Bibliographies from the Workshop Library
Game Theory and Experimental Economics
Compiled by Charlotte Hess
Abbink, Klaus, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner 2000. "The Moonlighting Game: Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42(2):265-277.
Abell, Peter. 1996. "A Model of the Informal Structure (Culture) of Organizations: Help, Trust, Rivalry, and Team Spirit." Rationality and Society 8(4):433-452.
Abell, Peter, and Diane Reyniers 2000. "Generalised Reciprocity and Reputation in the Theory of Cooperation: A Framework." Analyse & Kritik 22(1):3-18.
Abreu, Dilip. 1986. "Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames." Journal of Economic Theory 39: 191-225.
(Author Abstract)
General propositions established in Abreu are applied to the analysis of optimal punishments and constrained Pareto optimal paths of symmetric oligopolistic supergames. A remarkably simple 2-dimensional stick-and-carrot characterization of optimal symmetric punishments is obtained. An analogous result holds for the general case of asymmetric punishments, motivating the study of asymmetric Pareto optimal paths. The latter trun out to have a highly non-stationary dynamic structure which sometimes entails intertemporal reversals of relative payoffs between firms.
Abreu, Dilip, and Ariel Rubinstein 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata." Econometrica 56:1259-1282.
Acheson, James M., and Jack Knight 2000. "Distribution Fights, Coordination Games, and Lobster Management." Comparative Studies in Society and History 42(1):209-238.
Aggarwal, Vinod K., and Cédric Dupont 1999. "Goods, Games, and Institutions." International Political Science Review 20(3):393-409.
Agrawal, Arun. 1996. "Common Property Discourse and Forest Management in the Indian Himalayas: A Critical Assessment." (Working Paper)
"In the past decade the literature on common property has grown swiftly, finding stimulus in increasing concerns regarding resource degradation and depletion, and drawing upon developments in game theory, ethnographic writings, and critical social analysis. This paper, in looking at some of the major themes in the writings on the commons, seeks to assess critically some of the achievements of these writings. The second task the paper seeks to accomplish is to relate new directions in the research on common property with pressing themes in the use and management of resources, especially forests, in the Indian Himalayas. In developing this relationship, the paper advances the argument that some of the weaknesses of the literature on the commons are shared by those on resource management in the Indian Himalayas. But at the same time a number of empirical conditions obtain in the Indian Himalayas that would make the investigation of these themes in this region highly profitable from a theoretical stand point. The continuing outpouring of research from within the common property paradigm, as well as the vitality of research on mountain ecologies ensures that a review seeking to bring together these two bodies of literature can only be attempting to reach a moving target. Yet, the very enormity of the literature on the subject indicates that it is, perhaps, time to take stock. Some recent criticisms of the common property discourse make such a critical review even more germane."
Agrawal, Arun. 1994. "Rules, Rule Making and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use." In Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. E. Ostrom, R. Gardner, and J. M. Walker, eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Agrawal, Arun, and Sanjeev Goyal 1999. "Group Size and Collective Action: Third-Party Monitoring in Common-Pool Resources." (Working Paper)
Ahlbrecht, Martin, and Martin Weber 1995. "An Empirical Study on Intertemporal Choice under Risk." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Ahlert, Marlies, and Arwed Crüger 1999. "An Experimental Analysis of Equal Punishment Games." Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Wirtschafswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Econmoics Series, no. 144).
Ahn, T. K. et al. 1999. "Generating Distrust in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper Series W99-1).
Co-authors:
Ostrom, Elinor
Schmidt, David
Shupp, Robert
Walker, James
Ahn, T. K., Elinor Ostrom, David Schmidt, Robert Shupp, and James Walker 2001. "Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play." Public Choice 106:137-155.
Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton 2000. "Economics and Identity." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3):715-753.
Albers, Wulf. 2000. "Prominence Theory as a Tool to Model Boundedly Rational Decisions." In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten, eds. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Albers, Wulf. 1998. "Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part III: Perception of Numerical Information, and Relations to Traditional Solution Concepts." In Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part I-VI. Bielefeld, Germany: Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld. (Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Papers, No. 269).
Albers, Wulf. 1998. "Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part V: Operations on Scales, and Evaluation of Prospects." In Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part I-VI. Bielefeld, Germany: Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld. (Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Papers, No. 271).
Albers, Wulf. 1998. "Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part VI: Evaluation of Lotteries with Two Alternatives: A Normative Bench." In Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System Part 1-VI. Bielefeld, Germany: Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld. (Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Papers, No. 284).
Albers, Wulf. 1995. "Foundations of a Theory of Prominence: Present State and Outview." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences, Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Albers, Wulf. 1994. "Ten Rules of Bargaining Sequences: A Boundedly Rational Model of Coalition Bargaining in Characteristic Function Games." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Albers, Wulf. 1987. "Aspirations and Aspiration Adjustment in Location Games."
Albers, Wulf, Martin Strobel, and Reinhard Selten, eds. 1997. Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. New York: Springer.
Aldrich, John H. 1997. "When Is It Rational to Vote?" In Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. D. C. Mueller, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Aliprantis, Charalambos D., and Donald J. Brown 1982. "Equilibria in Markets with a Riesz Space of Commodities." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 427).
Alker, Hayward R., and Roger Hurwitz 1980. Resolving Prisoner's Dilemmas. Student Manual; Supplementary Analytical Units: Learning Analysis in Political and Social Science. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
Allan, Pierre, and Cedric Dupont 1999. "International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Baroque Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness." International Political Science Review 20(1):23- 48.
Allen, Nicholas, and John Orbell 1998. "Trust vs. Mindreading: A Framework for Analysis." (Working Paper)
Alt, James E., Randall L. Calvert, and Brian D. Humes 1986. "Game Theory and Hegemonic Stability: The Role of Reputation and Uncertainty." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 106).
Alt, James E., Margaret Levi, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 1999. Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Alt, James E., Margaret Levi, and Elinor Ostrom 1999. "Reinhard Selten: A Biographical Sketch." In Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science. J. E. Alt, M. Levi, and E. Ostrom, eds. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Ambec, Stefan, and Yves Sprumont 2001. "Sharing a River." Presented at the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics: "Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources," Toulouse, France, May 3-4, 2001.
"A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be dened). We first show that the cooperative game associated with that problem is convex: its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement: no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare distribution in the core satisfies this condition: its marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented."
Amir, Rabah, and Isabel Grilo 1999. "Stackelberg Versus Cournot Equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior 26(1):1-21.
Anderhub, Vital, Dirk Engelmann, and Werner Güth 2002. "An Experimental Study of the Repeated Trust Game with Incomplete Information." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 48(2):197-216.
"In the trust game first player 1 decides between non-cooperation or trust in reciprocity. Only in the latter case player 2 chooses between exploiting or rewarding player 1. In our computerized experiment, player 2 can be always rewarding (implemented as a robot strategy) or decide opportunistically. To allow for reputation formation, this base game is played repeatedly. Learning can be analyzed since participants play successively several repeated games with changing partners. Participants can explicitly rely on mixed strategies which allows testing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of reputation equilibria also at an individual level."
Anderhub, Vital, and Werner Güth 1999. "On Intertemporal Allocation Behavior: A Selective Survey of Saving Experiments." Ifo Studien: Zeitschrift für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung 45(3):303- 333.
Anderhub, Vital, Werner Güth, Ulrich Kamecke, and Hans-Theo Normann 2001. "Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt- Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 179).
Anderhub, Vital, Werner Güth, and Nadège Marchand 2001. "Alternating Offer Bargaining Experiments with Varying Institutional Details." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 180).
Anderson, Kim Allan, and Mikael Lind 1999. "Computing the NTU-Shapley Value of NTU-Games Defined by Multiple Objective Linear Programs." International Journal of Game Theory 28(4):585-597.
Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt 1998. "A Theoretical Analysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games." Journal of Public Economics 70(2):297-.
Andreoni, James, and Rachel T. A. Croson 1998. "Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments." In Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (Forthcoming). C. R. Plott and V. L. Smith, eds.
Andreoni, James, and John H. Miller 1999. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Rationality of Altruism." (Working Paper)
Angelsen, Arild. 2001. "Playing Games in the Forest: State-Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation." Land Economics 77(2):285-299.
"This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forestland appropriation. Three typical cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration. The local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs, market, and behavioral assumptions, and less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure (roads) which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion, or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs. The game structure is, however, important for total deforestation."
Anthonisen, N. 1997. "On the Convergence of Beliefs Within Populations with Games with Learning." Journal of Economic Theory 76(1):169-184.
Anttila, Sten. 1999. The Snowmobile Issues as a Commons Dilemma: A Problem of Concept Formation. Östersund, Sweden: Fjällforskningsinstitutet. (Fjällforskningsinstitutets Rapport 1999; 2).
Anttila, Sten, and Eivind Torp 1996. "Environmental Adjustment and Private Economic Strategies in Reindeer Pastoralism: Combining Game Theory with Participatory Action Theory."
Apesteguia, José J. 2000. "Does Information Make any Difference? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"The effects on behavior of two different levels of information about the payoff structure are analyzed in a fifty period Common-Pool Resource game of six players with no communication. Six groups of six players played a complete information game while other six groups played the same game but without knowledge of the payoff functions. Players in the incomplete information treatment only had some qualitative information about the interdependent character of the decision situation. It will be shown that the aggregated decision patterns are remarkably similar in both treatments. After arguing that this is of special importance to the literature on learning models, three such models are contrasted with the data. It will be concluded that the predictions of a simple extension of a learning model based on average payoffs cannot be rejected to be equal to the observed data."
Arce, M., and G. Daniel 1996. "Social Norms, Inflation and Stabilization." Rationality and Society 8(3): 277-294.
Armstrong, Claire W., and Ussif Rashid Sumaila 2001. "Optimal Allocation of TAC and the Implications of Implementing an ITQ Management System for the North-East Arctic Cod." Land Economics 77(3):350-359.
"First, we study the allocation ride applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. Second, we explore the bioeconomic implications of an ITQ management system for this fishery. A model combining a cannibalistic bio-mode with cooperative game theory is developed. Key results from the study are (1) the current allocation rule acts in opposite fashion to what may be considered bioeconomically optimal; and (2) an ITQ system for this fishery is likely to result in economic losses, as the biological advantages of harvesting with the two vessels types may be lost."
Asheim, G. B. 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency." Review of Economic Studies 64(3): 427-443.
Aumann, R. J. 1967. "Survey of Cooperative Games Without Side Payments." In Essays in Mathematical Economics. M. Shubik, ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Aumann, Robert J. 1999. "Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):263-300.
Aumann, Robert J. 1999. "Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):263-300.
Aumann, Robert J. 1999. "Interactive Epistemology II: Probability." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):301-314.
Aumann, Robert J. 1999. "Interactive Epistemology II: Probability." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):301-314.
Aumann, Robert J. 1988. Lectures on Game Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview. (Underground Classics in Economics).
Aumann, Robert J. 1985. "Repeated Games." In Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare. G. R. Feiwel, ed. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Aumann, Robert J. 1985. "What is the Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?" In Frontiers of Economics. K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, eds. New York: Blackwell.
Aumann, Robert J. et al. 1981. Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Mannheim, Germany: Bibliographisches Institut. (Oskar Morgenstern Memorial Symposium (1979: Universitaet Mannheim); Gesellschaft, Recht, Wirtschaft; Bd. 4).
Aumann, Robert, and Werner Güth 1998. "Species Survival and Evolutionary Stability in Sustainable Habitats: The Concept of Ecological Stability." (Working Paper)
Auriol, Emmanuelle, and Michel Benaim 2000. "Standardization in Decentralized Economies." The American Economic Review 90(3):550-570.
"This paper presents a dynamic model, inspired by evolutionary game theory, of how standards and norms emerge in decentralized economies. It shows that standardization outcomes depend on adopters' attitudes to problems caused by incompatibility. If individuals display aversion to incompatibility, standardization never fails to happen eventually, but societies sometimes end up picking inferior standards. In this case, official action can be useful to quickly achieve sensible
standardization. On the other hand, when individuals display tolerance or neutrality to incompatibility, there is neither path-dependency nor a lock-in problem, and regulation seems a poor alternative to laissez-faire."
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks 1998. "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory." In Annual Review of Political Science: Volume 1, 1998. N. W. Polsby, ed. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews.
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 643).
Austen-Smith, David, and William H. Riker 1987. "Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation." American Politcal Science Review 81(3):897-917.
Avenhaus, Rudolf, and Akira Okada 1992. "Statistical Criterial for Sequential Inspector-Leadership Games." Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan 35(2):134-151. The Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Reprint Series No. 349).
Avery, Christopher, and John H. Kagel 1995. "Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tucson, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Avrahami, Judith, Werner Güth, and Yaakov Kareev 2001. "The Parasite Game: Exploiting the Abundance of Nature in Face of Competition." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 188).
Avrahami, Judith, Werner Güth, and Yaakov Kareev 2001. "Predating Predators: An Experimental Study." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 189).
Axelrod, Robert. 2000. "On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory." Analyse & Kritik 22(1):130-151.
Axelrod, Robert. 1995. "The Evolution of Cooperation (Selection)." In Perspectives on Property Law. R. C. Ellickson, C. M. Rose, and Bruce A. Ackerman, eds. New York: Aspen Law & Business. (Perspectives on Law Series).
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane 1986. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." In Cooperation Under Anarchy. K. A. Oye, ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." World Politics 38(1):226-254.
Bacharach, M. O. L. et al., eds. 1997. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Boston: Kluwer Academic. (Theory and Decision Library; Series C: Game Theory, MathematicalProgramming and Operations Research, vol. 20).
Bacharach, Michael. 1997. "Showing What You Are by Showing Who You Are." Russell Sage Foundation, New York. (Russell Sage Working Paper no. 125).
Bacharach, Michael, and Diego Gambetta 2001. "Trust in Signs." In Trust in Society. K. Cook, ed. New York, NY: Russell Sage. (The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, v. 2).
Baden, John A. 1996. "An Economic Perspective on the Sustainable Use of Land." In Land Use in America. H. L. Diamond and P. F. Noonan, eds. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Bagnoli, Mark, and Barton L. Lipman 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions." Review of Economic Studies 56:583-601.
Bagnoli, Mark, and Michael McKee 1987. "Can the Private Provision of Public Goods Be Efficient? Some Experimental Evidence." Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and University of Windsor, Winsor, Ontario. Presented at the Canadian Economics Association Meeting, 1986 and seminars at University of Colorado-Boulder and Northern Illinois University, 1986.
Bai, Myeonggoo. 1997. "Cooperation Among Competitors: Inter-firm R&D Cooperation." Presented at the Mini-Conference at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, December 13 and 15, 1997.
Bailey, James Wood. 1997. Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Baird, Douglas G. 1998. "Game Theory and the Law." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 2. P. Newman, ed. New York: Stockton.
Baird, Douglas R., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker 1994. "Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models." In Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Baird, Douglas R., Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker 1994. "Reputation and Repeated Games." In Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Baird, Douglas, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker 1994. Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Baird, Douglas, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker 1994. "Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation." In Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Baland, Jean-Marie, and James A. Robinson 1998. "Rotten Parents." Centre de Recherche en Economie du Developpement (CRED), Faculte des Sciences Economiques, Sociales et de Gestion, Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur, Belgium. (Collection Developpement, no. 207).
Ball, Sheryl, and Roy Gardner 1991? "The Evolution of Beliefs in a Finitely Repeated Game." (Working Paper)
Banks, Jeffrey S. 1986. "Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 608).
Banks, Jeffrey S., Colin Camerer, and David Porter 1990. "An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 740).
Banks, Jeffrey S., and John Duggan 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice." American Political Science Review 94(1):73-88.
Banks, Jeffrey S., and Farid Gasmi 1986. "Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 603).
Banks, Jeffrey S., and Joel Sobel 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 565).
Baron, Robert S., Norbert L. Kerr, and Norman Miller 1992. Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action (Chapter 7 Only). Buckingham, England: Open University Press. (Mapping Social Pyschology).
Barrett, Scott. 1999. "International Cooperation for Sale." (Working Paper)
Barrett, Scott. 1999. "A Theory of Full International Cooperation." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(4): 519-541.
Barry, Brian, and Russell Hardin, eds. 1982. Rational Man and Irrational Society? An Introduction and Sourcebook. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Barth, Fredrik. 1959. "Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games: A Study of Pathan Organization." The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 89:5-21.
Basar, Tamer, and Geert J. Olsder 1982. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. New York: Academic.
Basu, Kaushik. 1998. "Social Norms and the Law." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 3. P. Newman, ed. New York: Stockton.
Basu, Kaushik. 1987. "Modelling Finitely-repeated Games with Uncertain Termination." Economic Letters 23:147-151.
Bates, Robert H., and William P. Rogerson 1979. "Agriculture in Development: A Game Theoretic Analysis." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 263).
Bates, Robert H., and Barry R. Weingast 1996. "Rationality and Interpretation: The Politics of Transition." Russell Sage Foundation, New York. (Russell Sage Working Paper no. 105).
Battigalli, Pierpaolo, Aldo Montesano, and Fausto Panunzi, eds. 1997. Decisions, Games, and Markets. Boston: Kluwer Academic. (Studies in Risk and Uncertainty, SIRU 8).
Beard, T. Randolph, Richard O. Beil, and Yoshiharu Mataga 1997. "Cultural Determinants of Economic Success: Trust and Cooperation in the U.S. and Japan." (Working Paper)
Beckencamp, Martin, and Wiebke Gümbel 2000. "Emotional Appraisal of Different Situations in Commons Dilemmas Depending on Social Value Orientation." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"A usual common consists of a common pool resource and members interacting and managing the resource. It is well-known that the resource is endangered to be overexploited if the members of the common behave self-interested or 'economically rational' ('tragedy of the commons;' Hardin, 1968). In order to counter this dilemma it is often suggested to establish a sanctioning regime on the incentive structure. In an experimental computer scenario we (Ostmann, Wojtyniak & Beckenkamp) simulated a self-governed common based on a scenario from Ostrom/Gardner/Walker and have published results of different experimental series. In these series a sanctioning-regime was introduced by adding limits to investments and a control mechanism. As an independent variable we investigated different sanctioning factors.
"Game-theoretical predicted increase in efficiency could not be confirmed in experiments. On the contrary: the results were even worse than equilibria prescribe for extremely low and extremely high sanctions. The players reached the Nash-equilibrium only for the medium sanction factor. The difference in efficiency was much lower between the other sanctioning factors. At the moment there are two different ways of explanation: in a first approach we explained these results by considering different types of individuals and reactance-phenomena in relation to the incentive structure. Unfortunately we only have hints from verbal protocols for this interpretation. The other interpretation is that this result has been a statistical outlier and we made an error of first kind. For this reason we are just starting a new experiment with a replication of the investigation of the influence of three different monetary sanctioning factors. However, in this experiment we will first classify the social value orientation (competitor, individualist and co-operator) of the subjects and paralellize the experimental groups with respect to this variable. We also will give a short questionnaire consisting of 16 different items raising the emotional appraisal after each period within the experimental setup, the whole set- up consisting of 20 periods with 8 subjects participating. The whole experiment consists of 9 groups and three different experimental conditions of severeness of monetary sanctioning, thus with 3 groups under each condition.
"We hope that we can replicate the demonstration of the particular efficiency of the medium sanctioning factor. In this case we can fill the gap of lacking account about the specific psychological impact of moderate sanctioning regimes by explaining the results with different modalities of emotional appraisal depending on social value orientation.
"What is rather new in this experimental set-up is that we are interested in how different situations in commons dilemmas (like calm periods, crisis, being detected by a control) take effect on different types of subjects. Only few experiments on emotional appraisal in resource dilemmas have been conducted, but usually with the opposite question formulation: how different 'moods' affect appropriation. Thus even if the results mentioned above cannot be replicated, we can present some data on the influence of different situations of appropriation on the emotional appraisal."
Beckenkamp, Martin, and Axel Ostmann 1998. "Missing the Target? Sanctioning as an Ambiguous Structural Solution." (Working Paper)
Becker, Nir. 1990. "Common Property Resources and Prisoner's Dilemma Games: The Missing Linkage." Presented at the first annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham, NC, September 27-30, 1990.
Becker, Nir, and K. William Easter 1999. "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources Such as the Great Lakes." Land Economics 75(2):233-245.
Beer, Francis A. 1986. "Games and Metaphors (Book Review of Axelrod, Robert, 'The Evolution of Cooperation')." Journal of Conflict Resolution 30(1):171-191.
Bendor, J., and P. Swistak 1997. "The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation." American Political Science Review 91(2):290-307.
From Murray Rudd's bibliography pm adaptive systems
Bendor, Jonathan, Roderick M. Kramer, and Suzanne Stout 1991. "When in Doubt...: Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner's Dilemma." Conflict Resolution 35(4):691-719.
Bennett, Elaine. 1984? "Bargaining in Cooperative Games: A Proposal Submitted to the National Science Foundation."
Berck, Peter, and Jonathan Lipow 2000. "Managerial Reputation and the 'Endgame'." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42(2):253-263.
Berezovskiy, B.A., Yu M. Baryshnikov, and A. V. Gnedin 1987. "Three Problems of the Theory of Choice on Random Sets." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 661).
Berge, Erling. 1994. "Democracy and Human Rights: Conditions for Sustainable Resource Utilization." In Who Pays the Price? The Sociocultural Context of Environmental Crisis. B. Johnston, ed. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Berge, Erling. 1992. "Democracy and Human Rights as Conditions for Sustainable Resource Utilization." Presented at "Inequality and the Commons," the third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Washington, DC, September 17-20, 1992.
"The game of chicken is seen as a simplified model of the structure of decision making in an open access resource. The discussion starts at the point where its users realize that population pressure or some equivalent external shock has made the utilization obviously unsustainable. To escape this social trap, the appropriators have to 'invent' a local state to govern the appropriation process. Rational decision makers then have to consider transaction costs, externalities, distributional consequences and the distribution of social power. Some sequences of decisions may turn the game of chicken into a prisoner's dilemma. The discussion is aimed at identifying necessary conditions the local state must satisfy in order to ensure a sustainable resource utilization. Democracy and human rights appear to be necessary."
Berkes, Fikret, and Aykut Kence 1987. "Fisheries and the Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Conditions for the Evolution of Cooperation among Users of Common Property Resources." (Working Paper)
Berninghaus, S. K., Werner Guth, R. Lechler, and H-J. Ramser 1997. "Decentralized Versus Collective Bargaining: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultaet, Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin. (Quantifikation und Simulation Oekonomischer Prozesse, Discussion Paper, 41).
Berninghaus, Siefried, Werner Güth, and Claudia Keser 1999. "Decentralized or Collective Bargaining in a Strategy Experiment." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Economics Series, no. 146).
Bianco, William T., and Robert H. Bates 1990. "Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas." American Political Science Review 84(1):133-47.
Bienenstock, Elisa Jayne. 1997. "Response to 'Network Games'." Rationality and Society 9(3):378-382.
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"The evidence is strong that modern hunter-gatherer societies approximate the Marxian ideal in which each contributes according to ability and receives according to need. It has been argued that such a form of social organization can be explained by neither reciprocity nor kinship. Attempts to found evolutionary social contract theories on sociobiological principles therefore seem doomed from the outset, since the same authors believe that modem foraging societies preserve in fossil form the type of social contract from which all later social contracts evolved. This paper outlines the importance of the issue to my own social contract theory. It then uses game- theoretic arguments to argue that reciprocity and kinship are actually the twin pillars that maintain the quasi-utilitarian social contracts of modem hunter-gatherer societies. Finally, the idea that modem foragers have social contracts similar to their prehistoric ancestors is questioned."
