WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY
AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Fall 2004 Colloquia
http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/colloquia/materials/fall2004_colloquia.html

 

Colloquia during Fall 2004:

 


Monday, August 30, 2004

 

CURRENT RESEARCH ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE
 

Presented by Dr. Barbara Göbel, Executive Director, International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP), Bonn, Germany, and Professor Sander van der Leeuw, Chair, Department of Anthropology, Arizona State University, Tempe

 

Summary: Dr. Göbel and Professor van der Leeuw will be visiting the Bloomington campus of Indiana University for a very short time on Sunday, August 29, and Monday, August 30.  Both are involved along with Marco Janssen and Elinor Ostrom in an effort to understand the problems associated with vulnerability, adaptability, and resilience in social-ecological systems.  Our colleagues will both present some of their current research.  Marco and Lin will enter the discussion in light of similar research going on here at Indiana University. 

 

BIOS
 

Barbara Göbel

 

Since 2002, she is Executive Director of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP). Social Anthropologist by training, she participated in multidisciplinary research projects on human – environmental relations.  Her main research interests are vulnerability studies, intercultural comparison of environmental knowledge and risk perceptions, sustainable use of resources and global change. She has more than three years of fieldwork experience in the Andean region (Argentina and Chile). Dr Göbel worked at the Universities of Göttingen, Tübingen, Hohenheim, and Bonn (Germany). She was also Research Fellow at the Collège de France, Paris, and Visiting Professor at the Universities of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Jujuy (Argentina), the University of La Paz (Bolivia), and the Universidad Católica del Norte (Chile).  She currently serves on the board of several global change related organizations and is engaged in the development of multidisciplinary postgraduate programmes in Latin America. 

 

S.E. van der Leeuw

An archaeologist and historian by training, he taught at the universities of Leyden, Amsterdam, Cambridge (UK), the Sorbonne and the Institut Universitaire de France. He is an External Faculty Member of the Santa Fe Institute, Corresponding Member of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences, and was Deputy Director for social and environmental sciences at CNRS. He held visiting positions at the University of Michigan, the University of Reading (UK), Australian National University, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and lectured in many parts of the world.

His research interests include archaeological theory, ancient ceramic technologies, regional archaeology, (ancient and modern) man-land relationships, GIS and modeling, and Complex Systems Theory. He did archaeological fieldwork in Syria,
Holland, and France, and conducted ethno-archaeological studies in the Near East, the Philippines, and Mexico. Since 1992, he has coordinated research projects financed by the European Union on socio-natural interactions and environmental problems. Since February 1, 2004, he is Chair of the Department of Anthropology of Arizona State University.

 

There will not be a formal paper for this session.

 

PowerPoint Presentation in PDF (4,500 KB)

 

Monday, September 6, 2004

 

ROUNDTABLE

 

Chaired by Dr. Amos Sawyer, Associate Director and Research Scholar, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

The Roundtable session will be an opportunity for our colleagues on campus and students to become acquainted with this year's visiting scholars, including the research they will be conducting while in residence this year.

 

Monday, September 13, 2004
 

THE MAKING OF AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY—REGIONAL RESPONSES TO EUROPEAN POLICIES IN BRANDENBURG (GERMANY)

 

Presented by Dr. Lutz Laschewski, Faculty of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, Institute for Rural Management, University of Rostock, Germany, and Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

Abstract: The starting point of the paper is the question if and how public policies that aim to target agri-environmental problems affect decision-making by local actors. The European Union currently follows a two-tiered approach of sharpening environmental legislation and increasing financial incentives for farmers in the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, agri-environmental problems have hardly been affected. Agri-environmental schemes have also been subject to harsh criticism due to its limited effectiveness.

 

The paper briefly describes the institutionalization of agri-environmental schemes in Europe. Taking this background the experiences of several projects dealing with agri-environmental policies in the region of Brandenburg in East Germany are summarized. The effectiveness of agri-environmental measures is hugely affected by the institutional setting in which those measures are implemented. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the rationale of different actors involved, in particular the administration. It is argued that to improve the environmental effectiveness the position of the local actors’ has to be strengthened. However, the given institutional framework offers only little Spielraum to them.

