Post-Katrina Homeland Security
Charles R. Wise 
The events of /11 revealed gaps in the capabilities of the U.S. to integrate
the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies for homeland
security. To address those gaps, many changes in law and organization
were made, including the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the
National Response Plan.
The response at all levels of government to Katrina has revealed
that the capability gaps still haven’t been closed and that
a significant national debate needs to occur about what is needed
to fully establish an effective framework to coordinate federal,
state, and local efforts to respond to catastrophic events. It
is important that post-Katrina inquiries and deliberations go
beyond questions of individual culpability for mistakes, focusing
instead on systemic issues and the policy questions that need
to be resolved to achieve a fully functioning national intergovernmental
response capability.
Among the questions that need to be addressed are:
- Does the federal government have the right organization in
place? If proposals to remove FEMA from the Department of Homeland
Security are accepted to address natural hazards such as hurricanes,
how effective will future federal actions be in coordinating
the response to the next terrorism event? What other organizational
changes need to be made to insure coordination among multiple
federal agencies such as the Departments of Homeland Security,
Defense, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Justice,
etc.?
- Do the existing laws and procedures that govern coordination
of the activities of state and local agencies with federal agencies
need changing? Are the procedures that govern state and local
requests for federal assistance effective? Under what circumstances
should federal officials supplant or overrule state and local
officials?
- What role should the assessment of risk play in the allocation
of resources for disaster preparedness? Should states and cities
that may have greater risks receive a greater share of federal
resources or should the funds be spread more evenly among the
states and localities?
- How much risk reduction is the public willing to pay for?
Should the rebuilding of New Orleans and the other Gulf Coast
communities be set to a standard of protecting them from a Category
3, 4, or 5 hurricane? The differences will be calculated in
hundreds of billions of dollars. How much of the cost should
be paid by federal, state, or local taxpayers?
Every state and community will now need to more systematically
assess the risks of emergencies and analyze and debate the alternative
levels of risk reduction and the costs associated with them. Congress,
President Bush, and the public will need to debate the national
objectives and the answers to the above questions.
Charles Wise is a professor at SPEA, IUB. His
focus is on public organizations and management, public law, and
democratization in comparative politics and administration. Within
public organization, his research focuses on interorganizational
relationships, and organization design. He also is the director
of the Parliamentary Development Project for Ukraine. Professor
Wise received his Ph.D. from Indiana University in 1972.
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