Binmore, Ken, Alan Kirman, and Pero Tani, eds. 1993. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Binmore, Ken, and Larry Samuelson 1990. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata." Social Systems Research Institute, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI.
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"We analyze a nonlinear discrete time Cournot duopoly game, where players have adaptive expectations. The evolution of expected outputs over time is generated by the iteration of a noninvertible two-dimensional map. The long-run behavior is characterized by multistability, that is, the presence of coexisting stable consistent beliefs, which correspond to Nash equilibria in the quantity space. Hence, a problem of equilibrium selection arises and the long run outcome strongly depends on the choice of the players' initial beliefs. We analyze the basins of attraction and their qualitative changes as the model parameters vary. We illustrate that the basins might be nonconnected sets and reveal the mechanism which is responsible for this often-neglected kind of complexity. The analysis of the global bifurcations which cause qualitative changes in the topological structure of the basins is carried out by the method of critical curves. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved."
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Bjorn, Paul A., and Quang H. Vuong 1984. "Simultaneous Equations Models for Dummy Endogenous Variables; A Game Theoretic Formulation with an Application to Labor Force Participation." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 537).
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Bohnet, Iris, and Bruno S. Frey 1999. "The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Games." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38(1):43-57.
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"We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets."
Bolton, Gary E., and Axel Ockenfels 1997. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition." (Working Paper)
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Border, Kim C. 1981. "Noncooperative Games, Abstract Economics and Walrasian Equilibria." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 396).
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Bousquet, François, et al. 1996. "Tragedy of the Commons, Game Theory and Spatial Simulation of Complex Systems." Ecological Economics:1-8.
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Brams, Steven J. 1996. "Game Theory and Emotions." Political Economy Research Group, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario. (Papers in Political Economy, no. 65).
Brams, Steven J. 1994. Theory of Moves. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Brams, Steven J., and Christopher B. Jones 1999. "Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power." Rationality and Society 11(2):139-167.
Brams, Steven J., and Ben D. Mor 1993. "When Is It Rational to Be Magnanimous in Victory?" Rationality and Society 5(4):432-454.
"There are two contending schools of thought on how a victor should treat a defeated party after a war or other major dispute. Whereas magnanimity might quell the desire of the defeated party for revenge, it might also be instrumental in the defeated party's resurrection. Similarly, the defeated party might face the conflicting choices of whether to cooperate or not cooperate with the victor. These interdependent choices am modeled by a generic 2 x 2 'magnanimity game' (MG), which subsumes 12 different specific games that might arise in the aftermath of a war. Rational choices in MG are based on two-sided analysis, in which players can think ahead several moves and take account of each other's preferences. Cycling may or may not be permitted, if it is, which player possesses 'moving power' can be critical to the outcome. The analysis is illustrated by historical examples from 19th- and 20th-century wars."
Brams, Steven J., and Douglas Muzzio 1977. "Unanimity in the Supreme Court: A Game-Theoretic Explanation of the Decision in the White House Tapes Case." Public Choice 30:67--85.
Brams, Steven J., and Alan D. Taylor 1996. Fair Division: From Cake-cutting to Dispute Resolution. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Brandt, Patrick T., John T. Williams, Benjamin O. Fordham, and Brian Pollins 2000. "Dynamic Modeling for Persistent Event-Count Time Series." American Journal of Political Science 44(4):823-843.
Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan 1981. "The Tax System as Social Overhead Capital; A Constitutional Perspective on Fiscal Norms." Presented at the 37th I.I.P.F. Congress on Public Finance and Growth, Tokyo, Japan.
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"The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of a community's economic characteristics on its ability to generate adherence to socially efficient norms. These norms prescribe a behavior for an individual when his/her preferred behavior imposes a negative externality on others. This paper explores social noons as a mechanism of how neighborhood characteristics can affect individual behavior. Understanding the mechanism through which community characteristics affect individual behavior is important in that it enables the development of a testable structural empirical model which is purged of the omitted variable bias arising from the potential endogeneity of the neighborhood choice."
Brooks, Robin, Michael Murray, and Jill C. Weise 1999. "When Is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non- Game-Theoretic Analyses." Journal of Political Economy 107(4):843-858.
Brookshire, David S., Don L. Coursey, and Douglas B. Redington 1988. "Special Interests and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 131).
Brown, David T. 1991. "Deserted Corridors: The Case for Special Interest Right-of-Way Management." Presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 26-29, 1991.
...Recent developments in game theory, based in large part on the Folk Theorem, offer the promise of a formal theory of presidential leadership as the focus of legislative coordination games and nexus of contracts in legislative policy-making.
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Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." American Political Science Review 93(4): 791-807.
Burnham, Terence, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith 2000. "Friend-or-Foe Intentionality Priming in an Extensive Form Trust Game." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 43(1):57-73.
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Buskens, Vincent, and Jeroen Weesie 2000. "Cooperation via Social Networks." Analyse & Kritik 22(1): 44-74.
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Cain, Michael J. G., and Keith L. Dougherty 1999. "Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design under the Articles of Confederation." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(2): 233-260.
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Calvert, Randall L. 1993. "Communication in Institutions: Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Hidden Information." In Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich, and N. J. Schofield, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics).
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Camerer, Colin F., Marc Knex, and Roberto A. Weger 1996. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and 'Weak Link' Coordination Games." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Ca. (Social Science Working Paper 970).
Campbell, Richmond, and Lanning Sowden, eds. 1985. Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and
Newcomb's Problem. University of British Columbia Press.
Canals, J., and F. Vega-Redondo 1998. "Multi-Level Evolution in Population Games." International Journal of Game Theory 27(1):21-.
de Cara, Mar, O. Pla, and F. Guinea 2000. "Learning, Competition and Cooperation in Simple Games." European Physical Journal B 13(3):413-416.
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo. 2000. "Real Wealth and Experimental Cooperation: Evidence from Field Experiments." Presented at: "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"This paper is about the role of poverty and inequality on communities trying to solve local commons dilemmas. The debate remains alive since Olson's (1965) argument that the privileged in a group facing a collective action problem may facilitate the provision of the public good despite the free riding of the poorer. Olson's hypothesis, however, has been contested by some arguing that inequality can create efficiency losses due to asymmetries of information, power or wealth , among others, which reduce the capacity of groups to achieve Pareto optimal equilibria. Experimental economics can and has been used to test with college students for these contrasting arguments. We expand the evidence by conducting a series of experiments in the field where the subjects are actual local commons users. We use additional information about the participants' real characteristics and test if such factors affected their behavior in the lab in a simple Common-Pool Resources experiment with groups of 8 people. We found that factors such as actual wealth and occupation do explain the rather wide variability on the level of cooperation achieved after allowing face-to-face communication before each round, for a sample of 10 groups. We first tested these hypotheses at group level finding that wealth and heterogeneity may be negatively associated with cooperation and efficiency. Then at a micro level we test and show that the individual is more willing to cooperate through face-to-face communication if i) has a lower level of real wealth, ii) her occupation is associated with local commons dilemmas, iii) and is playing in a group where she shows lower social distance with respect to the other 7 players. The results could be relevant not only for the inequality-cooperation debate, but for the debate on the power of experimental economics to tackle these type of questions."
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo. 1999. "Real Wealth and Experimental Cooperation: Evidence from Field Experiments." (Working Paper)
Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo. 1999. "What Do People Bring Into the Game? A Multi-Layer Framework for Studying People's Willingness to Cooperate." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, December 11-13, 1999.
Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, and Elinor Ostrom 2001. "What Do People Bring Into the Game? How Norms Help Overcome the Tragedy of the Commons." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, W01-4).
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, John Stranlund, and Cleve Willis 2001. "Economic Inequality and Burden- Sharing in the Provision of Local Environmental Quality." (Working Paper)
Carlton, Dennis W., Robert H. Gertner, and Andrew M. Rosenfeld 1997. "Communication among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust." George Mason Law Review 5(3):423-440.
Carpenter, Jeffrey, and Juan Camilo Cardenas 2001. "Using Cross-Cultural Experiments to Understand the Dynamics of Global Commons." Presented at a colloquium at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, March 18, 2002.
"Differences in group affiliation may affect the level of cooperation in commons situations such as complex international negotiations over the preservation of the rainforest. In this example, one might expect individuals from the north to show strong support for conservation because they receive mostly non-extractive benefits from the forest (e.g., clean air). However, locals may act with less restraint for two reasons: (1) much more of the benefits coming from the forest are resources that are extracted, and (2) compounding the first reason, local individuals may resist being told to conserve by outsiders. We design a real-time, cross- cultural common pool resource (CPR) experiment purposely using participants from cultures that derive different benefits from biodiversity (extraction versus conservation) to analyze the effect of group affiliation on cooperative behavior. In addition, we elicit real donations to local and international conservation funds to augment our CPR results. In the CPR environment, we find evidence that group affiliation affects behavior. American students maintain their extraction in the mixed treatment (both Colombian and American participants) compared to homogeneous groups (American only), while Colombian participants extract more in the mixed treatment. We also witness negative reciprocity by exploited subgroups. Here subgroups that extract less in one period (i.e., are exploited) tend to extract more in the future and the magnitude of this adjustment is determined by participant nationality and our treatments. In the donation stage, we show that nationality affects how much participants are willing to donate of their first-stage earnings to a conservation fund. We also examine the possibility that altruistic preferences to donate to a conservation fund are endogenous, in that, they reflect the level of cooperation in the CPR game."
Carpenter, Jefrey P. 1998. "Stochastic Evolution in the Nash Demand Game." (Working Paper)
Carraro, Carlo, and Domenico Siniscalco, eds. 1997. New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carter, Allen. 1999. "Game Theory and Decentralisation." Journal of Applied Philosophy 16(3):223-.
Casari, Marco, and Charles Plott 2000. "Keeping an Eye on Your Neighbors: Agents Monitoring and Sanctioning One Another in a Common-Pool Resource Environment." Presented at: "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"The role of a specific institution in avoiding a 'tragedy of the commons' situation in a common pool-resource environment is studied experimentally. The resource users privately decide their own exploitation level and then, once the group outcome is revealed, can choose to select other individuals for inspection. At a cost the inspector can view the decision of any individual. If the inspected individual has exploited the resource excessively, relative to a publicly known amount, a fine is imposed and paid to the inspector. The rules were modeled after a historical case of self-governed rural communities in Northern Italy.
"The introduction of the sanctioning institution greatly improves the efficiency of the group outcome from the initial level of severe 'tragedy.' The classical model with homogeneous, self- interested agents cannot explain these results. We present a model with heterogeneous, other-regarding agents that is compatible with both the resource use and the inspection decision patterns. In particular, differences in altruism/spite can explain the wide diversity of individual behavior and the willingness of spiteful agents to request unprofitable inspections help explaining the high inspection rate."
Cashman, Greg. 1993. What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict. New York: Lexington Books.
Cason, Timothy C., and Vai-Lam Mui 1997. "A Labratory Study of Group of Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game." The Economic Journal 107(444):1465-1486.
Castelfranchi, Cristiano. 1998. "Through the Minds of the Agents." Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 1(1)
De Castro, Fabio. 1998. "Landscape Diversity, Local Power, and the Appropriation of Natural Resources in the Lower Amazonian Floodplain." Presented at "Crossing Boundaries," the seventh annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10-14, 1998.
From the Introduction:
"The debate over the 'commons' can be divided into three main phases, according to the theoretical assumptions in the framework. The first phase is marked by the acknowledgement of the relationship between resource depletion and its form of appropriation. The seminal publications by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) introduced the questions of the 'commons' in an institutional approach by discussing how open access to the oceans responsible for the increasing depletion of maritime fish resources. Hardin (1967) later applied game theory to explain the logic behind resource overuse. This 'tragedy of the commons' model which assumes that users are homogenous, profit maximizers failed to recognize the ability of individuals to build a social arrangement of resource appropriation (Feeny et al. 1990; Feeny et al. 1996).
"It was not until the Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop's publication on the concept of common property (1975) that the 'tragedy of the commons' model was first contested. The authors argued that human populations were able to engage in collective property regimes and that, in many cases, the so-called 'open access' systems were in fact communal property systems. The recognition of a fourth property system overlooked in Hardin's model was the starting point of the second phase of the 'commons' debate. This phase was led by social scientists who examined the relationship between resource use and resource appropriation within a local ecological context. Netting (1976), in his 'groundbreaking' study on the pattern of property systems in the Swiss Alps, demonstrated that property regimes are closely related to ecological and economic features of the resource, a fact which influences the cost/benefit balance of different forms of appropriation.
"The volume edited by Pinkerton (1989) on cooperative management represents a benchmark in this 'political ecology' approach to the commons. It recognizes that local institutions represent a strong potential to conserve natural resources; yet it also recognizes that the development of a co-management system involves multiple resource use, and participation of different uses groups in a complex political process. Therefore, although it takes into account the role of local management in resource conservation, this new approach also recognizes that collective action requires the provision of certain incentives to the user groups (Ostrom 1990). In other words, while the 'cultural ecology' approach emphasizes the relationship between users and the resource, the 'political ecology' approach emphasizes the relationships among users in regard to the resource use. The focus on the interaction among resource users is appropriate for at least two reasons. First, it allows one to evaluate the resource sustainability in light of the institutional sustainability (Ostrom et al. 1993). In this regard, the 'management of people' is based on the structure of opportunities and constraints upon which individuals makes decisions. Second, the focus on the resource user enables one to broaden the analysis from a sectorial to a systemic perspective of the resource appropriation...
"In this paper I analyze the ecological and social heterogeneity in the local management of fishing in the Lower Amazon. In particular, I focus on the local context of resource use in the floodplain. The goal of the paper is to evaluate how the pattern of resource appropriation in the floodplain system may affect the local management of fishing in the floodplain lakes."
Cesar, Herman S. 1994. Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect: Economics Essays on the Comedy and Tragedy of the Commons. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Chan, Kenneth S., Stuart Mestelman, Robert Moir, and R. Andrew Muller 1992. "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Endowment Distributions: Experimental Evidence." Presented at "Inequality and the Commons, the third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Washington, DC, September 17-20, 1992.
"Field experience suggests that the management of a common property resource may be facilitated if there is a large stakeholder among the agents who are trying to manage the resource. The successful management of a common property resource can be viewed as the provision of a public good, for each user of the resource benefits from its proper management, and each has a private incentive to withdraw his contributions from the management of the resource.
"Theory suggests that the distribution of individual resource endowments may affect the voluntary contributions individuals will make towards the provision of a public good (or maintenance of a common property resource). This paper presents the results of a series of laboratory sessions in which individuals are able to make voluntary contributions to an activity which will result in 'group' benefits (comparable to the maintenance of the common property resource). Five different distributions of endowments are studies. Preliminary results suggest that as the distribution of endowments becomes more equal, the total voluntary contributions towards the maintenance of the public good falls."
Chander, P., and H. Tulkens 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities." International Journal of Game Theory 26(4):379-402.
Chander, Parkash, and Henry Tulkens 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution." Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm. (Beijer Discussion Paper Series no. 51).
Chen, Kai-Lih, Theodore Tomasi, and Terry L. Roe 1998. "Pollution Regulation in a Political Economy." In Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management. E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour, eds. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. (New Horizons in Environmental Economics).
Chen, Kay-Yet, and Charles R. Plott 1992. "Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 774).
Chen, Yan, and Peter C. Ordeshook 1993. "Constitutional Secession Clauses." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 859).
Chen, Yan, and Peter C. Ordeshook 1993. "Veto Games: Spatial Committees under Unanimity Rule." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 847).
Cho, Kisuk, and Byung-il Choi 1999. "A Cross-Society Study of Trust and Reciprocity: Korea, Japan and the U.S." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the "Workshop on the Workshop 2," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, June 9-June 13, 1999. (J99-45).
Chung, Tai-Yeong. 1996. "Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts." Public Choice 87(1-2):55-66.
"The objective of this article is to investigate contests in which efforts are productive. Tullock's standard rent-seeking model is extended by making the rent itself increase with the aggregate efforts. A positive externality is thereby introduced into the contest, because a contender's private effort in quest of the rent generates a benefit for other contenders. Coupled with a negative externality presented in the standard rent-seeking model, the net effect on the social efficiency of the contest is apriori ambiguous. It is shown that the extended contest generates socially wasteful, excessive aggregate efforts."
Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio, Richard L. Merritt, and Dina A. Zinnes, eds. 1987. Communication and Interaction in Global Politics. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. (Advances in Political Science: An International Series, vol. 5).
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Clark, D. J. 1997. "Learning the Structure of a Simple Rent-Seeking Game." Public Choice 93(1-2):119- 130.
Clark, Derek J., and Christian Riis 2000. "Allocation Efficiency in a Competitive Bribery Game." Journal of Economic Behavior and Efficiency 42(1):109-124.
Clark, Ken, and Martin Sefton 1997. "The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocal Altruism." The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK. (University of Manchester School of Economic Studies, Discussion Paper Series, no. 9733).
Clark, Kenneth, Stephen Kay, and Martin Sefton 1997. "When are Nash Equilibria Self Enforcing? An Experimental Analysis." School of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK. (Working Paper Series 97-04).
Clemhout, Simone, and Henry Wan 1990. "Environmental Problem as a Common Property Resource Game." In Dynamic Games in Economic Analysis: Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Differential Games and Applications, August 9-10, Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. R. P. Hamalainen and H. K. Ehtamo, eds. New York: Springer. (Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, v. 157).
Clemhout, Simone, and Henry Y. Wan 1986. "Common Property Exploitations Under Risks of Resource Extinctions." In Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. New York: Springer Verlag.
Clemhout, Simone, and Henry Y. Wan 1985. "Resource Exploitation and Ecological Degradation as Differential Games." Journal of Optimization Theory and Application 19:471-481.
Cleveland, Cutler et al. 1996. "A Framework for Modeling the Linkages between Ecosystems and Human Systems." Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden. (Beijer Discussion Paper Series, no. 76).
Cleveland, Cutler et al. 1995. "The Relationship between Ecosystems and Human Systems: Scale Challenges in Linking Property Rights Systems and Natural Resource Management." Presented at "Reinventing the Commons," the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, May 24-28, 1995, Bodoe, Norway.
Co-authors:
Costanza, Robert
Eggertsson, Thrainn
Fortmann, Louise
Low, Bobbi
McKean, Margaret
Ostrom, Elinor
Wilson, James
Young, Oran
"We hypothesize that successful sustainability requires human social systems that are concordant with the ecosystem to which they are related at appropriate scales given the limits of human information processing. Many current governance and management systems are either too large or too small for the ecosystems to which they are related, leading to inappropriate policies for these systems. Problems often occur when human systems developed and sustainable at one scale or for one ecosystem or for one part of an ecosystem are transferred to other scales and ecosystems or to the whole system without adequate modification. In order to test this hypothesis, we are developing multiscale conceptual and mathematical models and data bases that include a range of ecosystem characteristics and human system characteristics."
Cohen, Joel E. 1998. "Cooperation and Self-Interest: Pareto-Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria in Finite Random Games." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 95:9724-9731.
Cohen, Michael D., Rick L. Riolo, and Robert Axelrod 2001. "The Role of Social Structure in the Maintenance of Cooperative Regimes." Rationality and Society 13(1):5-32.
Cohen, Michael D., Rick L. Riolo, and Robert Axelrod 1999. "The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation." Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM. (SFI Working Paper Series 99-01-002).
Cohen, Youseff. 1994. Radicals, Reformers, and Reactionaries: The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Collapse of Democracy in Latin America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Colaresi, Michael. 1999. "The Shadow of the Past: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to History Dependence in International Rivalry." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, December 11-13, 1999.
Coleman, Andrew A., Andrew M. Colman, and Richard M. Thomas 1990. "Cooperation Without Awareness: A Multiperson Generalization of the Minimal Social Situation." Behavioral Science 35(2):115-121.
Coleman, James S. 1988. "Constitutions and the Construction of Corporate Actors." (Working Paper)
From Workshop correspondance archives
Coleman, Jules L. 1988. "Market Contractarianism." In Markets, Morals, and the Law. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Colman, Andrew M. 1982. Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction. New York: Pergamin.
Colomer, Jesep M. 1995. "Leadership Games in Collective Action." Rationality and Society 7(2):225-246.
Colomer, Joseph M. 1995. Game Theory and the Transitions to Democracy: The Spanish Model. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar.
Congleton, Roger D. 1997. "Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law." Kyklos 50(4):485-505.
Congleton, Roger D., ed. 1996. The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Cook, Karen, ed. 2001. Trust in Society (Advance Uncorrected Proof). New York, NY: Russell Sage. (The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, volume 2).
Cooper, Andrew F., and Richard Higgott "Two Level Games and the Political Economy of Adjustment: Comparing Australian and Canadian Approaches Towards the Cairns Group and Agricultural Trade in the Uruguay Round." Political Economy Research Group, University of Western Ontario. (Papers in Politcal Economy, No. 22).
Cooper, Russell W. 1999. Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, Russell W. et al. 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results." American Economic Review 80(1):218-233.
Cooter, Robert D. 1993. "Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law."
Cortazar, Rene. 1997. "Non-Redundant Groups, The Assurance Game and the Origins of Collective Action." Public Choice 92(1-2):41-53.
Coughlin, Peter. 1982. "Pareto Optimality of Policy Proposals with Probablistic Voting." Public Choice 39: 427-433.
Coughlin, Peter J. 1986. "Probabilistic Voting Models." In Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences. Kotz- Johnson, ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons. (Vol. 7).
Coughlin, Peter J. 1982. "Pareto Optimality of Policy Proposals with Probabilistic Voting." Presented at the 1982 meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, TX.
Article from Ostrom correspondence archives.
Cox, Gary W. 1985. "The Uncovered Set and the Core." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 104).
Cox, Gary W. 1983. "Non-Collegial Simple Games and the Nowhere Denseness of the Set of Preference Profiles Having a Core." Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX. (Working Papers on Institutional Design and Public Policy, WP-16).
Cox, Gary W., and Richard D. McKelvey "A Ham Sandwich Theorem for General Measures." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 337).
Cox, James C., Jason Shachat, and Mark Walker 1995. "An Experimental Test of Bayesian vs. Adaptive Learning in Normal Form Games." Presented at the conference on "Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences," Tucson, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Cramton, Peter C., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1990. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning From Disagreement." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 731).
Cramton, Peter C., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1986. "Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 619).
Crane, William V. 1997. "The Role of Institutions and Credibility in the Transforming Economies of Eastern Europe." Presented at the Mini-Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, May 3-5, 1997.
Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom 2000. "A Grammar of Institutions." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).
Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom 1995. "A Grammar of Institutions." American Political Science Review 89(3):582-600.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 2000. "Thinking Like a Game Theorist: Factors Affecting the Frequency of Equilibrium Play." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 41(3):299-314.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1999. "The Disjunction Effect and Reason Based Choice in Games (forthcoming)." Organization Behavior and Human Decision Processes 80(2):118-134.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1999. "Theories of Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games." (Working Paper)
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1999. "Thinking Like a Game Theorist: Factors Affecting the Frequency of Equilibrium Play." (Working Paper)
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Croson, Rachel T. A. 1997. "Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms: An Experiment in Team Production." In Research in Experimental Economics (Forthcoming). JAI.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1996. "Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 30:197-212.
Croson, Rachel T. A. 1996. "Partners and Strangers Revisited." Economics Letters 53:25-32.
Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks 1999. "The Effect of Recommended Contributions to the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods." (Working Paper)
Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Marks 1998. "Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold Public Goods Experiment." Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42:167-190.
Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Beth Marks 2000. "Step Returns in Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and Experimental Analysis." Experimental Economics 2(3):239-259.