 

BIO: Dr. Laschewski received his PhD in agricultural economics from the University of Halle. He was a research fellow at the Centre for Rural Economy at the University of Newcastle and at Humboldt University Berlin before he became a lecturer for Agricultural Policy and Markets at the University of Rostock in 2002. His work has been about agricultural restructuring and rural change in East Germany and the UK and the analysis of agri-environmental policies in Europe. His theoretical focus is on the formation of social capital in post-socialist rural societies, changing rural property regimes and the institutionalization of sustainable agriculture. He is member of the Executive committee of the European Society of Rural Sociology.

 

Recent publications in English:

Laschewski, Lutz und Rosemarie Siebert (2004): Power and Rural Development - Social Capital Formation in Rural East Germany, in: Henri Goeverde, Mireia Baylina and Henk deHaan (eds.). Rurality in the Face of Power and Gender, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp 20 - 31.

 

Lowe, Ph.; Ratschow, Christiane; Allison, Johanne; Laschewski, L. (2003): Government Decision making under Crisis: A Comparison of the German and British Responses to BSE and FMD. University of Newcastle : Centre for Rural Economy.

 

Laschewski, Lutz, Jeremy Phillipson und Matthew Gorton (2002): State Sponsored Formalisation and Transformation of Small Business Networks: Evidence from the North East of England, in: Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 20 (2002) 3, 375-391.

 

Laschewski, Lutz, Parto Teherani-Kroenner und Titus Bahner (2002): Recent Rural Restructuring in East and West Germany: Facts and Backgrounds, in: Imre Kovach, Keith Halfacree and Rachel Woodward (eds.), Leadership and Local Power in European Rural Development, Aldershot: Ashgate, 145-172.

 

Laschewski, Lutz (2002): Systems of Local Self-Administration after Agricultural Transformation - Experiences of a local resource management project in East Germany, CEESA Discussion Paper  12, Berlin: Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.

 

Phillipson, Jeremy, Matthew Gorton und Lutz Laschewski (2002): Connectivity or Anonymity? Microbusinesses in the North East of England, Centre for Rural Economy Working Paper Series  68, Newcastle upon Tyne: Centre for Rural Economy.

 

Siebert, Rosemarie und Laschewski, Lutz (2001): Becoming a part of the union - Changing Rurality in East Germany, in: Torvey, Hilary and Michael Blanc (eds.), Food, Nature and Society, Rural life in late modernity, Aldeshot: Ashgate, 235 -252.

 

Paper in PDF

 

PowerPoint Presentation in PDF (2,586 KB)

 

Monday, September 20, 2004

 

UNDERSTANDING COORDINATION IN THE BALI IRRIGATION SYSTEM

 

Presented by Dr. Marco Janssen, Research Scientist, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC); Visiting Assistant Professor, School of Informatics; and Affiliated Faculty, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

Abstract: The question on the level of coordination in irrigation systems has occupied generations of social scientists. This paper provides a small step in a more general understanding how governance is related to characteristics of social-ecological systems. This paper analyses the robustness of Steve Lansing’s insight that the best coordination level of irrigation at Bali is at the temple level containing a group of irrigation villages. Using the original Lansing-Kremer model we find this coordination level can only be explained for very particular growth rates and dispersal rates of pests.

 

BIO: Dr. Marco A. Janssen is Visiting Assistant Professor at the School of Informatics in the areas Complex Systems, Simulation & Modeling, and Social Informatics.  Dr. Janssen is also a Research Scientist at the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change, Indiana University. He received his M.S. in econometrics and operations research from Erasmus University of Rotterdam in 1992, and earned his Ph.D. from the Department of Mathematics of Maastricht University in 1996. From 1991 till 1998 Dr. Janssen worked on integrated assessment models for global (climate) change at the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). He conducted postdoctoral research for three years in the Department of Spatial Economics at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, before moving to Indiana University. He pioneered the modeling of social-ecological systems as complex-adaptive systems, and worked in various locations on methodology and application of agent-based and systems dynamics models to study human-environmental interactions. Janssen is especially interested in formal models of institutional dynamics and what characteristics of complex social-ecological systems make them robust.

