate primarily because they are ordered or coerced into doing so by an authoritative individual or organization, such as the state. Such individuals do not, I suggest, understand and endorse the collective end of enacting their basic structure in the way required by prominent accounts of social action. Such accounts suggest that ignorance, alienation and authority are incompatible with full membership or fall outside the paradigm of collective action. But, if actual societies are to be regarded as unjust, then oblivious, alienated and subject people must be recognized as fully participating members.

This suggests that prominent accounts of collective action are unsatisfactory and, even, at the limit that social activity should not be analyzed in terms of a ‘community of intention’ but a Wittgensteinian ‘community of practice’ where a group is united by their participation in a common practice rather than any common attitudes they have towards that practice.

Thomas Szanto (Copenhagen)

Distrusting Collectives

Interpersonal distrust prominently figures among our ordinary social stances. For the better or worse, we often distrust others to do something, or to take care of something or somebody. Distrusting collectives and corporations, though certainly not less common, typically goes deeper, as it were. For example, consider the life-insurance company that you distrust to issue the money to your children in case there should be any, however minor, error in the policy contract on your part, or any extraordinary circumstances of your demise. In contrast, it would be rather unnatural to exhibit such deep distrust towards the individual agent who sold you the life-insurance policy. At the most extreme, notably in cases of political or ethnic conflict, such distrust concerns our overall mental and/or physical vulnerability, or the loss of our very human personhood. It is this deep form that makes distrust in collectives and corporations particularly disconcerting, or so I shall argue.

Now, within the rapidly growing literature on trust in social epistemology, not only has, I contend, distrust not been sufficiently analyzed yet. Moreover, there has been next to no systematic work in philosophy on the difference between distrusting individuals and collectives. The few existing accounts focused on similar but different structural forms of distrust, such as distrust in economic systems, the market, legal systems, or states (Herzog 2013; Hawley 2014). Similarly, some have explored cogent, but again different, deeply negative socio-emotive stances, such as the loss of a universal ‘ur-trust’ (Simpson 2012), the ‘shattering of basic trust’ by violence (Pabst & Endreß 2013), or the ‘shaking of basal security’ in the face of terrorism (Jones 2004). Given that there is a particularly rich body of work in social psychology and business ethics on corporate distrust (cf. Kramer 1999; Chan 2003), this desideratum is even more surprising.

Against this background, I shall argue that the relevant difference between distrusting individuals and collectives correspond a.) to the type and degree of harm that the distrusting subject is expecting from her counterpart (and her level of tolerance of vulnerability or the risks in general), and b.) to the degree of control over the entrusted task, good, or person, as well as the power and/or dependence relation between the respective parties (Baier 1994). I will develop my argument in three steps:

(1) I will begin by outlining the difference between distrust proper and cogent but different forms of ‘anti-trust’ (Baier 1994), such as mere absence of trust, non-reliance, or confident prediction of disappointment. Here, I shall also consider the normative and the affective nature of distrust, and how this is essentially connected to such emotions and reactive attitudes as betrayal, or forgiveness (Jones 1996; Hollis, 1998; Faulkner 2007).
I will then distinguish two different types of distrust, both within the social context, namely what I shall label ‘ordinary social distrust’, and the above-mentioned ‘deep distrust’ (DD). Ordinary distrust involves a subject’s non-reliance upon the goodwill of, or upon the meeting of a commitment on the part of a competent ‘distrustee’, or a set of competent distrustees. This typically entails that the distrustful does not accept any sort of vulnerability by handing over an entrusted good, task, or her own mental or physical integrity to the distrustee(s). Correspondingly, such negative social stances, if reciprocal, will likely issue in some contractarian, legal, political, institutional entities so as to reduce vulnerability.

(2) In the second part of my paper, I will focus on the phenomenon of DD. In contrast to ordinary distrust, it arises, as I shall argue, exclusively in the context of genuinely collective, group or corporate agency, and takes a more disquieting form. More specifically, I shall claim that DD is an appropriate cognitive-cum-affective stance to be adopted towards collectives, if and only if someone cannot in any way rely on the habits, reactive or non-reactive attitudes, dispositions, or affective reactions (including even the most basic ones, such as existential fear), i.e., on the moral and non-moral psychology of non-pathological persons. Hence, unlike ordinary distrust, where untrustworthiness and unpredictability are usually to be distinguished (Hawley 2014), DD, in fact, ultimately coalesces with what might be characterized as the complete breakdown of ordinary social behaviour and, correspondingly, the total unpredictability of the distrusted.

Concerning the lack of trustworthiness, I shall claim that there are no deeply untrustworthy individuals, but only collectives towards whom DD may be an appropriate stance. Such collectives may be so-called ‘evil collectives’ (Scarre 2012), but there are also less lurid—and surely not less alarming—collectives, including corporations that use institutionalized forms of wrongdoing via mechanisms which have been widely studied in social psychology in terms of ‘diffusion responsibility’, ‘moral disengagement’ or ‘dehumanization’ (Kelman 1973; Bandura 1999; Brief et al. 2001), i.e., essentially collective forms of harming that deeply affect individual’s overall personal integrity.

(3) Finally, I shall consider the explanatory advantages of the concept of DD for the analysis of distrust in collectives. In particular, I will demonstrate that standard three-place relation models for analyzing (dis)trust fail to readily explain the phenomenon at issue. Thus, I will investigate (i.) the ‘entrusting model’, where the question of what somebody is (not) to be entrusted with (an object, task or person) takes precedence over the question of whom to distrust (cf. Baier 1986); (ii.) motive-based accounts, according to which distrust lies either in the non-sharing of interests between distruster and distrustee, or a distruster’s expectation of a negative motive (ill will, harm, etc.) on the part of the distrustee (Jones 1996; Hardin 2002); and finally, (iii.) commitment-based accounts, according to which distrust involves not relying on somebody fulfilling a commitment she has made (Hawley 2014).