Croson, Rachel T. A., and Melanie Beth Marks 1999. "The Effect of Heterogeneous Valuations for Threshold Public Goods: An Experimental Study." Risk Decision and Policy 4(2):99-115.
Croson, Rachel, and Nancy Buchan 1999. "Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games." American Economic Review 89(2):386-391.
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Davenport, Debbie. 2000. "Global Commons or Sovereign Property: Does Concept Matter?" Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"Antecedent to theoretical questions on how cooperation on CPRs should be handled is the question of how to identify the commons as distinct from other forms of property. While this question may seem obvious at first, in many cases the identification of a commons is determined or at least influenced by the political context in which negotiation of cooperative management takes place. This is particularly true at the global level, the most spectacular example of this being the negotiations of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. The result of these negotiations was to take the biological diversity resources found in nation-states out of the realm of the 'common heritage of mankind,' as had been the previous norm, and into the jurisdiction of national sovereignty.
"One consequence of these shifting definitions is that they may affect the outcome of cooperative efforts, a fact which cooperation theory has so far not taken fully into account. Insofar as environmental goods (or 'bads') and resources differ in status as to whether they are true CPRs or some other form of property, theory must address these different conceptualizations of environmental goods or natural resources so that its full explanatory, predictive, and prescriptive power may be developed. For instance, the game theory model, Prisoners' Dilemma, is frequently associated with the analysis of collective action on CPRs. However, if there is no common interest in a negative environmental externality, or environmental 'bad', due to a divergence of interests between producers and consumers of the 'bad', does Prisoner's Dilemma effectively describe the issues inherent in the negotiating milieu, or would another game better represent the situation the parties find themselves in?
"In this paper I will attempt to distinguish global commons from other environmental goods and resources at the global level by delineating conditions under which various conceptualizations are most appropriate. I then pose the question of whether differences in status as CPR or other form of property affects the likelihood of an effective cooperative outcome. Empirical examples from recent UN environmental negotiations will be used to test my predictions, including negotiations on ozone depletion, climate change, loss of biological diversity, desertification, and deforestation."
Davenport, William H. 1960. "Jamaican Fishing: A Game Theory Analysis.":3-11. Department of Anthropology, Yale University, New Haven, CT. (Yale University Publications in Anthropology, no. 59).
David, Paul A. 1997. "Communication Norms and the Collective Cognitive Performance of 'Invisible Colleges': Modeling the Epistemological Functioning of Scientific Research Networks."
Davis, Douglas D., and Charles A. Holt 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Davis, Otto, and Andrew Whinston 1962. "Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games." Journal of Political Economy 60:241-262.
Dawes, Robyn M. 1973. "The Commons Dilemma Game: An N-Person Mixed-Motive Game With a Dominating Strategy for Defection." ORI Research Bulletin 13(2) Oregon Research Institute.
"If individuals were to decide for themselves whether to buy anti-pollution devices for their cars, a commons dilemma would result (Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1968). The money saved by not buying the device accrues directly to the individual while the
harm done by the resulting pollution is shared equally by all. Moreover, the argument for not buying is independent of others' decisions--because if they do buy, the individual who does not makes no appreciable contribution to pollution, and if they don't the individual who does makes no appreciable contribution to reducing pollution. Yet everyone would prefer to have everyone buy. This paper presents an experimental commons dilemma game that has all the properties of the commons dilemma and that reduces to a prisoner's dilemma game when there are only two players."
Dawes, Robyn M., Jeanne McTavish, and Harriet Shaklee 1977. "Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other People's Behavior in A Commons Dilemma Situation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35(1):1-11.
Dawes, Robyn, M., and John M. Orbell 1995. "The Benefit of Optional Play in Anonymous One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Games." In Barriers to Conflict Resolution. Kenneth J. Arrow et al., eds. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Dayton-Johnson, Jeff, and Pranab Bardhan 2001. "Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Excercise." Presented at "Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources," the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics: Toulouse, France, May 3-4, 2001.
"To analyze the eect of asset inequality on cooperation within a group, we consider a two- player noncooperative model of conservation of a common-pool resource. Over-exploitation by one user aects another's payo by reducing the next-period catch. We give necessary and sufficient conditions such that conservation is a Nash Equilibrium, and show that increasing inequality does not, in general, favor full conservation. However, once inequality is sufficiently great, further inequality can raise efficiency. Thus the relationship between inequality and economic efficiency is U-shaped. Finally, we analyze the implications for conservation if players have earning opportunities outside the commons."
Deadman, Peter J. 1998. "Exploring Heterogeneity in Common Pool Resource Experiments with Intelligent Agent Based Simulations." Presented at "Crossing Boundaries," the seventh annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10-14, 1998.
Author's Abstract:
"This work utilizes previously documented common pool resource experiments as a foundation for the construction of a series of computer simulations in which the individuals participating in the experiments are represented as separate intelligent agents. An intelligent agent is an autonomous, self-contained entity that resides within a virtual, computer-based, environment. In this study, agents are created to represent the individual participants in the CPR experiment and the resource that they share in common. By programming the agents with different strategies and endowments, the researcher can allow the agents to interact within a prespecified environment and observe the outcomes. These outcomes may include the performance of individual strategies in a specific environment, or the overall behavior of the group that emerges as a result of the numerous interactions of the individual agents. These models allow the researcher to observe the relative performance, at the individual and group level, of different combinations of individual strategies and to begin to draw connections between individual behaviors and group outcomes.
"Group performance in heterogeneous simulations can vary significantly with minor changes in the initial parameters of the environment or the characteristics of the agents. Simulations which allow for simplified communication between agents show that a lock-in can occur in which the agents agree on a group wide investment strategy which may or may not be an optimal solution. Some general discussion of the results of these simulations is provided, including a comparison with some observations from experimental economics and game theory. Preliminary observations on the advantages and disadvantages of agent based simulation as a tool for the analysis of the commons dilemma and issues related to heterogeneity are provided, along with some suggestions for future directions in which this work might proceed."
Deadman, Peter J. 1997. "Modeling Individual Behavior in Common Pool Resource Management Experiments with Autonomous Agents." (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1997).
Author's abstract:
"This work introduces and illustrates the potential of intelligent agent based modeling and simulation as a tool for understanding individual action and group performance in common pool resource dilemmas. Three groups of models were developed, based on previously documented common pool resource experiments, and simulated using the Swarm multi-agent simulation environment. Agents in these models were designed to represent the actions of the individual appropriators in the experiments and the common pool resource itself. The three groups of models are differentiated by the capabilities of the appropriator agents and address preassogned fixed strategies with no communication, a cimple induction based approach to selecting amongst alternative strategies with no communication, and the induction based approach with two simple communication routines. Simulations of these three groups of models rendered observations of some potential relationships between individual action and group performance in common pool resource experimental situations. In particular, simulations of agents employing the induction based approach with no-communication generated group level behavior with similar performance characteristics to gorups in actual experiments. A discussion related the behavior of these simulations to other simulation based work in game theory and learning theory. Some potential future directions for this research, and possible applications in natural resources management are discussed."
Deadman, Peter J., Edella Schlager, and Randy Gimblett 1997? "Simulating Common Pool Resource Management Experiments with Adaptive Agents Employing Alternate Communication Routines." (Working Paper)
Deci, Edward L., Richard M. Ryan, and Richard Koestner 1999. "A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards of Intrinsic Motivation." Psychological Bulletin 125(6):627-668.
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Derks, J., and H. Reijnierse 1998. "On the Core of a Collection of Coalitions." International Journal of Game Theory 27(3):451-.
Derks, Jean, and Hans Haller 1999. "Weighted Nucleoli." International Journal of Game Theory 28(2): 173-187.
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"In overlapping-generations models of public-goods provision, in which the contribution decision is binary and lifetimes are finite, the set of symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria can be categorized into three types: seniority equilibria, in which players contribute (effort) until a predetermined age and then shirk thereafter; dependency equilibria, in which players initially shirk, then contribute for a set number of periods, then shirk for the remainder of their lives; and sabbatical equilibria, in which players alternately contribute and shirk for periods of varying length before entering a final stage of shirking. In a world without
discounting we establish conditions for equilibrium and demonstrate that for any dependency equilibrium there is a seniority equilibrium that Pareto dominates it ex ante. We proceed to characterize generational preferences over alternative seniority equilibria. We explore the aggregation of these preferences by embedding the public-goods provision game in a voting framework and solving for the majority-rule equilibria. In this way we can think of political processes as providing one natural framework for equilibrium selection in the original public- goods provision game."
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Co-authors:
Holzman, Ron
Monderer, Dov
Shitovitz, Benyamin
Eisentraut, Renate. 2000. "The Use of Peer Sanctioning Mechanisms in an Asymmetric Commons Dilemma: An Experimental Study." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"In symmetric commons dilemmas, peer sanctioning, i.e. the possibility to gather information about the resource use of others and to sanction overuse, can be an effective structural solution in terms of resource conservation. However, most real world commons are characterized by structural asymmetries, with some users having the facilities to harvest more and therefore being more powerful than others. This structure is, for example, found in fisheries where large commercial fishers with sizable harvesting capacities compete with smaller subsistence fishers.
"Will peer sanctioning be effective in asymmetric commons dilemmas as well? And what are the effects of structural asymmetry on the users information gathering behavior? Do individual users request more information about the resource use of powerful actors because they expect powerful actors to misuse their power? And do powerful actors themselves request more or less information about the resource use of others than powerless actors?
"To answer these questions, an experimental study was conducted. The research tool was a computer-simulated fishing commons, having one human player compete with four computer simulated others playing a range of fixed strategies in an iterated game. On the one hand, the players' task was to decide about their harvests and to inform the other players about their decisions. However, the players were told that this information was not necessarily true and that they therefore could not rely on the indicated harvest sizes of the others. On the other hand, by giving the players the possibility to gather information about the resource use of the others, a peer sanctioning system was introduced. If overuse was detected, the overusing player was sanctioned. As the costs of information gathering had to be born individually while sanctioning resulted in collective gains (distribution of an additional bonus in the short run, resource conservation in the long run), the peer sanctioning system constituted a second order social dilemma.
"In the experimental setting, both the most overusing computer simulated players' power and the human players' power were manipulated. In general, the subjects' information gathering behavior turned out to be quite adaptive, making use of the sanctioning system whenever they suspected overuse. Results indicated also that the application of the sanctioning system depended on the other players' observed harvests and on expectations concerning their future harvests, but not on the other players power. Furthermore, powerful subjects tended to gather more information about the resource use of others than powerless subjects. Further analyses of the experimental situation allow for the conclusion that the subjects' information gathering behavior was presumably mediated by their knowledge about the other players' harvesting strategies. Implications for the management of real world commons are discussed."
Eisentraut, Renate. 2000. "The Use of Peer Sanctioning Mechanisms in an Asymmetric Commons Dilemma: An Experimental Study." (Working Paper)
El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey 1991. "A Bayesian Sequential Experimental Study of Learning in Games." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 757).
El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1992. "Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Padadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 800).
El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and Rangarajan K. Sundaram 1990. "Bayesian Economists...Bayesian Agents II: Evolution of Beliefs in the Single Sector Growth Model." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 736).
El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and Rangarajan K. Sundaram 1989. "Bayesian Economists...Bayesian Agents I: An Alternative Approach to Optimal Learning." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 705).
Elazar, Daniel J. 1981. "Games and Complexes: Links Between Institutions and Actors in Political Systems." Presented at the International Conference on the Analysis of Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Arrangements in Public Administration, IU, Bloomington, IN, May 11-14, 1981.
Elliott, E. Donald et al. 1996. "Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law." In An Environmental Law Anthology. R. L. Fischman, M. I. Lipeles, and M. S. Squillace, eds. Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing.
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Epstein, Gil S., and Carsten Hefeker 2001. "Lobbying and Concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg Games." Public Choice 109(1-2):175-181.
"We analyze how the standard results in lobbying theory change when one side has a second instrument at its disposal. We look at the effect concessions by one side have on the outcome in a Nash and a Stackelberg game."
Epstein, Joshua M. 1999. "Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma." Complexity 4(2): 36-48.
Epstein, Lee, and Olga Shvetsova 2002. "Heresthetical Maneuvering on the Supreme Court." Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(1):93-122.
"Can an apparent loser snatch victory out of the jaws of defeat? This question occupied the attention of the late William H. Riker during the last ten years of his career, and it is one that he answered in the affirmative: By constructing choice situations in order to manipulate outcomes, losers can become winners, and vice versa. Riker even coined a term, 'heresthetics', to describe this 'art of political manipulation'. But is Riker's rather large body of work the 'idiosyncratic' product of a 'singular genius' or can it serve as the 'foundation of a new theory of politics'? Scholars have recently raised this question, and not unreasonably so, for Riker's theory of heresthetics has yet to gain a serious foothold into the political science literature. We develop a game-theoretic model, which enables leaders - in our case, Chief Justices - to engage in heresthetical manipulations. From this model, we deduce propositions about the circumstances that would lead them to invoke heresthetical devices, as well as the particular strategies we would expect them to employ. Finally, we explore the propositions against data amassed from the private papers of two former justices. Our results indicate that Riker's work was not the 'idiosyncratic' product of a 'singular genius' but rather can serve as the 'foundation of a new theory of politics'."
Erev, Ido. 1994. "Convergence in the Orange Grove: Learning Processes in a Social Dilemma Setting." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Erikson, Robert S., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1993. "The Spending Game: Money, Votes, and Incumbency in Congressional Elections." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 851).
Erikson, Robert S., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1992. "The Puzzle of Incumbent Spending in Congressional Elections." Division of the Humanities and Social Science, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 806).
This paper takes a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of te spending-votes relationship in Congressional elections to reinvestigate the surprisingly weak effects of incumbent spending measured in previous studies...
Erikson, Robert S., and Thomas R. Palfry 2000. "Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data." American Political Science Review 94(3):595-609.
Eshel, I., E. Sansone, and A. Shaked 1999. "The Emergence of Kinship Behavior in Structured Populations of Unrelated Individuals." International Journal of Game Theory 28(4):447-463.
Eshel, Ilan. 1988. "Game Theory and Population Dynamics in Complex Genetical Systems; The Role of Sex in Short Term and in Long Term Evolution." Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, W. Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/ 88; no. 24).
Eshel, Ilan. 1988. "On the Evolutionary Genetic Stability of an Even Sex Ratio in Two Locus, Autosomal Systems of Sex Determination." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no. 16).
Eshel, Ilan, Daphna Weinshall, and Emilia Sansome 1994. "What Risk Should a Selfish Partner Take in Order to Save the Life of a Nonrelative, Selfish Friend? -A Stochastic Game Approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Eswaran, Mukesh, and Tracy R. Lewis 1983. "Collusive Bahavior in Fine Repeated Games with Bonding." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 466).
Evens, T. M. S. 1985. "The Paradox of the Nuer Feud and the Leopard-Skin Chief: A Creative Solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma." American Ehtnologist:84-102.
Abstract by Esther Mwangi, 1/2000:
"The author uses game theoretic models to develop his argument that the Nuer feud is a response to an existential dilemma springing from the motivations of agnation (principle) and territory (expedience). The argument follows the follwing five steps: first, the paradoxical nature of the Nuer political order is brought out; second, the practcie of the feud is depicted in terms of games theory and the prisoner's dilemma; third, the figure of the leopard skin chief is shown to furnish a move that transcends the game's definition of the situation; fourth, it is established that feud is indeterminable despite the possibility of settlement; and fifth, this logically absurd state of affairs is shown to be rooted in the implicitly holistic ontology to be found in the Nuer folk model."
Eyckmans, Johan, and Henry Tulkens 2001. "Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem." Presented at "Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources," the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics: Toulouse, France, May 3-4, 2001.
"In this paper we introduce the CLIMNEG World Simulation (CWS) model for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We first state the necessary conditions that determine optimal investment and emission abatement paths under alternative cooperation regimes, and then we test empirically with a numerical version of the CWS model whether the cooperative game theoretic 'core' property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) holds. Under this transfer scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries, should have an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. For the numerical specification of the CWS model used here, we obtain the result that this is indeed the case."
Faigle, U., W. Kern, and W. Hochstattler 1997. "On the Complexity of Testing Membership in the Core of Min-Cost Spanning Tree Games." International Journal of Game Theory 26(4):361-366.
Falbo, Clement E. 1980. "Negotiations in Nonzero Sum Games." (Working Paper) EDC/Project UMAP, Newton, MA.
Falk, Armin, Ernst Fehr, and Fischbacher 1999. "On the Nature of Fair Behavior." (Working Paper)
Falk, Armin, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher 2002. "Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical Explantaion." In The Drama of the Commons. E. Ostrom et al., eds. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Falk, Armin, and Urs Fischbacher 1998. "A Theory of Reciprocity." (Working Paper) Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Switzerland.
Falkinger, Josef, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence." The American Economic Review 90(1):247-264.
Fan, Chinn-Ping. 2000. "Teaching Children Cooperation: An Application of Experimental Game Theory." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 41(3):191-209.
Farmer, Amy, James R. Kahn, Judith A. McDonald, and Robert O'Neill 2001. "Rethinking the Optimal Level of Environmental Quality: Justifications for Strict Environmental Policy." Ecological Economics 36(3):461-473.
Farrell, J., and R. Ware 1988. "Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Game." Theoretical Population Biology 36:161-166.
Faulhaber, Gerald R., and Daniel E. Ingberman 1996. "Market versus Government: The Political Economy of NIMBY." In The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence. R. D. Congleton, ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin 1999. "Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence Since 1945." (Working Paper) Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, September 2-5, 1999.
Feeny, David. 1998. "Suboptimality and Transaction Costs on the Commons." In Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management. E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour, eds. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. (New Horizons in Environmental Economics).
Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt 1997. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition,and Cooperation." (Working Paper)
Fehr, Ernst, and Jean-Robert Tyran 1996. "Institutions and Reciprocal Fairness." Nordic Journal of Political Economy 23(2):133-144.
Felkins, Leon. 1996. "The Prisoner's Dilemma: General Model of the Two Player Game."
Felkins, Leon. 1996. "A Rational Justification for Ethical Behavior." Ethical Spectacle
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Ferejohn, John A., Robert Forsythe, Roger Noll, and Thomas R. Palfrey 1979. "An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms for Discrete Public Goods." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 262).
Ferejohn, John A., and Richard D. McKelvey 1979. "An Impossibility Theorem for Von Newmann Morgenstern Solutions." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 252).
Ferguson, T., and C. Melolidakis 2000. "Games with Finite Resources." International Journal of Game Theory 29(2):289-303.
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Fey, Mark, Richard D. McKelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey 1994. "An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. (Social Science Working Paper 877).
Field, Alexander J. 2001. Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origin of Reciprocity. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Economics, Cognition, and Society).
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Flanagan, Scott C. 1973. "Theory and Method in the Study of Coalition Formation: Toward a More General Model of Political Coalitions." In Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 5, No. 3. P. Savage, ed. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Flanagan, Thomas. 1998. Game Theory and Canadian Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Flanagan, Thomas. 1998. "Game Theory and Professional Baseball: Mixed Strategy Models." Journal of Sport Behavior 21(2):121-.
Flesch, J., F. Thuijsman, and K. Vrieze 1997. "Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games." International Journal of Game Theory 26(3):303-.
Foddy, Margaret, and Andrew Crettenden 1994. "Leadership and Group Identity as Determinants of Resource Consumption in a Social Dilemma." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Fogarty, T. M. 1981. "Prisoner's Dilemma and Other Public Goods Games." Conflict Management and Peace Science 5(2):111-120.
Fogarty, T. M. 1981. "Prisoners-Dillemma and Other Public-Goods Games." Conflict Management and Peace Science 5(2):111-120.
Forges, F., and E. Minelli 1997. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations." Journal of Economic Theory 75(2):388-406.
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Frank, S. A. 1998. Foundations of Social Evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Franzen, Axel. 1995. "Group Size and One-Shot Collective Action." Rationality and Society 7(2):183-200.
Franzen, Axel. 1994. "Group Size Effects in Social Dilemmas: A Review of the Experimental Literature and Some New Results for One-Shot N-PD Games." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Freidman, James W., and Larry Samuelson 1988. "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Continuous Reaction Functions." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no. 8).
Frey, Bruno S., and Iris Bohnet 1997. "Identification in Democratic Society." Journal of Socio-Economics 26(1):25-38.
Frey, Bruno S., and Iris Bohnet 1996. "Experiments, Theory -- and Reality?" In Experiments in Economics -- Experimente in der Ökonomie. P. de Gijsel et al., eds. New York: Campus Verlag. (Ökonomie und Gesellschaft: Jahrbuch 13).
Frey, Bruno S., and Manfred J. Holler 1998. "Tax Compliance Policy Reconsidered." Homo Oeconomicus 15(1):27-44.
Friedman, Eric J., and Thomas Marschak 1992. "Communication Effort in Teams and in Games."
Friedman, James W. 1992. "Views on the Relevance of Game Theory." Rationality and Society 4(1):41-50.
"The article comments on the works by Michael Hechter, Gordon Tullock, and Aaron Wildavsky that are critical of game theory. Although most of the points raised by the authors have merit, some are not relevant to game theory (as opposed to the misuse of game theory within social science). Those points pertaining to game theory vary in importance from quite central to exceedingly peripheral."
Friedman, James W. 1987. "A Modified Folk Theorem for Time-Dependent Supergames." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no. 2).
Friedman, James W., and Claudio Mezzetti 1995. "Contract, Honor and Self-Enforcing Behavior." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Friedman, James W., and Robert W. Rosenthal 1986. "A Positive Approach to Non-Cooperative Games." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 7:235-251.
Frohlich, Norman. 1974. "The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions." Presented at the Public Choice Meeting, New Haven, CT, March, 1974.
Frohlich, Norman, and Joe Oppenheimer 1998. "How Engineering Optimal Policies May Undermine Socially Oriented Behavior: Some Problematic Effects of an Incentive Compatible Device." (Working Paper)
Frohlich, Norman, and Joe Oppenheimer 1998. "Solving Collective Action Problems Fairly: Puzzles in Policy Design." In Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management. E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour, eds. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. (New Horizons in Environmental Economics).
Frohlich, Norman, and Joe Oppenheimer 1997. "Kenneth Arrow, Welfare Aggregation and Progress in Political Theory." Presented at the American Political Science Annual Meetings, Washington, DC, September 1997.
Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer 1990. "Testing Leadership Solutions to Collective Action Problems." Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 29, 1990.
Frohlich, Norman, Joe Oppenheimer, and J. Bernard Moore 2001. "Some Doubts about Measuring Self- Interest Using Dictator Experiments: The Costs of Anonymity." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 46(3):271-290.
"Traditionally, economists have assumed self-interest governs economic choices. Recently, some social scientists and economists, especially those working in game theoretic and experimental areas, have begun to treat self-interest as a testable hypothesis. One important vehicle for evaluating self-interest has been a class of experiments called 'dictator' experiments. We believe that these experiments may have a flaw in their design which leads researchers to overstate, systematically, the role of self-interest in individuals' motivations. Double-blind experiments, designed to create conditions of privacy and anonymity, may engender doubts in subjects regarding the existence of pairings and the disposition of any money they share. Moreover, subjects may view the experiment as a game. We test these conjectures using both traditional and modified dictator experiments."
Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games." American Economic Review 80:274-279.
Funaki, Y., and T. Yamato 1999. "The Core of an Economy with a Common Pool Resource: A Partition Function Approach." International Journal of Game Theory 28(2):157-171.
