WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY 
   AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
   Fall 1998 Colloquia 
    http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/colloquia/materials/fall1998_colloquia.html

Colloquia during Fall 1998:

Monday December 7, 1998

NOTE: This is the last Colloquium presentation for the fall semester. The first talk of the spring semester will occur on January 25, 1999. Thanks to all of you for attendance!

Red triangleProfessor Rachel Croson, Assistant Professor of Operations and Information Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, December 7, 1998. Her presentation [co- author Ayse Onculer, Decision Sciences, INSEAD] is entitled "Rent-Seeking for a Risky Rent: A Model and Experimental Investigation." An abstract of her paper is provided below. This paper extends Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking model to the case of a risky rent. We derive equilibrium and comparative static predictions from extended model and present the results of an experiment with subjects from the US and Turkey to test it. Results are consistent with the comparative static predictions of the model, although we observe significantly more absolute levels of rent-seeking than the model predicts.

Monday November 16, 1998

Red triangleMr. David Robb, Joint Ph.D. Candidate in Public Policy, Department of Political Science and the School of Public and Environmental Affairs (SPEA), Indiana University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, November 16, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Meta-theory Framework: Explaining Urban Development by Sorting the Theory." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

What theories of urban development are best for understanding? Theories of urban development have a wide variance. For example, Michael Porter (1994) argues that cities have location and market advantages that, when exploited, lead to urban development. In contrast, the progressive era reformers believed that the organization and a professional administration of government are the basis of urban development. To further add to this variance in theory, other authors, like Ross and Friedman (1990) and Fosler (1992), argue that urban development rests upon the existence of flexible governance institutions that can adapt to changing economic conditions. Why is there such a wide variance in the theories of urban development?

In American cities, we see a wide variance in urban development outcomes. Urban development in Gary is characterized by an economic and social decline since the 1950s. Urban development in Cleveland is characterized by a period of economic and social decline in the 70s and 80s and an alleged rapid rebound in the 90s. Urban development in Pittsburgh is characterized by a long period of social and economic growth since the collapse of the steel industry. Why is there such a wide variance in these real-world urban development outcomes?

There are many ways to sort the theories about urban development (see Judge, Stoker, & Wolman, 1995; Grimshaw, 1996; Herson & Bolland, 1997). In this paper, the riot of urban development theory is sorted into a meta-theory framework based upon temporal accumulation. This framework is then used to construct an explanation for variance in urban development outcomes across time. This explanation is tested using 50 years of empirical evidence from the cities of Gary, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh.

Monday November 9, 1998

Red triangleProfessor Alexander Thompson, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, November 9, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Enforcement in the Shadow of International Institutions: Canada and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

I seek to demonstrate that unilateral enforcement or sanctioning efforts by a state are shaped by the presence and design of the institution whose rules are being violated. The principal conclusion is that even a weak institution that relies on decentralized enforcement (conducted directly be states) can have a positive bearing on whether and how this enforcement takes place if minimum design criteria are met. Two general features are required for these virtues to manifest themselves. First, information must be collected and disseminated in a fair and sufficiently centralized manner. And second, rule-making procedures must produce rules that are seen as objective and appropriate enough to carry some normative weight. These functions expose violators and legitimize the enforcer state's actions, thus, making them less costly than they would otherwise be. Support for the argument is drawn principally from the 1995 incident between Canada and Spain over fishing rights in the Northwest Atlantic, though suggestive evidence is also offered from the areas of international security and trade.

Monday November 2, 1998

Red triangleDr. Sujai Shivakumar, Visiting Scholar, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and the Department of Economics, George Mason University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, November 2, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Institutional Problem-Solving and the Constitution of Development." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

As social scientists, what is our fundamental quarry? We study how individuals and groups of individuals solve problems. Indeed, problem-solving is immutable to the human condition. The degree to which human-beings are able to individually and/or collectively problem-solve reflects on their well-being. Problem-solving through collective action can be directed or coordinated through a range of facilities, from informal covenants with one another, to the maintenance and revision of civil bodies politic, and to formal governance structures of the State. Among these, the State is commonly conceived in the orthodox social science literature as the entity possessing monopoly prerogatives over collective problem-solving and conflict resolution. Government is seen as an omniscient, omicompetent, and omnibenevolent problem-solver responding to the problems of a society of subjects. Indeed, this is the predominant view in Development Economics: Here, the responsibilities of the State are taken as two-fold; first to gather information and develop the appropriate policies and next to faithfully implement them. In this, constitutions as structures mediating interactive problem-solving among citizens become formalities; instead there is a preoccupation with manufacturing outcomes. As such, institutional arrangements for problem-solving are neglected as instrumentalities through which patterns of order are generated.

