WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY 
   AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
   Spring 1998 Colloquia 
    http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/colloquia/materials/spring1998_colloquia.html

Colloquia during Spring 1998:

 

Monday, April 20, 1998

Professor Michael McGinnis, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, April 20, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Polycentric Development and Resource Management and Polycentric Games and Institutional Analysis." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

Over the past year, I have been working on an overview of the major intellectual accomplishments of scholars associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis during its first twenty-five years of existence. I thought that the overall coherence of these research programs could best be conveyed by collecting together in one place research reports that originally appeared in a vast array of publication outlets. However, the magnitude and diversity of this research dictated separation of this material into three books, each directed to different audiences. I have drafted integrative introductions for each volume, as well as a brief preface designed to appear in all three edited volumes. This week's colloquium will be based on discussions of the introductions to two volumes: (1) Polycentric Development and Resource Management and (2) Polycentric Games and Institutional Analysis. After I present a brief summary of the major themes in these papers, I would like us to have a general discussion that addresses the following questions: What is the original contribution of the Workshop to the study of development? To game theory? With what other research programs do Workshop scholars share the most in common? What have been the central themes of Workshop research programs on development and common-pool resources and on the use of game models and laboratory experiments? What is the relationship between these research programs and studies of constitutional order and self-governance? How can we sustain the past successes of productive synergy between detailed substantive applications and abstract models and analyses?

Monday, April 13, 1998

Dr. Timothy Frye, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, April 13, 1998. His presentation is entitled "The State and the Market: Governing the New Russian Economy." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

State actors are often critical to self-governance because their policies influence actors' incentives to share information about themselves and their trading partners -- a necessary condition for successful self-governance. From this premise, I present a "political" theory of self- governance that builds on existing literature. It recognizes that state policy can significantly and systematically affect the costs of sharing information among group members and, thereby, shape the potential for self-governance. This chapter introduces the political approach to self-governance and offers a preliminary test of the approach. It then locates the political approach within the larger literature on self-governance and concludes by discussing methodological issues. A copy of his paper is available by calling the above number.

Monday, April 6, 1998

Dr. Michael McGinnis, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, April 6, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Polycentric Order and Metropolitan Governance." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

Over the past year, I have been working on an overview of the major intellectual accomplishments of scholars associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis during its first twenty-five years of existence. I thought that the overall coherence of these research programs could best be conveyed by collecting together in one place research reports that originally appeared in a vast array of publication outlets. However, the magnitude and diversity of this research dictated separation of this material into three books, each directed to different audiences. I have drafted integrative introductions for each volume, as well as a brief preface designed to appear in all three edited volumes. This week's colloquium will be based on discussions of this general preface and the introduction to the volume entitled Polycentric Order and Metropolitan Governance.  (Introductions to the other two volumes will be discussed at the April 20 colloquium session.) After I present a brief summary of the major themes in these papers, I would like us to have a general discussion that addresses the following questions: What is the original contribution of the Workshop to the study of urban public economies and to institutional analysis more generally? What has been the central themes of Workshop research programs? How have we been able to sustain productive interactions among scholars with such diverse substantive interests and methodological skills? What is the continuing relevance of the early police studies on the whole array of ongoing Workshop research programs on the provision of public services, the management of common-pool resources, development and environmental change, constitutional order, and self-governance?

Monday, March 30, 1998

Dr. Claudia Keser, Institute for Statistics and Mathematical Economic Theory, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, March 30, 1998. Her presentation is entitled "Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run." An abstract of her paper [co-author Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Institute for Statistics and Mathematical Economic Theory, University of Karlsruhe] is provided below.

In experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good where subjects have the option to move to other groups or create new ones, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects, in turn, continually attempt to enter groups of more cooperative ones in order to free-ride on their contributions.

Monday, March 23, 1998

Dr. Sujai Shivakumar, Visiting Scholar, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, March 23 1998. His presentation is entitled "Constitutional Constraints and the Market for Policy Advice." An abstract his paper is provided below.

There is no such thing as the market but rather nexus of exchange as circumscribed by certain rules. The patterns we observe as characteristics of varied markets are in turn dependent on the presence or absence of various static and dynamic rule properties. This basic insight of Constitutional Political Economy extends here to consider the market for economic theory and public policy. Traditionally interpreted, policy action rests on advice developed scientifically from economic theory. However, the possibility exists for the invocation of economic arguments and the selection of policy among alternatives offered which suit political imperatives. In turn, an inquiry into whether economic science drives policy or if political imperatives select from rationalizing theories and theoretical frameworks would depend on how the market for public policy is structured.