Abstract from Web of Science:
"In this paper we consider a model of an economy with a common pool resource. Under decreasing returns to scale, it is well-known that no Nash equilibrium attains Pareto efficiency. We examine whether it is possible to achieve Pareto efficiency and avoid the tragedy of the commons through cooperation among players. For that purpose, we use the notion of a game in partition function form. Whether or not the core exists depends crucially on the expectations of each coalition regarding the coalition formation of the outsiders. If each coalition has pessimistic expectations, then the core always exists, while if it has optimistic
expectations, the core may be empty."
Fundenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information." Econometrica 54(3):533-554.
Gamson, William A. 1971. "SIMSOC Establishing Social Order in a Simulated Society." Simulation and Games II:287-308.
Gantner, Anita, and Manfred Konigstein 1995. "Spontaneous Strategies in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Monitoring."
Gardner, James H., and Michael J. Griem "Simulated Hospital Administration and Planning Exercise: (Shape)." (Working Paper)
Gardner, Roy. 1995. Games for Business and Economics. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Gardner, Roy. 1987. "Non-Transferable Utility Values of Voting Games." Presented at the World Conference on Game Theory, June 19, 1987. (W87-19).
Gardner, Roy. 1987. "A Theory of the Spoils System." Public Choice 54:171-185.
Gardner, Roy. 1985. "A Theory of Spoils Systems." Institüt für Gesellschafts und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Bonn, Bonn, Germany.
Gardner, Roy. 1985. "Values of Voting Games." Presented at the World Congress of the Econometric Society, Boston, August, 1985.
Revision of the paper present at the Public Choice Meetings, New Orleans, February 1985
Gardner, Roy. 1983. "Transfer Value and Fixed-Price Equilibrium in Two-Sided Markets." Social Choice and Welfare:301-323. North-Holland Publishing.
Gardner, Roy et al. 1998. "The Power and Limitations of Proportional Cutbacks in Common-Pool Resources." Presented at the Japan Science and Technology Conference "Game Theory and International Cooperation," Kyoto, Japan, March 24-27, 1998. (Workshop Working Paper Series no. W98-31).
Co-authors:
Herr, Andrew
Ostrom, Elinor
Walker, James A.
(Authors' abstract)
"This paper examines the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks as an allocation rule for improving the performance of common pool resources (CPRs). Two field cases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, where there are high value types and low value types. This asymmetry induces a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linear-quadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency and distributional consequences of proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived."
Gardner, Roy, and Werner Guth 1992. "Bribery, Regulators, and Firms: Corruption in the S & L Industry, 1982-1989." Presented at the Conference on Game Theory in Behavior Sciences, Frankfurt, Germany, 1993.
Gardner, Roy, Michael R. Moore, and James M. Walker 1994. "Racing for the Water: Laboratory Evidence on Managing a Groundwater Commons." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workhsop Working Paper, W94-7).
Gardner, Roy, and Molly Morris 1991. "The Evolutionary Stability of Bluffing in a Class of Extensive Form Games." In Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics. R. Selten, ed. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Gardner, Roy, and Molly R. Morris 1989. "The Evolution of Bluffing in Animal Contests: An ESS Approach." Journal of Theoretical Biology 137:235-243. (Workshop Reprint Series, No. R89-5).
Gardner, Roy, Molly R. Morris, and Craig Nelson 1985. "Conditional Evolutionarily Stable Strategies." Presented at the Conference on Evolutionary Theory in Biology and Economics, University of Bielefeld, November 1985.
This paper uses game theory to address male-male competition for mates. In evolutionary game theory, mating phenotypes are treated as alternative strategies...
The chief theoretical novelty of this paper is the formalization of a class of games called conditional. A game is conditional when the payoff matrix varies systematically with conditions in the environment, even though the strategies available to the players do not...
Gardner, Roy, Molly R. Morris, and Rod Walton 1987. "The Evolution of Bluffing in Animal Contests: An ESS Approach." Presented at the International Conference on Game Theory, June 20, 1987.
Gardner, Roy, Molly Morris, and Craig Nelson 1987. "Conditional Evolutionarily Stable Strategies." Animal Behavior 35:507-517. (Workshop Reprint Series, no. R87-3).
Gardner, Roy, Molly Morris, and Craig Nelson 1986. "Evolutionary Stable Mating Behavior." Institut für Gesellschafts-und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Bonn, Bonn, Germany.
Gardner, Roy, and Elinor Ostrom 1991. "Rules and Games." Public Choice 70(2):121-149.
This paper reconsiders the relationship between rules of a game and its outcomes. We develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of Pareto improved equilibria points. We then apply this notion to a series of naturally occuring fishing rules, including examples from Malaysia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Canada. We show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy.
Gardner, Roy, and Elinor Ostrom 1989. "Rules and Games." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W87-16).
"This paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes. We develop a notion of rule reform, which leads to the selection of Pareto improved equilibria points. We then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules, including examples from Malaysia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Canada. We show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy."
Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom, and James A. Walker 1998. "Proportional Cutbacks as an Institution for Promoting International Cooperation: Success and Limitations." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the Japan Science and Technology conference 'Game Theory and International Cooperation,' Kyoto, Japan, March 24- 27, 1998. (Workshop Working Paper Series no. W98-25).
Authors' Abstract:
"This paper studies the success and limitations of proportional cutbacks for improving the performance of common pool resources (CPRs) which cross national boundaries. Two field cases, one success and one failure, motivate the analysis. For symmetric CPRs, we establish the existence of efficiency-enhancing proportional cutbacks. We then introduce complications that arise in the presence of asymmetries, where there are high value types and low value types. This asymmetry again induces a continuum of proportional cutbacks that raise efficiency above Nash equilibrium. Calibrating a linear-quadratic CPR model to global carbon dioxide emissions, the efficiency and distributional consequences of proportional cutbacks like those embodied in the Kyoto Protocol are derived."
Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom, and James M. Walker 1994. "Social Capital and Cooperation: Communication, Bounded Rationality, and Behavioral Heuristics." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom, and James M. Walker 1992. "Social Capital and Cooperation: Communication, Bounded Rationality, and Behavioral Heuristics." Presented at "Inequality and the Commons," the third annual conference for the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Washington, DC, September 1992. (Workshop Working Paper, W92-4).
"Common-pool resources are natural or man made resources used in common by multiple users, where yield is subtractable (rival) and exclusion is nontrivial (but non necessarily impossible). The role of face-to-face communication in CPR situations, where individuals must repeatedly decide on the number of resource units to withdraw from a common-pool, is open to considerable theoretical and policy debate. In this paper, we summarize the findings from a series of experiments in which we operationalize face-to-face communication (without the presence of external enforcement). In an attempt to understand the high degree of cooperation observed in the laboratory, we turn to a bounded rationality explanation as a starting point for understanding how cooperative behavior can be supported in decision environments where game theory suggests it will not."
Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom, and James M. Walker 1990. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems." Rationality and Society 2(3):335-358.
Gardner, Roy, and Jürgen Von Hagen 1997. "Sequencing and the Size of the Budget: Experimental Evidence." In Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. W. et al. Albers, eds. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Garratt, Rod. 1999. "On Bargaining for an Indivisible Good." Games and Economic Behavior 26(1):186-192.
Gaspart, F. et al. 1998. "Participation in the Construction of a Local Public Good with Indivisibilities: An Application to Watershed Development in Ethiopia." International Livestock Research Institute, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, Nairobi, Kenya. (Livestock Policy Brief, no. 12).
Gautshi, Thomas. 2000. "History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations." Rationality and Society 12(2):131- 162.
Gavious, Arieh, and Shlomo Mizrahi 2000. "Information and Common Knowledge in Collective Action." Economics and Politics 12(3):297-319.
Geanakoplos, Fagin R., J. Halpern, and M. Y. Vardi 1999. "The Hierarchical Approach to Modeling Knowledge and Common Knowledge." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):331-.
Ghirardato, Paolo, and Michel Le Breton 1997. "Choquet Rationalizability." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 1000).
Gibbons, Robert. 2001. "Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games." In Trust in Society (Advance Uncorrected Proof). K. Cook, ed. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. (The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, volume 2).
Gibbons, Robert. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gidwani, Vinay K. 1997. "The Merits and De-Merits of Game Theoretic Approaches to the Governance of Common-Pool Resources." Presented at the Co-Operative Management of Water Resources Workshop, held at the Centre for India and South Asian Research, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, December 15-17, 1997.
Gilles, Robert P. 1996. Economic Exchange and Social Organization: The Edgeworthian Foundations of General Equilibrium Theory. Boston: Kluwer Academic. (Theory and Decision Library; Series C, Game Theory, Mathematical Programming, and Operations Research, v. 12).
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Gilmour, John B. 1989. "Hardball and Softball Politics: A Theory of Coalition Size in Congress." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 134).
Gintis, Herbert. 2000. "Beyond Homo economicus: Evidence from Experimental Economics." Ecological Economics 35(3):311-322.
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Gneezy, Uri, and Werner Güth 1999. "On Competing Rewards Standards: An Experimental Study of Ultimatum Bargaining." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 103).
Gneezy, Uri, Werner Güth, and Frank Verboven 1998. "Presents or Investments? An Experimental Analysis." Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 114).
Goeree, Jacob K., and Charles A. Holt 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions." American Economic Review 91(5):1403-1422.
"This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others' decisions."
Goerke, Laszlo, and Manfred J. Holler 1997. "Strategic Standardization in Europe: A Public Choice Perspective." Sozialoekonomisches Seminar der Universitaet Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany. (Beitraege zur Wirtschaftsforschungm nr. 97).
Goetze, David. 1997. "An Evolutionary Psychology Model and Exit/Stay Decisions." (Working paper)
Goldschmidt, Walter. 1969. "Game Theory, Cultural Values and the Brideprice in Africa." In Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences. I. R. Buchler and H. G. Nutini, eds. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Goldstein, Joshua S., and John R. Freeman 1990. Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
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Goodin, Robert E. 1976. The Politics of Rational Man. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
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Gowdy, John M., and Kozo Mayumi 2001. "Reformulating the Foundations of Consumer Choice Theory and Environmental Valuation." Ecological Economics 39(2):223-237.
"The burgeoning field of environmental valuation has raised serious doubts about the fundamental axioms of consumer choice theory, the general validity of the Walrasian system and methodological individualism. This paper examines these aspects of consumer choice theory, paying particular attention to the pioneering contributions of Georgescu-Roegen. We argue that evidence from psychology, game theory, anthropology and contingent valuation surveys reveals a more complex pattern of decision-making than that described by neoclassical utility theory. We discuss the notions of the invariance of preferences, non- satiation, the principle of complementarity, lexicographic preferences and the hierarchy of wants with reference to environmental valuation. We also discuss the notion of marginal utility of money, the validity of the Walrasian system, and methodological individualism using scaling concept in hierarchy theory. We then address the conflict between theory and reality by introducing a probabilistic binary choice scheme under uncertainty about environmental attributes. We argue that these extensions are necessary to account for consumer choices revealed in environmental valuation surveys. We conclude with the hope that a reformulation of consumer choice theory based on realistic models of human behavior can be the basis for a viable alternative to neoclassical welfare economics."
Grabisch, M., and M. Roubens 1999. "An Axiomatic Approach to the Concept of Interaction Among Players in Cooperative Games." International Journal of Game Theory 28(4):547-565.
Gradstein, Mark, and Shmuel Nitzan 1987. "Binary Participation and Incremental Provision of Public Goods." (Working Paper)
File includes correspondance between Gradstein and the Workshop.
Graetz, Michael, Jennifer Reinganum, and Louis Wilde 1989. "Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Compliance: A Stategic Analysis." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 710).
Green, Edward J., and Robert H. Porter 1981. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 367).
Green, Jerry, and Jean-Jacques Laffont 1988. "Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signalling Equilibrium." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 664).
Greif, Avner. 1998. "Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa." In Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Greif, Avner. 1997. "On the Social Foundations and Historical Development of Institutions that Facilitate Impersonal Exchange: From the Community Responsibility System to Individual Legal Responsibility in Pre-Modern Europe." (Working Paper)
Greif, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies."
Gren, Ing-Marie. 2000. "Winners and Losers from the Baltic Sea Nitrogen Reductions." In Managing a Sea: The Ecological Economics of the Baltic. I. M. Gren, K. Turner, and F. Wulff, eds. London: Earthscan.
Grether, David M. 1990. "Testing Bayes Rule and the Representativeness Heuristic: Some Experimental Evidence." California Institute of Technology, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 724).
Grezelak, J., and T. Tyska 1974. "Some Preliminary Experiments on Cooperation in N-Person Games." Polish Psychological Bulletin 5:80-91.
Grofman, Bernard. 1993. "Is Turnout the Paradox That Ate Rational Choice Theory?" In Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective. B. Grofman, ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Grofman, Bernard et al. 1985. "A New Look at an Old Solution Concept in the Spatial Context, and Some Evidence for its Predictive Power in Experimental Games." (Working Paper)
Authors:
Grofman, Bernard
Owen, Guillermo
Glazer, Amihai
Noviello, Nicholas
Grofman, Bernard, and Johnathon Pool 1975. "Bayesian Models for Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma Games." General Systems 20:185-194.
de Groot, H., and E. Pommer 1987. "Budgetgames and the Private and Social Demand for Mixed Public Goods." Public Choice 52(3):257-272.
Groseclose, Tim, and Keith Krehbiel 1993. "On the Pervasiveness of Sophisticated Sincerity." In Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich, and N. J. Schofield, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics).
Groseclose, Tim, and Sara Schiavoni 2001. "Rethinking Justices' and Committees' Strategies in Segal's Separation of Powers Game." Public Choice 106(1/2):131-135.
Guastello, Stephen J., and Denise D. Guastello 1998. "Origins of Coordination and Team Effectiveness: A Perspective from Game Theory and Nonlinear Dynamics." Journal of Applied Psychology 83(3):423-437.
Gul, Faruk. 1997. "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3):159-174.
Guler, Kemal, and Charles R. Plott 1988. "Private R&D and Second Sourcing in Procurement: An Experimental Study." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 684).
Guler, Kemal, Charles R. Plott, and Quang H. Vuong 1987. "A Study of Zero-Out Auctions: Experimental Analysis of a Process of Allocating Private Rights to the Use of Public Property." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 650).
Guth, Sandra, and Werner Guth 1998. "Preemption in Capacity and Price Determination: A Study of Endogenous Timing of Decisions for Homogeneous Markets." Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultat, Berlin, Germany. (Quantifikation und Simulation Okonomischer Prozesse, Discussion Paper 100).
Guth, Werner. n.d. "Equilibrium Selection by Unilateral Deviation Stability."
From its very beginning, the theory of equilibrium selection has been based on constructive solution procedures as well as on axiomatic characterizations of solutions. HARSANYI and SELTEN have suggested a set of convincing axioms which allows to select a unique solution in all 2 x 2-bimatrix games with two strict equilibria. This paper tries to generalize this approach. Our concept of unilateral deviation stability gives priority to risks of unilateral deviations, i.e. deviations from an intended behaviour by single players. We investigate the general properties of unilateral deviation stability and consider some crucial examples.
Guth, Werner. 1998. "On the Effects of Pricing Rule in Auction and Fair Distribution Games: An Experimental Study." In Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport. D. V. Budescu, I. Erev, and R. Zwick, eds. Mahwan, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Guth, Werner. 1997. "Negotiation Rules and Bargaining Behaviour: What Is Known and What Needs to Be Further Explored?" Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultat, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany. (Economics Series, Discussion Paper, no. 104).
Güth, Werner. 1997. "Sequential Versus Independent Commitment: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis of Bargaining Rules." Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Wirtscaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, 106).
Güth, Werner. 1997. "Ultimatum Proposals: How do Decisions Emerge?" Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, no. 45).
Guth, Werner. 1995. "Are Rational Expectations Evolutionarily Stable?" Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Guth, Werner. 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives." International Journal of Game Theory 24:323-344.
Guth, Werner. 1995. "On the Construction of Preferred Choice: The Case of Ultimatum Proposals." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultaet, Humboldt-Universitaet m Berlin, Germany. (Economics Series Discussion Paper, no. 59).
Guth, Werner. 1995. "On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments; A Personal Review." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27:329-344.
Guth, Werner. 1994. "On the Scientific Work of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash, and Reinhard Selten." Wirtschatftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Economics Series Discussion Paper, no. 35).
Guth, Werner. 1992. "Distributive Justice: A Behavioral Theory and Empirical Evidence." (Research Paper, no. 6461).
We speak of a distribution conflict if at least two individuals have to share a burden of reward or both. Based on equity theory we try to outline a behavioral theory which predicts the allocation results for such situations. Whereas our conditions specify when equity considerations will be applied, the hypotheses predict the way in which individual contributions and rewards are meeasured in case of competing standards. As empirical evidence we provide experimental observations as well as supporting real life situations. It is also discussed how justice considerations can be incorporated into a general theory of human decision making.
Guth, Werner. 1991. "Incomplete Information about Reciprocal Incentives: An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior." (Working Paper)
Reciprocal behavior means that recipients of harm respond in kind, that is by harming the other. We try to explain why such a behavior may be rational, although the damage cannot be prevented anymore. Our main approach is the one of evolutionary stability, i.e. we will show that mutants established with incentives to reciprocate are more effective, measured in terms of reproductive success. The evolutionary approach is applied to a game model with incomplete information, as well as the two situations of asymmetric incomplete information about reciprocal incentives. Other ways to generalize our analysis are studied only for the case of complete information.
Guth, Werner. 1990. "Game Theory's Basic Question: Who is a Player? Examples, Concepts, and their Behavioral Relevance." Presented at the First Summer School in Economic Psychology, Linz, Austria, August 1990.
Game theory is the theory of individually rational decision behavior in social decision conflicts, i. e. a game always involves at least two players (to be "social") with at least partially contradicting objectives (to be a "decision conflict").
Guth, Werner. 1988. "On the Behavioral Approach to Distributive Justice - A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation." In Applied Behavioral Economics. S. Maital, ed. Brighton Sussex, England: Wheatsheaf Books.
According to the behavioral theory of distributive justice bargaining situations are exchange relations as usual market relations. Its main axiom is that the same proportion between individual rewards and investments must hold for all bargaining parties. For a selection of experiments it will be shown how the behavioral theory of distributive justice provides straightforward explanations of results, which contradict game theoretic predictions, simply by using other investment or reward standards than those suggested by normative decision theory. Our theoretical considerations concentrate on the problem how to decide between competing investment and/or reward standards. Our main hypothesis is that people rely on the same hierarchy of their prerequisites. Compared to a basic standard a superior standard requires a more subtle diescription of individual characteristics.
Guth, Werner. 1985. "An Extensive Game Approach to Modelling the Nuclear Deterrence Debate." Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 141:525-538.
Guth, Werner, and Roy Gardner 1991. "Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach." In Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Güth, Werner, and Steffen Huck 1997. "From Ultimatum Bargaining to Dictatorship: An Experimental Study of Four Games Varying in Veto Power." Metroeconomica 48(3):262-279.
Guth, Werner, and Steffen Huck 1995. "On the Evolutionary Stability of Profit Maximinzation." Humboldt- Universitaet zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftelich Fakultaet, Berlin, Germany. Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995. (Discussion Paper, Economic Series, 60).
Guth, Werner, and Steffen Huck 1994. "From Ultimatum Bargaining to Dictatorship -- An Experimental Study of Four Games Varying in Veto Power." (Working Paper)
Güth, Werner, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, and Sabine Kroger 2000. "Procurement Experiments: How to Choose Quality When its Costs Are Not Known." Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Kakultät. (Discussion Paper, Economic Series 173).
Guth, Werner, Georg Kirchsteiger, and Klaus Ritzberger 1995. "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultat, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper: Economic Series no. 81).
Guth, Werner, and Hartmut Kleimt 1995. "Evolutionarily Stable Co-operative Commitments." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, Germany. (Economics Series Discussion Paper, no. 54).
Güth, Werner, and Hartmut Kliemt 1998. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach: Bridging the Gap between Rationality and Adaptation." Rationality and Society 10(3):377-399.
"Besides opportunistically rational choice, emotion and commitment to norms influence human choice behavior. Traditionally economists have opted for the rationality side while sociologists worked the other side of the street. By pursuing an indirect evolutionary approach one can integrate the two polar extremes to some extent in one model. To that end preferences on which rational choices depend are treated as endogenous to an evolutionary process. In this process, choices are not motivated by objective evolutionary success, yet objective evolutionary success depends on the choices made, which in turn depend on
subjective preferences. Success feeds back on subjective preferences, and so on. How this argument may be pushed to the point where rationality itself is treated as adaptive is illustrated in an indirect evolutionary treatment of preference formation in a very elementary yet fundamental game of trust."
Güth, Werner, and Hartmut Kliemt 1995. "On the Justification of Strategic Equilibria: Rationality Requirements Versus Conceivable Adaptive Processes." Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economic Series, no. 46).
Güth, Werner, Maria Vittoria Levati, and Boris Maciejovsky 2001. "Deadline Effects in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study of Concession Sniping with Low or No Costs Delay." Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany. (Papers on Strategic Interaction, no. 1).
"In this paper we report an experimental study of the ultimatum game in which subjects bargain for constant and slowly decreasing pies, over 3 and 11 rounds with either constant or alternating offers. With decreasing pies efficiency requires early agreements, whereas constant pies allow for late efficiency. Slowly decreasing pies are here captured by a 10%- decrease of total rewards from the first to the last round. While in the alternating offer bargaining mode roles are exchanged from round to round, in the constant role mode the same party is constantly proposing. Participants play all games with changing partners but keep their role as (initial) proposer or responder over the entire experiment. Our findings offer institutional advice, e.g. that conflict can be avoided by role alternation and time pressure."
Güth, Werner, Nadège Marchand, Jean-Louis Rullière, and Romain Zeiliger 2000. "Preempt or Wait! An Experimental Study of Endogenous Timing in Bargaining." Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftelich Fakultät, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economic Series, 160).
Guth, Werner, P. Ockenfels, and M. Wendel 1991. "Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake." (Working Paper)
"Former ultimatum bargaining experiments have shown that bargainers face the conflict whether to exploit bargaining power or to comply with basic norms of distributive justice. In multiperiod ultimatum bargaining for an incrasing cake, trust in fairness can enable cooperation and thus more efficient results but is also open to opportunistic expoitation. In such a game the two players take turns in being the one who suggests an agreement and decides whether this is the final proposal, whereas his partner can only accept this proposal or reject it. While the game theoretic solution implies an immediate agreement assigning nearly all the cake to the demanding player, efficiency requires to postpone the agreement to the last possible round. Our 2x2-factorial design varies the number of possible bargaining periods and the cake increase, allowing us to explore several hypotheses, including the game theory and efficiency hypothesis."
Güth, Werner, Peter Ockenfels, and Markus Wendel 1997. "Cooperation Based on Trust: An Experimental Investigation." Journal of Economic Psychology 18:15-43.
Güth, Werner, Bazalel Peleg, and Hartmut Kliemt 2000. "Co-Evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust." German Economic Review 1(1):83-110.
Güth, Werner, and Bezalel Peleg 1995. "On Ring Formation in Auctions." Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Wirtscaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, 64).
Guth, Werner, and Klaus Ritzberger 1994. "Resistance Against Mass Immigration - An Evolutionary Explanation." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Guth, Werner, and Klaus Ritzberger 1992. "Resistance Against Mass Immigration: An Evolutionary Explanation." (Working Paper)
Guth, Werner, and Klaus Ritzberger 1991. "The Durable Monopoly Game, Part I: Theory and the Anti- Coase Conjecture."
The durable monopoly game with uniformly distributed consumers is studied within a finite time horizon. It is shown that the game generically posseses a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which can be explicitely calculated. To test the Coase-Conjecture the finite time horizon is divided into successively more subperiods and the limiting solution is derived. It turns out that the Coase-Conjecture does not hold.