In contrast to such accounts, I will further develop (Strawsonian) ‘participant stance’ and ‘reactive attitude’ accounts of trust (Holton 1994), and suggest that DD towards collectives consists in a disruption, or a complete breakdown of normal forms of interpersonal, participant stances. This, in turn, happens because of the respective group agents displaying psychopath-like behavior—i.e., lacking empathy, etc. (Bakan 2004)—or the presence of (individual) ‘corporate psychopaths’ (Boddy 2011, 2013; Holt/Marques 2012). I will corroborate this claim by drawing on two well-researched real-life scenarios: distrust in corporations using workplace espionage against own employees (Chan 2003), and the infamous ‘Pinto Fire’ case of General Motors (Dowie 1977; Gioia 1992; Brief et al. 2001).

Ashley Walton, Anthony Chemero & Michael Richardson (Cincinnati)

Self-Organization and Semiosis in Jazz Improvisation

Self-organization provides new ways to understand the dynamics behind the emergent, spontaneous exchanges of musical performance. In biological self-organization, energy is expended to maintain order in a system in the form of work that constrains the possible behaviors of the components of the system. When two self-organized systems become closely coupled they compose a teleodynamic system where each does work to maintain one another’s constraints. The semiotic exchange between two improvising jazz musicians forms a teledynamic system where musicians expend energy that constrains each other’s sign behavior, and each allows their sign behavior to be constrained by the work of the other. This self-organization framework allows for new insight into developing theories of musical semiotics to address spontaneous, emergent musical performances, and non-linear time series analyses can provide the tools necessary for explicating the processes of these complex social exchanges.
Auriel Washburn, Rachel Kallen, Kevin Shockley & Michael Richardson (Cincinnati)

Aperiodic Visual-Motor and Interpersonal Coordination: Feedback Delays Facilitate Anticipation

The ability of an individual to coordinate with ongoing, ever-changing environmental events, including the actions of other individuals, is fundamental to the performance of many everyday tasks. The majority of previous research on the behavioral dynamics that occur between an individual’s movements and visually-specified environmental events has primarily focused on the coordination of simple stereotyped or periodic movements (e.g., rhythmic leg movements; rocking chair movements. However, a large proportion of agent-environment interactions require that individuals coordinate their movements with rather complex, aperiodic, and seemingly unpredictable events. Recent work in physics and motor control may help to explain how individuals are able to achieve this kind of complex, aperiodic coordination. In particular, the somewhat counter-intuitive finding indicating that small temporal feedback delays can sometimes enhance, rather than hinder, an individual’s ability to synchronize with unpredictable (aperiodic) and even chaotic environmental events is especially interesting. This phenomenon has previously been referred to as anticipatory synchronization.

The interactive processes between an agent and an agent’s task environment that lead to this phenomenon are not yet readily understood. However, theories about the relative importance of coordination between short-term behavioral events versus long-term behavioral patterns for the successful achievement of complex coordination have recently started to surface. The short-term coordination of events is often referred to as ‘local coordination’ and can be assessed using various measures of temporal synchronization. The longer-term coordination of behaviors has been termed ‘global coordination’ and often requires a comparison of the complexity of the two behavioral sequences match; so-called complexity matching. The relative importance of local and global forms of coordination has not yet been assessed with respect to the locally defined phenomenon of anticipatory synchronization. Additionally, it is not yet clear how this relationship might be affected by differences between unidirectional coupling, as found in visual agent-environment coordination, and bidirectional coupling, as often exists for interpersonal interactions. The current study brings together research on visual rhythmic coordination, anticipatory synchronization, and complexity matching in order to determine whether complex visual interpersonal coordination may be supported by feedback delay-enhanced anticipatory processes of coordination.

Method

A series of three experiments were conducted in order to establish whether anticipatory synchronization could ultimately be achieved in an interpersonal context with bi-directional coupling between actors.

Participants. Thirty-three total University of Cincinnati students participated in Experiments 1, 2, and 3.

Procedure and Design. In Experiments 1 and 2, a single participant sat facing a 50” HD Plasma TV and was equipped with a motion sensor, attached to the middle joint of the first two fingers of their right hand. Participants were asked to coordinate their arm movements with a moving blue dot on the display screen by controlling the movements of a red dot. In Experiment 3, two participants sat back-to-back facing separate 50” HD Plasma TVs and were each equipped with a motion sensor. Here, one of the participants was asked to coordinate their arm movements with those of their co-actor, with the coordinator’s movements being reflected in the movement of a blue display dot and the coordinator’s reflected in the movement of a red dot. The single participant in Experiments 1 and 2 and the coordinating participant in Experiment 3 experienced a feedback delay in their display dot with respect to their own movements at each of 0, 200, 400, and 600 ms delays.

Measures and Analyses. For each experiment we were interested in examining both local and global forms of coordination. Two different analyses were used to evaluate local coordination: 1) maximum cross-correlation, and 2) instantaneous relative phase and a box counting analysis used to establish fractal dimension allowed us to detect complexity matching.

Results and Discussion

Experiment 1. With respect to the phenomenon of anticipatory synchronization, this experiment was successful in replicating previous results. The inclusion of an additional analysis of local coordination provided valuable new
information about the fluctuating phase relationship between participant and stimulus movements. Measures of complexity matching indicated that global behavioral similarities occurred between the participant and stimulus movements in some, but not all, feedback delay conditions. These findings supported the continued use of the current experimental paradigm and analyses for further examination of the phenomenon of anticipatory synchronization in Experiments 2 and 3.

Experiment 2. This experiment showed that anticipatory synchronization can be achieved by a participant with respect to naturally produced, aperiodic movements, as has previously been observed for simulated chaotic movements. Results also provided evidence of complexity matching by participants to naturally produced, aperiodic behaviors. These findings supported the continued investigation of anticipatory synchronization and associated complexity matching within a truly interpersonal context carried out in Experiment 3.

Experiment 3. This final experiment successfully demonstrated that anticipatory synchronization can occur in an interpersonal context, with bi-directional coupling. Findings also indicated that complexity matching developed between participants even more often in this context than in for the previous two experiments.

Conclusions

The findings of the current study suggest that neither behavioral complexity, nor perceptual feedback delays, should be considered challenges to interpersonal coordination. This is consistent with the suggestion that the exchange of information between systems may actually improve with increases in behavioral complexity. Results also support the related idea that the matching of behavioral complexity improves with increases in information exchange, as the highest levels of complexity matching were found in the interpersonal, bi-directional coupling context of Experiment 3.