 

Paper in PDF

 

Monday, September 27, 2004

 

DOLLARIZATION IN UKRAINE

1991 to the Present

 

Presented by Professor Roy Gardner, Chancellors’ Professor of Economics and Affiliated Faculty, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington (Coauthors: Elisabeth S. Curtis, Drexel University, and Christopher J. Waller, Notre Dame University)

 

Abstract: The collapse of the USSR has left in its wake 12 former republics in a loose diplomatic formation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine is a typical member of the CIS. Its economy is heavily dollarized, with the US dollar (and to a much lesser extent, the euro) performing the functions of money—rather than the local currency. Dollarization is intimately linked to the shadow economy and corruption, two of the major pathologies found throughout the CIS. Unlike the former satellites and the 3 Baltic republics, no member of the CIS—in particular, Ukraine--is on the road to Europe.

 

BIO: Roy Gardner received his PhD in Economics from Cornell University in 1975. He is Chancellor’s Professor of Economics and Remak Professor of West European Studies at Indiana University, and he has been a Faculty Associate of the Workshop for nearly 20 years. He also serves as Academic Director of the MA Program in Economics at Ukrainian National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.”  He specializes in applications of the theory of games to economic and social behavior. He is Associate Editor of the European Economic Review and a member of the Editorial Council of the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

 

Outline in PDF

 

Paper in PDF

 

Monday, October 4, 2004

 

THE DURABILITY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

When Do Intentional Communities Survive Challenges?

 

Presented by Dr. Amy Poteete, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of New Orleans, Louisiana, and Affiliated Faculty, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

Abstract: How can variation in the sustenance of collective action be explained? Responses of intentional communities to challenges may shed light on variation in the durability of cooperation. Intentional communities encompass a wide variety of groups formed in an effort to create community, often through group living or cooperative working arrangements. Ideological commitment brings many individuals into such communities, but they face numerous challenges once established, ranging from financial pressures to conflicts over collective goals. Such challenges may prompt clarification of organizational arrangements or lead to the dissolution of the community. This paper evaluates the relative importance of factors expected to influence responses to challenges: group age, group size, institutional definition, institutional flexibility, trial membership periods, ease of exit, and organizational change in response to the challenge. Data are drawn from a long-term study of five intentional communities in southern Indiana. All five sites encompass forests owned and managed jointly by community members. Otherwise, the communities are quite diverse, ranging from a small set of friends sharing land through spiritual and recreational communities to a larger suburban residential community. Financial challenges confronted all five communities at various points. Internal disputes in three communities spilled into the court system. Responses to these challenges varied, as has the relative success in overcoming them. None of the five completely collapsed, although two communities saw membership numbers plummet at least once. The variation in purpose and experience represented by these communities offers a unique opportunity to analyze the responses of groups to major challenges.

 

BIO: Amy R. Poteete’s research looks at natural resource management as a window onto political development. Her work examines tensions between professionalism in the national bureaucracy and democracy, the quality of state-society relations, local level political dynamics, the politics affecting distributional outcomes, prospects for collective action, and the capacity of humans to understand and manage complex natural systems. She has published articles in Development and Change, Governance, Human Ecology, and Journal of Southern African Studies. Dr. Poteete is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of New Orleans, where she teaches courses on political development, environment and development, African politics, and empirical research methods. She is affiliated with the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program based at Indiana University and has taught at Duke University, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Indiana University, and Yale University.

 

Paper in PDF

 

Monday, October 11, 2004

 

TRUST, FEAR, RECIPROCITY, AND ALTRUISM

Theory and Experiment

 

Presented by Professor James C. Cox, Arizona Public Service Professor of Economics and Director of the Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, and Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

Abstract: This colloquium presentation will include discussion of central topics in some of the papers in Professor Cox’s research program on social preferences, including:

 

 

 

 

 

Background Reading

 

James C. Cox, “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior, 46, no. 2, 2004, pp. 260-281 (http://uaeller.eller.arizona.edu/~jcox/research/howtoidentify.pdf).

 

James C. Cox and Cary A. Deck, “On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives,” Economic Inquiry,

forthcoming (paper in PDF).