Güth, Werner, Carsten Schmidt, and Matthias Sutter 2001. "Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economics Series, no. 190).
Guth, Werner, and Reinhard Tietz 1990. "Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior; A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results." Journal of Economic Psychology 11:417-449.
Guth, Werner, and Eric van Damme 1993. "Information, Strategic Behavior and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining; An Experimental Study." (Working Paper)
Guth, Werner, and Menahem E. Yaari 1992. "Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach." In Explaining Process and Change: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics. U. Witt, ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Economics, Cognition, and Society).
Guttman, J. M. 1996. "Rational Actors, Tit-for-Tat Types, and the Evolution of Cooperation." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 29(1):27-56.
Guttman, Joel M. 1999. "Self-Enforcing Agreements and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity." (Working Paper)
Hackett, Steven, Edella Schlager, and James M. Walker 1992. "The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriations." Presented at "Inequality and the Commons," the third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Washington, DC, September 17-20, 1992.
"Communication has been shown to be a powerful mechanism for promoting efficient appropriation in small homogenous collective action settings. Communication allows the parties to agree on an aggregate appropriation target and coordinate over the selection of allocation rules. When appropriators are identical, these rules result in identical allocations, which facilitates coordination. We examine the robustness of communication as an efficiency- enhancing mechanism in settings where appropriators differ in appropriation capacity, or size. Appropriators must both agree on an aggregate target and select an allocation rule. In such a setting different allocation rules produce different payoff allocations, raising issues of fairness. We present findings form a series of experiments where 1) heterogeneities are randomly assigned, and 2) heterogeneities are assigned through an auction."
Hahm, Sung Deuk, Mark S. Kamlet, David C. Mowery, and Tsai-Tsu Su 1992. "The Influence of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on Federal Budgetary Outcomes, 1986-1989." 11(4)
Hahn, Sunk. 1998. "Three Essays on Game Theory and Its Applications." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998).
Haken, H., and A. Mikhailov, eds. 1993. Interdisciplinary Approaches to Nonlinear Systems. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Haller, Hans. 1989. "Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no. 29).
Halpern, Joseph Y. 1999. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Counterfactual Reasoning." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):315-330.
Hamburger, Henry. 1979. "Economic and Social Dilemmas." In Games as Models of Social Phenomena. San Fransisco: W. H. Freeman.
Hamburger, Henry. 1979. "Economic and Social Games." In Games as Models of Social Phenomena. Henry Hamburger, ed. San Fransisco, CA: W.H. Freeman.
Hamburger, Henry. 1973. "N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Mathematical Sociology 3:27-43.
Hamiache, Gerard. 1999. "A Value with Incomplete Communication." Games and Economic Behavior 26(1):59-78.
Hamilton, James T. 1996. "Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities." In The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence. R. D. Congleton, ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Hammerstein, Peter. 2001. "Games and Markets: Economic Behaviour in Humans and Other Animals." In Economics in Nature: Social Dilemmas, Mate Choice and Biological Markets. R. Noë, J. A. R. A. M. van Hooff, and P. Hammerstein, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hammerstein, Peter, and Geoffrey A. Parker 1981. "The Asymmetric War of Attrition." Institute of Mathematical Economics, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Papers, no. 109).
Hammond, Thomas H., and Jack H. Knott 1987. "A Formal Model of Subgovernment Power in the Policymaking Process." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 120).
Hammond, Thomas H., and Gary J. Miller 1986. "The Core of the Constitution." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 112).
Handy, Rollo, and Paul Kurtz 1964. A Current Appraisal of the Behavioral Sciences. Great Barrington, MA: Behavioral Research Council.
Hanley, Nick, and Henk Folmer, eds. 1998. Game Theory and the Environment. Northampton, MA: Elgar.
Hanson, Robin. 1996. "Voters Can Have Strong Incentives to Become Informed, Or To Be Strategically Ignorant." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper 968)..
Hardin, Garrett. 1985. Filters Against Folly: How to Survive Despite Economics, Ecologist and the Merely Eloquent. New York: Viking.
From a letter to Elinor Ostrom dated 9-16-85, Garrett Hardin writes:
"As I see it...[the] question, 'How is the Tragedy Avoided,' brings forward the 64 Dollar Question. I don't have the answer to it. I'm encouraged that your group tackled it. I'm sure the answer must by numerate in various ways, but beyond that vague statement I have nothing to say.
"For many purposes I now find another approach to commons phenomena more useful -- in terms of that I call the 'CC -- PP Game.' I develop this in my recently published book 'Filters Against Folly. You might be interest in looking at it."
Hardin, Russell. 1998. "Distrust." Russell Sage Foundation, New York. (Russell Sage Working Paper no. 130).
Hardin, Russell. 1990. "Contractarianism: Wistful Thinking." Constitutional Political Economy 1(2):35-52.
Hardin, Russell. 1984. "Rational Choice Theories." (Working Paper) University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
Hardin, Russell. 1971. "Collective Action as an Agreeable N-Prisoner's Dilemma." Behavioral Science 16(5):472-481.
Harrington, Joseph E. 1998. "Non-Cooperative Games." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 2. P. Newman, ed. New York: Stockton.
Harsanyi, John C. 1992. "In Defense of Game Theory." Rationality and Society 4(1):51-61.
"In this article, the author analyzes and argues against the claims made by Michael Hechter, Gordon Tullock, and Aaron Wildavsky that game theory has limited value for the social sciences."
Harsanyi, John C. 1978. "Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics." American Economic Review 68(2):223-228.
Harsanyi, John C. 1977. "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory." Erkenntnis 11(1):25-53.
Harsanyi, John C. 1974. "The Tracing Procedure: A Bayesian Approach to Defining a Solution for n- Person Noncooperative Games. Part I." Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefedld, Germany. (Working Papers no. 15).
Harsanyi, John C. 1974. "The Tracing Procedure: A Bayesian Approach to Defining a Solution for n- Person Noncooperative Games. Part II." Institut für Mathematische Wirtschatfsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Papers no. 16).
Harsanyi, John C. 1969. "Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories." World Politics 21:513-538.
Harsanyi, John C. 1968. "Games With Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian' Players." Management Science 14(3,5,7)
Harsanyi, John C. 1962. "Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations." Behavioral Science 7:81-91.
Harsanyi, John C. 1962. "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two- Person Bargaining Games." Behavioral Science 7:67-80.
Harsanyi, John C. 1962. "Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solutions in Cooperative and Non Cooperative Games." Management Science 9:141-153.
Harsanyi, John C. 1961. "On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games." Journal of Conflict Resolution 5:179-196.
Harsanyi, John C., and Reinhard Selten 1988. "A Formal Framework." In A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. J. Harsanyi, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Harsanyi, John C., and Reinhard Selten 1988. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Harsanyi, John C., and Reinhard Selten 1988. "The Need for a New Solution Concept." In A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. J. Harsanyi, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Harstad, Ronald M. 1989. "Admissible Solutions and Information Aggregation in Competitive Auctions." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no.28).
Hart, Sergiu, and Andreu Mas-Colell 1997. Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches. New York: Springer, in cooperation with NATO Scientific Affairs Division. (NATO ASI Series; Series F, Computer and Systems Sciences, no. 155).
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Harvey, Anna L. 2001. "Partisanship As a Social Convention." Rationality and Society 13(4):462-504.
"Existing research models partisanship as a function of either running tallies of party performance evaluations or emotional identifications with parties. However, these models are arguably insufficient to account for the variation in the propensity to act on behalf of a party. This article develops and tests a model of partisanship as a social convention. The decision to act on behalf of a party is modeled as an asymmetric n-person coordination game with multiple equilibria, where the payoffs from being coordinated on acts of partisanship are higher than the payoffs from coordination on abstention if the costs of those actions are sufficiently low. Given that such a coordination game will be easier to solve where acts of partisanship are more public, we should see a greater incidence of partisanship in states with laws providing for publicly available party registration, relative to states without such laws. The model is tested using data from the 1984-96 American National Election Studies merged with data on states' party registration laws. Several measures of partisanship are shown to be responsive to the presence of laws providing for party registration, controlling for other factors known to affect the propensity to be partisan."
Hass, Berthold H. 1998. "'Risikobereitschaft' und 'Gewissen' als Determinanten für Kooperatives Verhalten im Gefangenendilemma." Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Humboldt- Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany. (Discussion Paper, Economic Series, no.115).
Hassler, Björn. 1997. "Thou Should Not Know Too Much...When Lack of Information Promotes Co- operative Behaviour: The Case of Oil-Fields in Wyoming, Oklahoma and Texas." In Managing Common Resources in Local and Global Systems: Applying Theory Across Scales. S. Karlsson, ed. Linköping, Sweden: Institute of Tema Research, Linköping University. (Research Program on Enivronmental Policy and Society (EPOS), Research Report no. 9).
Hausken, Kjell, and Thomas Pluemper 1995. "Hegemons, Leaders and Followers: A Game-Theoretic Approach to the Postwar Dynamics of International Political Economy." Max-Planck-Institut fuer Gesellschaftsforschung, Koeln, Germany.
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Hayes, David R., and Alastair Smith 1994. "The Shadow of the Polls: Electoral Effects on International Agreements." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Paper no. 183).
Heaney, James P., and Robert E. Dickinson 1982. "Methods for Apportioning the Cost of a Water Resource Project." Water Resources Research 18(3):476-482.
Hechter, Michael. 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems." Rationality and Society 4(1):33-40.
"Game-theoretical analyses of the iterated prisoner's dilemma (PD) supergame aim to deduce the existence of wholly endogenous solutions to collective action problems. So far, however, game theory has been unable to identify a unique equilibrium solution to the PD supergame. This lack of success, together with the assumption of complete and perfect information, suggests that these purely deductive searches for endogenous solutions are insufficient for understanding collective action problems in the real world. To be of use in the social sciences, applied game theory must be oriented toward specifying the links between its abstract categories and actual social structures."
Hechter, Michael. 1990. "Comment: On the Inadequacy of Game Theory for the Solution of Real-World Collective Action Problems." In The Limits of Rationality. K. S. Cook and M. Levi, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hechter, Michael, and Karl-Dieter Opp, eds. 2001. Social Norms. New York: Russell Sage.
From the book cover:
"Social norms are rules that prescribe what people should and should not do given their social surroundings and circumstances. Norms instruct people to keep their promises, to drive on the right, or to abide by the golden rule. They are useful explanatory tools, employed to analyze phenomena as grand as international diplomacy and as mundane as the rules of the road. But our knowledge of norms is scattered across disciplines and research traditions, with no clear consensus on how the term should be used. Research on norms has focused on the content and the consequences of norms, without paying enough attention to their causes. Social Norms reaches across the disciplines of sociology, economics, game theory, and legal studies to provide a well-integrated theoretical and empirical account of how norms emerge, change, persist, or die out.
"Social Norms opens with a critical review of the many outstanding issues in the research on norms: When are norms simply devices to ease cooperation, and when do they carry intrinsic moral weight? Do norms evolve gradually over time or spring up spontaneously as circumstances change? The volume then turns to case studies on the birth and death of norms in a variety of contexts, from protest movements, to marriage, to mushroom collecting. The authors detail the concrete social processes, such as repeated interactions, social learning, threats and sanctions, that produce, sustain, and enforce norms. One case study explains how it can become normative for citizens to participate in political protests in times of social upheaval. Another case study examines how the norm of objectivity in American journalism emerged: Did it arise by consensus as the professional creed of the press corps, or was it imposed upon journalists by their employers? A third case study examines the emergence of the norm of national self-determination: has it diffused as an element of global culture, or was it imposed by the actions of powerful states? The book concludes with an examination of what we know of norm emergence, highlighting areas of agreement and points of contradiction between the disciplines.
"Norms may be useful in explaining other phenomena in society, but until we have a coherent theory of their origins we have not truly explained norms themselves. Social Norms moves us closer to a true understanding of this ubiquitous feature of social life."
Heckathorn, Douglas D. 1998. "Collective Action, Social Dilemmas, and Ideology." Rationality and Society 10(4):451-479.
Heckathorn, Douglas D. 1984. "A Formal Theory of Social Exchange: Process and Outcome." Current Perspectives in Social Theory 5:145-180.
Heckathorn, Douglas D., and Steven M. Maser 1990. "The Contractual Architecture of Public Policy: A Critical Reconstruction of Lowi's Typology." Journal of Politics 52(4):1101-1123.
Hegselmann, Rainer, and Andreas Flache 2000. "Rational and Adaptive Playing: A Comparative Analysis for All Possible Prisoner's Dilemmas." Analyse & Kritik 22(1):75-97.
Heifetz, Aviad. 1999. "How Canonical is the Canonical Model? A Comment on Aumann's Interactive Epistemology." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):435-442.
Heikkila, Tanya. 2000. "Linking Policy Changes and Resource Management Decisions: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Coordinated Water Management in Colorado." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"This paper uses game theory to explain the evolution of rules governing ground and surface water in the South Platte River Basin in Colorado. Issues addressed in the analysis include 1) the role of existing institutions in creating credible commitments among actors to follow certain policy change strategies, 2) an examination of other 'off-the path' choices available to actors, 3) the effects of two level games such that efforts at the local level shaped statewide decisions, and 4) the effects of the rule changes on availability of information about ground and surface water in the watershed. From this analysis, the author will consider how water management institutions in Colorado's South Platte support or contradict watershed management theories."
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike. 1997. "Break-offs in Bargaining: Evidence from a Video Experiment." University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany. (Projektbereich A, Discussion Paper No. A-402).
Herr, Andrew R. 1996. "Appropriation Externalities in the Commons: Theory and Experimental Evidence." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1996).
Herr, Andrew, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker 1997. "An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons." Games and Economic Behavior 19:77- 96. (Workshop Reprint Series, R97-11).
Herr, Andrew, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker 1995. "Appropriation Externalities in the Commons: Repetition, Time Dependence, and Group Size." (Working Paper)
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Herzberg, Roberta, and Rick K. Wilson 1990. "Effects of Agenda Access Costs in Spatial Committee Setting." (Working Paper, No. W88-21).
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Hirsch, Moshe. 1998. "Game Theory, International Law, and Future Environmental Cooperation in the Middle East." Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 27(1):75-.
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Ho, Teck Hua, Keith Weigelt, and Colin Camerer 1996. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental 'P-Beauty Contests'." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper 974).
Hodges, Luther H. 1994. "The Value of Cooperation: An Analysis of Dynamic Fishery Games (Based on a Case Study of the Eastern Bering Sea Pollock Fishery)." (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1994).
Hoel, Michael. 1997. "CO2 and the Greenhouse Effect: A Game-Theoretic Explanation." In The Environment and Emerging Development Issues, Vol. 2. P. Dasgupta and K.-G. Maler, eds. New York: Oxford University Press. (UNU/WIDER Studies in Development Economics).
Hofbauer, J., and K. Sigmund 1998. Evolutionary Games and Replicator Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Höffler, Felix. 1999. "Some Play Fair, Some Don't: Reciprocal Fairness in a Stylized Principal-Agent Problem." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38(1):113-131.
Hoffman, D. Jay. 1997. "Dead on Arrival: Understanding Collective Bads and the Incentive Structure for the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act." Presented at the Mini-Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, May 3-5, 1997.
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon l. Smith 1991. "Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games." (Working Paper)
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games." American Economic Review 86(3):653-660.
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon l. Smith 1995. "Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
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Hoffman, Robert. 2001. "Mixed Strategies in the Mugging Game." Rationality and Society 13(2):205-212.
"This note is a contribution to the debate on Steven Brams's Theory of Moves. In particular, it aims to show that standard game-theoretic concepts can both account for and explain the statistics concerning mugging incidents that Brams presents to support the better predictive power of his own theory."
Hoggatt, A. et al. 1975. "Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information." Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Papers no. 39).
Co-authors:
Selten, Reinhard
Crockett, David
Gill, Shlomo
Moore, Jeff
Holler, Manfred J. 1991. "The Kreps-Wilson Monopoly-Entrant Game and Cautiously Rationalizable Sequential Equilibria." Quality & Quantity 25:69-83.
Holler, Manfred J. 1991. "Three Characteristic Functions and Tentative Remarks on Credible Threats." Quality & Quantity 25:29-35.
In this paper the a and characteristic functions are reviewed and a new concept, the credible threat function, is introduced following some tentative remarks on the credibility of threats.
Hollis, Martin. 1998. Trust Within Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Holmqvist, Göran. 2000. "Fungibility Parameters: A Comment on Their Reliability and Policy Implications from Practitioners." (Working Paper)
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Holzinger, Katharina. 2000. "Aggregation Technology of Common Goods and Its Strategic Consequences: Global Warming, Biodiversity, and Siting Conflicts." Max-Planck- Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn, Germany. (Preprints aus der Max-Planck- Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, no. 2000/8).
Hopkins, Ed. 1999. "Learning, Matching, and Aggregation." Games and Economic Behavior 26(1):79-110.
Hopkins, Raul, Andrew Powell, Amlan Roy, and Christopher L. Gilbert 1997. "The World Bank and Conditionality." Journal of International Development 9(4):507-516.
Hosli, Madeleine O. 1999. "Power, Connected Coalitions, and Efficiency: Challenges to the Council of the European Union." International Political Science Review 20(4):371-391.
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Huberman, Bernardo A., and Rajan M. Lukose 1997. "Social Dilemmas and Internet Congestion." Science 277(5325):535-537.
Huck, Steffen. 1996. "Trust, Treason, and Trials: An Example of How the Evolution of Preferences Can Be Driven By Legal Institutions." (Working Paper)
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Huck, Steffen, and Joerg Oechssler 1995. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations." Presented at a conference on "Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
Hurwicz, Leonid. 1998. "Issues in the Design of Mechanisms and Institutions." In Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management. E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour, eds. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. (New Horizons in Environmental Economics).
Hurwicz, Leonid. 1996. "Institutions as Families of Game Forms." Japanese Economic Review 47(2):113-132.
Hurwicz, Leonid. 1994. "Economic Design, Adjustment Processes, Mechanisms, and Institutions." Economic Design 1:1-14.
Hurwicz, Leonid. 1987. "Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective." American Journal of Agricultural Economics:395-402.
Hurwitz, Roger. 1991. "Reason and Resolution: Strategic and Social Rationality in Resolving Prisoner's Dilemmas." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991).
Hurwitz, Roger. 1991. "What's in a Game?: Behavior, Strategic Action and Communicative Interaction in Sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas." Presented in the Panel on Practical Reasoning in Political Communication at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31, 1991, Washington, D.C.
Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio, and Richard O. Beil 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Stategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure." American Economic Review 80(1):234-248.
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Imbeau, Louis M. "In Search of a Compromise in Canada: Constitutional Negotiation and Game Theory." Political Economy Research Group, University of Western Ontario. (Papers in Political Economy, No. 23).
Jackson, Thomas L. 1991. "A Method for Synthesizing Sample Information in Games with Bayesian Players."
James, Patrick. 1999. "The Chain Store Paradox and Constitutional Politics in Canada." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(1):5-36.
James, Patrick. 1990. "Energy Politics in Canada, 1980-1981: Threat Power in a Sequential Game." Political Economy Research Group, The Unitersity of Western Ontario, London, Ontario. (Papers in Political Economy, No. 3).
Jamison, Julian. 1998. "Bringing Game Theory Back to Earth: Thinking, Feeling, and Talking." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998).
"The Nash Equilibrium concept, in which all players optimize given their beliefs and beliefs are correct in equilibrium, is central to game theory. It has long been informally justified by assuming that players may have an opportunity to engage in communication, or cheap-talk, before playing a game. Chapter I presents a formal model of this idea, in which credible announcements concerning future play in the game contribute to belief formation. In this model, it is further shown that if these announcements are made strategically, then such communication will lead to play of an efficient equilibrium in the action game, shedding light on the equilibrium selection problem. Chapter II extends this idea to repeated games, for which a new question naturally arises. If players can always renegotiate to a Pareto superior continuation equilibrium between rounds of the stage game, threats of punishment may no longer have any bite. In this case, it may be impossible to support the superior equilibrium itself. This circularity gives rise to a notion of sets of internally renegotiation-proof equilibria. By comparing the external stability of these sets, a new concept of renegotiation-perfection for infinitely repeated games can then be defined, both axiomatically and constructively. It is unique, and agrees with the standard renegotiation definition for finitely repeated games. Almost all equilibrium concepts take utilities--true final preferences over outcomes--as given and work from that starting point. Typically, however, in both applied settings and theoretical examples, only individual gross payoffs are known. In reality, among other factors, players may care not just about their own payoffs but also about the utilities of the other players (e.g., due to altruism). Chapter III presents a flexible formal framework in which to model this intuition, and determines the solubility of the resultant fixed-point problem. Several examples, including both well-known games and various experimental games, illustrate the potential applicability of these synergistic utilities."
Jankowski, Richard. 1990. "Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games." Rationality and Society 2:449-470.
Janssen, Maarten C. W., Joeri Gorter, and Sjoerd Van de Meerendonk 1997. "Cooperation in a Modified Version of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Game." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 32(4):613-619.
de Jasay, Anthony. 1995. "Conventions: Some Thoughts on the Economics of Ordered Anarchy." Max- Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, Germany. (Lectiones Jenenses; Heft 3).
Jayaraman, Rajshri, and Ravi Kanbur 1999. "International Public Goods and the Case for Foreign Aid." In Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, and M. Stern, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Jervis, Robert. 1988. "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation." World Politics 40(3):317-349.
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John, Reinhard, and Matthias G. Raith 2001. "Optimizing Multi-Stage Negotiations." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 45(2):155-173.
"We consider procedures where issues of varying importance and risk are negotiated in stages. Negotiation at any stage requires an agreement at each previous stage. If negotiation terminates, players realize the benefits from all earlier agreements. We formalize this process by a strategic n-stage negotiation game. The expected subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is characterized by an intuitive, compact formula, which aggregates all the structural elements of the multi-stage process. We describe the optimal negotiation agenda for a given decomposition of the bargaining problem, and we derive intuitive prescriptions for an optimal decomposition."
Johnson, Marv. 1975. "Optimal Fiscal Behavior Under General Revenue Sharing: A Game Theoretic Analysis." Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY. (Occasional Paper, no. 22).
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Jolls, Christine, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics." Stanford Law Review 50:1471-1548.
"Economic analysis of law usually proceeds under the assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives much reason to doubt these assumptions, people exhibit bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower. This article offers a broad vision of how law and economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual human behavior. It considers specific topics in the economic analysis of law and proposes new models and approaches for addressing these topics. The analysis of the article is organized into three categories. positive, prescriptive, and normative.
Positive analysis of law concerns how agents behave in response to legal rules and how legal rules are shaped. Prescriptive analysis concerns what rules should be adopted to advance specified ends. Normative analysis attempts to assess more broadly the ends of the legal system: Should the system always respect people's choices? By drawing attention to cognitive and motivational problems of both citizens and government, behavioral law and economics offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard analysis."
Jones, Michael A. 1999. "The Effect of Punishment Duration of Trigger Strategies and Quasifinite Continuation Probabilities for Prisoners' Dilemmas." International Journal of Game Theory 28(4):533-546.
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Kaitala, Veijo. 1986. "Game Theory Models of Fisheries Management - A Survey." In Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Berlin: Springer. (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, no. 265).
Kaitala, Veijo. 1985. "Game Theory Models of Dynamic Bargaining and Contracting in Fisheries Management." (Ph.D. dissertation, Helsinki University of Technology, 1985).
