Bibliographies from the Workshop Library
Game Theory and Experimental Economics
Compiled by Charlotte Hess
Abbink, Klaus, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner 2000. "The Moonlighting Game: Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42(2):265-277.
Abell, Peter. 1996. "A Model of the Informal Structure (Culture) of Organizations: Help, Trust, Rivalry, and Team Spirit." Rationality and Society 8(4):433-452.
Abell, Peter, and Diane Reyniers 2000. "Generalised Reciprocity and Reputation in the Theory of Cooperation: A Framework." Analyse & Kritik 22(1):3-18.
Abreu, Dilip. 1986. "Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames." Journal of Economic Theory 39: 191-225.
(Author Abstract)
General propositions established in Abreu are applied to the analysis of optimal punishments and constrained Pareto optimal paths of symmetric oligopolistic supergames. A remarkably simple 2-dimensional stick-and-carrot characterization of optimal symmetric punishments is obtained. An analogous result holds for the general case of asymmetric punishments, motivating the study of asymmetric Pareto optimal paths. The latter trun out to have a highly non-stationary dynamic structure which sometimes entails intertemporal reversals of relative payoffs between firms.
Abreu, Dilip, and Ariel Rubinstein 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata." Econometrica 56:1259-1282.
Acheson, James M., and Jack Knight 2000. "Distribution Fights, Coordination Games, and Lobster Management." Comparative Studies in Society and History 42(1):209-238.
Aggarwal, Vinod K., and Cédric Dupont 1999. "Goods, Games, and Institutions." International Political Science Review 20(3):393-409.
Agrawal, Arun. 1996. "Common Property Discourse and Forest Management in the Indian Himalayas: A Critical Assessment." (Working Paper)
"In the past decade the literature on common property has grown swiftly, finding stimulus in increasing concerns regarding resource degradation and depletion, and drawing upon developments in game theory, ethnographic writings, and critical social analysis. This paper, in looking at some of the major themes in the writings on the commons, seeks to assess critically some of the achievements of these writings. The second task the paper seeks to accomplish is to relate new directions in the research on common property with pressing themes in the use and management of resources, especially forests, in the Indian Himalayas. In developing this relationship, the paper advances the argument that some of the weaknesses of the literature on the commons are shared by those on resource management in the Indian Himalayas. But at the same time a number of empirical conditions obtain in the Indian Himalayas that would make the investigation of these themes in this region highly profitable from a theoretical stand point. The continuing outpouring of research from within the common property paradigm, as well as the vitality of research on mountain ecologies ensures that a review seeking to bring together these two bodies of literature can only be attempting to reach a moving target. Yet, the very enormity of the literature on the subject indicates that it is, perhaps, time to take stock. Some recent criticisms of the common property discourse make such a critical review even more germane."
Agrawal, Arun. 1994. "Rules, Rule Making and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use." In Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. M. Walker, eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Agrawal, Arun, and Sanjeev Goyal 1999. "Group Size and Collective Action: Third-Party Monitoring in Common-Pool Resources." (Working Paper)
Ahlbrecht, Martin, and Martin Weber 1995. "An Empirical Study on Intertemporal Choice under Risk." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Ahlert, Marlies, and Arwed Crüger 1999. "An Experimental Analysis of Equal Punishment Games." Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Wirtschafswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Econmoics Series, no. 144).
Ahn, T. K. et al. 1999. "Generating Distrust in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper Series W99-1).
Co-authors:
Ostrom, Elinor
Schmidt, David
Shupp, Robert
Walker, James
Ahn, T. K., Elinor Ostrom, David Schmidt, Robert Shupp, and James Walker 2001. "Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play." Public Choice 106:137-155.
Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton 2000. "Economics and Identity." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3):715-753.
Albers, Wulf. 2000. "Prominence Theory as a Tool to Model Boundedly Rational Decisions." In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten, eds. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Albers, Wulf. 1998. "Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part III: Perception of Numerical Information, and Relations to Traditional Solution Concepts." In Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part I-VI. Bielefeld, Germany: Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld. (Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Papers, No. 269).
Albers, Wulf. 1998. "Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part V: Operations on Scales, and Evaluation of Prospects." In Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part I-VI. Bielefeld, Germany: Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld. (Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Papers, No. 271).
Albers, Wulf. 1998. "Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part VI: Evaluation of Lotteries with Two Alternatives: A Normative Bench." In Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part 1-VI. Bielefeld, Germany: Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld. (Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Papers, No. 284).
Albers, Wulf. 1995. "Foundations of a Theory of Prominence: Present State and Outview." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences, Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Albers, Wulf. 1994. "Ten Rules of Bargaining Sequences: A Boundedly Rational Model of Coalition Bargaining in Characteristic Function Games." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Albers, Wulf. 1987. "Aspirations and Aspiration Adjustment in Location Games."
Albers, Wulf, Martin Strobel, and Reinhard Selten, eds. 1997. Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. New York: Springer.
Aldrich, John H. 1997. "When Is It Rational to Vote?" In Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. D. C. Mueller, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Aliprantis, Charalambos D., and Donald J. Brown 1982. "Equilibria in Markets with a Riesz Space of Commodities." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 427).
Alker, Hayward R., and Roger Hurwitz 1980. Resolving Prisoner's Dilemmas. Student Manual; Supplementary Analytical Units: Learning Analysis in Political and Social Science. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
Allan, Pierre, and Cedric Dupont 1999. "International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Baroque Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness." International Political Science Review 20(1):23- 48.
Allen, Nicholas, and John Orbell 1998. "Trust vs. Mindreading: A Framework for Analysis." (Working Paper)
Alt, James E., Randall L. Calvert, and Brian D. Humes 1986. "Game Theory and Hegemonic Stability: The Role of Reputation and Uncertainty." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 106).
Alt, James E., Margaret Levi, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 1999. Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Alt, James E., Margaret Levi, and Elinor Ostrom 1999. "Reinhard Selten: A Biographical Sketch." In Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science. J. E. Alt, M. Levi, and E. Ostrom, eds. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Ambec, Stefan, and Yves Sprumont 2001. "Sharing a River." Presented at the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics: "Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources," Toulouse, France, May 3-4, 2001.
"A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be dened). We first show that the cooperative game associated with that problem is convex: its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement: no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare distribution in the core satisfies this condition: its marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented."
Amir, Rabah, and Isabel Grilo 1999. "Stackelberg Versus Cournot Equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior 26(1):1-21.
Anderhub, Vital, Dirk Engelmann, and Werner Güth 2002. "An Experimental Study of the Repeated Trust Game with Incomplete Information." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 48(2):197-216.
"In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity. Only in the latter case player 2 chooses between exploiting or rewarding player 1. In our computerized experiment, player 2 can be always rewarding (implemented as a robot strategy) or decide opportunistically. To allow for reputation formation, this base game is played repeatedly. Learning can be analyzed since participants play successively several repeated games with changing partners. Participants can explicitly rely on mixed strategies which allows testing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reputation equilibria also at an individual level."
Anderhub, Vital, and Werner Güth 1999. "On Intertemporal Allocation Behavior: A Selective Survey of Saving Experiments." Ifo Studien: Zeitschrift für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung 45(3):303- 333.
Anderhub, Vital, Werner Güth, Ulrich Kamecke, and Hans-Theo Normann 2001. "Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt- Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 179).
Anderhub, Vital, Werner Güth, and Nadège Marchand 2001. "Alternating Offer Bargaining Experiments with Varying Institutional Details." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 180).
Anderson, Kim Allan, and Mikael Lind 1999. "Computing the NTU-Shapley Value of NTU-Games Defined by Multiple Objective Linear Programs." International Journal of Game Theory 28(4):585-597.
Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt 1998. "A Theoretical Analysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games." Journal of Public Economics 70(2):297-.