Perceptual feedback delays do seem to be critical for an actor to achieve anticipatory synchronization and complexity matching with an aperiodic behavior. However it is also worth noting that the instance of local and global coordination -- both with and without the involvement of perceptual feedback delays -- was highest in an interpersonal context with bi-directional coupling between actors. Ultimately, much remains to be understood about commonly occurring aperiodic coordination processes, but this study should serve as motivation for further exploration of complex interpersonal movement coordination.

Paul Weirich (Missouri)

The Lesson of the Prisoner’s Dilemma

The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a classic game with a memorable point. In it two agents each prefer another outcome to the outcome they achieve by following their preferences. A group of agents who each follow their preferences may be inefficient in the sense of failing to achieve Pareto optimality. The inefficiency results despite the agents’ common knowledge of their game and their rationality.

Some theorists, such as Sen (2002: 212), portray the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a conflict between individual and collective rationality. However, game theory offers our best account of collective rationality, and according to it collective rationality emerges from individual rationality. A solution to a game is collectively rational for the players, and in a solution each player’s contribution is rational given the other players’ contributions. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but adverse circumstances create excuses for falling short. Although the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s solution is inefficient, the players have a good excuse for inefficiency. They lack opportunities to enter binding contracts.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma’s lesson is to promote goals of collective rationality by removing obstacles to joint action. In ideal conditions for joint action, a game’s solution achieves efficiency. This essay formulates idealizations assuring efficiency in a broad range of games of strategy.

Besides efficiency, tradition advances several other goals of collective rationality, in particular, the goal of maximizing collective utility. This goal defines collective utility as a sum of utilities for individuals. Plausible versions of the goal limit it to cases that do not demand any individual to make a large sacrifice for the group’s sake. This essay also identifies ideal conditions that ground maximization of collective utility in a selected range of cases.
In the cases the essay treats, individuals in a sequential game may each in turn make a small sacrifice to win a large gain for others in the group. Given ideal conditions, each individual rationally takes a turn promoting collective utility, despite the required sacrifice, because of expectations of future benefits as others take their turns. Ideal conditions make it rational for each individual to participate in a policy of mutual aid.

Identifying idealizations that ensure that the rationality of individuals produces collective acts that attain goals of collective rationality besides efficiency extends the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s lesson.

Sunny Yang (Inje University)

A New Conception of Collective Guilt: In Defense of the Reactive Attitude View

Suppose one assumes that morality is a matter of feelings; specifically that guilt is a feeling or is constituted by feelings. This position implies that there can be no such thing as collective guilt, since collective entities (e.g. the United States or General Motors) are incapable of feelings of any kind. However, many people hold that (1) morality is a matter of feelings, and that (2) collective guilt exists – without realizing that there might be a problem connecting the two together. In this paper, I address this conflict.

Does it make sense to say that one cannot be guilty of X unless one ought to feel guilty about X? I shall show that Strawson, Gibbard and Prinz would all agree. Suppose I am on trial and the jury declares that I am guilty of X, and yet, it is not the case that I ought to feel guilty about X, nor that there is anyone who has a right to be resentful about X (endorsing here Strawson’s connection between guilt and resentment). This would make no sense. For it amount to saying that I am morally guilty of something that I ought not to feel guilty about and no one ought to resent. It would be hard to say in these circumstances that I am morally guilty of X, even if I am legally guilty of X—and what this paper will be concerned with is moral guilt, not legal guilt.

There are two questions here: one about the feeling of guilt, and another about its warrant. Following Gibbard, I shall argue that to call a feeling warranted is to express one’s acceptance of norms that allow or require having that feeling.

I shall argue against the idea that one can be guilty without feeling guilty; or that feeling guilty does not require actual feeling. (Gilbert 2000, 2002) I shall also take a stance of skepticism on the view that a collective can be said to be ‘guilty’ of wrongdoing. The first reason for being skeptical about a collectivist view is that the feeling of guilt is intimately connected to attitudes of self-assessment and this emotion is felt by individuals: collective guilt for group action, if it were possible, would either be in virtue of individuals’ vicarious guilt feelings on behalf of those who committed to the wrongdoing or be in virtue of individuals’ self-reactive attitudes. Hence, I take collective guilt to be distinct from collective guilt feelings. For my argument to work, I shall make a distinction between directly attributing some property to a collective and indirectly attributing it by way of directly attributing the property to its members. I will argue that the latter position is the only possible one.

Another reason that I am skeptical about the idea that there can be direct attribution of collective guilt is that we cannot be certain whether a collective can truly respond affectively – such as having feelings of discomfort and distress – when they are subject to a vicarious feeling of guilt. I shall suggest that the appropriateness of collective guilt feelings of group harm derives from a reflection on the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes. Following A. Gibbard and P.F. Strawson, I shall suggest that the moral reactive emotions of guilt and resentment must be reciprocal. If reactive attitudes are constitutive of moral responsibility, we can say that the proper response to group wrongdoing should be mutually expressed emotions – guilt and anger or indignation, which are self-reactive and vicarious reactive attitudes, respectively.

Individuals who are members of the group (at least under certain forms of membership) can appropriately regard themselves as guilty of the collective wrong in virtue of their self-reactive attitudes. Although someone thinks that she is herself unlikely to participate in such collective wrongdoing or even to consent to them, she might feel guilt in response to other’s outrage, or indignation, which is a vicarious reactive attitude. In the case of the terror of 9.11, as a citizen of the U.S or citizen of other countries all over the world, someone might feel outrage or indignation on behalf of the victims or the family of victims. This is the vicarious reactive attitude, which is the attitude we feel in response to ill or good will shown to others. Indignation is anger calibrated to injustice. One might object that the
vicarious reactive attitude of indignation is not linked to phenomenal feeling. Yet we can say that it can be linked to phenomenal feeling by virtue of the fact that it derives from the basic form of anger, which is concerned with an appraisal of threat or offense. As Prinz points out, "when we react emotionally to victimization, the anger response is natural because it is evolved to cope with threats, and it disposes us to aggression."[1] Although righteous anger and indignation have a common ground in that they derive from a more basic form, Prinz differentiates them in that the latter, but not necessarily the former, always involves violations of justice.

If we take a reactive attitude view, we can say that collectives can be morally responsible because it can be appropriate to blame them and take certain attitudes against them.