 

James C. Cox, Klarita Sadiraj, and Vjollca Sadiraj, “Implications of Trust, Fear, and Reciprocity for Modeling Economic Behavior,” University of Arizona Discussion Paper, 2004 (paper in PDF).

 

James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj, “Direct Tests of Models of Social Preferences and a New Model,” University of Arizona Discussion Paper, 2004 (paper in PDF).

 

James C. Cox, Daniel Friedman, and Steven Gjerstad, “A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness,” University of Arizona Discussion Paper, 2004 (paper in PDF).

 

BIO: James C. Cox is past president of the Economic Science Association and current member of the editorial boards of several journals.  His research interests center on experimental economics and applied microeconomic theory.  He has conducted research on mathematical economics, integration of portfolio choice and consumer demand theories, public expenditure theory, credit rationing, energy policy, economics and political economics of minimum wage legislation, auction markets, job search models, decentralized mechanisms for control of monopoly, the utility hypothesis, the preference reversal phenomenon, procurement contracting, the lottery payoff experimental procedure, topics in social epistemology and legal theory, and group vs. individual behavior in strategic market games and fairness games. Professor Cox’s current research includes work on theoretical modeling and laboratory experiments with: trust, reciprocity, and altruism; small- and large-stakes risk aversion; e-commerce with combinatorial demands; multi-unit incentive-compatible auctions; and centipede games vs. Dutch auctions. He received his B.A. in Economics from the University of California at Davis and his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University.

 

For more information, please see http://uaeller.eller.arizona.edu/~jcox/.

 

Monday, October 18, 2004

 

UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY

 

Presented by Professor Elinor Ostrom, Co-Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis; Co-Director, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC); and Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Government, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

Professor Ostrom will discuss chapter 9 of her book Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press, forthcoming fall 2005).

 

Table of Contents

 

I.  An Overview of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework

 

Chapter 1: Understanding the Diversity of Structured Human Interactions

Chapter 2: Zooming in and Linking Action Situations

Chapter 3: Studying Action Situations in the Lab

Chapter 4: Animating Institutional Analysis

 

II.  Focusing on Rules

 

Chapter 5: A Grammar of Institutions (by Sue Crawford and Elinor Ostrom)

Chapter 6: Why Classify Generic Rules?

Chapter 7: Classifying Rules by Their AIM (by Elinor Ostrom and Sue Crawford)

 

III.  Working with Rules

 

Chapter 8: Using Rules as Tools to Cope with the Commons

Chapter 9: Robust Resource Governance in Polycentric Institutions

 

For Professor Ostrom’s bio information, please see http://www.indiana.edu/~iupolsci/bio_ostrom.html.

 

A copy of the chapter can be found at: http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/ui.

 

Monday, October 25, 2004

 

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS FOR RESEARCH IN AFRICA

Challenges and Prospects

 

PANELISTS

 

Gracia Clark, Acting Director, African Studies Program, and Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology, Indiana University, Bloomington

Charlotte Hess, Director of Library and Information Services, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

Amos Sawyer, Associate Director and Research Associate, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and Coordinator, Consortium for Self-Governance in Africa, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

Abstract: The study of collective action in a range of human endeavors in African societies is of interest to scholars and practitioners in Africa and other parts of the world. Scholars at Indiana University, like colleagues elsewhere, have, through various research, teaching, and outreach programs, organized collaborative undertakings with colleagues in Africa to explore research puzzles of mutual interest and to cooperate in ways that are mutually productive and rewarding. However, doing research in Africa and building collaborative relationships do pose a distinct set of challenges. In some parts of Africa, these challenges may be as basic as inaccessibility of the country (difficulty getting there) and the lack of reliable communications facilitates. Yet, joint inquiry and scholarly contestation do yield enormous dividends. What are some of the intellectual and material challenges encountered in building partnerships with researchers in Africa and in doing research in Africa? What strategies are available for addressing these challenges? How can cooperation between researchers in Africa and Indiana University be strengthened? A panel of colleagues will discuss these issues.