Outside the neoclassical orthodoxy, there is an increasing awareness of the importance of and complementarities among institutions, process, and polycentricity in promoting human welfare. For these arguments to cohere, however, there is need for an appropriate grammar for an "art and science of association." The groundwork for such syntax is to be found in the concept of Institutional Problem-Solving.

Red triangleMonday October 26, 1998

Professor Peter J. Deadman, Department of Geography, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, October 26, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Simulating Common Pool Resource Management Experiments with Adaptive Agents Employing Alternate Communication Routines." An abstract of his paper [co-author Professor Edella Schlager, School of Public Administration and Policy, University of Arizona and Professor Randy Gimblett, School of Renewable Natural Resources, University of Arizona] is provided below.  

This paper describes the development of a series of adaptive agent simulations based on data from previously documented common pool resource (CPR) experiments. In the past, researchers have employed techniques from experimental economics and social psychology in order to better understand individual behavior under different institutional configurations. In this approach to the study of CPRs, intelligent agent-based situations are employed to examine the effects of different institutional configurations and individual behavioral characteristics on group-level performance in a commons dilemma. Simulations based on previously documented CPR experiments were created using the Swarm simulation system. Adaptive agents were created to represent the action of individuals in a CPR experiment. These simulations allow the analyst to specify the precise initial configuration of an institution and an individual's behavioral characteristics, so as to observe the interaction of the two and the group-level outcomes that emerge as a result. Simulations explored the effects on performance of two different communication settings. In one setting, intelligent agents were not allowed to communicate with one another in choosing how to use the common pool resource. In another setting, intelligent agents were allowed to use two different forms of communication in choosing their strategies for using the common pool resource. The behavior of these simulation s compared with documented CPR experiments. Future directions in the development of the technology are outlined for natural resource management modeling applications.

Monday October 19, 1998

Red triangleProfessor Ernst Fehr, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zuerich, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, October 19, 1998. His presentation is entitled "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation." An abstract of his paper [co-author Klaus M. Schmidt, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Germany] is provided below.

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations.  There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free-riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequity aversion the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the inequity averse types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior

October 12, 1998

Red triangle Ms. Marissa E. Myers, Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, October 12, 1998. Her presentation is entitled "Calling the Shots: Great Powers, the Secretary-General, Troop Contributors and the Political Control of UN Peacekeeping." An abstract of her paper is provided below.

International organizations are an arena for international politics. States use IOs as vehicles to pursue their national interests. UN peacekeeping is no exception - it is a struggle for influence among member states and the Secretariat. Who calls the shots in the peacekeeping arena? Do great powers dominate UN peacekeeping? Does the Secretary-General enjoy some autonomy? Do troop contributors influence operations? This dissertation explores the governance of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping poses two control problems - agency and holdups. In delegating an operation to the Secretary-General, great powers create an agency problem: how do they ensure that the Secretariat implements Security Council mandates in the desired manner? Furthermore, the Secretary-General relies on member-states for material contributions (e.g., troops, equipment). How does the Secretary-General prevent troop contributors from exploring this dependence to seek influence over the direction or command of operations?

Viewed from a New Institutionalist perspective, political control and organizational structure are inseparable analytical issues. In the peacekeeping setting, I argue that great powers, Secretary-General and troop contributors each design or exploit institutions in pursuit of their interests. Chapter 1 will present a typology of organizational structures (lead nation and multiple contributor), explain the conditions under which they occur, and use descriptive statistics to compare them. Chapter 2 will focus on the great power-Secretary-General relationship. I generate theoretical expectations for great power control under different conditions, then use case studies to test my claims in operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and the Congo. Chapter 3 will address the political logic behind the multiple contributor structure, as the Secretary-General designs UN force structure to maximize his autonomy. Chapter 4 will consider how the holdup problem affects Secretariat control, re-examining the Cambodia and Congo cases with respect to Secretariat-troop contributor interaction.