Now one might say that this is quite odd because he or she can be responsible for X without feeling guilty about X, at least in cases in which he or she does not think they are responsible for X, as well as in many other cases. To answer this objection, this paper endorses a weaker hypothesis that one cannot be guilty of X unless one ought to feel guilty about X. This connects being guilty with feeling guilty via a moral principle, rather than a logical principle. In short, being guilty must be connected with possible feelings—feelings that you ought to have. Since a collective entity cannot have possible feelings, and since it makes no sense to say that a collective entity ought to have feelings, I shall show that my view that collective entities cannot be morally guilty is sustained.

Marc van Zee (Luxembourg), Mehdi Dastani (Utrecht), Leon van der Torre (Luxembourg) and Yoav Shoham (Stanford)

Collective Intention Revision from a Database Perspective

Icard et al. recently formalized the Shoham "database perspective" with a logical model to capture action, belief and intention. We extend this model to a multi-agent setting by introducing a collective intention base that captures dependencies between intentions of different agents. We provide AGM-like postulates for multi-agent revision of beliefs, individual intentions, and collective intentions, and state a representation theorem relating our postulates to the formal model.

David Zoller (Cal Poly)

Why You Are Almost Certainly Guilty of Unstructured Harms

There has been significant recent interest in building a case that individuals who contribute to phenomena like climate change or labor exploitation through their everyday practices are morally guilty of the harms these phenomena may cause. The difficulty with substantiating moral guilt in cases like this has been that contributions to “unstructured collective harms” do not satisfy even the standardly accepted criteria for guilty complicity in a joint project: unlike the participant in a joint intention to rob a bank, an investor who knowingly contributes to a harm like sweatshop labor does not actually intend for her contributions to be contributions to that outcome. This evidently leaves us no grounds for holding her backwardly responsible for that outcome. Indeed, as Tracy Isaacs presents the case, it would be incorrect to speak of a moral wrong here at all: the harm is something we can lament, but without any collective intention to create the relevant outcome, it would be a misuse of language to call it a “moral wrong.” Isaacs and others accordingly take what we can call a “weak” position: contributors and non-contributors alike have general forward looking duties to alleviate the suffering of victims, but contributors have no special responsibility.

Iris Marion Young has argued for a “moderate” position that contributors to the unstructured harm are in a different position than bystanders, since their actions require for their success a system of conditions that will cause the harm. Young’s “moderate” position shares with the weak position the premise that contributors have no intent to harm (they are merely getting a good price, etc.), and hence cannot be backwardly guilty; however, a contributor’s actions make her forward looking obligations are more stringent than those of pure bystanders. Contributors have a unique forward looking “political responsibility” to fix the harmful social structures in which they participate. This “moderate” position has significant intuitive appeal, since it puts contributors to unstructured collective harms on the moral hook to aid, but never calls them guilty. Despite that appeal, this position has the odd consequence
that our investor can continue enjoying his unethical investment, and has a morally clean record if only he additionally puts pressure on his Congressperson to regulate businesses. As Walter Sinnott Armstrong puts this, “It is better to enjoy your Sunday driving [in a gas guzzling car] while working to change the law so as to make it illegal for you to enjoy your Sunday driving.” Paradoxical as this sounds, it is a paradox that much in the current conversation on collective responsibility makes it reasonable to accept.

My aim here is to argue that we shouldn’t accept it, and that while the moderate position offers much that we “want to hear,” it is untenable. I argue that any instance where a contributor to unstructured collective harm is cognizant of her forward looking “political responsibilities,” she is also backwardly guilty if she contributes to that harm. This is a variant of the “strong” position: that contributors to unstructured collective harm can (under the right conditions) be backwardly guilty with reference to that harm. I mean to demonstrate this while conceding most of what weak and moderate critics have said against the strong position. I agree with critics that it is impossible to make cases of unstructured collective harm look morally similar to a conspiracy, or even to make them look like cases of moral recklessness. But what has made the weak and moderate positions on unstructured collective harm so appealing, I argue, is that we are considering the wrong object of blame.

To blame me for the deprivations my unethical investment distantly causes, as though I jointly intended to bring them about, is certainly wrong. But I concede to critics that it is also wrong to blame me for those deprivations as something I have thoughtlessly or recklessly brought about. Brian Lawson and Melany Banks have independently argued on these lines for a strong position on climate change contributions. Both invoke variants of George Sher’s idea that I may legitimately be held responsible for causing harms I did not, but should have, had in mind when I acted—as I can be guilty when I have been negligent or reckless. Proponents of the strong position will need to use some reasoning like this, since a consumer or unethical investor or polluter has clearly put out of mind moral concerns that she ought to have in mind. Yet too much leeway here is undesirable: one can always come up with a bizarre act description that connects my act to some distant harm, and claim that I should have had those in mind. The right question is why consumers must attend to descriptions of their actions that include distant global harms. Bjorn Petersson argues that the strong view needs to provide clearer evidence of actual wrongdoing before tossing around the language of moral guilt: too much leeway makes backward looking responsibility unintelligible.

My view is tailored to provide that evidence. I argue that when I am sufficiently aware of harm to some distant anonymous person(s) resulting from my contributory action, but act anyway, I have effectively treated the victim as morally invisible. The phenomenological indistinctness of the anonymous victim(s)—that I have no idea who she/they is/are, that her very existence is a mere idea to me—does not give me license to act in ways that treat her in reality as a figment of my imagination. Merging work in the phenomenology of social reality with consideration of Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative, I argue that authentic belief in S’s autonomy requires that I accept S’s autonomy as a real limit on my behavior, and that I refrain from treating her autonomy as a mere idea. The consumer who treats some distant indistinct person’s (or persons’) autonomy as something of philosophical interest, but beneath consideration as a possible limit on her actions, is participating directly (not indirectly) in the primary harm done to victims of global economy: contributing to their continued moral invisibility. When we consider these phenomenological features of the contributory action itself as part of the object of blame—and not merely the outcome itself—we can make the case that contributors to unstructured collective harms can be backwardly guilty.