Kaitala, Veijo, Karl-Goran Maler, and Henry Tulkens 1993. "The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia, and Estonia." Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm. (Beijer Discussion Paper Series no. 28).
Kaitala, Veijo, and Gordon R. Munro 1994. "The Economic Management of High Seas Fisheries: Some Game Theoretic Aspects." Marine Resource Economics 8:313-329. (Beijer Reprint Series no. 24).
Kalai, Ehud, and Ehud Lehrer 1993. "Subjective Games and Equilibria." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 875).
Kalai, Ehud, and Ehud Lehrer 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium." Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Science, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. (Discussion Paper, no. 895).
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Kamecke, U. 1997. "Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of a One Shot Game." International Journal of Game Theory 26(3):409-.
Kaneko, Mamoru, and Wen Mao 1992. "N-Person Nash Bargaining Problems with Variable Threats."
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"Facing globalization, the challenge for political science resembles that of the founders of the United States: how to design institutions for a polity of unprecedented size and diversity. Globalization produces discord and requires effective governance, but effective institutions are difficult to create and maintain. Liberal-democratic institutions must also meet standards of accountability and participation, and should foster persuasion rather than rely on coercion and interest-based bargaining.
Effective institutions must rely on self-interest rather than altruism, yet both liberal-democratic legitimacy and the meaning of self-interest depend on people's values and beliefs. The analysis of beliefs and their effect on institutional outcomes, must therefore be integrated into institutional analysis. Insights from branches of political science as diverse as game theory, rational-choice institutionalism,, historical institutionalism, and democratic theory carl help political scientists understand how to
design institutions on a world-and human-scale."
Keser, Claudia. 1996. "Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good When Partial Contribution Is a Dominant Strategy." Economic Letters 50(3):359-366.
Keser, Claudia. 1994. "Strategies Used in Public Goods Experimentation Rounds: An International Strategy Experiment Based on a Public Good Situation."
Keser, Claudia. 1992. Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia: Game-Playing Experiments and the Strategy Method. New York: Springer-Verlag. (Lecture Notes on Economic and Mathmatical Systems, no. 391).
Keser, Claudia, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, and Siegfried K. Berninghaus 1998. "Coordination and Local Interaction: Experimental Evidence." Economics Letters 58:269-275.
"Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbors around a circle eventually coordinated on the risk-dominant equilibrium."
Keser, Claudia, and Roy Gardner 1999. "Strategic Behavior of Experienced Subjects in a Common Pool Resource Game." International Journal of Game Theory 28(2):241-252.
Khan, M. A., K. P. Rath, and Y. Sun 1997. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players." Journal of Economic Theory 76(1):13-46.
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Kilgour, D. Marc. 1983. "Equilibria for Far-Sighted Players." (Working Paper)
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"The relationship between social structure and individual decision making is attracting increasing attention among social scientists. Their work to date, however, has proceeded without the aid of a fully developed theoretical framework. Significant progress in constructing such a framework appears in Ostrom (1967) and Hurwicz (1973). This paper attempts to advance that work."
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"We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with interdependent preferences (who care not only about their own material payoffs but also their payoffs relative to others) earn strictly higher material payoffs than do the material payoff maximizers. Included in the class are common pool resource and public good games. If each member of the population interacts with each other member (the playing-the- field model), we show that any evolutionary selection dynamic satisfying a weak payoff monotonicity condition implies that only interdependent preferences can survive in the long run. "
Kockesen, Levent, Efe A. Ok, and Rajiv Sethi 1998. "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences." (Working Paper)
"We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoffs. Specifically, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others. We identify sufficient conditions under which members of the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragroup symmetric equilibria of the game, they earn strictly higher material payoffs than do players who seek to maximize their material payoffs. The conditions are satisfied by number of games of economic importance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the evolutionary theory of preference formation and the theory of strategic delegation."
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"Many open-access resources, such as elephants, are used to produce storable goods. Anticipated future scarcity of these resources will increase current prices and poaching. This implies that, for given initial conditions, there may be rational expectations equilibria leading to both extinction and survival. The cheapest way for governments to eliminate extinction equilibria may be to commit to tough antipoaching measures if the population falls below a threshold. For governments without credibility, the cheapest way to eliminate extinction equilibria may be to accumulate a sufficient stockpile of the storable good and threaten to sell it should the population fall."
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Kreps, David M. et al. 1982. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Economic Theory 27:245-252.
Authors:
Kreps, David M.
Milgrom, Paul
Roberts, John
Wilson, Robert
Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson 1982. "Reputation and Imperfect Information." Journal of Economic Theory 27(2):253-279.
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Laine, Charles, and James A. Roumasset 1991. "The Evolution of Cooperation from a Non-cooperative Game with Public Goods." Presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 26-30, 1991.
"When players systematically underestimate public goods provision by others due to pessimism or risk-aversion, it is possible that efficient provision will emerge even in a non- cooperative setting. Once efficient provision is reached, it can be sustained in a repeated game setting as the focal point of strategic punishment to sustain the cooperative outcome."
Laing, James D. 1988. "A Noncooperative Models of Bargaining in Simple Spatial Games." Zentrum für interdisciplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, W. Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88; no. 22).
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"The concept of strategic surprise has been used by writers on military strategy to explore the successful amplification of resources during battle. This paper applies the same concept to subcontracting relationships and develops a cognitive framework to explain the phenomenon of strategic surprises, using buyer-supplier relations as an example. We first examine the factors that produce vulnerability to strategic surprise in cooperative situations. Then, we explore the reasons why firms are caught by surprise in spite of their vigilance. We present a model representing false alarms and strategic surprises as judgmental errors. We argue that judgmental errors cause misinterpretation of evidence and a consequent sense of false security. Interactive norms, which exist in some industries and may be taken as proxies for enduring relationships, may increase the likelihood of misjudgment and strategic surprises."
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"This article examines the possible treaty designs that are available to the signatories of international agreements such as NAFTA and START. In the noisy environment that these treaties regulate we construct different types of phased designs that all require that signatories move towards the cooperative goal gradually over time at a pace that is determined by the particular features of the agreement. Self-enforcement of the terms of a phased agreement requires that the signatories adopt countervailing strategies. This means that punishment for observed noncompliance must be the minimum punishment that ensures deterrence. This characteristic enhances the stability of cooperation so that the best phased designs lead signatories closer to full cooperation in the long run than would a traditional probabilistic trigger scheme. The discounted utility of the long-run position reached by the players provides a novel criterion for choice among the various phased and trigger designs that are available."
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Ledyard, John O., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1990. "On the Optimality of Lottery Drafts: Characterization of Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 717).
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Lee, Myungsuk. 1994? "The Possibility of Cooperation in Common Pool Resource: A Dynamic Game Theoretic Approach."
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Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, and Robert H. Bates 1985. "Political Power in the International Coffee Organization: A Research Note." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 587).
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Following Nicholas Miller (1983), a formal model is formulated to examine the relationship between the extent of crosscuttingness and the probability of the paradox of voting in the cleavage situation involving the crosscutting of two binary issues. Measures of crosscuttingness are developed, and a calculus of the probability is presented under assumptions about preference separability and intensity. It is found through simulation that, contrary to Miller's assertion, reinforcing cleavages are conducive to the paradox of voting. The size of the "pivot" cluster whose preferred policy alternative is potential of becoming the Condorcet winner is found to be highly negatively correlated with the probability of the paradox of voting. In the electoral competition between two non-Downsian parties, this "pivot principle" provides the minority party with heresthetical incentives to introduce a new issue reinforcing the old partisan cleavage in order to generate majority cycles. Repetitions of the game lead to "equilibrium cycles" that have been observed in American presidential elections. The result is compatible with electoral changes in normal periods with parties are entrenched in the enduring cleavage system consolidated in the previous realignment.
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Lipnowski, Irwin F. 1991. "Solving the 'Tragedy of the Commons': An Alternative to Privatization." Presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September, 1991.
"In this paper, we propose a solution to the 'tragedy of the commons' problem which is an alternative to privatization or single ownership of the resource. To induce each of the finite number of individually rational agents, who share a common property, to regrain from individually profitable behavior which is damaging to all others, where the magnitude of such damage may well exceed the individual's gain, the standard prescription is to 'internalize' the externality. The impossibility of monitoring individual behaviour has rendered the latter prescription unimplementable in the common property setting. Our paper presents a mechanism for overcoming this implementation problem, thereby solving the 'tragedy of the commons problem' in a common property setting. The solution proposed is based upon the concept of 'collective punishment.' If any anonymous agent behaves anti-socially and imposes an externality, all individuals would be punished. However, in equilibrium, all rational agents would, in fact, act in a socially responsible manner and collective punishment would not be carried out."
Lippman, Steven A., John W. Mamer, and Kevin F. McCardle 1987. "Comparative Statics in Non- Cooperative Games via Transfinitely Iterated Play." Journal of Economic Theory 41:288-303.
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Lise, Wietze. 1997. "An Econometric & Game Theoretic Approach to Common Pool Resource Management: Case Studies in Rural India." (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Delhi, 1997).
Lise, Wietze. 1995. "Preservation of the Commons by Pooling Resources, Modelled as a Repeated Game." Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Dehli. (Working Paper Series, no. 27).
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Authors:
Lynch, Michael
Miller, Ross M.
Plott, Charles R.
Porter, Russell
Mackie, Gerry. 2001. "Patterns of Social Trust in Western Europe and Their Genesis." In Trust in Society (Advance Uncorrected Proof). K. Cook, ed. New York, NY: Russell Sage. (The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, volume 2).
Macmillan, Bill. 1996. "Fun and Games: Serious Toys for City Modelling in a GIS Environment." In Spatial Analysis: Modelling in a GIS Environment. P. Longley and M. Batty, eds. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Macy, Michael W. 1998. "Social Order in Artificial Worlds." Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 1(1)
Macy, Michael, and John Skvoretz 1998. "The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation Between Strangers: A Computational Model." American Sociological Review 63(5):638-660.
"Social and economic exchanges often occur between strangers who cannot rely on past behavior or the prospect of future interactions to establish mutual trust. Game theorists formalize this problem as a 'one-shot prisoner's dilemma' and predict mutual noncooperation. Recent studies, however challenge this conclusion. If the game provides an option to emit (or to refuse to play), strategies bused on 'projection' (of a player's intentions) and 'detection' (of the intentions of a stranger) can confer a 'cooperator's advantage.' Yet previous research has nor found a way for these strategies to evolve from a random start or to recover from invasion by aggressive strategies that feign trustworthiness. We use computer simulation to show how trust and cooperation between strangers can evolve without formal or informal social controls. The outcome decisively depends, however; on two structural conditions: the payoff for refusing to play, and the embeddedness of interaction. Effective norms for trusting strangers emerge locally, in exchanges between neighbors, and then diffuse through 'weak ties' to outsiders."
Macy, Michael, and John Skvoretz 1996? "The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation Between Strangers: A Computational Model." (Working Paper)
Mailath, George J. 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory." Journal of Economic Literature 36(3):1347-1374.
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Maler, Karl-Goran, and Aart de Zeeuw 1994. "Critical Loads in Games of Transboundary Pollution Control." Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm. (Beijer Discussion Paper Series no. 50).
From authors' abstract:
"This paper considers the acid rain differential game...As an illustration the dynamic acid rain game between Great Britain and Ireland is analyzed."
Mao, Wen. 1993. "Commitments to Threat Strategies in Nash Bargaining." International Journal of Game Theory 22:141-151.
Mao, Wen, and Charles Zech 2002. "Choices of Organizational Structures in Religious Organizations: A Game Theoretic Approach." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 47(1):55-70.
"This study has extended the work done by Allen [Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27 (1995) 97] and others who attempted to show a relationship between a denomination's doctrine and its organizational structure. While Allen's work resulted in a one- to-one mapping between doctrinal beliefs and organizational structure, this study has argued that there exists a continuum of structures that are consistent with a particular church's doctrine. The church's ultimate organizational structure is a game theoretic outcome resulting when churches attempt to maximize membership subject to the constraints imposed by their doctrines. We examine how churches' organizational structures depend on the extent to which members are willing to sacrifice their structural preferences to hold on to their doctrines. Consistent with Allen's outcome, our result indicates the further apart are the doctrines held by two churches, the greater the variation in their structural organization. This paper also examines the relationship between churches' organizational structures and the degree of the majority church's majority."
Margolis, Howard. 2001. "Game Theory and Juries." Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(4):425-435.
"Recent work on game theory and juries reaches the startling result that making convictions easier (by easing the requirement for unanimity) would make false convictions rarer. Only the guilty would be put at increased risk. The note explains why the result is contingent on a quirk in the mathematical analysis."
Marinacci, M. 1997. "Finitely Additive and Epsilon Nash Equilibria." International Journal of Game Theory 26(3):315-.
Marion, John. 1997. "Political Debates as a Form of Cooperation in U.S. Senate Elections." Presented at the Mini-Conference at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, December 13 and 15, 1997.
Markovsky, Barry. 1997. ". . . And More Games." Rationality and Society 9(3):386-392.
Markovsky, Barry. 1997. "Network Games." Rationality and Society 9(1):67-90.
Marschak, T., and Reinhard Selten 1975. "Convolutions, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria." Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Papers no. 40).
Marsili, M., and Y.-C. Zhang 1997. "Fluctuations Around Nash Equilibria in Game Theory." Physica A: Statistical and Theoretical Physics 245(1/2):181-.
Martin, Elizabeth M. 1997. "An Informational Theory of the Legislative Veto." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13(2):319-343.
Martin, Shubik. 1999. Political Economy, Oligopoly and Experimental Games., ed. Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub.
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Maskin, Eric S., eds. 1999. Recent Developments in Game Theory. Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
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Matsui, Akihiko. 1991. "Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society." Journal of Economic Theory 54(2): 245-258.
Matthews, Steven A. 1977. "Undominated Directions in Simple Dynamic Games." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 169).
May, Robert M. 1987. "More Evolution of Cooperation." Nature 327(7):15-17.
Mayer, Wolfgang, and Raymond A. Riezman 1990. "Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments." California Institute of Technology, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 722).
McAfee, R. Preston. 1990. "A Dominant Strategy Double Auction." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 734).
McAfee, R. Preston, and John McMillan 1990. "Bidding Rings." California Institute of Technology, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 726).
McCabe, Kevin A. 1987. "Fiat Money as a Store of Value in an Experimental Market." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 115).
McCabe, Kevin A., Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith 1996. "Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form Experimental Games." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93:13421-13428.
McCabe, Kevin A., and Vernon L. Smith 2001. "Goodwill Accounting and the Process of Exchange." In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten, eds. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
McCarthy, Nancy. 2001. "Rainfall Variability, Traditional and Commercial Rangelands Management, and the Drought Cycle: Some Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence from Ethiopia." Presented at the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics: "Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources," Toulouse, France, May 3-4, 2001.
"Extensive livestock production is practiced in arid and semi-arid areas all over the world, and is particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa. Because land is marginal and rainfall patterns are erratic, returns per hectare are generally low and variability of returns is quite high, both seasonally and inter-annually. It has been hypothesized by a number of researchers studying rangelands management under these conditions that 1) returns to traditional commonly accessed pastures compare favorably with returns to commercial ranches in similar environments, 2) it is individually rational to accumulate animals in anticipation of a drought, so as to come out of a drought with more animals, and thus that 3) the use and management of traditional rangelands show little evidence of tragedy of the commons type problems. Policy recommendations thus include devolving resource management to communities, and structuring long-term development and short-term crises interventions to mitigate stock losses during a drought."
McCarthy, Nancy, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Alain de Janvry 2001. "Common Pool Resource Appropriation under Costly Cooperation." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42(3):297-309.
McCay, Bonnie J. 1984. "Everyone's Concern; No One's Responsibility: A Review of Discourse on the Commons." Presented at the Symposium "Capturing the Commons," at the annual meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology, Toronto, Ontario, March 14-18, 1984.
(Workshop abstract)
The paper presents a critical review of various concepts, connotations and theories of common property resources drawing upon the work done in a number of social science disciplines like economics, sociology, law anthropology, political science, game theory, and biology. It gives a very broad perspective on the subject.
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Terry Sullivan, eds. 1989. Congress: Structure and Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions).
McDaniel, Tanga, E. Elisabet Rutström, and Melonie Williams 1994. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics: Comment." (Working Paper)
McGinnis, Michael, ed. 2000. Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).
From Series foreword:
"Workshop scholars use game theory and laboratory experiments to understnad how individuals behave in the context of diverse political and economic institutions. Results from laboratory experiments and field settings show that individuals draw upon an extensive repertoire of rules or strategies from which they select different strategies, given their understanding of the nature of the situation at hand."
McGinnis, Michael. 1998. "Polycentric Development and Resource Management and Polycentric Games and Institutional Analysis." (Working Paper) Presented at the Workshop Colloquium, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, April 20, 1998.
McGinnis, Michael D. 1999. "Institutional Analysis and the Future of the Workshop: Toward a Tocquevillean Synthesis of the Policy Sciences?" Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the "Workshop on the Workshop 2," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, June 9-13, 1999. (J99-24).
McGinnis, Michael D. 1993. "Heterogeneity of Interpretation: Rule Repertoires, Strategies, and Regime Maintenance." Presented at the conference on "Hetereogeneity and Collective Action," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, October 14-17, 1993.
McGinnis, Michael D. 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: I; Bridging or Broadening the Gap? A Comment on Wagner's 'Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory'." Journal of Theoretical Politics 4(4):443-457.
McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams 2000. "Policy Uncertainty in Two-Level Games: Examples of Correlated Equilibria." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).
McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams 1993. "Policy Uncertainty in Two-Level Games: Examples of Correlated Equilibria." International Studies Quarterly 37:29-54.
McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams 1993. "Principals, Agents, and Two-Level Games: A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Rivalry Systems." Presented at the Workshop on Processes of Enduring Rivalries of the Midwest Consortium for International Security Studies and the Center for the Study of International Relations, Bloomington, IN, May 1-2, 1993 and at the Spring Semster Mini-Conference of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomoington, IN, May 1,3, 1993.
McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams 1991. "Configurations of Cooperation: Correlated Equilibria in Coordination and Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games." Presented at the 25th North American Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), held at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, November 15-17, 1991.
McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams 1991. "Correlated Equilibria in Domestic and International Policy Games." (Working Paper)
McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams 1990. "Bayesian Social Choice Theory and International Politics." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, April 10-14, 1990, Washington, DC; and the Mini-Conference in the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, April 28-30, 1990, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.
McKelvey, Richard D. 1975. "Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium." Econometrica 43(5-6):815- 843.
McKelvey, Richard D., and Andrew McLennan 1994. "The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. (Social Science Working Paper 865).
McKelvey, Richard D., P. Ordeshook, and M. Winer 1978. "The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, With an Application to Committee Games." American Political Science Review 72(2):599-615.
McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook 1982. "Elections with Limited Information; A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources." (Working Paper) California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 434).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook 1976. "Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria." American Political Science Review 70(4):1172-1184.
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas Palfrey 1990. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 732).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games." Experimental Economics 1(1):9-41.
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1996. "A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper 955).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games." Division of the Humanitites and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper no. 947).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1994. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 883).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1993. "Endogeneity of Alternating Offers in a Bargaining Game." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 876).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1993. "The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 804).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1992. "Stationarity and Chaos in Infinitely Repeated Games of Incomplete Information." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Techology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 803).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey 1991. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game." (Working Paper)
McKelvey, Richard D., and Raymond Riezman 1993. "Initial Versus Continuing Proposal Power in Legislative Seniority Systems." In Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich, and N. J. Schofield, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Raymond Riezman 1990. "Seniority in Legislatures." California Institute of Technology, Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 725).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Norman Schofield 1986. "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 111).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Norman J. Schofield 1985. "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 552).
McKelvey, Richard D., and Norman J. Schofield 1984. "Structural Instability of the Core." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 535).
McLennan, Andrew, and In-Uck Park 1999. "Generic 4x4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria." Games and Economic Behavior 26(1):111-130.
Mefford, Dwain. 1987. "Artificial Intelligence, Case-Based Reasoning, Case-based Game Theory and the Study of Foreign Policy: Talking Points for the Conference." Presented at the Conference on "Psychological Approaches to Foreign Policy Making", Columbus, OH, May 8-9, 1987.
Meinhardt, Holger. 1999. "Common Pool Games Are Convex Games." Journal of Public Economic Theory 1(2):247-.
Meinhardt, Holger, and Axel Ostmann 1999. "Resolving Commons Dilemmas by Cooperative Games." Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany. (Game Theory and Experimental Economics no. 10).
Mertens, J.-F. 1998. "The Speed of Convergence in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information." International Journal of Game Theory 27(3):343-358.
Messick, David M., and Marilynn B. Brewer 1983. "Solving Social Dilemmas; A Review." In Review of Personality and Social Psychology. L. Wheeler and P. Shaver, eds. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Messick, David M., and Roderick M. Kramer 2001. "Trust as a Form of Shallow Morality." In Trust in Society (Advance Uncorrected Proof). K. Cook, ed. New York, NY: Russell Sage. (The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, volume 2).
Messick, David M., and Wim B. G. Liebrand 1994. "Computer Simulations of the Relation Between Individual Heuristics and Global Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Messick, David M., and Christel G. Rutte 1989. "The Provision of Public Goods by Experts: The Groningen Study." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no. 31).
Mesterton-Gibbons, Michael. 1993. "The Comedy of the Commons: A Comment on Wildavsky and Friedman." Rationality and Society 5(4):537-540.
From page 537:
"In a special issue of this journal (January 1992) devoted to the use of game theory in the social sciences, Wildavsky, while arguing that the rationality of the prisoner's dilemma is context dependent, overlooked the most obvious escape from this dilemma; Friedman did not but was unaware of very relevant recent work in the biological literature. Moreover, despite asserting that the Prisoner's Dilemma game arises most frequently as the Tragedy of Commons, for which Axelrod's (1984) payoff matrix is most appropriate, Wildavsky used a different matrix.The purpose of this comment is to clarify both points."
Mesterton-Gibbons, Michael, and E. J. Milner-Gulland 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Monitoring: Implications for Cooperative Wildlife Management Programmes in Africa." Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences 265(1402):1237-1244.
Michener, H. Andrew, and Daniel J. Myers 1998. "Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories: An Empirical Comparison in Four-Person Superadditive Sidepayment Games." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(6):830-.
Micko, Hans Ch. 1994. "Learning Models for the Prisoner's Dilemma Game: A Review." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Miles, Charles E. 1991. "Game Theory, Institutions, and Stateless Societies: Historical and Cross- Cultural Evidence."
Milgrom, Paul. 1998. "Game Theory and the Spectrum Auctions." European Economic Review 42(3-5):771-778.
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts 1985. "Reliance on the Information of Interested Parties: Does the Invisible Hand Operate in the Marketplace for Ideas?" (Working Paper)
Miller, Gary. 2001. "Why Is Trust Necessary in Organizations? The Moral Hazard of Profit Maximization." In Trust in Society (Advance Uncorrected Proof). K. Cook, ed. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. (The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, volume 2).
Miller, Gary J. 1991. "Abnormal Politics: Possibilities for Presidential Leadership." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, No. 153).
Miller, J. H. 1996. "The Coevolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 29(1):87-112.
Miller, John H., Carter T. Butts, and David Rode 2002. "Communication and Cooperation." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 47(2):179-195.