Andreoni, James, and Rachel T. A. Croson 1998. "Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments." In Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (Forthcoming). C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, eds.
Andreoni, James, and John H. Miller 1999. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Rationality of Altruism." (Working Paper)
Angelsen, Arild. 2001. "Playing Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation." Land Economics 77(2):285-299.
"This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forestland appropriation. Three typical cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration. The local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs, market, and behavioral assumptions, and less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure (roads) which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion, or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs. The game structure is, however, important for total deforestation."
Anthonisen, N. 1997. "On the Convergence of Beliefs Within Populations with Games with Learning." Journal of Economic Theory 76(1):169-184.
Anttila, Sten. 1999. The Snowmobile Issues as a Commons Dilemma: A Problem of Concept Formation. Östersund, Sweden: Fjällforskningsinstitutet. (Fjällforskningsinstitutets Rapport 1999; 2).
Anttila, Sten, and Eivind Torp 1996. "Environmental Adjustment and Private Economic Strategies in Reindeer Pastoralism: Combining Game Theory with Participatory Action Theory."
Apesteguia, José J. 2000. "Does Information Make any Difference? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"The effects on behavior of two different levels of information about the payoff structure are analyzed in a fifty period Common-Pool Resource game of six players with no communication. Six groups of six players played a complete information game while other six groups played the same game but without knowledge of the payoff functions. Players in the incomplete information treatment only had some qualitative information about the interdependent character of the decision situation. It will be shown that the aggregated decision patterns are remarkably similar in both treatments. After arguing that this is of special importance to the literature on learning models, three such models are contrasted with the data. It will be concluded that the predictions of a simple extension of a learning model based on average payoffs cannot be rejected to be equal to the observed data."
Arce, M., and G. Daniel 1996. "Social Norms, Inflation and Stabilization." Rationality and Society 8(3): 277-294.
Armstrong, Claire W., and Ussif Rashid Sumaila 2001. "Optimal Allocation of TAC and the Implications of Implementing an ITQ Management System for the North-East Arctic Cod." Land Economics 77(3):350-359.
"First, we study the allocation ride applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. Second, we explore the bioeconomic implications of an ITQ management system for this fishery. A model combining a cannibalistic bio-mode with cooperative game theory is developed. Key results from the study are (1) the current allocation rule acts in opposite fashion to what may be considered bioeconomically optimal; and (2) an ITQ system for this fishery is likely to result in economic losses, as the biological advantages of harvesting with the two vessels types may be lost."
Asheim, G. B. 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency." Review of Economic Studies 64(3): 427-443.
Aumann, R. J. 1967. "Survey of Cooperative Games Without Side Payments." In Essays in Mathematical Economics. M. Shubik, ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Aumann, Robert J. 1999. "Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):263-300.
Aumann, Robert J. 1999. "Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):263-300.
Aumann, Robert J. 1999. "Interactive Epistemology II: Probability." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):301-314.
Aumann, Robert J. 1999. "Interactive Epistemology II: Probability." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):301-314.
Aumann, Robert J. 1988. Lectures on Game Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. (Underground Classics in Economics).
Aumann, Robert J. 1985. "Repeated Games." In Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare. G. R. Feiwel, ed. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Aumann, Robert J. 1985. "What is the Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?" In Frontiers of Economics. K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, eds. New York: Blackwell.
Aumann, Robert J. et al. 1981. Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Mannheim, Germany: Bibliographisches Institut. (Oskar Morgenstern Memorial Symposium (1979: Universitaet Mannheim); Gesellschaft, Recht, Wirtschaft; Bd. 4).
Aumann, Robert, and Werner Güth 1998. "Species Survival and Evolutionary Stability in Sustainable Habitats: The Concept of Ecological Stability." (Working Paper)
Auriol, Emmanuelle, and Michel Benaim 2000. "Standardization in Decentralized Economies." The American Economic Review 90(3):550-570.
"This paper presents a dynamic model, inspired by evolutionary game theory, of how standards and norms emerge in decentralized economies. It shows that standardization outcomes depend on adopters' attitudes to problems caused by incompatibility. If individuals display aversion to incompatibility, standardization never fails to happen eventually, but societies sometimes end up picking inferior standards. In this case, official action can be useful to quickly achieve sensible
standardization. On the other hand, when individuals display tolerance or neutrality to incompatibility, there is neither path-dependency nor a lock-in problem, and regulation seems a poor alternative to laissez-faire."
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks 1998. "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory." In Annual Review of Political Science: Volume 1, 1998. N. W. Polsby, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 643).
Austen-Smith, David, and William H. Riker 1987. "Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation." American Politcal Science Review 81(3):897-917.
Avenhaus, Rudolf, and Akira Okada 1992. "Statistical Criterial for Sequential Inspector-Leadership Games." Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan 35(2):134-151. The Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Reprint Series No. 349).
Avery, Christopher, and John H. Kagel 1995. "Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tucson, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Avrahami, Judith, Werner Güth, and Yaakov Kareev 2001. "The Parasite Game: Exploiting the Abundance of Nature in Face of Competition." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 188).
Avrahami, Judith, Werner Güth, and Yaakov Kareev 2001. "Predating Predators: An Experimental Study." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 189).
Axelrod, Robert. 2000. "On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory." Analyse & Kritik 22(1):130-151.
Axelrod, Robert. 1995. "The Evolution of Cooperation (Selection)." In Perspectives on Property Law. R. C. Ellickson, C. M. Rose, and Bruce A. Ackerman, eds. New York: Aspen Law & Business. (Perspectives on Law Series).
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane 1986. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." In Cooperation Under Anarchy. K. A. Oye, ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." World Politics 38(1):226-254.
Bacharach, M. O. L. et al., eds. 1997. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Boston: Kluwer Academic. (Theory and Decision Library; Series C: Game Theory, MathematicalProgramming and Operations Research, vol. 20).
Bacharach, Michael. 1997. "Showing What You Are by Showing Who You Are." Russell Sage Foundation, New York. (Russell Sage Working Paper no. 125).
Bacharach, Michael, and Diego Gambetta 2001. "Trust in Signs." In Trust in Society. K. Cook, ed. New York, NY: Russell Sage. (The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, v. 2).
Baden, John A. 1996. "An Economic Perspective on the Sustainable Use of Land." In Land Use in America. H. L. Diamond and P. F. Noonan, eds. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Bagnoli, Mark, and Barton L. Lipman 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions." Review of Economic Studies 56:583-601.
Bagnoli, Mark, and Michael McKee 1987. "Can the Private Provision of Public Goods Be Efficient? Some Experimental Evidence." Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and University of Windsor, Winsor, Ontario. Presented at the Canadian Economics Association Meeting, 1986 and seminars at University of Colorado-Boulder and Northern Illinois University, 1986.
Bai, Myeonggoo. 1997. "Cooperation Among Competitors: Inter-firm R&D Cooperation." Presented at the Mini-Conference at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, December 13 and 15, 1997.
Bailey, James Wood. 1997. Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baird, Douglas G. 1998. "Game Theory and the Law." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 2. P. Newman, ed. New York: Stockton.
Baird, Douglas R., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker 1994. "Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models." In Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Baird, Douglas R., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker 1994. "Reputation and Repeated Games." In Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Baird, Douglas, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker 1994. Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Baird, Douglas, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker 1994. "Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation." In Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Baland, Jean-Marie, and James A. Robinson 1998. "Rotten Parents." Centre de Recherche en Economie du Developpement (CRED), Faculte des Sciences Economiques, Sociales et de Gestion, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur, Belgium. (Collection Developpement, no. 207).
Ball, Sheryl, and Roy Gardner 1991? "The Evolution of Beliefs in a Finitely Repeated Game." (Working Paper)
Banks, Jeffrey S. 1986. "Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 608).