**POSTER ABSTRACTS**

**Maria Botero (Sam Houston State Univ.)**

**Primate Mother: The Mother of all Collective Basic Emotions**

Studies on basic emotions have focused on the existence of individual basic emotions that have an evolutionary history and reflex-like response to the environment expressed through specific facial expressions. This view has been contested by research that shows how even the basic units of emotion are generated not individually but collectively. According to von Sheve and Ismer (2013) collective emotions can be classified into three perspectives depending on
where they manifest in the social world: face-to-face encounters, culture and shared knowledge, and identification with a social group. I will focus on what von Sheve and Ismer call the second perspective, but I will not limit my research to human culture. I am interested in the biological aspect of basic emotions. Because of the evolutionary history of emotions, there is a collective aspect common to most primates: the primate mother. That is, I will argue that the first form of collective emotions in primates (and perhaps the precursor of all collective emotions) starts with the mother-infant interaction. To argue this point I will focus on the development of basic emotions in primates and I will use as an example the mother-infant interaction in chimpanzees.

Pedro Cadenas & Jacinto Davila (Universidad de los Andes)

A Computational Model of Bounded Rationality that Studies the Agency Problem: The Case of ‘Physician-induced Demand’

Economic theory has always been interested in understanding, explaining and predicting human behavior when acting on the economic scene. Since the work of John Von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern and Leonard Savage, around the middle of the 20th century, rational choice theory (RCT) has become the cornerstone for modeling social and economic behavior. Despite the fact that RCT has become a powerful framework of analysis for decision-making, with applications in different realms of the social and behavioral sciences, some of its basic foundations – or premises – have been the object of debate among cognitive scientists, philosophers, psychologists, computer scientists and economists. RCT is rooted in the notion of utility maximization and revealed preferences which purports to be neutral in terms of psychological assumptions or philosophies of mind. This important point has been made by cognitive scientists and philosophers over the years, but its real content and implications seem to remain largely ignored by many economists who, by the way, tend to forget that these lines of argument have been explored in the past by figures, from their own yard, such as Frank H. Knight, Herbert Simon and, to some extent, Amartya Sen. In this respect, we find ourselves in full agreement with the argument that, in most instances, RCT emphasis on utility maximization and behaviorism is quite restrictive and problematic, from both a descriptive and a normative point of view, for understanding human behavior and decisions. A key point that concerns us here is that RCT makes it very hard to analyze intentionality, not only on individuals but even more critically in multi-agent and collective settings. In this paper we follow (and explore) some of Herbert Simon ideas about procedural and bounded rationality, as an alternative way to understand human decisions, in many of the economic situations where RCT has proved to be inadequate. In particular we focus our attention to situations, which have been proved to be inadequate since the work of Arrow (1971), that 'belong' to health economics

We are interested in studying the interaction of two or more bounded rational agents in the light of the physician agency problem. The physician-agency problem studies the motives of physicians and to what extent these motives are aligned with the welfare of their patients. Based on superior knowledge of the patient's medical condition, physicians possess some kind of social power over the behavior and decisions of their own patients. Yet, physicians are not always altruistic individuals whose only concern is based on the patient’s health. Sometimes, economists argue, physicians also behave as self-interested individuals. As a consequence, it is reasonable to assume that doctors make different tradeoffs between the patient's benefit and their own gain when these two sources of motivation are in conflict with each other. This problem has been studied under the lenses of RCT, more specifically under the framework of utility maximization and Bayesian reasoning, and applied to an important concept related to physician agency known as the physician-induced demand (PID). PID is a hypothesis, first formulated by Evans (1974), that states that physicians engage in some kind of persuasive activity to shift the patient's demand curve, or the patient's preferences, according to the physician's interest.

The purpose of the paper is to present a model of bounded rational agents, using a computational model based on a goal-oriented framework, that pays attention to aspects such as intentionality and cognitive limitations when studying the physician agency problem. In particular, we study the PID problem and propose a computational bounded rational model to be compared, and analyzed, with respect to a more traditional model of rational economic behavior. The point of comparison is the basic structure of Dranove's model (1988) on demand inducement. Our goal would be to identify some of the advantages and disadvantages of studying the physician induce-demand problem, from a point of view of bounded rationality, when compared to a more traditional model like Dranove (1988) where bounded rationality and intentionality is absent. We have found that a model that studies
the interaction between two bounded rational agents, who may have different rules of behavior - and using the analytical tools of cognitive sciences - are rarely seen in the economic literature. We also believe that this type of exercise may provide an opportunity for bridging the gap between models of social interaction and intentional/goal-oriented models of agency. If so, this could serve as a window for modeling some elements of collective intentionality at a more aggregate level.

According to Paul Thagard (2010), “The central hypothesis of cognitive science is that thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures”. There are two approaches to model cognitive processes in cognitive sciences: (1) Rule-based procedures and (2) neural networks. Both models have had many successes in explaining a wide range of cognitive and psychological phenomena like problem solving, learning and other kinds of thinking. In this essay we have chosen to work on (1), not because we believe that this type of modeling is "superior" to (2), but because we believe it best captures the type of problem we would like to address. Rule-based models assume that the mind has mental representations analogous to the data structure we find in computers, and procedures similar to computational algorithms. The simplest kind of rule is of the IF-THEN type. As a consequence logic programming, as one of the central paradigms for programming in computer science, emerges as a natural candidate for the construction of our rule-based model simulation. One of the main contributors and key figures behind computational logic, namely Robert Kowalski, has shown that logic programming is a much more flexible tool than it may initially appear.

Jacinto Davila was a doctoral student of Robert Kowalski at Imperial College in London, where, inspired on a proposal made by Kowalski, conceived the agent simulation platform (Galatea) to be used in this paper. Galatea is a software that allows to model and simulate multi-agent systems under conditions that are ideal to a cognitive science rule-based model. “The possibility of modeling and simulating entities that perceive their environment, reason upon those perceptions and certain background of knowledge, and then act upon that environment (i.e. as Agents in AI) opens the door to a number of extensions to the established uses of simulation. Economic modeling can, with agents, take into account new and, arguably, more precise characterizations of human beings. This way of modeling economic agents may become an alternative to more traditional mathematical models employed in economics. Those traditional descriptions of human beings normally exclude, for the sake of tractability, fundamental aspects such as qualitative descriptions of the agents goals and intentions, beliefs and other attributes of human reasoning (e.g. bounded rationality)”. Pedro Cadenas provides the inputs for the agents and economic analysis for the modeling and Jacinto Davila develops the programming and language specification of the agents. We both work on the implications and analysis of the behavior of agents, before and after the simulation.