"Communication plays a vital role in the organization and operation of biological, computational, economic, and social systems. Agents often base their behavior on the signals they receive from others and also recognize the importance of the signals they send. Here we develop a framework for analyzing the emergence of communication in an adaptive system. The framework enables the study of a system composed of agents who evolve the ability to strategically send and receive communication. While the modeling framework is quite general, we focus here on a specific application, namely the analysis of cooperation in a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma. We find that, contrary to initial expectations, communication allows the emergence of cooperation in such a system. Moreover, we find a systematic relationship between the processing and language complexity inherent in the communication system and the observed behavior. The approach developed here should open up a variety of phenomena to the systematic exploration of endogenous, strategic communication. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved."
Mizrahi, Shlomo, and Abraham Mehrez 1999. "Managing Quality in Higher Education Systems via Minimal Quality Requirements: Signaling and Control." (Working Paper)
Mizrahi, Shlomo, Abraham Mehrez, and Arye Naor 1998? "A Two-Level Analysis of Israel's Strategy toward Peace during the 1990s." (Working Paper)
Moir, Rob. 1999. "The Nash Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Effects: Cooperation is Easier When There Is More Elbow Room." (Working Paper)
Moir, Robert. 1999. "Spies and Swords: Behaviour in Environments with Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning." (Working Paper)
Moir, Robert. 1998. "Applying the Exact Randomization Test in Experimental Economics." Environmetrics 9(1):93-99.
Moir, Robert. 1998. "It Works in Practice. Does It Work in Theory?" Presented at "Crossing Boundaries," the seventh annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10-14, 1998.
Author's Abstract:
"In 1968, Hardin argued that all commonly-owned resources would tragically be depleted unless private ownership was granted. There are many case studies which prove Hardin wrong. Common-pool resources have been managed with success. However, this success does not imply (as some believe) that communal ownership and management 'works' and is the appropriate management style for all resources. At the very least, the word 'works' needs definition.
"The Japanese village of Hirano used a lottery mechanism to distribute winter fodder gathered on village-owned land. It is true that the fodder gathering and distribution system worked- the villagers used this system from the 1600's to the 1950's. But, the question remains: was the mechanism effective in curtailing excessive harvesting from the commons? The results of this economic experiment suggest that the lottery mechanism greatly enhances the efficient use of the resource by reducing individual incentives to over-appropriate. Despite the effectiveness of this mechanism, it is not the case that individuals act in the manner suggested by economic theory. Further research is necessary to understand how individuals operate in this environment."
From pages 2-3:
"The lottery rule has been used to determine the right to fishing grounds in Alanya, Turkey (Berkes, 1992: 170), to determine the timing of access to irrigation waters in Valencia, Spain (Ostrom, 1990: 73), and in Newfoundland, until the fishery collapse, cod trap locations were distributed using a lottery scheme. However, the particular rulel I will test is described in McKean (1992: 63-98). Hirano is one of three Japanese villages mentioned in McKean's study..."
Moir, Robert. 1998. "Testing Incentive Mechanisms in Collective Action Environments: Eliciting Cooperation (Simple Mechanism Design for Collective Action Games)." (Working paper)
Moir, Robert. 1996. "The Analysis of Cooperation in Collective Action Games: Experimental Evidence." (Ph.D. Dissertation, McMaster University, 1996).
Molander, Per. 1985. "The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment." Journal of Conflict Resolution 29(4):611-618.
Monroe, Burt L. 1997. "Information Aggregation Under Alternative Electoral Systems."
Monroe, Burt L. 1992. "In Defense of Reciprocity: Comment on Martinez Coll and Hirshleifer." Rationality and Society 4(2):234-239.
From Sociological Abstracts:
"Juan Carlos Martinez Coll's & Jack Hirshleifer's model of the iterated prisoner's dilemma game, which questions the universality of the claim by R. Axelrod (The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books, 1984) that TIT-FOR-TAT is a robust strategy, is critically assessed. Martinez Coll & Hirshleifer (see SA 39:4 /91X7912) argue that Axelrod's results are an artifact of the particular situation of his computer tournament, & that in an evolutionary setting with simple strategies, TIT-FOR-TAT will not necessarily be dominant. Martinez Coll & Hirshleifer are criticized for presenting two misleading claims: that reactive strategies have instantaneous response capability, & that their model represents an elimination tournament as opposed to the round-robin tournament format used by Axelrod. An alternative model is presented. In The Limits of Reciprocity Reaffirmed, Martinez Coll (U of Malaga, Spain) & Hirshleifer defend their TIT-FOR-TAT model & criticize Monroe for not acknowledging that they analyzed round-robin tournaments only."
Moore, Clement Henry. 1987. "Prisoners' Financial Dilemmas: A Consociational Future for Lebanon." American Political Science Review 81(1):201-218.
Moore, Samuel F. et al. 1987. "The Effects of Interpersonal Trust and Prior Commons Problem Experience on Commons Management." Journal of Social Psychology 127(1):19-29.
Morris, Stephen. 1999. "Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited." International Journal of Game Theory 28(3):385-408.
Morrow, James D. 1999. "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics." In Strategic Choice and International Relations. D. A. Lake and R. Powell, eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Morrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Moulin, Herve. 1990. "Monotonic Surplus Sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources." In Game Theory and Applications. T. Ichiishi, A. Neyman, and Y. Tauman, eds. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. (Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics Series).
Mulford, Matthew, John Orbell, Catherine Shatto, and Jean Stockard 1996. "Physical Attractiveness, Opportunity, and Success in Everyday Exchange." (Working Paper)
Muller, Andrew A., and Michelle Vickers 1996. "Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probalistic Destruction." Present at the meetings of the Public Choice Society/ Economic Science Association, Houston, TX, April 12-14, 1996.
"We investigate whether communication can promote co-operation in a common pool resources environment. In a series of labvoratory experiments, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker have shown that aggregate appropriate in a no-commuication environment generally exceeds one-shot Nash equilibrium levels. Face-to-face communication reduced an environment in which the common pool resource could be destroyed with a probability proportional to aggregate appropriation. Destruction of the resource was rapid and efficiencies were low even when the probability of destruction was zero for group appropriations within a 'safe-zone'. They did not investigate the effect of communication in the environment.
"We extend the OGW results by investigating the effect of communication in a common pool resource subject to probabilistic destruction when group appropriation exceeds a safe zone. We replicate the OGW result that destruction of the resource is rapid and efficiencies are low when communication is not allowed. When face-to-face communication is introduced mean efficiencies are significantly increased. Three groups of five sustain a 'good' Nash equilibrium in the safe zone. The remaining two groups quickly destroy the resource. Achieving a 'good' equilibrium is highly dependent on the emergence of a leader in the group communication."
Müller, Christian. 1998. "Risk-Aversion in Constitutional Choice: Reply to Kyriacou." Constitutional Political Economy 9(4):339-343.
"In his comment on my article on the possibility of discriminatory and non-consensual decsionmaking under Buchanans 'veil of uncertainty' (Müller 1998) Andreas Kyriacou proposes to take the players to be 'quasi-risk averse' in order to secure fair and unanimous results at the constitutional level. As analytical tools of incorporating this premise into my model he not only suggests to assume that the individuals weigh losses higher than gains but also to take them as being rational maximiners. In this reply to his comment it is argued that both these points are inadequate to weaken my case against the veils ability to guarantee unanimity and fairness of constitutional decisionmaking in view of a post-constitutional prisoners dilemma."
Müller, Christian. 1998. "The Veil of Uncertainty Unveiled." Constitutional Political Economy 9:5-17.
Munck, Gerardo L. 2001. "Game Theory and Comparative Politics: New Perspectives and Old Concerns." World Politics 53(2):173-204.
"In an effort to take stock of the claims put forth by advocates of game theory, this article offers an assessment that considers game theory both as a set of theoretical principles that extends rational choice theory to interdependent decision making and as a type of formal methodology. Some important strengths of game theory are identified, such as its emphasis on actors and strategic choices and its ability to generate predictions in a logically rigorous and internally consistent manner. But many shortcomings are also discussed. One shortcoming is that the effort to develop a theory of action falls short, both in the sense of
failing to provide a full explanation of actions and in the sense of not applying to domains of great significance. A second shortcoming is the failure of the procedures used in formal modeling to offer guidance pertaining to a critical step in the process of modeling: the conceptualization of the model. Thus, the challenge facing scholars in comparative politics is to consider the new perspectives offered by game theory and draw upon its strengths, but to do so without losing sight of a series of old concerns in the social sciences that game theory is not suited to tackle."
Munro, Gordon R. 1990. "The Optimal Management of Transboundary Fisheries: Game Theoretic Considerations." Natural Resource Modeling 4:403-436.
Murnighan, J. Keith. 1978. "Models of Coalition Behavior: Game Theoretic, Social Psychological, and Political Perspectives." Psychological Bulletin 85(5):1130-53.
Murnighan, J., and Alvin E. Roth 1983. "Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games." Journal of Conflict Resolution 27:279-300.
Murnighan, Keith J., and Alvin E. Roth 1978. "Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game." Journal of Conflict Resolution 22(2):299-317.
Myerson, R. B. 1998. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games." International Journal of Game Theory 27(3):375-392.
Myerson, Roger B. 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory." Journal of Economic Literature 37(3):1067-1082.
Myerson, Roger B. 1992. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science." Rationality and Society 4(1): 62-73.
"The articles discusses the value and limitations of game theory's use in the social sciences. The role of game theory is discussed and contrasted with exaggerated expectations of the subject. The importance of a modeling dialogue between theorists and empiricists is reviewed. The basic limitations of game theory are discussed, including the rationality and intelligence assumptions and the problem of multiple equilibria. The appropriate interpretation of randomized equilibria is illustrated."
Myerson, Roger B. 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal." Econometrica 51(6):1767-1797.
"When a principal with private information designs a mechanism to coordinate his subordinates, he faces a dilemma: to conceal his information, his selection of mechanism must not depend on his information; but his information may influence which mechanism he prefers. To resolve this dilemma, this paper develops a theory of inscrutable mechanism selection. The principles neutral optima are defined as the smallest possible set of unblocked mechanisms. They are shown to exist and are characterized using parametric linear programs. Any safe and undominated mechanism is a neutral optimum. Any neutral optimum is an expectational equilibrium and a core mechanism."
Nachbar, John H. 1998. "Rational Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games." Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Paper no. 204).
Nachbar, John H. 1995. "Prediction, Optimization, and Rational Learning in Games." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Paper, no. 184).
Nachbar, John H. 1990. "'Evolutionary' Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties." International Journal of Game Theory 19(1):59-89.
Nalebuff, Barry. 1998. "Prisoners' Dilemma." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 3. P. Newman, ed. New York: Stockton.
Nash, John. 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games." Econometrica 21(1):128-140.
"In this paper, the author extends his previous treatment of 'The Bargaining Problem' to a wider class of situations in which threats can play a role. A new approach is introduced involving the elaboration of the threat concept."
Nash, John F. 1953. "Two Person Cooperative Games." Econometrica 21:128-140.
Neary, Hugh M. 1997. "A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict." Public Choice 93(3-4):373-388.
Netanyahu, Sinaia, Richard E. Just, and John K. Horowitz 1995. "Possibilities and Limitations in Sharing the Mountain Aquifer Between Israel and the Palestinians." In Joint Management of Shared Aquifers: The Second Workshop Nov. 27-Dec. 1, 1994. E. Feitelson and M. Haddad, eds. Jerusalem, Israel: The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace.
Newman, Peter, ed. 1998. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. 3 Vols. New York: Stockton Press.
Neyman, A., and S. Sorin 1998. "Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: The General Symmetric Case." International Journal of Game Theory 27(2):201-210.
Niou, Emerson M. S., and Peter C. Ordeshook 1991. "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 761).
Alliances play a central role in international relations theory. However, aside from applications of traditional cooperative game theory that ignore the issue of enforcement in anarchic systems, or interpretations of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma in the attempt to understand the source of cooperation in such systems, we have little theory on which to base predictions about alliance formation. This essay, then, builds on an n-country, non-cooperative, game- theoretic model of conflict in anarchic systems in order to furnish a theoretical basis for such predictions....
Niou, Emerson M. S., and Peter C. Ordeshook 1990. "A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 738).
Niou, Emerson M. S., and Guofu Tan 1995. "A Theory of Alliance Formation." Duke University Program in Political Economy, Duke University, Durham, NC. (Papers in American Politics, Working Paper, no.198).
Niou, Emerson M.S., and Peter C. Ordeshook 1989. "Conflict and Stability in Anarchic International Systems." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 700).
Niou, Emerson M.S., and Peter C. Ordeshook 1989. "Realism Versus Neoliberalism: A Formation." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 709).
Niou, Emerson M.S., and Peter C. Ordeshook 1987. "The Geographical Imperatives of the Balance of Power in 3-Country Systems." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 660).
Nishihara, K. 1997. "A Resolution of N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma." Economic Theory 10(3):531-540.
Nitz, Lawrence, Jack Dawson, and James L. Phillips 1975. "Machiavellianism and Competitive Social Contacts in a Limited Information Convention Game." Institut fuer Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universitaet Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Papers no, 29).
Nitzan, Shmuel. n.d. "The Game of Political Entry with Truly Effective Indentical Players." (Working Paper) Dept. of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel.
Nitzan, Shmuel. 1990. "Participation Cost, Productivity and Two-Person Games of Voluntary Provision of Public Goods." (Working Paper) Dept. of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel.
Noë, Ronald. 2001. "Biological Markets: Partner Choice as the Driving Force Behind the Evolution of Mutualisms." In Economics in Nature: Social Dilemmas, Mate Choice and Biological Markets. R. Noë, J. A. R. A. M. van Hooff, and P. Hammerstein, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Noussair, Charles, and David Porter 1990. "Allocating Priority with Auctions; An Experimental Analysis." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 747).
Novac, M. Cristina. 1997. "Lessons from Communism: Always Play Defect?" Presented at the Mini- Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, May 3-5, 1997.
Nowack, Andrzej, Bibb Latané, and Maciej Lewenstein 1994. "Social Dilemmas Exist in Space." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Nowak, Martin A., Karen M. Page, and Karl Sigmund 2000. "Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game." Science 289(5485):1773-1775.
Nti, K. O. 1999. "Rent-seeking with Asymmetric Valuations." Public Choice 98(3-4):415-430.
Nunn, Charles L., and Rebecca J. Lewis 2001. "Cooperation and Collective Action in Animal Behaviour." In Economics in Nature: Social Dilemmas, Mate Choice and Biological Markets. R. Noë, J. A. R. A. M. van Hooff, and P. Hammerstein, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.
O'Neill, Barry. 1986. "Game Theory and the Study of the Deterrence of War." Prepared for the Research Workshop on Deterrence, Washington, D.C., Nov 5-6.
Okada, Akira. 2000. "The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining." The Japanese Economic Review 51(1):34-50.
Okada, Akira. 1999. "A Cooperative Game Analysis of CO2 Emission Permits Trading: Evaluating Initial Allocation Rules." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper, no. 495).
Okada, Akira. 1998. "Social Development Promoted by Cooperation: A Simple Game Model." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper, no. 483).
Okada, Akira. 1997. "Coalition Formation and Renegotiation." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper no. 460).
Okada, Akira. 1996. "The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper, no. 431).
Okada, Akira. 1993. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper Series 369).
Okada, Akira. 1991. "Noncooperative Bargaining and the Core of an n-Person Characteristic Function Game." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper, no. 336).
Okada, Akira. 1990. "The Possibility of Cooperation in N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements." Institute for Policy Science, Saitama University, Urawa Saitama, Japan. (Institute for Policy Science Research Report, 90-B-2).
Okada, Akira. 1988. "A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no. 15).
Okada, Akira et al. 1993. "A Public Choice of Political Systems: A Game Theoretic Approach to Theory of Social Contract." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper Series 367).
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Okada, Akira, and Arno Riedl 1999. "Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper no. 491).
Okada, Akira, and Arno Riedl 1999. "When Culture Does Not Matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan." Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan. (Discussion Paper no. 497).
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Ostmann, Axel, Beate Wojtyniak, and Martin Beckenkamp 1999. "Comparing and Explaining the Success of a Common Endowed with Different Degrees of Sanctioning." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Presented at the "Workshop on the Workshop 2," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, June 9-13, 1999.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2001. "Social Dilemmas and Human Behaviour." In Economics in Nature: Social Dilemmas, Mate Choice and Biological Markets. R. Noë, J. A. R. A. M. van Hooff, and P. Hammerstein, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. "Crowding out Citizenship." Scandinavian Political Studies 23(1):3-16.
"The currently accepted theory of collective action preseumes that individuals are helplessly trapped in social dilemmas. This has led to a form of policy analysis that presumes external authorities must solve all collective-action problems. The presumed universal need for externally implemented incentives is based, hoever, on a single model of rational behavior. This model has been shown to be an inadequate foundation to explain extensive empirical findings from the field and the experimental laboratory related to nonmarket settings. Thus, it is necessary to adopt a broader theory of human behavior that posits multiple types of individuals--including rational egoists as well as conditional cooperators--and examines how the contexts of collective action affent the mix of individuals involved.
I will briefly review the empirical evidence related to intrinsic motivations and how external incentives may crowd out or crowd in behaviors that are based on intrinsic preferences. I then discuss the delicate problem of designing institutions that enhance citizenship rather than crowding it out. The penchant for neat, orderly hierarchical systems needs to be replaced with a recognition that complex, polycentric systems are needed to cope effectively with complex problems of modern life and to give all citizens a more effective role in the governance of democratic societies."
Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University; Bloomington, Indiana. (Working Paper, no. W99-20).
Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. "Preface to the German Edition of Governing the Commons." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. "Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept?" In Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. P. Dasgupta and I. Seraeldin, eds. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational-Choice Theory of Collective Action." American Political Science Review 92(1):1-22.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "Coping with Tragedies of the Commons." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the 1998 annual meeting of the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences (APLS), Boston, September 3-6, 1998. (Workshop Working Paper W98-24).
Note: Two papers with the title 'Coping with Tragedies of the Commons' are in the Workshop Library. One is from August 1998, and the other is from September 1998. Both have the series number 'W98-24' assigned to them.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "Social Dilemmas and Human Behavior." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper Series no. W98-21).
Ostrom, Elinor. 1997. "Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory (Draft)." In ARE Handbook. (Workshop Working Paper Series no. W97-18).
Ostrom, Elinor. 1995. "Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development." Presented at the World Bank's Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, May 1-2, 1995.
Author's Abstract:
"This paper presents some paradoxical findings from a recent study of irrigation systems in Nepal and describes past efforts made to improve the physical infrastructure of irrigation systems in Nepal. incentives facing officials on government irrigation systems, staff in donor agencies, and farmers on self-organized systems are discussed to explain these empirical findings. A game-theoretical analysis of institutional choice on self-organized systems illustrates the variety of factors that affect the adoption of any particular rule configuration. After a brief analysis of why external assistance does not always improve performance, the paper describes one externally funded intervention that has been evaluated as highly successful. The last section focuses on the policy significance of these findings.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1989. "Institutionelle Arrangements und das Dilemma der Allmende." In Gesellschaftliche Steuerungsrationalität und partikulare Handlungstrategien. Herbolzheim, Germany: Centaurus- Verlagsgesellschaft.
German translation of: Ostrom, Elinor. 1988. "Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma" which was published in Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices. 1988. V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and Hartmut Picht, eds. San Francisco: ICS Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1988. "Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma." In Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices. V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and Hartmut Picht, eds. San Francisco: ICS Press. (Workshop Reprint, No. R88-2).
An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Distinguished Faculty Research Lecture, Indiana University, April 3, 1986.
From pp. 102-3: "If the only 'commons' of importance were a few grazing areas or fisheries, the 'tragedy of the commons' would be of little general interest. This is not the case. Hardin himself used the grazing commons as a metaphor for the general problem of overpopulation. The tragedy of the commons has been used to describe such diverse problems as the Sahelian famine of the 1970s (Picardi and Seifert, 1977), the problem of acid rain (R. Wilson, 1985), the organization of the Mormon Church (Bullock and Baden, 1977) the inability of the U.S. Congress to limit its own capacities to overspend (Shepsle and Weingast, 1984, urban crime (Neher, 1978), public sector-private sector relationships in modern economies (Scharph, 1985), the problems of international cooperation (Snidal, 1985) and communal conflict in Cyprus (Lumsden, 1973).
"Analytically, Hardin's theory has been formalized as an N-Person, Commons Dilemma Game (Dawes, 1973, 1975).When the stark features of the formal representation are examined, the decision facing the herdsman in an open-access commons has the same underlying structure as the decision facing each prisoner in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game..."
Ostrom, Elinor, and Roy Gardner 2000. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).
Ostrom, Elinor, and Roy Gardner 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: A Challenge for Development." In Common Property Regimes: Law and Management of Non-Private Resources; Proceedings of the Conference, Vol. I. E. Berge, ed. Ås, Norway: The Agricultural University of Norway. (Man and the Biosphere).
Ostrom, Elinor, and Roy Gardner 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work." Journal of Economic Perspectives 7(4):93-112.
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker 1995. "Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue." In Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, Elinor, and James M. Walker 1991. "Communication in a Commons: Cooperation without External Enforcement." In Contemporary Laboratory Research in Political Economy. T. Palfrey, ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, Elinor, James M. Walker, and Roy Gardner 1992. "Covenants With and Without A Sword: Self- Governance Is Possible." American Political Science Review 86(2):404-417.
Ostrom, Elinor, James M. Walker, and Roy Gardner 1990. "Sanctioning by Participants in Collective Action Problems." Presented at the Conference on Experimental Research on the Provision of Public Goods and Common-Pool Resources, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, May 18-20, 1990.
From pages 23-24:
"We have found that individuals are willing to sanction one another (even at a cost to themselves) more than previously thought. Sanctioning is highly directed toward individuals who are heavily appropriating from a CPR. No evidence of trigger strategies was found, but some evidence of one period punishments supporting imperfect equilibria (consistent with equation 8 above). Even though independent sanctioning is at a substantial level, rent dissipation continues to be a serious problem. Thus, sanctioning as an independent mechanism does not have the ameliorative effect of ongoing communication, found in our previous research (Ostrom and Walker, 1990).
"The willingness of individuals to pay for a sanctioning mechanism in an experimental setting (and in the field settings discussed in our introduction) suggests that sanctioning might be used in a more effective manner by individuals who are able to communicate with one another and then vote on whether they want a sanctioning mechanism and its parameters. Communication would give players an opportunity to negotiate their own contractual arrangement to arrive at a new set of coordinated strategies rather than the independent strategies described above. We are also pursuing this question in a preliminary way by giving subjects, who have had experience in at least one sanctioning experiment, one opportunity to communicate with one another and then to choose whether they want to create a sanctioning mechanism themselves. We report the findings from four experiments where this option has been made available in Appendix A."
Ostrom, Elinor, James M. Walker, and Roy Gardner 1990. "Sanctioning by Participants in Collective Action Problems." Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September 2, 1990. (D90-4).
From page 4, 23-24:
"This paper will not focus on the theoretical problem of explaining participants' investment in institutional change (see instead E. Ostrom, 1990). Two descriptions of sanctioning behavior in natural settings in the next section provide context for the analysis. This section examines the results of an empirical study of appropriator and governmentally organized irrigation systems in regard to the presence of external guards, sanctioning behavior, and rule following behavior. The third section turns to the theory, design, and results for a series of baseline experiments of limited access CPR settings. The fourth section examines the theory, design, and initial results of first series of sanctioning experiments. Appendix A presents the initial findings from a supplemental series of experiments where participants are allowed to discuss whether they want to establish a sanctioning mechanism or not, and if so, at what parameters of the mechanism. This paper should be read as a very preliminary report of a theoretical and empirical inquiry in process.