 

BIOS

 

Gracia Clark (PhD Cambridge) has been working with traders in Kumasi Central Market since 1978.  Among other topics, she has studied their commodity groups and leadership, under policies from price controls to free markets and under governments from military to democratic.  She also consulted for UN agencies for several years.  With her teaching in research methods, these have sparked her interest in participative and collaborative alternatives in knowledge generation.  Dr. Clark is an Associate Professor in the Anthropology Department.  

 

Charlotte Hess is Director of Library and Information Services at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and Director of IU’s Digital Library of the Commons  http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu . One of her primary research areas is information collaboration in Africa. Recently, as part of an Andrew W. Mellon Foundation planning grant awarded to Hess and Elinor Ostrom, she visited colleagues at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda and at the Kenyan Forest Research Institute, Maguga, Kenya to investigate the possibility of developing new ways of collecting, organizing, preserving, and disseminating research information by building a collaborative, open source, digital library

 

Amos Sawyer is Associate Director and Research Associate at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern University and taught for many years at the University of Liberia, becoming dean of the College of Social Sciences and Humanities in 1981. He was chairman of the Liberian constitution commission in 1981 and president of the Interim Government during Liberia’s civil war. He is actively involved in peacebuilding and conflict resolution initiatives in Africa and frequently serves in advisory capacities to African regional organizations and the UN on questions of African governance and conflict resolution. He has published extensively on such issues. His recent article on violent conflict and governance challenges in West Africa appears in the current issue of the Journal of Modern Africa Studies. His book on the challenges of reconstituting institutions of governance in post-conflict Liberia is to be published early summer 2005.

 

There will not be a formal paper for this session.

 

Monday, November 1, 2004

 

RECIPROCAL CO-PRODUCTION

 

Presented by Edgar S. Cahn, Founder, President and Chairman of the Board, Time Dollar Institute, and Christine Gray-Cahn, Director of Training and Strategies for Systems Change, Time Dollar Institute

 

Abstract: In this working paper, “Reciprocal Co-Production,” we offer an augmented definition of Co-Production as: 1) entailing a fundamental partnership between two economic systems: the Monetary Economy and a distinct economic system we have designated the Core Economy; and 2) catalyzing the rebuilding, restructuring and restoring of that Core Economy. We argue that regardless of the specific service that Co-Production is utilized to deliver, or the specific social problem that it seeks to address, it generates profound processes of system change that arises from redefining the product, process, producer and consumer of social welfare services. Such system change is most effectively achieved when four operating principles are adhered to that transform the clientele or community being served from passive consumer to active partner, co-worker or Aco-producer@ in addressing specific social problems. Although not an obligatory element of Co-Production, the utilization of a Complementary Currency (Time Dollars) helps to address some of the critical problems identified in the original work on Co-Production (free rider and burn-out). The currency reinforces altruism by maintaining an ambiguity about motive; and helps to formalize recognition of the Core Economy where different principles (governing production, distribution, compensation, motivation, risk and liability) apply. We provide an in-depth case history to show how, in the absence of Time Dollars, utilizing Co-Production can

      a. Demonstrate the significance of being explicit about rebuilding the Core Economy,

      b. Operationalize the four core values (with an emphasis on reciprocity and social

          capital)

      c. Generate pervasive system change

      d. Effect an alignment of the effort to rebuild the Core Economy with agency mission

      e. Provide a new credibility for governmental programs that can counter the ideology of

         market as panacea and that insist that privatization is the only alternative to

         centralized, bureaucratic entropy.

 

BIOS

 

Edgar S. Cahn, J.D., Ph.D

Dr. Edgar Cahn is the originator of Time Dollars and Time Banking, creator of Co-Production, and President and Founder of the Time Dollar Institute. He is author of No More Throw-Away People (Essential Books, 2004) and Time Dollars (co-author, Jonathan Rowe, Rodale Press, 1992). In 1980, Edgar created Time Dollars, a local, tax-exempt currency designed to validate and reward the work of rebuilding community. As a Distinguished Scholar at the London School of Economics, Edgar completed the work and development of Time Dollars that has led to Time Dollar initiatives being funded by government and major philanthropic foundations in areas as widespread as juvenile justice, community health, education, public housing, community building, wraparound services for children with emotional disorders and elder care. His work today includes ongoing collaboration with the Time Dollar Youth Court, which he created and founded in 1996, and an increasing focus on using Co-Production and Time Dollars as strategies for system change and social justice.