Bryan Chambliss (University of Arizona)

Deceptively Simple: Why Joint Mental Representations Don't Solve the Puzzle of Social Interaction

Understanding and explaining social interaction is a primary goal of studying social cognition. Moreover, certain types of social interactions seem resistant to explanation in classical accounts of social cognition, e.g. those seeking to explain interaction in purely “observational” terms, such as the perception and attribution of mental states to others. Consequently, many have called for a fundamental rethinking of social cognition.

I’ll articulate the Puzzle of Social Interaction which has led to such ferment, and argue that while neither Observational nor Enactivist accounts yield satisfactory explanations for such interactions, Joint Mental Representations offer a compelling framework for responding to the puzzle. However, the framework offered by Joint Mental Representations fails to explain certain types of interactions (deceptive interactions). Thus it leaves a substantial type of (otherwise puzzling) social interaction unexplained, and cannot itself constitute a full response to the puzzle.
Barbara Fultner (Denison University)

Taking the Second-Person Perspective Seriously in Social Cognition

Scholarship on social cognition continues to undervalue, misconceive, or ignore intersubjectivity, privileging first- and third-person perspectives over the second-person perspective (a notable exception is Schilbach et al. 2013). Similarly, representation is often privileged over practice. Indeed, privileging representation and a third-person stance often go hand-in-hand. To demonstrate this dual privileging, I consider recent discussions of 1) the role of mirror neurons in social cognition and 2) direct perception accounts of understanding others. Both debates remain caught in third-person conceptions of sociality. I argue, first, that the direct perception of other's mental states must be understood as primarily a second-person interactive relation and only secondarily a third-person, observer-observed relation. Second, perception may or may not be representational, depending on what kind of state is perceived. To make these arguments, I draw on a phenomenological analysis of the embodied practice of yoga.

1. Mirror Neurons

Mirror neurons, touted by some to be the mechanism explaining social behavior, have recently been argued to play a more minimal role in social cognition. Shannon Spaulding argues persuasively that “mirror neuron activation,” though it may causally contribute to understanding goal-directed behavior, is never “constitutive of, necessary, or sufficient for action understanding” (Spaulding 2013, 237, 241). The relationship between mirror neuron activation and understanding intentions (i.e. mental states) is even more tenuous. According to Spaulding, mirror neurons “causally contribute to understanding goal-directed behavior by causing the subject to share (some of) the motor and sensory representations that the target has with respect to the goal-directed behavior” (253). That is, her argument turns in part on what sorts of representations (sensory-motor but not mental) can be associated with mirror neuron activity. Following the literature, she defines mirror neurons in terms first- and third-person perspectives: “Mirror neurons are multi-modal neurons that fire during both execution [first-person] and observation [third-person] of actions” (Spaulding 2013, 234).

Heyes and others have argued that mirror neurons develop in the context of associative learning and that insofar as they have a role in social cognition, that functionality is socially constructed (Ray and Heyes 2011; Cook et al. 2014). That is, the very phenomenon mirror neurons are supposed to explain may be constituting them. By shifting “explanatory power from neurons themselves to environments in which they develop” (192), the associative-learning account of mirror neurons is more compatible not only with interactive practice-based views of intersubjectivity, but also with extended or embodied mind theories that de-emphasize representational conceptions of the mind. It also opens the door for culture to play a more prominent role in social cognition. Cook et al. emphasize “social interaction as a source of relevant sensorimotor experience in development” (187). However, like Spaulding, they do not challenge the description of mirror neurons as firing in “ecocentric (first-person)” or “allocentric (third-person)” contexts (183).

If mirror neurons are not the result of genetic adaptation but have been recruited by a more general associative learning mechanism, then the environment plays an important part in their development. But that makes how we conceptualize this environment and, in particular the social interactions that partly constitute it, crucially important. Whether we think of human beings as mutual observers or as interacting agents matters.

2. Direct Perception

Jane S. Lavelle distinguishes between a strong and a weak reading of the Direct Perception approach, arguing that the latter is compatible with the theory-theory. Lavelle begins by quoting Shaun Gallagher that “in most intersubjective situations we have a direct understanding of another person’s interactions because their intentions are explicitly expressed in their embodied actions, and mirrored in our own capabilities for actions,” (Lavelle 2012, 215). However, the notions of explicit expression and embodiment are lost in her subsequent analysis. She attributes to the direct-perception theorist the view that an observer’s mirror neuron activity “is sufficient to provide her with knowledge about the other’s intentions” (219)—a suspect view since Lavelle agrees that mirror neuron firing is not sufficient to make us see the mental states of others. The theory-theorist, she suggests, need not be committed to the view that mental states are unobservable. Like a theoretical term such as “shingles,” mental states could be regarded as observable once one has a theory of mind. To observe some mental states is to “perceive certain behaviours as actions, and thus as intentional... Without a theory of mind I would not be able to see Bob’s
movement as a reach [for a cupcake], I would only see it as a movement of his arm” (228). While this is an interesting attempt to reconcile the direct-perception and theory-theory accounts, Lavelle casts understanding other minds in third-personal terms: “seeing” (direct perception) is a matter of observing. Thus she, too, misses the importance of embodied second-person social interactions.

3. The Phenomenology of Yoga

Yoga presents an ideal phenomenological case study because it involves non-linguistic embodied and linguistically mediated (representational) knowledge. The practitioner cultivates increased awareness of body position, flexibility, strength, breath, and increased awareness of her train of thought. Yoga fosters powers of self-observation. Yet it also crucially involves second-person perspectives. Specifically, the teacher-student relationship requires first-person experience, second-person interaction and third-person observation of another. Yoga therefore allows us to differentiate between first-, second-, and third person perspectives and to gain a better understanding of the relationship between practice and representation.

Yoga requires observing another’s body. The student observes poses the teacher demonstrates; the teacher watches the student copy the poses. At the same time, the situation is intersubjective and communicative. The instructor is giving verbal cues, both while demonstrating and while observing the students. She also gives physical “adjustments”, communicating with the student non-verbally and non-representationally. An expert yoga teacher can transform a student’s pose by the slightest touch—whereas a teacher-in-training may encounter the student as an immovable rock. When a teacher is verbally cueing her students, she may be imaginatively doing the movements with the students. This is a form of what Stein Bråten, referring to infant development, has called “altercentric participation” (Bråten 1998).