Banks, Jeffrey S., Colin Camerer, and David Porter 1990. "An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 740).
Banks, Jeffrey S., and John Duggan 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice." American Political Science Review 94(1):73-88.
Banks, Jeffrey S., and Farid Gasmi 1986. "Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 603).
Banks, Jeffrey S., and Joel Sobel 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 565).
Baron, Robert S., Norbert L. Kerr, and Norman Miller 1992. Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action (Chapter 7 Only). Buckingham, England: Open University Press. (Mapping Social Pyschology).
Barrett, Scott. 1999. "International Cooperation for Sale." (Working Paper)
Barrett, Scott. 1999. "A Theory of Full International Cooperation." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(4): 519-541.
Barry, Brian, and Russell Hardin, eds. 1982. Rational Man and Irrational Society? An Introduction and Sourcebook. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Barth, Fredrik. 1959. "Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organization." The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 89:5-21.
Basar, Tamer, and Geert J. Olsder 1982. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. New York: Academic.
Basu, Kaushik. 1998. "Social Norms and the Law." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 3. P. Newman, ed. New York: Stockton.
Basu, Kaushik. 1987. "Modelling Finitely-repeated Games with Uncertain Termination." Economic Letters 23:147-151.
Bates, Robert H., and William P. Rogerson 1979. "Agriculture in Development: A Game Theoretic Analysis." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 263).
Bates, Robert H., and Barry R. Weingast 1996. "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition." Russell Sage Foundation, New York. (Russell Sage Working Paper no. 105).
Battigalli, Pierpaolo, Aldo Montesano, and Fausto Panunzi, eds. 1997. Decisions, Games, and Markets. Boston: Kluwer Academic. (Studies in Risk and Uncertainty, SIRU 8).
Beard, T. Randolph, Richard O. Beil, and Yoshiharu Mataga 1997. "Cultural Determinants of Economic Success: Trust and Cooperation in the U.S. and Japan." (Working Paper)
Beckencamp, Martin, and Wiebke Gümbel 2000. "Emotional Appraisal of Different Situations in Commons Dilemmas Depending on Social Value Orientation." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"A usual common consists of a common pool resource and members interacting and managing the resource. It is well-known that the resource is endangered to be overexploited if the members of the common behave self-interested or 'economically rational' ('tragedy of the commons;' Hardin, 1968). In order to counter this dilemma it is often suggested to establish a sanctioning regime on the incentive structure. In an experimental computer scenario we (Ostmann, Wojtyniak & Beckenkamp) simulated a self-governed common based on a scenario from Ostrom/Gardner/Walker and have published results of different experimental series. In these series a sanctioning-regime was introduced by adding limits to investments and a control mechanism. As an independent variable we investigated different sanctioning factors.
"Game-theoretical predicted increase in efficiency could not be confirmed in experiments. On the contrary: the results were even worse than equilibria prescribe for extremely low and extremely high sanctions. The players reached the Nash-equilibrium only for the medium sanction factor. The difference in efficiency was much lower between the other sanctioning factors. At the moment there are two different ways of explanation: in a first approach we explained these results by considering different types of individuals and reactance-phenomena in relation to the incentive structure. Unfortunately we only have hints from verbal protocols for this interpretation. The other interpretation is that this result has been a statistical outlier and we made an error of first kind. For this reason we are just starting a new experiment with a replication of the investigation of the influence of three different monetary sanctioning factors. However, in this experiment we will first classify the social value orientation (competitor, individualist and co-operator) of the subjects and paralellize the experimental groups with respect to this variable. We also will give a short questionnaire consisting of 16 different items raising the emotional appraisal after each period within the experimental setup, the whole set- up consisting of 20 periods with 8 subjects participating. The whole experiment consists of 9 groups and three different experimental conditions of severeness of monetary sanctioning, thus with 3 groups under each condition.
"We hope that we can replicate the demonstration of the particular efficiency of the medium sanctioning factor. In this case we can fill the gap of lacking account about the specific psychological impact of moderate sanctioning regimes by explaining the results with different modalities of emotional appraisal depending on social value orientation.
"What is rather new in this experimental set-up is that we are interested in how different situations in commons dilemmas (like calm periods, crisis, being detected by a control) take effect on different types of subjects. Only few experiments on emotional appraisal in resource dilemmas have been conducted, but usually with the opposite question formulation: how different 'moods' affect appropriation. Thus even if the results mentioned above cannot be replicated, we can present some data on the influence of different situations of appropriation on the emotional appraisal."
Beckenkamp, Martin, and Axel Ostmann 1998. "Missing the Target? Sanctioning as an Ambiguous Structural Solution." (Working Paper)
Becker, Nir. 1990. "Common Property Resources and Prisoner's Dilemma Games: The Missing Linkage." Presented at the first annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham, NC, September 27-30, 1990.
Becker, Nir, and K. William Easter 1999. "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources Such as the Great Lakes." Land Economics 75(2):233-245.
Beer, Francis A. 1986. "Games and Metaphors (Book Review of Axelrod, Robert, 'The Evolution of Cooperation')." Journal of Conflict Resolution 30(1):171-191.
Bendor, J., and P. Swistak 1997. "The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation." American Political Science Review 91(2):290-307.
From Murray Rudd's bibliography pm adaptive systems
Bendor, Jonathan, Roderick M. Kramer, and Suzanne Stout 1991. "When in Doubt...: Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner's Dilemma." Conflict Resolution 35(4):691-719.
Bennett, Elaine. 1984? "Bargaining in Cooperative Games: A Proposal Submitted to the National Science Foundation."
Berck, Peter, and Jonathan Lipow 2000. "Managerial Reputation and the 'Endgame'." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42(2):253-263.
Berezovskiy, B.A., Yu M. Baryshnikov, and A. V. Gnedin 1987. "Three Problems of the Theory of Choice on Random Sets." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 661).
Berge, Erling. 1994. "Democracy and Human Rights: Conditions for Sustainable Resource Utilization." In Who Pays the Price? The Sociocultural Context of Environmental Crisis. B. Johnston, ed. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Berge, Erling. 1992. "Democracy and Human Rights as Conditions for Sustainable Resource Utilization." Presented at "Inequality and the Commons," the third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Washington, DC, September 17-20, 1992.
"The game of chicken is seen as a simplified model of the structure of decision making in an open access resource. The discussion starts at the point where its users realize that population pressure or some equivalent external shock has made the utilization obviously unsustainable. To escape this social trap, the appropriators have to 'invent' a local state to govern the appropriation process. Rational decision makers then have to consider transaction costs, externalities, distributional consequences and the distribution of social power. Some sequences of decisions may turn the game of chicken into a prisoner's dilemma. The discussion is aimed at identifying necessary conditions the local state must satisfy in order to ensure a sustainable resource utilization. Democracy and human rights appear to be necessary."
Berkes, Fikret, and Aykut Kence 1987. "Fisheries and the Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Conditions for the Evolution of Cooperation among Users of Common Property Resources." (Working Paper)
Berninghaus, S. K., Werner Guth, R. Lechler, and H-J. Ramser 1997. "Decentralized Versus Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultaet, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin. (Quantifikation und Simulation Oekonomischer Prozesse, Discussion Paper, 41).
Berninghaus, Siefried, Werner Güth, and Claudia Keser 1999. "Decentralized or Collective Bargaining in a Strategy Experiment." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Economics Series, no. 146).
Bianco, William T., and Robert H. Bates 1990. "Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas." American Political Science Review 84(1):133-47.
Bienenstock, Elisa Jayne. 1997. "Response to 'Network Games'." Rationality and Society 9(3):378-382.