 

Prior to his work with Time Dollars, Edgar enjoyed a distinguished career as special counsel and speechwriter for Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Economic Opportunity, co-founder the National Legal Services Program during the War on Poverty, and co-founder and co-dean of the country’s first clinical law school (Antioch School of Law). His work as an author and advocate was critical in spearheading the first national campaign against hunger and malnutrition in the U.S. and initiating the official adoption of Indian self-determination as national policy. Edgar was awarded a B.A. magna cum laude from Swarthmore College, an M.A. and Ph.D. from Yale University, a Fulbright Scholar to Pembroke College, Cambridge University, and a J.D. from Yale Law School. He was recently appointed Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia School of Law.

 

Christine Gray-Cahn

As the Director of Training and Strategies for Systems Change, Christine is responsible for the materials, training, and technical assistance resources the Institute offers to non-profit organizations and agencies seeking to use Time Dollars and Co-Production for system change. Drawing upon her grounding in political and social science, she has been called upon to translate the construct of Reciprocal Co-Production into language, processes and actions that organizations can turn into concrete applications. Her role includes facilitating meetings, workshops and seminars to address the multiple issues and possibilities that relate to Co-Production. Most recently, these include meetings held by the Rowntree Foundation, the British Home Office Strategic Unit, the British Association of Directors of Social Services, and a seminar convened by the Minister of Social Justice, Wales.


Prior to her work at the Institute, Christine was a community activist and leader in Agoura Hills, California, where she was engaged in a grass-roots movement for the community’s cityhood. She was a leader in the coalition dedicated to ensuring that planning and development in the wilderness areas in north Los Angeles County would be sensitive to environmental concerns. As a writer, she has been published in the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Monthly, and the American Indian Culture and Research Journal. Christine received her B.S. in Mathematics from California State University, Northridge, and her M.A. in Political Science from UCLA. She is currently at work on her doctoral thesis on the role of the Johnson and Nixon administrations in American Indian affairs, and upon its completion will receive her Ph.D. in Political Science from UCLA.

 

Paper in PDF

 

2nd Paper in PDF

 

Monday, November 8, 2004

 

FAVORITISM IN REPEATED PROCUREMENT AUCTION

 

Presented by Dr. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Research Fellow, CERAS (Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche Appliquée aux Sciences Sociales) – a research institute affiliated with the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées – Paris, France, and Visiting Professor at the New Economic School, Moscow, Russia (coauthor: Gregory Kosenok, New Economic School, Moscow, gkosenok@nes.ru)

 

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the interaction between two firms engaged in a repeated procurement relationship modelled as a multiple criteria auction, and a procurement official (agent) whose duty is to decide on a scoring rule.

 

We find that with favoritism, the procedure selects projects with an extreme design. In the one-shot game, the equilibrium bribe is maximal when the cost of favoritism is zero. As the cost increases, competition for favors weakens.

 

With repeated interaction but no corruption the optimal collusive scheme entails an allocation rule contingent on firms' costs and on the government preferences. Our main finding is that with corruption a non-contingent allocation rule where firms take turn in winning independently of the true government preferences and the firms' costs is optimal. The ‘environment’ adapts to the cartel: in equilibrium, the contract is fine-tailored to the in-turn winner. Favoritism not only increases the gains from collusion, it also solves basic problems of implementation for the cartel.

 

BIO: Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky received her PhD in Economics from the University of Stockholm in 1996. Since 1998, she has been a research fellow at CERAS (Centre d’Enseignement et de Recherche Appliquée aux Sciences Sociales), a research institute affiliated with the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (one of the prestigious Grandes Ecoles of France). The CERAS collects twenty-five whole and part time researchers divided into two groups: economic geography and theory. The theory group to which she belongs focuses on issues of bounded rationality, game theory, auction theory, and industrial organization. Her main interest includes issues of corruption that she has been addressing in a variety of international collaborations, including with Russian, French, and American scholars. Her latest publication in this field includes a paper forthcoming in 2004 in the Rand Journal of Economics, written jointly with O. Compte and Thierry Verdier.  Ariane has also been consulting on behalf of the European Community on corruption issues, including in hearings of the Russian Federal Duma.