Nicolas Lindner & Gottfried Vosgerau (Heinrich Heine University)

Is Joint Action Necessarily Based on Shared Intentions?

Regarding joint action, the majority of researchers assume that underlying collective or joint intentions bind the respective actions of the participants together (Searle 1990, Bratman 1993, Tuomela 1988). A major part of the debate thus focuses on the nature of these particular intentions. In this talk, we will describe one major account and criticize that this account cannot explain joint action as displayed by small children. Based on this critique, we will formulate an alternative view, which suggests that some non-demanding cases of (seemingly) joint action (including those displayed by small children) are rather effects of the lack of representing one’s own intentions as one’s own (it is just represented as an intention that is there). This account has the advantage of offering a way to specify the pivotal role that joint action is supposed to play in the acquisition of socio-cognitive abilities.

In his influential account of shared intention Bratman (1993, 2009) construes collective intention as a web of interrelated intentions and attitudes of the participants. Any complex that fulfills a set of particular roles that he sees as a necessary condition does the job of a shared intention and can thus be identified with it. Bratman proposes a complex of sufficient conditions that functions as one characteristic form of shared intention.

Bratman’s conception of shared intention seems to be a convincing characterization of how cognitively mature agents act together. Some researchers yet doubt whether his approach is suited to account for joint action in young children. This issue is closely related to the developmental onset of socio-cognitive abilities. The common knowledge condition of Bratman’s substantial account presupposes that the system of intentions in question is in the public domain. Furthermore, there has to be mutual knowledge of the others’ intentions plus knowledge of the others’ knowledge. The cognitive basis for common knowledge thus rests on a variety of capacities—all in all, it presupposes a robust theory of mind. With respect to this, criticism of Bratman’s account stems from the idea that shared intention is too complex to accommodate for joint action of young children (Tollefsen 2005; Pacherie 2011; Butterfill 2012). We will review these criticisms and conclude that Bratman’s conception cannot account for children’s joint collective actions—and at least, if it is supposed to explain the development of their understanding of minds (Tomassello/Carpenter/Call/Behne/Moll 2005; Moll/Tomassello 2007). Yet, his approach is suited to explain joint action mature cognitive agents. In particular, for cases of joint action that involve planning, future-directed intentions and deliberation.
We will conclude our talk by offering an alternative account of children’s ability for joint action, which turns, in a way, the circularity upside down: If joint action is indeed pivotal for the development of socio-cognitive abilities, they cannot be developed in small children. Thus, joint action as displayed by small children has to be grounded in other abilities. Our proposal is that it is the lack of the concept of a mental state (esp. intentions) that produces behaviour which looks like joint action (we will not discuss whether the term should be applied to these cases or not). If a child has not yet learned that a mental state is something that “belongs” to single persons, it cannot be said to have acquired the concept of a mental state. However, the child might be, at the same time, able to introspect the content of the own intentions, such that the child’s introspection can be paraphrased as “there is the intention to”. In other words, the child has not yet learned to differentiate between its own intentions and those of others. The effect of this lack of abilities will result in a behaviour that looks like joint action (at least in cases in which the intention of the adult and the child match).

This account does not only offer new perspectives for the explanation of autism (cf. Frith 1989, Vosgerau 2009), it also offers a way to specify the thesis that (seemingly) joint action is pivotal to the acquisition of socio-cognitive abilities: Joint action sets up an environment in which children are able to gradually learn that intentions can differ between individuals. The result of this learning phase will ultimately be the acquisition of the concept of a mental state, which includes that mental states belong to persons and that thus mental states can differ between individuals (this “knowledge” is then tested in the “false-belief-task”). In other words, the learning of a theory of mind starts with acquiring the concept of a mental state, and this concept can be best acquired in (seemingly) joint action scenarios, in which children directly experience the effects of differing mental states (intentions and beliefs). Accordingly, empirical research has already suggested that the acquisition of mental state concepts is dependent on the use of mental state terms (Rakoczy, Tomasello, und Striano 2006), which are presumably most often used in joint action scenarios.

Some empirical results have been interpreted to show that very young children already possess the socio-cognitive abilities needed for cooperative activities and act on a rather sophisticated understanding of the mental states of self and other (Carpenter 2009). Following this line of argument, researchers propose that infants already understand others’ knowledge and ignorance (Liszkowski/Carpenter/Tomasello 2008), they can act on a shared goal (Warneken/Chen/Tomasello 2006, Warneken/Tomasello 2007), and exploit the common ground they shared with an adult (Liebal/Behne/Carpenter/Tomasello, 2009, Moll/Richter/Carpenter/Tomasello, 2008). While appreciating the importance of this research, we will present alternative interpretations of these findings that are cognitively less demanding and thus consistent with our proposal.

Our alternative account is primarily designed to explain the behaviour of small children. However, we point to the possibility that non-demanding cases of cooperation (e.g. to buy an article in a grocery) can be explained by similar mechanisms in adults. In such cases, adults would not explicitly represent their own intentions as their own intentions, thereby generating actions that are structurally similar to those of small children. Nevertheless, other more complex cases of joint action certainly also exist in adults. In the light of our proposal, we thus also conclude that Bratman’s account of shared intention should not be abandoned altogether. Although a uniform account of joint action for both children and mature agents would have the benefits of being parsimonious, candidates for such a comprising explanation (cf. Tollefsen/Dale 2012; Vesper et al. 2010; Gold/Sugden 2007) do not seem to have the resources to explain the development of qualitatively differing stages of joint action.

Naozumi Mitani (Shinshu University)

Some Reflections on the Social Origin of Intentionality—A Sellarsian Perspective

‘The Father, the Son, and the Daughter’ (FSD) is the title of an essay that Ruth Millikan published in 2005. As the subtitle—“Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan”—reveals, the “Father” refers to Wilfrid Sellars, the Son is Robert Brandom, and the Daughter is Millikan herself. In the paper, Millikan talks about a family story, focusing on what the two scions owe to their father.