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"The evidence is strong that modern hunter-gatherer societies approximate the Marxian ideal in which each contributes according to ability and receives according to need. It has been argued that such a form of social organization can be explained by neither reciprocity nor kinship. Attempts to found evolutionary social contract theories on sociobiological principles therefore seem doomed from the outset, since the same authors believe that modem foraging societies preserve in fossil form the type of social contract from which all later social contracts evolved. This paper outlines the importance of the issue to my own social contract theory. It then uses game- theoretic arguments to argue that reciprocity and kinship are actually the twin pillars that maintain the quasi-utilitarian social contracts of modem hunter-gatherer societies. Finally, the idea that modem foragers have social contracts similar to their prehistoric ancestors is questioned."
Binmore, Ken, Alan Kirman, and Pero Tani, eds. 1993. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Binmore, Ken, and Larry Samuelson 1990. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata." Social Systems Research Institute, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI.
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"We analyze a nonlinear discrete time Cournot duopoly game, where players have adaptive expectations. The evolution of expected outputs over time is generated by the iteration of a noninvertible two-dimensional map. The long-run behavior is characterized by multistability, that is, the presence of coexisting stable consistent beliefs, which correspond to Nash equilibria in the quantity space. Hence, a problem of equilibrium selection arises and the long run outcome strongly depends on the choice of the players' initial beliefs. We analyze the basins of attraction and their qualitative changes as the model parameters vary. We illustrate that the basins might be nonconnected sets and reveal the mechanism which is responsible for this often-neglected kind of complexity. The analysis of the global bifurcations which cause qualitative changes in the topological structure of the basins is carried out by the method of critical curves. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved."
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Bjorn, Paul A., and Quang H. Vuong 1984. "Simultaneous Equations Models for Dummy Endogenous Variables; A Game Theoretic Formulation with an Application to Labor Force Participation." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 537).
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Bohnet, Iris, and Bruno S. Frey 1999. "The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Games." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38(1):43-57.
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"We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets."
Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels 1997. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition." (Working Paper)
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Border, Kim C. 1981. "Noncooperative Games, Abstract Economics and Walrasian Equilibria." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 396).
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Bousquet, François, et al. 1996. "Tragedy of the Commons, Game Theory and Spatial Simulation of Complex Systems." Ecological Economics:1-8.
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Brams, Steven J. 1996. "Game Theory and Emotions." Political Economy Research Group, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario. (Papers in Political Economy, no. 65).
Brams, Steven J. 1994. Theory of Moves. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Brams, Steven J., and Christopher B. Jones 1999. "Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power." Rationality and Society 11(2):139-167.
Brams, Steven J., and Ben D. Mor 1993. "When Is It Rational to Be Magnanimous in Victory?" Rationality and Society 5(4):432-454.
"There are two contending schools of thought on how a victor should treat a defeated party after a war or other major dispute. Whereas magnanimity might quell the desire of the defeated party for revenge, it might also be instrumental in the defeated party's resurrection. Similarly, the defeated party might face the conflicting choices of whether to cooperate or not cooperate with the victor. These interdependent choices am modeled by a generic 2 x 2 'magnanimity game' (MG), which subsumes 12 different specific games that might arise in the aftermath of a war. Rational choices in MG are based on two-sided analysis, in which players can think ahead several moves and take account of each other's preferences. Cycling may or may not be permitted, if it is, which player possesses 'moving power' can be critical to the outcome. The analysis is illustrated by historical examples from 19th- and 20th-century wars."
Brams, Steven J., and Douglas Muzzio 1977. "Unanimity in the Supreme Court: A Game-Theoretic Explanation of the Decision in the White House Tapes Case." Public Choice 30:67--85.
Brams, Steven J., and Alan D. Taylor 1996. Fair Division: From Cake-cutting to Dispute Resolution. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Brandt, Patrick T., John T. Williams, Benjamin O. Fordham, and Brian Pollins 2000. "Dynamic Modeling for Persistent Event-Count Time Series." American Journal of Political Science 44(4):823-843.
Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan 1981. "The Tax System as Social Overhead Capital; A Constitutional Perspective on Fiscal Norms." Presented at the 37th I.I.P.F. Congress on Public Finance and Growth, Tokyo, Japan.
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"The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of a community's economic characteristics on its ability to generate adherence to socially efficient norms. These norms prescribe a behavior for an individual when his/her preferred behavior imposes a negative externality on others. This paper explores social noons as a mechanism of how neighborhood characteristics can affect individual behavior. Understanding the mechanism through which community characteristics affect individual behavior is important in that it enables the development of a testable structural empirical model which is purged of the omitted variable bias arising from the potential endogeneity of the neighborhood choice."
Brooks, Robin, Michael Murray, and Jill C. Weise 1999. "When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non- Game-Theoretic Analyses." Journal of Political Economy 107(4):843-858.
Brookshire, David S., Don L. Coursey, and Douglas B. Redington 1988. "Special Interests and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 131).
Brown, David T. 1991. "Deserted Corridors: The Case for Special Interest Right-of-Way Management." Presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 26-29, 1991.
...Recent developments in game theory, based in large part on the Folk Theorem, offer the promise of a formal theory of presidential leadership as the focus of legislative coordination games and nexus of contracts in legislative policy-making.
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Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." American Political Science Review 93(4): 791-807.
Burnham, Terence, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith 2000. "Friend-or-Foe Intentionality Priming in an Extensive Form Trust Game." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 43(1):57-73.
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Buskens, Vincent, and Jeroen Weesie 2000. "Cooperation via Social Networks." Analyse & Kritik 22(1): 44-74.
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Cain, Michael J. G., and Keith L. Dougherty 1999. "Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design under the Articles of Confederation." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(2): 233-260.
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Calvert, Randall L. 1993. "Communication in Institutions: Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Hidden Information." In Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich, and N. J. Schofield, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics).
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Camerer, Colin F., Marc Knex, and Roberto A. Weger 1996. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and 'Weak Link' Coordination Games." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Ca. (Social Science Working Paper 970).
Campbell, Richmond, and Lanning Sowden, eds. 1985. Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and
Newcomb's Problem. University of British Columbia Press.
Canals, J., and F. Vega-Redondo 1998. "Multi-Level Evolution in Population Games." International Journal of Game Theory 27(1):21-.
de Cara, Mar, O. Pla, and F. Guinea 2000. "Learning, Competition and Cooperation in Simple Games." European Physical Journal B 13(3):413-416.
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo. 2000. "Real Wealth and Experimental Cooperation: Evidence from Field Experiments." Presented at: "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"This paper is about the role of poverty and inequality on communities trying to solve local commons dilemmas. The debate remains alive since Olson's (1965) argument that the privileged in a group facing a collective action problem may facilitate the provision of the public good despite the free riding of the poorer. Olson's hypothesis, however, has been contested by some arguing that inequality can create efficiency losses due to asymmetries of information, power or wealth , among others, which reduce the capacity of groups to achieve Pareto optimal equilibria. Experimental economics can and has been used to test with college students for these contrasting arguments. We expand the evidence by conducting a series of experiments in the field where the subjects are actual local commons users. We use additional information about the participants' real characteristics and test if such factors affected their behavior in the lab in a simple Common-Pool Resources experiment with groups of 8 people. We found that factors such as actual wealth and occupation do explain the rather wide variability on the level of cooperation achieved after allowing face-to-face communication before each round, for a sample of 10 groups. We first tested these hypotheses at group level finding that wealth and heterogeneity may be negatively associated with cooperation and efficiency. Then at a micro level we test and show that the individual is more willing to cooperate through face-to-face communication if i) has a lower level of real wealth, ii) her occupation is associated with local commons dilemmas, iii) and is playing in a group where she shows lower social distance with respect to the other 7 players. The results could be relevant not only for the inequality-cooperation debate, but for the debate on the power of experimental economics to tackle these type of questions."