Monday, March 2, 1998

Dr. Timothy Feddersen, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, March 2, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting." An abstract his paper [co-author Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey] is provided below.

It is often suggested that requiring juries to reach a unanimous verdict reduces the probability of convicting an innocent defendant while increasing the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant. We construct a model that demonstrates how strategic voting by jurors undermines this basic intuition. We show that unanimity rule may lead to high probabilities of both kinds of errors and that the probability of convicting an innocent defendant may actually increase with the size of the jury. Finally, we demonstrate that a wide variety of voting rules, including simple majority rule, lead to much lower probabilities of both kinds of errors.

Monday, February 16, 1998

Dr. Audun Sandberg, Department of Social Sciences, Nordland College, Bodo, Norway, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, February 16, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Institutional Dilemmas in Integrated Coastal Zone Management." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

Coastal zones contain most of the dilemmas of the modern way of governing resources, characterized not only by the tension between fluid seas and solid land, but also by tensions between traditional perceptions of property rights and the modern industrial nations rights to "development," raw materials and defense. Based on experience from a five-country comparative project on the managing of marine resources in the European Union, some of these dilemmas and their solutions in the age of High Modernity will be discussed.

Monday, February 9, 1998

Dr. Mao Shoulong, School of Economical and Social Studies, University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, February 9, 1998. His presentation is entitled "Recent Developments of Social Sciences in China." An abstract of his paper is provided below.

This paper is trying to provide a snap picture of recent developments of social sciences in China. It will be composed of five parts. The first will offer a short review of the history of the social sciences development before 1978. The second will extend the development after 1978. The third will discuss some influences of public choice and institutional analysis approach. The fourth will give a short statement about my own works in China. In the last part, I will list some obstacles and potentialities of social sciences developments from a rational choice perspective

Monday, February 2, 1998

Ms. Pamela Schmitt and Mr. Kurtis Swope, Department of Economics, Indiana University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, February 2, 1998. Their presentation is entitled "Collective Action With Incomplete Commitment: Experimental Evidence." An abstract of their paper [co-author Professor James Walker, Department of Economics, Indiana University] is provided below.

This paper extends the research on individual and group decision-making in experimental common-pool resource (CPR) settings by introducing two new decision environments. Face-to-face communication is investigated as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism in decision environments in which the appropriation activities of "outside" appropriators create coordination and monitoring problems for the communicating group. Specifically, members of the communicating group face uncertainty about the extent to which other members are upholding any agreements because they observe only aggregate (inclusive of outside appropriators) investment levels in the CPR market. Common to both environments is that only six of a total of eight of the participants are given the opportunity to communicate. In the first decision environment, Protocol 1, the investment decisions of the remaining two participants are determined by random draws conducted by the experimenters. In the second decision environment, Protocol 2, the two outside participants are simply isolated from the other six and make independent investment decisions. The results of this study have several implications for field CPR settings. Communication is less likely to be effective at preventing rent dissipation in CPR environments in which a subset of appropriators either cannot or will not participate in collective action. The lack of commitment of outsiders to a cooperative appropriation strategy agreed to by communicating participants is compounded by the fact that communicating members are more likely to deviate from agreements. The problem becomes more severe when outsiders have less constraints on their overall appropriation behavior and have the ability to act strategically.

January 26, 1998

Red triangleProfessor Jerome Busemeyer, Department of Psychology, Indiana University, will be the speaker for the Workshop Colloquium on Monday, January 26, 1998.  "Decision Field Theory: A Dynamic-Cognitive Approach to Decision Making in an Uncertain Environment." An abstract of his paper [co-author James T. Townsend, Department of Psychology, Indiana University] is provided below.

Decision field theory provides for a mathematical foundation leading to a dynamic, stochastic theory of decision behavior in an uncertain environment. This theory is used to explain (a) violations of stochastic dominance, (b) violations of strong stochastic transitivity, (c) violations of independence between alternatives, (d) serial position effects on preference, (e) speed-accuracy trade-off effects in decision making, (f) the inverse relation between choice probability and decision time, (g) changes in the direction of preference under time pressure, (h) slower decision times for avoidance as compared with approach conflicts, and (i) preference reversals between choice and selling price measures of preference. The proposed theory is compared with four other theories of decision making under uncertainty.


To request a full text copy of a paper, if it is available, send an email to workshop@indiana.edu, or contact Gayle Higgins at ghiggins@indiana.edu.



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Last updated:  April 10, 1998