 

A second main avenue of research includes the development of a concept of ‘type indeterminacy’ using the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to propose a unified approach to so-called behavioral anomalies in social sciences. A first part of this program addresses decision theory. It is a joint work with S. Zamir (game theorist) from the Jerusalem Center for Rationality and H. Zwirn (physicist) from Paris. A second part of this program addresses the axiomatic foundation of quantum logic and its interpretation in psychology. It is a joint work with V. I. Danilov, a mathematician from CEMI, Russian Academy of Sciences. The program also includes an experimental part currently being discussed with T. Kaplan from Exeter, England. 

 

For more information, please see: http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/lambert.

 

Paper in PDF

 

Monday, November 15, 2004

 

DO ATTORNEYS AFFECT THE RESOLUTION OF TAX COURT CASES?

An Empirical Study

 

Presented by Professor Leandra Lederman, School of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, and Visiting William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, School of Law, Indiana University Bloomington (coauthor: Warren B. Hrung, Financial Economist, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury)

 

Abstract: In the United States Tax Court (Tax Court), where most federal tax cases are litigated, the United States always is represented by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attorneys but a large portion of the taxpayers proceed pro se.  A prior study found that, although cases docketed in the Tax Court are not randomly selected for trial, the presence of counsel for the taxpayer did not have a statistically significant effect on whether the case settled or was tried.  But do attorneys affect the length of time the case takes to resolve or the financial outcome of the case, in settled cases, tried cases, or both?

 

The article examines that question, which has both theoretical and empirical components.  First, the article analyzes what factors might impact the timing of settlements and trials.  Second, it suggests that there are three principal ways in which represented litigants differ from unrepresented litigants and the theoretical impact of each of those differences on case outcomes, particularly the timing of case resolutions.  Finally, it tests empirically the theory that attorneys may impact case resolutions.

 

The empirical study used data on a random sample of cases docketed in Tax Court to test the effect of the presence of counsel for the taxpayer and the experience of that counsel on length of time to resolution of the case and IRS recovery rate, both for cases that settled after being docketed in Tax Court and for cases that went to trial.  It attempted to control for such factors as the amount at stake in the case, the type of taxpayer (individual, estate or corporation), and the complexity of the case.  The results should provide insight into the contribution representation by an attorney may make to case resolution. 

 

BIO: Leandra Lederman is the Visiting William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington and a Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law.  Her research focuses on federal tax law and procedure, with an emphasis on the United States Tax Court.  Professor Lederman has written a book on corporate taxation, co-authored a casebook on tax procedure, and served as general editor of a treatise on tax procedure.  For a complete list of her published work, please see http://mason.gmu.edu/~llederma/Publications.htm.

 

Prior to entering academia, Professor Lederman practiced law as an associate at the New York office of White & Case and served as an attorney-adviser (clerk) to Judge David Laro of the United States Tax Court.  She graduated cum laude in 1990 from New York University School of Law, where she was a Note and Comment Editor of the N.Y.U. Law Review and was elected to the Order of the Coif.  In 1993, she earned an LL.M. in taxation from New York University School of Law, where she was a student editor of the Tax Law Review.

 

For more information, please see her home page at http://mason.gmu.edu/~llederma.  For her full bio, see http://www.law.indiana.edu/directory/llederma.asp.

 

Paper in PDF

 

Monday, November 29, 2004

 

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN BIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

 

Presented by Oliver Curry, Darwin@LSE Research Fellow, Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics, London, UK, and Visiting Scholar, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

Abstract: Economists use rational choice theory to model individual decision-making. But their model of human nature is routinely falsified by experiments showing that people are neither selfish nor rational. Behavioural economists have responded by arguing that people have altruistic preferences, or that rational choice is biased by emotions and norms. Thus economists are forced to choose between an elegant but incorrect theory, and an inelegant collection of empirical observations. Evolutionary biology offers a way out of this impasse. It uses rational choice and game theory to model natural selection; it sees individuals as collections of phenotypic strategies; and it views individual decision-making and behaviour as the execution of these strategies. This approach to behaviour retains the rigour of rational choice theory, but arrives at a more realistic view of the individual, a view in which certain kinds of altruism and irrationality turn out to be not anomalies but predictions. For these reasons, the biologists’ use of rational choice theory is to be preferred over the economists’.