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo. 1999. "Real Wealth and Experimental Cooperation: Evidence from Field Experiments." (Working Paper)
Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo. 1999. "What Do People Bring Into the Game? A Multi-Layer Framework for Studying People's Willingness to Cooperate." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, December 11-13, 1999.
Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, and Elinor Ostrom 2001. "What Do People Bring Into the Game? How Norms Help Overcome the Tragedy of the Commons." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, W01-4).
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, John Stranlund, and Cleve Willis 2001. "Economic Inequality and Burden- Sharing in the Provision of Local Environmental Quality." (Working Paper)
Carlton, Dennis W., Robert H. Gertner, and Andrew M. Rosenfeld 1997. "Communication among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust." George Mason Law Review 5(3):423-440.
Carpenter, Jeffrey, and Juan Camilo Cardenas 2001. "Using Cross-Cultural Experiments to Understand the Dynamics of Global Commons." Presented at a colloquium at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, March 18, 2002.
"Differences in group affiliation may affect the level of cooperation in commons situations such as complex international negotiations over the preservation of the rainforest. In this example, one might expect individuals from the north to show strong support for conservation because they receive mostly non-extractive benefits from the forest (e.g., clean air). However, locals may act with less restraint for two reasons: (1) much more of the benefits coming from the forest are resources that are extracted, and (2) compounding the first reason, local individuals may resist being told to conserve by outsiders. We design a real-time, cross- cultural common pool resource (CPR) experiment purposely using participants from cultures that derive different benefits from biodiversity (extraction versus conservation) to analyze the effect of group affiliation on cooperative behavior. In addition, we elicit real donations to local and international conservation funds to augment our CPR results. In the CPR environment, we find evidence that group affiliation affects behavior. American students maintain their extraction in the mixed treatment (both Colombian and American participants) compared to homogeneous groups (American only), while Colombian participants extract more in the mixed treatment. We also witness negative reciprocity by exploited subgroups. Here subgroups that extract less in one period (i.e., are exploited) tend to extract more in the future and the magnitude of this adjustment is determined by participant nationality and our treatments. In the donation stage, we show that nationality affects how much participants are willing to donate of their first-stage earnings to a conservation fund. We also examine the possibility that altruistic preferences to donate to a conservation fund are endogenous, in that, they reflect the level of cooperation in the CPR game."
Carpenter, Jefrey P. 1998. "Stochastic Evolution in the Nash Demand Game." (Working Paper)
Carraro, Carlo, and Domenico Siniscalco, eds. 1997. New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carter, Allen. 1999. "Game Theory and Decentralisation." Journal of Applied Philosophy 16(3):223-.
Casari, Marco, and Charles Plott 2000. "Keeping an Eye on Your Neighbors: Agents Monitoring and Sanctioning One Another in a Common-Pool Resource Environment." Presented at: "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"The role of a specific institution in avoiding a 'tragedy of the commons' situation in a common pool-resource environment is studied experimentally. The resource users privately decide their own exploitation level and then, once the group outcome is revealed, can choose to select other individuals for inspection. At a cost the inspector can view the decision of any individual. If the inspected individual has exploited the resource excessively, relative to a publicly known amount, a fine is imposed and paid to the inspector. The rules were modeled after a historical case of self-governed rural communities in Northern Italy.
"The introduction of the sanctioning institution greatly improves the efficiency of the group outcome from the initial level of severe 'tragedy.' The classical model with homogeneous, self- interested agents cannot explain these results. We present a model with heterogeneous, other-regarding agents that is compatible with both the resource use and the inspection decision patterns. In particular, differences in altruism/spite can explain the wide diversity of individual behavior and the willingness of spiteful agents to request unprofitable inspections help explaining the high inspection rate."
Cashman, Greg. 1993. What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict. New York: Lexington Books.
Cason, Timothy C., and Vai-Lam Mui 1997. "A Labratory Study of Group of Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game." The Economic Journal 107(444):1465-1486.
Castelfranchi, Cristiano. 1998. "Through the Minds of the Agents." Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 1(1)
De Castro, Fabio. 1998. "Landscape Diversity, Local Power, and the Appropriation of Natural Resources in the Lower Amazonian Floodplain." Presented at "Crossing Boundaries," the seventh annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10-14, 1998.
From the Introduction:
"The debate over the 'commons' can be divided into three main phases, according to the theoretical assumptions in the framework. The first phase is marked by the acknowledgement of the relationship between resource depletion and its form of appropriation. The seminal publications by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) introduced the questions of the 'commons' in an institutional approach by discussing how open access to the oceans responsible for the increasing depletion of maritime fish resources. Hardin (1967) later applied game theory to explain the logic behind resource overuse. This 'tragedy of the commons' model which assumes that users are homogenous, profit maximizers failed to recognize the ability of individuals to build a social arrangement of resource appropriation (Feeny et al. 1990; Feeny et al. 1996).
"It was not until the Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop's publication on the concept of common property (1975) that the 'tragedy of the commons' model was first contested. The authors argued that human populations were able to engage in collective property regimes and that, in many cases, the so-called 'open access' systems were in fact communal property systems. The recognition of a fourth property system overlooked in Hardin's model was the starting point of the second phase of the 'commons' debate. This phase was led by social scientists who examined the relationship between resource use and resource appropriation within a local ecological context. Netting (1976), in his 'groundbreaking' study on the pattern of property systems in the Swiss Alps, demonstrated that property regimes are closely related to ecological and economic features of the resource, a fact which influences the cost/benefit balance of different forms of appropriation.
"The volume edited by Pinkerton (1989) on cooperative management represents a benchmark in this 'political ecology' approach to the commons. It recognizes that local institutions represent a strong potential to conserve natural resources; yet it also recognizes that the development of a co-management system involves multiple resource use, and participation of different uses groups in a complex political process. Therefore, although it takes into account the role of local management in resource conservation, this new approach also recognizes that collective action requires the provision of certain incentives to the user groups (Ostrom 1990). In other words, while the 'cultural ecology' approach emphasizes the relationship between users and the resource, the 'political ecology' approach emphasizes the relationships among users in regard to the resource use. The focus on the interaction among resource users is appropriate for at least two reasons. First, it allows one to evaluate the resource sustainability in light of the institutional sustainability (Ostrom et al. 1993). In this regard, the 'management of people' is based on the structure of opportunities and constraints upon which individuals makes decisions. Second, the focus on the resource user enables one to broaden the analysis from a sectorial to a systemic perspective of the resource appropriation...
"In this paper I analyze the ecological and social heterogeneity in the local management of fishing in the Lower Amazon. In particular, I focus on the local context of resource use in the floodplain. The goal of the paper is to evaluate how the pattern of resource appropriation in the floodplain system may affect the local management of fishing in the floodplain lakes."
Cesar, Herman S. 1994. Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect: Economics Essays on the Comedy and Tragedy of the Commons. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Chan, Kenneth S., Stuart Mestelman, Robert Moir, and R. Andrew Muller 1992. "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Endowment Distributions: Experimental Evidence." Presented at "Inequality and the Commons, the third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Washington, DC, September 17-20, 1992.
"Field experience suggests that the management of a common property resource may be facilitated if there is a large stakeholder among the agents who are trying to manage the resource. The successful management of a common property resource can be viewed as the provision of a public good, for each user of the resource benefits from its proper management, and each has a private incentive to withdraw his contributions from the management of the resource.
"Theory suggests that the distribution of individual resource endowments may affect the voluntary contributions individuals will make towards the provision of a public good (or maintenance of a common property resource). This paper presents the results of a series of laboratory sessions in which individuals are able to make voluntary contributions to an activity which will result in 'group' benefits (comparable to the maintenance of the common property resource). Five different distributions of endowments are studies. Preliminary results suggest that as the distribution of endowments becomes more equal, the total voluntary contributions towards the maintenance of the public good falls."