October 5, 1998

Red triangleAssociate Professor Kenneth Bickers, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, October 5, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Social Welfare Provision in American Communities: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

The underlying concern of this paper is that in an environment of significant devolution of redistributive policies to states and local communities, the prospect of a "race to the bottom" needs to be taken seriously. The question is: what kinds of factors may be effective in providing a countervailing upward pressure to ensure a supply of redistributive policies? This paper suggests two ways in which coalitions of nonprofit organizations may play a role in spurring increases in spending on social welfare at the local level. The first of these ways is that these coalitions serve as vehicles for advocacy, lobbying, and political mobilization on behalf of the poor. Second, nonprofit organizations constitute an institutional form that can sever the link between redistributive spending and the financing of those services. When a government spends its own-source revenues on a service, the provision of the service necessarily has a direct and immediate impact on the tax burden imposed by that government on its citizens. But the same is not true of nonprofit organizations. While they may obtain grants or contracts from governments, they draw from other sources of funds that impose no increased burden on local tax payers.

The paper empirically explores two issues: what is the content to which the coalitions of nonprofit at the local level are able to influence the local governments to make welfare expenditures out of own-source revenues? And secondly, if there is such a relationship, what are the conditions under which local communities will see sufficient numbers of well-organized nonprofit organizations to make a substantively important impact on local social welfare spending? The paper finds that nonprofit organizations engaged in social welfare have an impact on the amount of money that local governments spend on welfare out of their own source revenues. The aspect of nonprofit organizations that appears to have the greatest impact is not the raw number of the organizations in a community, but the amount of resources that they have for carrying out activities, which includes direct services, as well as advocacy and involvement in the political process. The paper also finds that there is a fairly serious mismatch between communities that have the greatest needs and the kinds of communities in which social welfare nonprofit organizations tend to be most numerous and best funded.

September 28, 1998

Red triangleDr. Keith Dougherty, Visiting Scholar, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and St. Mary's College of Maryland, St Mary's City, MD, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, September 28, 1998. His presentation is entitled "An Empirical Evaluation of the American Confederation, 1775-1782." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

Ratification of the American Constitution hinged upon the Federalist debates. One of the first, and perhaps most important, issues debated by the American framers was why the states failed to support the central government under the Articles of Confederation. The Federalists argued that states withheld resources because the Articles of Confederation were flawed and these flaws gave the states few incentives to contribute to the union. The Anti-Federalists, in contrast, claimed that states conformed to the structure of the union, but maintained insufficient resources to fulfill their quotas. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by analyzing data on state compliance with federal requests for soldiers from 1775-1782. Evidence suggests that neither argument can be rejected. States behaved consistent with some combination of the two. In addition, acceptance of the Nash model suggests that states contributed consistent with the theory of joint products.

September 21, 1998

Red triangleProfessor Edella Schlager, School of Public Administration and Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, September 21, 1998. Her presentation is entitled "A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Individual and Collective Property Rights in Coastal Fisheries." An abstract of her paper is provided below.

Policy fad plague fisheries management practices. Such fads occur because scholars and practitioners use a single institutional, and not a comparative institutional, approach when devising policy. Adopting a new policy is justified on the basis of the disappointing performance of an existing policy, not on the basis of how well the new policy is likely to perform relative to its alternatives. A framework for conducting comparative institutional analyses is devised and three institutional arrangements -- ITQs, self-governing arrangements, and individual leases -- are compared in two different settings, one involving a mobile fish stock, the other a stationary fish stock. Institutional performance varies according to setting; and a system of ITQs, the current policy favorite, does not out perform the other two arrangements in either setting. Fisheries management scholars and practitioners can avoid creating policy fads and can better match institutional arrangements with fishery settings by adopting a comparative institutional analysis approach.

September 14, 1998

Red triangleProfessor Roy Gardner, Department of Economics, Indiana University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, September 14, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Proportional Cutbacks as an Institution for Promoting International Cooperation: Success and Limitations." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

This paper studies the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks for improving the performance of common pool resources (CPRs) which cross national boundaries. Two field cases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, where there are high value types and low value types. This asymmetry again induces a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linear-quadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency and distributional consequences of proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived.

September 7, 1998

Red triangle Professor Vincent Ostrom, Co-Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, will chair a Roundtable session for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, September 7, 1998. The Roundtable session will be an opportunity for our colleagues on campus, visiting scholars, and students to become acquainted with the research projects currently being pursued at the Workshop. After the brief discussion of the Workshop research, colleagues will be asked to introduce themselves and to briefly discuss their current work.


Back to the Workshop Homepage Copyright 1998, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Last updated:  September 6, 1998