 

BIO: Oliver Curry is a post-doctoral Visiting Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. He is also a Darwin@LSE Research Fellow in the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics. Oliver is interested in evolutionary explanations of behaviour, especially human social behaviour. His PhD thesis was on the evolution of human moral sentiments. The thesis used recent developments in evolutionary game theory, animal behaviour and evolutionary psychology to update David Hume's account of the moral sentiments, and to provide a framework in which to make sense of various aspects of moral philosophy. He is currently looking at the different ways in which biologists and economists use rational choice and game theory to explain behaviour. He is also working on turning some of the predictions that evolutionary theory makes about human moral psychology into tractable experiments, and putting them to the test.

 

Paper in PDF

 

Monday, December 6, 2004

 

CONTINENTAL OR LOCAL ELECTRICITY GRIDS FOR THE US — CONFLICTS BETWEEN DIFFERENT INTEREST GROUPS

History and Semi-Analytical Tools to Facilitate Debate

 

Presented by Stephen C. Peck, Ph.D., President, Flèche, Palo Alto, California, and Visiting Scholar, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington

 

Abstract: Making changes to the massive electricity industry in the United States has proved more difficult than industry experts expected. Many looked to the relative success of the reconstruction of the electricity industry in England and Wales – initiated by the Thatcher government in 1989 - and of the unbundling of the natural gas industry in the United States – from the mid 1980’s - and anticipated that the same results might be achieved for electricity in the United States. Few remembered the insights from the early paper by Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” published in 1937, that sometimes companies take the form they do because it is cheaper.

 

The Carter Administration’s Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 and the Bush Administration’s Energy Policy Act of 1992 set the stage for the restructuring of the electricity industry. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission attempted to establish open transmission access with its orders 888 and 889 in 1996 and its order 2000 of 1999 encouraging the establishment of regional transmission organizations. But the industry has been sharply divided on the desirability of open access and in addition the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has been in almost constant conflict with the states’ Public Utility Commissions represented by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners - founded in 1889.

 

The United States with its Federal system and respect for States’ rights may not be politically suited for the type of structural change which took place in England and Wales with its strong central government which had the political will and capability to create a single transmission company and several generation companies from the old Central Electricity Generating Board. Perhaps North America would do better with ten strong regional monopolies formed in politically homogeneous States which met most of their load from their own generating stations and had only weak ties between systems and limited wholesale markets.

 

For the United States, having learned now from a decade of “deregulation” and for many other countries poised on the edge of the cliff, it may be worthwhile to take a deep breath and consider the next steps.

 

Electricity restructuring in the US cannot be dealt with in isolation from what has been happening in the electricity industry and in other parts of the energy industry. Current and prospective issues associated with the consideration of electric structure in the United States are:

 

 

In this short paper I cover the relevant history of the US electricity industry, describe how analysis has been brought to bear on the issue of the appropriate structure for the industry and suggest a more powerful approach to forging consensus on the collective good of having a well functioning US electricity industry.

 

BIO: Stephen Peck was educated in England as an Engineer (Cambridge University) and Economist (London School of Economics) and in the United States in Business Economics and Econometrics (University of Chicago). He was an Assistant Professor of Economics at University of California, Berkeley and then spent about 25 years at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as a research manager and researcher.

 

At EPRI, he started as a Project Manager in Energy Economics and ended as Vice President of Environment, running a well regarded extramural $50 million a year research program focused on environmental and health issues of importance to the electric utilities, their customers and society.

 

He maintained his own personal research at EPRI, publishing about sixty peer reviewed papers. His work on global climate change economics (with T.J. Teisberg) and on the market organization of transmission (with H. Chao) is known worldwide.

 

For further information, please see his CV.

 

CV in PDF

 

Paper in PDF

 

 

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