Chander, P., and H. Tulkens 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities." International Journal of Game Theory 26(4):379-402.
Chander, Parkash, and Henry Tulkens 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution." Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm. (Beijer Discussion Paper Series no. 51).
Chen, Kai-Lih, Theodore Tomasi, and Terry L. Roe 1998. "Pollution Regulation in a Political Economy." In Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management. E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour, eds. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. (New Horizons in Environmental Economics).
Chen, Kay-Yet, and Charles R. Plott 1992. "Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 774).
Chen, Yan, and Peter C. Ordeshook 1993. "Constitutional Secession Clauses." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 859).
Chen, Yan, and Peter C. Ordeshook 1993. "Veto Games: Spatial Committees under Unanimity Rule." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 847).
Cho, Kisuk, and Byung-il Choi 1999. "A Cross-Society Study of Trust and Reciprocity: Korea, Japan and the U.S." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the "Workshop on the Workshop 2," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, June 9-June 13, 1999. (J99-45).
Chung, Tai-Yeong. 1996. "Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts." Public Choice 87(1-2):55-66.
"The objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive. Tullock's standard rent-seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts. A positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest, because a contender's private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders. Coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent-seeking model, the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is apriori ambiguous. It is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful, excessive aggregate efforts."
Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio, Richard L. Merritt, and Dina A. Zinnes, eds. 1987. Communication and Interaction in Global Politics. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. (Advances in Political Science: An International Series, vol. 5).
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Clark, D. J. 1997. "Learning the Structure of a Simple Rent-Seeking Game." Public Choice 93(1-2):119- 130.
Clark, Derek J., and Christian Riis 2000. "Allocation Efficiency in a Competitive Bribery Game." Journal of Economic Behavior and Efficiency 42(1):109-124.
Clark, Ken, and Martin Sefton 1997. "The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocal Altruism." The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK. (University of Manchester School of Economic Studies, Discussion Paper Series, no. 9733).
Clark, Kenneth, Stephen Kay, and Martin Sefton 1997. "When are Nash Equilibria Self Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis." School of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK. (Working Paper Series 97-04).
Clemhout, Simone, and Henry Wan 1990. "Environmental Problem as a Common Property Resource Game." In Dynamic Games in Economic Analysis: Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Differential Games and Applications, August 9-10, Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. R. P. Hamalainen and H. K. Ehtamo, eds. New York: Springer. (Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, v. 157).
Clemhout, Simone, and Henry Y. Wan 1986. "Common Property Exploitations Under Risks of Resource Extinctions." In Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. New York: Springer Verlag.
Clemhout, Simone, and Henry Y. Wan 1985. "Resource Exploitation and Ecological Degradation as Differential Games." Journal of Optimization Theory and Application 19:471-481.
Cleveland, Cutler et al. 1996. "A Framework for Modeling the Linkages between Ecosystems and Human Systems." Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden. (Beijer Discussion Paper Series, no. 76).
Cleveland, Cutler et al. 1995. "The Relationship between Ecosystems and Human Systems: Scale Challenges in Linking Property Rights Systems and Natural Resource Management." Presented at "Reinventing the Commons," the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, May 24-28, 1995, Bodoe, Norway.
Co-authors:
Costanza, Robert
Eggertsson, Thrainn
Fortmann, Louise
Low, Bobbi
McKean, Margaret
Ostrom, Elinor
Wilson, James
Young, Oran
"We hypothesize that successful sustainability requires human social systems that are concordant with the ecosystem to which they are related at appropriate scales given the limits of human information processing. Many current governance and management systems are either too large or too small for the ecosystems to which they are related, leading to inappropriate policies for these systems. Problems often occur when human systems developed and sustainable at one scale or for one ecosystem or for one part of an ecosystem are transferred to other scales and ecosystems or to the whole system without adequate modification. In order to test this hypothesis, we are developing multiscale conceptual and mathematical models and data bases that include a range of ecosystem characteristics and human system characteristics."
Cohen, Joel E. 1998. "Cooperation and Self-Interest: Pareto-Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria in Finite Random Games." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 95:9724-9731.
Cohen, Michael D., Rick L. Riolo, and Robert Axelrod 2001. "The Role of Social Structure in the Maintenance of Cooperative Regimes." Rationality and Society 13(1):5-32.
Cohen, Michael D., Rick L. Riolo, and Robert Axelrod 1999. "The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation." Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM. (SFI Working Paper Series 99-01-002).
Cohen, Youseff. 1994. Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Colaresi, Michael. 1999. "The Shadow of the Past: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to History Dependence in International Rivalry." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, December 11-13, 1999.
Coleman, Andrew A., Andrew M. Colman, and Richard M. Thomas 1990. "Cooperation Without Awareness: A Multiperson Generalization of the Minimal Social Situation." Behavioral Science 35(2):115-121.
Coleman, James S. 1988. "Constitutions and the Construction of Corporate Actors." (Working Paper)
From Workshop correspondance archives
Coleman, Jules L. 1988. "Market Contractarianism." In Markets, Morals, and the Law. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Colman, Andrew M. 1982. Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction. New York: Pergamin.
Colomer, Jesep M. 1995. "Leadership Games in Collective Action." Rationality and Society 7(2):225-246.
Colomer, Joseph M. 1995. Game Theory and the Transitions to Democracy: The Spanish Model. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar.
Congleton, Roger D. 1997. "Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law." Kyklos 50(4):485-505.
Congleton, Roger D., ed. 1996. The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Cook, Karen, ed. 2001. Trust in Society (Advance Uncorrected Proof). New York, NY: Russell Sage. (The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, volume 2).
Cooper, Andrew F., and Richard Higgott "Two Level Games and the Political Economy of Adjustment: Comparing Australian and Canadian Approaches Towards the Cairns Group and Agricultural Trade in the Uruguay Round." Political Economy Research Group, University of Western Ontario. (Papers in Politcal Economy, No. 22).
Cooper, Russell W. 1999. Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, Russell W. et al. 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results." American Economic Review 80(1):218-233.
Cooter, Robert D. 1993. "Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law."
Cortazar, Rene. 1997. "Non-Redundant Groups, The Assurance Game and the Origins of Collective Action." Public Choice 92(1-2):41-53.
Coughlin, Peter. 1982. "Pareto Optimality of Policy Proposals with Probablistic Voting." Public Choice 39: 427-433.
Coughlin, Peter J. 1986. "Probabilistic Voting Models." In Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences. Kotz- Johnson, ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons. (Vol. 7).
Coughlin, Peter J. 1982. "Pareto Optimality of Policy Proposals with Probabilistic Voting." Presented at the 1982 meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, TX.
Article from Ostrom correspondence archives.
Cox, Gary W. 1985. "The Uncovered Set and the Core." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 104).
Cox, Gary W. 1983. "Non-Collegial Simple Games and the Nowhere Denseness of the Set of Preference Profiles Having a Core." Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX. (Working Papers on Institutional Design and Public Policy, WP-16).
Cox, Gary W., and Richard D. McKelvey "A Ham Sandwich Theorem for General Measures." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 337).
Cox, James C., Jason Shachat, and Mark Walker 1995. "An Experimental Test of Bayesian vs. Adaptive Learning in Normal Form Games." Presented at the conference on "Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences," Tucson, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Cramton, Peter C., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1990. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning From Disagreement." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 731).
Cramton, Peter C., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1986. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 619).
Crane, William V. 1997. "The Role of Institutions and Credibility in the Transforming Economies of Eastern Europe." Presented at the Mini-Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, May 3-5, 1997.
Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom 2000. "A Grammar of Institutions." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).
Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom 1995. "A Grammar of Institutions." American Political Science Review 89(3):582-600.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 2000. "Thinking Like a Game Theorist: Factors Affecting the Frequency of Equilibrium Play." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 41(3):299-314.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1999. "The Disjunction Effect and Reason Based Choice in Games (forthcoming)." Organization Behavior and Human Decision Processes 80(2):118-134.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1999. "Theories of Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games." (Working Paper)
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1999. "Thinking Like a Game Theorist: Factors Affecting the Frequency of Equilibrium Play." (Working Paper)
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Croson, Rachel T. A. 1997. "Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms: An Experiment in Team Production." In Research in Experimental Economics (Forthcoming). JAI.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1996. "Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 30:197-212.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1996. "Partners and Strangers Revisited." Economics Letters 53:25-32.
Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks 1999. "The Effect of Recommended Contributions to the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods." (Working Paper)
Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks 1998. "Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment." Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42:167-190.
Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Beth Marks 2000. "Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis." Experimental Economics 2(3):239-259.
Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Beth Marks 1999. "The Effect of Heterogeneous Valuations for Threshold Public Goods: An Experimental Study." Risk Decision and Policy 4(2):99-115.
Croson, Rachel, and Nancy Buchan 1999. "Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games." American Economic Review 89(2):386-391.
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Davenport, Debbie. 2000. "Global Commons or Sovereign Property: Does Concept Matter?" Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"Antecedent to theoretical questions on how cooperation on CPRs should be handled is the question of how to identify the commons as distinct from other forms of property. While this question may seem obvious at first, in many cases the identification of a commons is determined or at least influenced by the political context in which negotiation of cooperative management takes place. This is particularly true at the global level, the most spectacular example of this being the negotiations of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. The result of these negotiations was to take the biological diversity resources found in nation-states out of the realm of the 'common heritage of mankind,' as had been the previous norm, and into the jurisdiction of national sovereignty.
"One consequence of these shifting definitions is that they may affect the outcome of cooperative efforts, a fact which cooperation theory has so far not taken fully into account. Insofar as environmental goods (or 'bads') and resources differ in status as to whether they are true CPRs or some other form of property, theory must address these different conceptualizations of environmental goods or natural resources so that its full explanatory, predictive, and prescriptive power may be developed. For instance, the game theory model, Prisoners' Dilemma, is frequently associated with the analysis of collective action on CPRs. However, if there is no common interest in a negative environmental externality, or environmental 'bad', due to a divergence of interests between producers and consumers of the 'bad', does Prisoner's Dilemma effectively describe the issues inherent in the negotiating milieu, or would another game better represent the situation the parties find themselves in?
"In this paper I will attempt to distinguish global commons from other environmental goods and resources at the global level by delineating conditions under which various conceptualizations are most appropriate. I then pose the question of whether differences in status as CPR or other form of property affects the likelihood of an effective cooperative outcome. Empirical examples from recent UN environmental negotiations will be used to test my predictions, including negotiations on ozone depletion, climate change, loss of biological diversity, desertification, and deforestation."
Davenport, William H. 1960. "Jamaican Fishing: A Game Theory Analysis.":3-11. Department of Anthropology, Yale University, New Haven, CT. (Yale University Publications in Anthropology, no. 59).
David, Paul A. 1997. "Communication Norms and the Collective Cognitive Performance of 'Invisible Colleges': Modeling the Epistemological Functioning of Scientific Research Networks."
Davis, Douglas D., and Charles A. Holt 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Davis, Otto, and Andrew Whinston 1962. "Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games." Journal of Political Economy 60:241-262.
Dawes, Robyn M. 1973. "The Commons Dilemma Game: An N-Person Mixed-Motive Game With a Dominating Strategy for Defection." ORI Research Bulletin 13(2) Oregon Research Institute.
"If individuals were to decide for themselves whether to buy anti-pollution devices for their cars, a commons dilemma would result (Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1968). The money saved by not buying the device accrues directly to the individual while the
harm done by the resulting pollution is shared equally by all. Moreover, the argument for not buying is independent of others' decisions--because if they do buy, the individual who does not makes no appreciable contribution to pollution, and if they don't the individual who does makes no appreciable contribution to reducing pollution. Yet everyone would prefer to have everyone buy. This paper presents an experimental commons dilemma game that has all the properties of the commons dilemma and that reduces to a prisoner's dilemma game when there are only two players."
Dawes, Robyn M., Jeanne McTavish, and Harriet Shaklee 1977. "Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other People's Behavior in A Commons Dilemma Situation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35(1):1-11.
Dawes, Robyn, M., and John M. Orbell 1995. "The Benefit of Optional Play in Anonymous One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Games." In Barriers to Conflict Resolution. Kenneth J. Arrow et al., eds. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Dayton-Johnson, Jeff, and Pranab Bardhan 2001. "Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Excercise." Presented at "Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources," the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics: Toulouse, France, May 3-4, 2001.
"To analyze the eect of asset inequality on cooperation within a group, we consider a two- player noncooperative model of conservation of a common-pool resource. Over-exploitation by one user aects another's payo by reducing the next-period catch. We give necessary and sufficient conditions such that conservation is a Nash Equilibrium, and show that increasing inequality does not, in general, favor full conservation. However, once inequality is sufficiently great, further inequality can raise efficiency. Thus the relationship between inequality and economic efficiency is U-shaped. Finally, we analyze the implications for conservation if players have earning opportunities outside the commons."
Deadman, Peter J. 1998. "Exploring Heterogeneity in Common Pool Resource Experiments with Intelligent Agent Based Simulations." Presented at "Crossing Boundaries," the seventh annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10-14, 1998.
Author's Abstract:
"This work utilizes previously documented common pool resource experiments as a foundation for the construction of a series of computer simulations in which the individuals participating in the experiments are represented as separate intelligent agents. An intelligent agent is an autonomous, self-contained entity that resides within a virtual, computer-based, environment. In this study, agents are created to represent the individual participants in the CPR experiment and the resource that they share in common. By programming the agents with different strategies and endowments, the researcher can allow the agents to interact within a prespecified environment and observe the outcomes. These outcomes may include the performance of individual strategies in a specific environment, or the overall behavior of the group that emerges as a result of the numerous interactions of the individual agents. These models allow the researcher to observe the relative performance, at the individual and group level, of different combinations of individual strategies and to begin to draw connections between individual behaviors and group outcomes.
"Group performance in heterogeneous simulations can vary significantly with minor changes in the initial parameters of the environment or the characteristics of the agents. Simulations which allow for simplified communication between agents show that a lock-in can occur in which the agents agree on a group wide investment strategy which may or may not be an optimal solution. Some general discussion of the results of these simulations is provided, including a comparison with some observations from experimental economics and game theory. Preliminary observations on the advantages and disadvantages of agent based simulation as a tool for the analysis of the commons dilemma and issues related to heterogeneity are provided, along with some suggestions for future directions in which this work might proceed."
Deadman, Peter J. 1997. "Modeling Individual Behavior in Common Pool Resource Management Experiments with Autonomous Agents." (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1997).
Author's abstract:
"This work introduces and illustrates the potential of intelligent agent based modeling and simulation as a tool for understanding individual action and group performance in common pool resource dilemmas. Three groups of models were developed, based on previously documented common pool resource experiments, and simulated using the Swarm multi-agent simulation environment. Agents in these models were designed to represent the actions of the individual appropriators in the experiments and the common pool resource itself. The three groups of models are differentiated by the capabilities of the appropriator agents and address preassogned fixed strategies with no communication, a cimple induction based approach to selecting amongst alternative strategies with no communication, and the induction based approach with two simple communication routines. Simulations of these three groups of models rendered observations of some potential relationships between individual action and group performance in common pool resource experimental situations. In particular, simulations of agents employing the induction based approach with no-communication generated group level behavior with similar performance characteristics to gorups in actual experiments. A discussion related the behavior of these simulations to other simulation based work in game theory and learning theory. Some potential future directions for this research, and possible applications in natural resources management are discussed."