The configuration of names—Millikan and Brandom with Sellars as via media—might well evoke one philosophical backdrop: the now well-known division of Sellarsians into a right and left wing. Roughly, right-wing Sellarsians are those who read Sellars as a scientific realist, taking the dictum of scientia mensura—in the dimension of describing
and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not”—to be the core of Sellarsian enterprise. In contrast, left-wing Sellarsians are those who read Sellars as a social pragmatist, taking his idea of inferential approach to intentionality—bluntly, intentionality in a full-fledged sense is inseparable from our social practice—to lie at the center of his philosophy.

Offhand, as some of the literature point out, it might seem that this demarcation between right and left applies to Millikan and Brandom (to which possibility alludes Millikan herself in the opening paragraphs of “FSD”). However, once you begin to dig deeper, this first impression disappears. As Brandom rightly says, “There is something right about this opposition [among the Sellarsians], [b]ut ...in our case the left/right division does not seem to cut at the joints. [Millikan] has sketched a different context, one that is much more helpful”.

That said, how are we to understand the siblings’ relationship? As we saw, the discrepancy should be mapped from a different perspective than the traditional right/left division. Then, where precisely is the point of their bifurcation to be located? In my presentation, I will first delve into the details of the debate and make explicit where the difference between the two Sellarsian thinkers lies.

Roughly, my presentation will proceed along the following lines:

(1) Siblings’ dispute originates from Sellars’s consideration about the relationship between what he called languagings as “pattern governed behavior” and “rule governed behavior.” The former is characterized as a propensity to exhibit a certain sort of behavioral uniformities (such as the disposition to utter “red” when presented red objects), and this can be achieved through S-R reinforcement or causal conditioning in a linguistic community. However, as Brandom stresses, this much can be done by a parrot, which, say, has been trained to utter “Green” in the presence of green objects. Pattern governed behavior alone falls short of full–fledged intentionality. And it is at this point that the notion of rule–governed behavior, in regard of which the bifurcation between the siblings is to be placed, cuts in.

(2) On the one hand, Brandom adopts the Sellarsian idea that linguistic rules are like the rules of chess, implying that the practice of language ought to proceed in accordance with the rules that govern the “game of giving and asking for reasons”. According to Brandom, semantic content or intentional character of our linguistic performances is explained in terms of the fact that the speaker, if asked, can give reasons to justify her own remark, as when a seven year old child mentions “I saw smoke in the kitchen” in response to the demand to explain why she thought the house was on fire. Thus, for Brandom, the rule–governed, i.e., normative, character of our intentional states is instituted by and embedded in the community practice from top to bottom: “Only communities, not individuals, can be interpreted as having original intentionality. ...the practices that institute the sort of normative status characteristic of intentional states must be social practices”.

(3) On the other hand, Millikan highlights another element in Sellars’s theory of intentionality, saying Brandom’s recourse to the fundamentally social character of intentionality is misleading in that it deflects our eyes from a broadly evolutionary story that made language what it is. For Millikan, who takes up Sellars’s notion that the proper function of language can be illuminated with the metaphor of “mapping” or “picturing” rather than that of a game, rule–governedness or normative character of linguistic activities gets clarified in accordance with the “survival value” that accrues to the “language of beehive”. Millikan adopts Sellars’s suggestion that “[linguistic] picturing or mapping may have immediate practical uses, as when one bee makes a dance–map that guides another towards nectar.”

Now, the implication should be clear. Seen from the evolutionary perspective that Millikan adopts, “Playing a conceptual game of solitaire must also have its advantages,” and in that sense, “conforming to the semantic rules embodied in a language is not just a social activity, of use only within a society. If learning a language is learning to think, having learned a language will also come in handy on Robinson Crusoe’s island, with or without assistance from Man Friday.”

(4) Consideration along the lines above brings us to the next terrain to be explored. How would the “Dad” respond to the siblings’ dispute, were he to know about it? Would he regard one of the siblings to “have abandoned the faith”, calling him or her an apostate? Or would he admit there’s a crack in his own position, saying it’s just that the scions have “driven a wedge” into the crack that he himself had made? Or, would he show up with an ieric verdict, telling the son and the daughter that the schism is to be bridged? The second aim of my presentation is to pursue the third option and to reconstruct the adjudication of the Dad himself, in the hope that we can locate a platform to
command a view that would accommodate both of the robust arguments put forth by the two giant Sellarsian thinkers of our day.

James Swindler (Illinois State University)
Social Roles and Moral Law

This paper aims to carry forward Raimo Tuomela’s central thesis in his recent book, The Philosophy of Sociality. He proposes as a constitutive element of collective action what he calls the “Collectivity Condition:” roughly, that a goal is satisfied for a group member iff it is satisfied for all group members. Moreover, he suggests in several passages that “full blown” collective intentionality parallels Kantian ethics. More than a mere parallel, I think that if collective intentionality requires a coherent collective perspective, then the Collectivity Condition is equivalent to the Categorical Imperative. Thus a group is a genuinely collective just in case it displays moral integrity. After interpreting Tuomela’s thesis, I compare it to the three forms Kant gives his imperative.

Brandon Thomas & Michael Riley (Cincinnati)

Perceived affordances for remembered objects depend on functional task constraints

Affordances are opportunities for an organism to behave in its environment. Individuals are capable of perceiving affordances for remembered objects (Wagman et al., 2013). In three experiments, remembered affordance estimates for absent objects were not dependent on memory for relevant geometrical object properties. The results suggest that perceived and remembered affordances for objects are fundamentally action-oriented and inextricably tied to the functional context of the task, as predicted by ecological psychology.

Tim Tung-Ying Wu (Missouri, Columbia)

Epistemic Uniqueness, Permissiveness, and Peer Disagreement

Two theses of the relationship between rationality and evidence are closely related to the question as to how we should react to peer disagreement: Uniqueness: for given evidence rationality fixes a unique fully rational level of confidence in a proposition. Permissivism: for given evidence sometimes rationality permits a range of fully rational levels of confidence in a proposition. I carefully examine Uniqueness and Permissivism from the perspective of peer disagreement and specify a considerable objection to a form of Permissivism which implies that peers’ different fully rational beliefs might be originated from different epistemic systems, and a commonly accepted but problematic response to it. I defend a theory of Permissivism that is not susceptible to the objection by appealing to peers’ different epistemic systems and the distinction between first-order evidence and norm evidence.