Deadman, Peter J., Edella Schlager, and Randy Gimblett 1997? "Simulating Common Pool Resource Management Experiments with Adaptive Agents Employing Alternate Communication Routines." (Working Paper)
Deci, Edward L., Richard M. Ryan, and Richard Koestner 1999. "A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards of Intrinsic Motivation." Psychological Bulletin 125(6):627-668.
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Derks, J., and H. Reijnierse 1998. "On the Core of a Collection of Coalitions." International Journal of Game Theory 27(3):451-.
Derks, Jean, and Hans Haller 1999. "Weighted Nucleoli." International Journal of Game Theory 28(2): 173-187.
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"In overlapping-generations models of public-goods provision, in which the contribution decision is binary and lifetimes are finite, the set of symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria can be categorized into three types: seniority equilibria, in which players contribute (effort) until a predetermined age and then shirk thereafter; dependency equilibria, in which players initially shirk, then contribute for a set number of periods, then shirk for the remainder of their lives; and sabbatical equilibria, in which players alternately contribute and shirk for periods of varying length before entering a final stage of shirking. In a world without
discounting we establish conditions for equilibrium and demonstrate that for any dependency equilibrium there is a seniority equilibrium that Pareto dominates it ex ante. We proceed to characterize generational preferences over alternative seniority equilibria. We explore the aggregation of these preferences by embedding the public-goods provision game in a voting framework and solving for the majority-rule equilibria. In this way we can think of political processes as providing one natural framework for equilibrium selection in the original public- goods provision game."
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Co-authors:
Holzman, Ron
Monderer, Dov
Shitovitz, Benyamin
Eisentraut, Renate. 2000. "The Use of Peer Sanctioning Mechanisms in an Asymmetric Commons Dilemma: An Experimental Study." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"In symmetric commons dilemmas, peer sanctioning, i.e. the possibility to gather information about the resource use of others and to sanction overuse, can be an effective structural solution in terms of resource conservation. However, most real world commons are characterized by structural asymmetries, with some users having the facilities to harvest more and therefore being more powerful than others. This structure is, for example, found in fisheries where large commercial fishers with sizable harvesting capacities compete with smaller subsistence fishers.
"Will peer sanctioning be effective in asymmetric commons dilemmas as well? And what are the effects of structural asymmetry on the users information gathering behavior? Do individual users request more information about the resource use of powerful actors because they expect powerful actors to misuse their power? And do powerful actors themselves request more or less information about the resource use of others than powerless actors?
"To answer these questions, an experimental study was conducted. The research tool was a computer-simulated fishing commons, having one human player compete with four computer simulated others playing a range of fixed strategies in an iterated game. On the one hand, the players' task was to decide about their harvests and to inform the other players about their decisions. However, the players were told that this information was not necessarily true and that they therefore could not rely on the indicated harvest sizes of the others. On the other hand, by giving the players the possibility to gather information about the resource use of the others, a peer sanctioning system was introduced. If overuse was detected, the overusing player was sanctioned. As the costs of information gathering had to be born individually while sanctioning resulted in collective gains (distribution of an additional bonus in the short run, resource conservation in the long run), the peer sanctioning system constituted a second order social dilemma.
"In the experimental setting, both the most overusing computer simulated players' power and the human players' power were manipulated. In general, the subjects' information gathering behavior turned out to be quite adaptive, making use of the sanctioning system whenever they suspected overuse. Results indicated also that the application of the sanctioning system depended on the other players' observed harvests and on expectations concerning their future harvests, but not on the other players power. Furthermore, powerful subjects tended to gather more information about the resource use of others than powerless subjects. Further analyses of the experimental situation allow for the conclusion that the subjects' information gathering behavior was presumably mediated by their knowledge about the other players' harvesting strategies. Implications for the management of real world commons are discussed."
Eisentraut, Renate. 2000. "The Use of Peer Sanctioning Mechanisms in an Asymmetric Commons Dilemma: An Experimental Study." (Working Paper)
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Epstein, Gil S., and Carsten Hefeker 2001. "Lobbying and Concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg Games." Public Choice 109(1-2):175-181.
"We analyze how the standard results in lobbying theory change when one side has a second instrument at its disposal. We look at the effect concessions by one side have on the outcome in a Nash and a Stackelberg game."
Epstein, Joshua M. 1999. "Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma." Complexity 4(2): 36-48.
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"Can an apparent loser snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat? This question occupied the attention of the late William H. Riker during the last ten years of his career, and it is one that he answered in the affirmative: By constructing choice situations in order to manipulate outcomes, losers can become winners, and vice versa. Riker even coined a term, 'heresthetics', to describe this 'art of political manipulation'. But is Riker's rather large body of work the 'idiosyncratic' product of a 'singular genius' or can it serve as the 'foundation of a new theory of politics'? Scholars have recently raised this question, and not unreasonably so, for Riker's theory of heresthetics has yet to gain a serious foothold into the political science literature. We develop a game-theoretic model, which enables leaders - in our case, Chief Justices - to engage in heresthetical manipulations. From this model, we deduce propositions about the circumstances that would lead them to invoke heresthetical devices, as well as the particular strategies we would expect them to employ. Finally, we explore the propositions against data amassed from the private papers of two former justices. Our results indicate that Riker's work was not the 'idiosyncratic' product of a 'singular genius' but rather can serve as the 'foundation of a new theory of politics'."
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Erikson, Robert S., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1992. "The Puzzle of Incumbent Spending in Congressional Elections." Division of the Humanities and Social Science, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 806).
This paper takes a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of te spending-votes relationship in Congressional elections to reinvestigate the surprisingly weak effects of incumbent spending measured in previous studies...
Erikson, Robert S., and Thomas R. Palfry 2000. "Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data." American Political Science Review 94(3):595-609.
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Eshel, Ilan. 1988. "On the Evolutionary Genetic Stability of an Even Sex Ratio in Two Locus, Autosomal Systems of Sex Determination." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no. 16).
Eshel, Ilan, Daphna Weinshall, and Emilia Sansome 1994. "What Risk Should a Selfish Partner Take in Order to Save the Life of a Nonrelative, Selfish Friend? -A Stochastic Game Approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Eswaran, Mukesh, and Tracy R. Lewis 1983. "Collusive Bahavior in Fine Repeated Games with Bonding." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 466).
Evens, T. M. S. 1985. "The Paradox of the Nuer Feud and the Leopard-Skin Chief: A Creative Solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma." American Ehtnologist:84-102.
Abstract by Esther Mwangi, 1/2000:
"The author uses game theoretic models to develop his argument that the Nuer feud is a response to an existential dilemma springing from the motivations of agnation (principle) and territory (expedience). The argument follows the follwing five steps: first, the paradoxical nature of the Nuer political order is brought out; second, the practcie of the feud is depicted in terms of games theory and the prisoner's dilemma; third, the figure of the leopard skin chief is shown to furnish a move that transcends the game's definition of the situation; fourth, it is established that feud is indeterminable despite the possibility of settlement; and fifth, this logically absurd state of affairs is shown to be rooted in the implicitly holistic ontology to be found in the Nuer folk model."
Eyckmans, Johan, and Henry Tulkens 2001. "Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem." Presented at "Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources," the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics: Toulouse, France, May 3-4, 2001.
"In this paper we introduce the CLIMNEG World Simulation (CWS) model for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We first state the necessary conditions that determine optimal investment and emission abatement paths under alternative cooperation regimes, and then we test empirically with a numerical version of the CWS model whether the cooperative game theoretic 'core' property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) holds. Under this transfer scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries, should have an interest in leaving the internationa