"We have found that individuals are willing to sanction one another (even at a cost to themselves) more than previously thought. Sanctioning is highly directed toward individuals who are heavily appropriating from a CPR. No evidence of trigger strategies was found, but some evidence of one period punishments supporting imperfect equilibria (consistent with equation 8 above). Even though independent sanctioning is at a substantial level, rent dissipation continues to be a serious problem. Thus, sanctioning as an independent mechanism does not have the ameliorative effect of ongoing communication, found in our previous research (Ostrom and Walker, 1990).
"The willingness of individuals to pay for a sanctioning mechanism in an experimental setting (and in the field settings discussed in our introduction) suggests that sanctioning might be used in a more effective manner by individuals who are able to communicate with one another and then vote on whether they want a sanctioning mechanism and its parameters. Communication would give players an opportunity to negotiate their own contractual arrangement to arrive at a new set of coordinated strategies rather than the independent strategies described above. We are also pursuing this question in a preliminary way by giving subjects, who have had experience in at least one sanctioning experiment, one opportunity to communicate with one another and then to choose whether they want to create a sanctioning mechanism themselves. We report the findings from four experiments where this option has been made available in Appendix A."
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"In determining the design of local institutions for the regulation of natural resource use, some scholars have pointed out that the nature of society may be at least as important as the nature of the resource (Blaikie 1993). The study of informal institutions in CPR management includes much more than the assumptions of rational choice and game theory embodied in certain traditions of contemporary academic discourse.
"A number of authors have noted the way in which perceptions of nature and environmental risk vary across social and political cultures, which seems in some ways related to the fundamental Kantian assertion that it is impossible to make unbiased representations of things (Douglas 1966, 1975; Rappaport 1979; Pedersen 1992; Simmons 1993). These perceptions are different from, though they may be related in different ways to, the formulation of individual and collective interests.
"The role of the Himalayan village commons managing institution as a forum for mediating different perceptions and interests, each with its own interpretation of ecosystem resilience, will be illustrated through a case-study of forest and pasture management in Pujargaon village in the Garhwal Himalaya over a five-year period (1987-92). This informal institution successfully mediated plural and frequently contentious dialogues on environmental risk as well as related notions of fairness with respect to the consequent allocation of benefit and burden, instead of assuming that there could be any single correct definition of the problems concerned.
"Concerns of fairness have also influenced the evolution of other natural resource management programs in the Himalaya, often playing an important role in their ability to involve popular participation, and in their ultimate success or failure in creating robust institutions.
"If such discourse on fairness, like those on justice, represent the form of a society (Douglas 1993), then it may be necessary to study why different actors and cultures are attracted to various notions of fairness in order to inform policies sufficient for the cultivation of 'new traditions' of collective resource use (Sarin 1993), and to understand the significance of alternate plausible regimes of natural resource management in their relation to societal variations."
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Rabin, Matthew. 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics." American Economic Review 83(5):1281-1302.
Radner, Roy. 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting." Review of Economic Studies:43-57.
Radnitzky, Gerard, ed. 1992. Universal Economics; Assessing the Achievements of the Economic Approach. New York: Paragon House. (An ICUS (International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences) Book).
Radzik, T. 2000. "Characterization of Optimal Strategies in Matrix Games with Convexity Properties." International Journal of Game Theory 29(2):211-228.
Rafels, C., and S. Tijs 1997. "On the Cores of Cooperative Games and the Stability of the Weber Site." International Journal of Game Theory 26(4):491-500.
The Rand Corporation. 1982. "Game Theory." A Bibliography of Selected Rand Publications. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA 90406.:1-37.
The Rand Corporation. 1979. "Game Theory; A Bibliography of Selected Rand Publications." The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. (Rand Bibliography, SB-1039).
Rapoport, Amnon. 1997. "Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form." International Journal of Game Theory 26:113-136.
"'Can we find a pair of extensive form games that give rise to the same strategic form game such that, when played by a reasonable subject population, there is a statistically significant difference in how the games are played?' (Kreps, 1990, p. 112). And if yes, 'can we organize these significant differences according to some principles that reflect recognizable differences in the extensive forms?' Both questions are answered positively by reporting results from three different experiments on public goods provision, resource dilemmas, and pure coordination games."
Rapoport, Amnon. 1991. "Individual Strategies in a Market Entry Game." Institute of Information Processing and Decision Making, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel. (IPDM Report, No. 92).
Quantitatively trained Ph. D. students participated in three replications of a 20-trial market entry game in which each agent has two pure strategies -- to "enter the market or "stay out of the market" and the individual payoff depends on the size of the set of active agents entering the market. With experience subjects adhered more strictly to pure strategies, which differed from one to the other but combined to form distributions supporting a Nash equilibrium solution to the game (p. 1).
Rapoport, Amnon, and Ido Erev 1994. "Provision of Step-Level Public Goods: Effects of Different Information Structures." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Rapoport, Amnon, Darryl A. Seale, and Eyal Winter 2000. "An Experimental Study of Coordination and Learing in Iterated Two-Market Entry Games." Economic Theory 16:661-687.
"Tacit coordination in large groups is studied in an iterated market entry game with complete information and multiple market capacities that are varied randomly from period to period. On each period, each player must decide independently whether to enter any of the markets, and if entering, which of the two markets to enter. Across symmetric and asymmetric markets, we find remarkable coordination on the aggregate level, which is accounted for by the Nash equilibrium, together with considerable individual differences in frequency of entry and decision rules. With experience, the decisions of most players converge to decision rules with cutoff values on the combined market capacity that determine whether or not to enter but not which of the two markets to enter. This latter decision is determined probabilistically by the differential market capacities. The aggregate and individual results are accounted for quite well by a reinforcement-based learning model that combines deterministic and probabilistic elements."
Rapoport, Anatol. 1992. "Game Theory Defined: What It Is and Is Not." Rationality and Society 4(1):74-82.
"A sharp distinction is made between normative and descriptive theories of decision. The former is purely deductive, and thus can be regarded as belonging to a branch of mathematics. The results of a normative decision theory are not applicable to descriptions or predictions of how people will make decisions in given situations. Given a sufficiently precise definition of a 'rational decision,' a normative theory can prescribe one in a given situation. Descriptive decision theory attempts to predict decisions of people in given situations sufficiently precisely described. In his critique of Prisoner's Dilemma, Aaron Wildavsky regards the theory underlying this game as a descriptive (or predictive) theory. For this reason, although his discussion calls attention to many interesting questions relating to people's decision behavior, his conclusions have no relevance to the theory of games."
Rapoport, Anatol. 1988. "Experiments with N-Person Social Traps: Tragedy of the Commons." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 32:473-488.
Rapoport, Anatol. 1974. "Prisoner's Dilemma, Recollections and Observations." In Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution. A. Rapoport, ed. Dordecht, The Netherlands: D. Riedel.
Rapoport, Anatol. 1960. "Enter the Foe." In Fights, Games and Debates. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.
Rapoport, Anatol, Andreas Diekmann, and Axel Franzen 1996. "Experiments with Social Traps III: Breakup of Coalitions." Rationality and Society 7(3):328-337.
Rapoport, Anatol, and C. Orwant 1962. "Experimental Games: A Review." Behavioral Science 7:283-310.
Rapopport, Amnon et al. 1995. "Coordination Success in Market Entry Games: Tests of Equilibrium and Adaptive Learning Models." Presented at a conference on "Game theory and the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, Oct. 11-12, 1995.
co-authors:
Seale, Darryl A.
Erev, Ido
Sundali, James A.
Rasmusen, Eric. 2000. "Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).
Rasmusen, Eric. 1994. "Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game." The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 10(1):63-83.
Rasmusen, Eric. 1992. "Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models." Rationality and Society 4(1): 83-94.
"Game theory has been criticized as neglecting key aspects of individual behavior and as relying too heavily on special assumptions. It can, in fact, handle individual heterogeneity if the modeler is willing to carefully specify how people are different, but to the extent that such things as heterogeneity and culture are important, the desire for a single unified model is impossible to satisfy. At the same time, game theory's approach is very useful for building specialized models."
Rasmusen, Eric. 1989. "Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information." In Games and Information; An Introduction to Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
Rasmusen, Eric. 1989. "Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information." In Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
Rasmusen, Eric. 1989. Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
Rasmussen, Lise Nordvig, and Ruth Meinzen-Dick 1995. "Local Organizations for Natural Resource Management: Lessons from Theoretical and Empirical Literature." Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Presented at a Workshop on Local Organizations for Natural Resource Management, Columbia, MD, October 19-21, 1994. (EPTD Discussion Paper no. 11).
Rassenti, Stephen et al. 2000. "Adaptation and Convergence of Behavior in Repeated Experimental Cournot Games." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 41(2):117-146.
Rath, K. P. 1999. "Stationary and Nonstationary Strategies in Hoteling's Model of Spatial Competition with Repeated Pricing Decisions." International Journal of Game Theory 27(4):525-.
Raub, Werner. 1988. "Problematic Social Situations and the 'Large-Number Dilemma'; A Game Theoretical Analysis." The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 13(4):311-357.
Raub, Werner. 1986. "Problematic Social Situations and the `Large-Number Dilemma': A Game- Theoretical Analysis." Presented to the Ad Hoc Group, "Rational Choice: The Structural- Individualistic Approach in Sociology," of the Eleventh World Congress of Sociology, New Delhi, India, August 18-22, 1986.
Raub, Werner, and Thomas Voss 1986. "Conditions for Cooperation in Problematic Social Situations." In Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport. A. Diekmann and P. Mitter, eds. Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-Verlag.
Our analysis refers to conditions of cooperation of (individually rational) actors in situations where cooperation generates efficiency,
i.e. collective rationality, but is beset by incentive problems. Section II of this paper contains an explication in terms of game theory of such "problematic social situations," the classical Prisoner's Dilemma being a paradigmatic example. In Section III some results of the game theoretical analysis of these situations are outlined. In Section IV, we deal with implications of these results for conditions which are conducive to cooperation.
Raub, Werner, Thomas Voss, and Jeroen Weesie 1992. "On the Usefulness of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems." Rationality and Society 4(1):95-102.
"An important task in the application of game-theoretic rational choice models to collective action problems consists in linking elements of the social structure to abstract concepts used in the modeling of game situations. Michael Hechter correctly identifies three major research areas in game theory (equilibrium selection, incomplete information, imperfect information) where such links are needed. However, we disagree with most of his conclusions on the problem situation in these areas."
Raub, Werner, and Jeroen Weesie 2000. "Cooperation via Hostages." Analyse & Kritik 22(1):19-43.
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Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1983. "Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R and D." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 504).
Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1982. "Patent Races with a Sequence of Innovations." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 426).
Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1982. "Research and Development with a Generalized Hazard Function." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 455).
Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1980. "A Class of Differential Games Where the Closed-Loop and Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium Coincide." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 333).
Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1980. "A Note on Rational Threats and Competitive Equilibrium." (Working Paper) California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 297).
Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1980. "On the Diffusion of New Technology; A Game Theoretic Approach." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 312).
Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1979. "A Dynamic Game of R&D; Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 289).
Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1979. "Dynamic Games of Innovation." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 287).
Reinganum, Jennifer F., and Louis L. Wilde 1990. "Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 744).
Reinganum, Jennifer F., and Louis L. Wilde 1984. "Sequential Equilibrium Detection and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Evasion." (Working Paper) California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 525).
Reinganum, Jennifer, and Louis L. Wilde 1988. "Tax Practitioners and Tax Compliance." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 666).
Reuveny, Rafael, and John W. Maxwell 2000. "The Dynamics of Continuing Conflict." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"There is a relatively small but growing literature in economics that examines conflictive activities using a framework in which agents allocate their resource endowments between wealth production and appropriation. To date, studies in this literature have employed a similar one period game theoretic framework. We propose a methodology to extend this literature to a dynamic setting, and illustrate it by modeling continuous conflict over renewable natural resources between two rival groups--an interesting topic in its own right. Recent case studies suggest that natural resource scarcities in less-developed countries (LDCs) lead to conflict, and predict more conflict in the future. However, instances of conflict over resources in LDCs, absent resource scarcity, also exist. Thus, it appears that the role of renewable resources in conflict may be greater than simply a conflict trigger. Our model illustrates a complex non- linear dynamic interaction between the populations of the groups and the resource stock, with periods of heavy and light conflict. The system's steady states are identified, and comparative statics are computed. The system's global dynamics are investigated in simulations. Applications of our methodology to other types of conflice are discussed at a general level."
Reyniers, D. J. 2000. "Relative Impatience Determines Preference Between Contract Bargaining and Repeated Bargaining." International Journal of Game Theory 29(2):189-210.
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Richards, Diana. 2001. "Coordination and Shared Mental Models." American Journal of Political Science 45(2):259-276.
"Preferences may be structured by social constraints, by institutional procedures, or, as in the focus of this article, by knowledge representations. This article explores the prospects for successful coordination when players have conflicting preferences but have similar cognitive representations of the decision context. A 'knowledge-induced equilibrium' is a stable outcome reached under players' mutual understandings of the empirical context. The purpose of this article is to develop a formal framework that combines strategic rationality with social or cognitive components of knowledge."
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Ridley, Matt. 1996. The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Viking.
Riechert, Susan E., and Peter Hammerstein 1983. "Game Theory in the Ecological Context." Annual Review of Ecological Systems 14:377-409.
Riezman, Raymond G. 1990. "Dynamic Tariffs with Assymetric Information." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 720).
Riis, Christian, and Jon Vislie 1995. "On Game Theory and How to Use It for Understanding the Functioning of Organizations." In Economic Approaches to Organizations and Institutions: An Introduction. P. Foss, ed. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing.
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Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook 1973. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. D. Easton, ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. (Contemporary Political Theory).
Riker, William H., and William James Zavoina 1970. "Rational Behavior in Politics: Evidence from a Three Person Game." The American Political Science Review 64:48-64.
Rockenbach, Bettin, and Gerald R. Uhlich 1989. "The Negotiation Agreement Area: An Experimental Analysis of Two-Person Characteristic Function Games." University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany. (Sonderforschungsbereich 303, Discussion Paper B-16).
Rogers, James R. 2001. "Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative Interaction." American Journal of Political Science 45(1):84-99.
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Roth, Alvin E. 1991. "Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics." Economic Journal 101:107-114.
Roth, Alvin E., ed. 1988. The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Llyod S. Shapley. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Roth, Alvin E. 1985. Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Roth, Alvin E. 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory." Journal of Political Economy 92(6):991-1016.
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Ruttan, Lore. 2000. "Conservation and Wealth Asymmetries among East African Pastoralists." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"Controversy exists among anthropologists, conservation biologists and development workers as to whether the concept of the 'ecologically noble savage' is a myth. Central to this debate are the problems of how to identify conservationist behavior and the issue of whether sound management practices of common property are likely to evolve. While social scientists have documented instances where restraint over the use of resources occurs, those who adopt an evolutionary perspective are challenged to identify the selective mechanisms whereby such altruistic conservation acts might be maintained in a population. Here a game theoretical approach is used to analyze the case of pastoralist grazing reserves. It is demonstrated that under some conditions, conservation can be the result of narrow self- interest and there is no collective action problem. However, the range of these conditions is much broader for wealthy individuals and thus, the wealthy may also find it advantageous to coerce others into conserving. "
Ruttan, Lore M., and Monique Bergerhoff Mulder 1999. "Are East African Pastoralists Truly Conservationists?" Current Anthropology 40(5):621-652.
Comments by:
Berkes, Fikret
Colding, Johan and Folke, Carl
Fratkin, Elliot
Galaty, John G.
Homewood, Katherine
Little, Peter D.
Ostrom, Elinor
Prins, Herbert H. T.
Smith, Eric A.
Sabel, Charles F. 1993. "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development." Presented at a Meeting of the Economic Growth Group of the Social Capital Project, 1993.
Sacco, Pier Luigi, and Stefano Zamagni 2001. "Provision of Social Services: Civil Economy, Cultural Evolution, and Participatory Development." In Social Provision in Low-Income Countries: New Patterns and Emerging Trends. G. Mwabu, C. Ugaz, and G. White, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sadanand, Venkatraman. 1981. "A Noncooperative Equilibrium Concept with an Endogenously Determined Dominant Player: The Case of Cournot Versus Stackelberg." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 411).
Salant, Stephen W. 1984. "Litigation of Settlement Demands Questioned by Bayesian Defendants." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 516).
Salant, Stephen W., and Eban Goodstein 1990. "Predicting Committee Behavior in Majority Rule Voting Experiments." RAND Journal of Economics 21(2):293-313.
Sally, David. 2001. "On Sympathy and Games." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44(1):1-30.
Sally, David. 1995. "Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992." Rationality and Society 7(1):58-92.
"This article presents an analysis of 35 years of published experiments testing decision making in prisoner's dilemmas. The objective is to begin to reconnect the theory and the evidence of rational behavior by accumulating the experience of the laboratory and examining this record for those factors that consistently altered subjects' choices. It is shown that a model of pure self-interest is usually inconsistent with the results of experimental decision making, predicting either the wrong sign, as in the case of monetary stakes, or ignoring influential variables, such as the content of instructions. This incongruity is widest with respect to the role of language in encouraging cooperation."
Samuelson, L. 1987. "A Note on Uncertainty and Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma." International Journal of Game Theory 16(3):187-195.
Samuelson, Larry. 1997. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (MIT Press Series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution, no. 1).
Sanchez S. F. 1997. "Balanced Contributions Axiom in the Solution of Cooperative Games." Games and Economic Behavior 20(2):161-168.
Sandholm, William H. 1998. "History-Independent Prediction in Evolutionary Game Theory." Rationality and Society 10(3):303-326.
"Three classes of models from evolutionary game theory are studied, which make history- independent predictions: stochastic stability, stochastic stability with local interaction and cheap talk. It is argued that of the three, only local interaction models yield credible history- independent predictions."
Sandler, Todd. 1999. "Intergenerational Public Goods: Strategies, Efficiency and Institutions." In Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, and M. Stern, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sandler, Todd. 1997. "Collective Action and Tropical Deforestation." International Journal of Social Economics 24(7/8/9):741-761.
Abstract by Esther Mwangi
"Looks at the collective action problem caused by deforestation, as it relates to social economics. Benefits of forest including biodiversity; Analysis of the problem through a joint product model; Implications of the problem; Simple game representations."
Sandler, Todd. 1997. Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sandler, Todd. 1996. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emissions." In The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence. R. D. Congleton, ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Sandroni, Alvaro, and Rann Smorodinsky 1999. "The Speed of Rational Learning." International Journal of Game Theory 28(2):199-210.
Sapiro, Virginia. 1979. "Sex and Games: On Oppression and Rationality." Political Science 9:385-408.
Sarker, Ashutosh, and Tadao Itoh 2002. "The Nature of the Governance of Japanese Irrigation Common- Pool Resources." Society and Natural Resources: An International Journal (forthcoming)
Scandizzo, Pasquale Lucio. 1999. "Ownership, Appropriation, and Risk." In Property Rights, Risk, and Livestock Development in Africa. N. McCarthy, B. Swallow,, M. Kirk, and P. Hazell, eds. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
Schanuel, Stephen H., Leo K. Simon, and William R. Zame 1989. "The Algebraic Geometry of Games and the Tracing Procedure." Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences 1987/88, no. 30).
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1997. Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy).
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Problem of Mutual Predictability." Rationality and Society 2(4):471-494.
"The use of game-theoretical explanations and predictions in empirical social science research is often thought to be precluded by the unrealism of the cognitive and computational capabilities that mathematical game theory imputes to its idealized 'players,' as well as by the prohibitive information costs that an attempt to reconstruct these cognitions and computations would impose on researchers. The article tries to show that these misgivings are exaggerated. Under realistic conditions, actors will often be able to pragmatically approximate complete-information conditions regarding each other's strategy options and payoffs. Moreover, empirical research will, in many situations, be able to reconstruct actors' relevant opportunities, perceptions, and preferences from socially constructed institutions, norms, and expectations that have always been the subject of mainstream social science research."
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1989. "Games Real Actors Could Play: The Problem of Complete Information." Max- Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Federal Republic of Germany. (MPIFG Discussion Paper, no. 89/9).
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1987. "The Political Calculus of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe; A Game-Theoretical Interpretation." (Working Paper)
Schelling, Thomas C. 1963. The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1958. "The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory." Journal of Conflict Resolution 2:203-264.
Schleicher, Heinz, and Reinhard Selten 1982. "The River Basin Game: A Noncooperative Analysis of Cooperation." Zentrum fuer interdisziplinaere Forschung, Universitaet Bielefeld, Bielefeld, W. Germany. (Guidance, Control and Performance Evaluation in the Public Sector; Research Group; no. 22).
Schlenker, Barry R., and Thomas V. Bonoma 1978. "Fun and Games: The Validity of Games for the Study of Conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution 22(1):7-35.
Schmidt, Dave et al. 1997. "Coordination Failure: The Role of Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, Social History, and Reputation." Presented at the Annual Meetings of the Economics Science Association, Tucson, Arizona, September 18-21, 1997. (Workshop Working Paper Series W97-12).
Co-authors:
Shupp, Robert
Walker, James M.
Ostrom, Elinor
Schmidt, David et al. 1998. "Playing Safe in Coordination Games: The Role of Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, Social History, and Reputation." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper Series W97-12).
Co-authors:
Shupp, Robert
Walker, James M.
Ostrom, Elinor
Schmidt, David, Robert Shupp, James Walker, T. K. Ahn, and Elinor Ostrom 2001. "Dilemma Games: Game Parameters and Matching Protocols." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46(4):357-377.
"This study examines the impact of changes in pecuniary payoffs and the linkages between players in the game environment on strategy choice in repeated PD games. Rates of cooperation are found to be correlated with variations in game parameters related to concepts of Fear, Greed, and Cooperators' Gain. In addition, rates of cooperation are affected by the information that subjects have regarding the history of play of their counterparts, as well as the protocol used for matching subjects across decision rounds."
Schmidt, Robert J. 1996. "International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of Pacific Salmon Commission." Environmental Law 26:95-139.
Schmidtchen, Dieter. 1999? "To Help or Not to Help: The Samaritan's Dilemma Revisted." (Working Paper)
Schmitt, Pamela, Kurtis Swope, and James Walker 1998. "Collective Action with Incomplete Commitment: Experimental Evidence." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper Series, W98-2).
Schofield, Norman. 1998. "America, Britain, France and Spain: 1763-1804: 'Core' Beliefs in America at the War of Independence and at the Ratification of the Constitution." Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Paper no. 201).
Schofield, Norman. 1998. "The Heart and the Atlantic Constitution." Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Paper no. 200).
Schofield, Norman. 1993. "The Heart of a Polity." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Paper, No. 175).
Schofield, Norman. 1988. "Smooth Social Choice." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 126).
Schofield, Norman. 1985. "Anarchy, Altruism and Cooperation: A Review." Social Choice and Welfare 2: 207-219.
Schofield, Norman. 1985. "Existence of Permutation Cycles and Manipulation of Choice Functions." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 55).
Schofield, Norman. 1984. "Bargaining Theory for Games with Transferable Value." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 509).
Schofield, Norman. 1984. "Classification Theorem for Smooth Social Choice." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 514).
Schofield, Norman. 1984. "The General Relevance of the Impossibility Theorem in Smooth Social Choice." Theory and Decision 16:21-44.
Schofield, Norman. 1983. "Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 482).
Schofield, Norman. 1983. "The Geometry of Voting." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 485).
Schofield, Norman. 1983. "Social Equilibrium and Cycles on Compact Sets." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 484).
Schofield, Norman. 1982. "Instability and Development in the Political Economy." In Political Equilibrium. P. Ordeshook and K. Shepsle, eds. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Schofield, Norman, Bernard Grofman, and Scott L. Feld 1987. "The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games." School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Papers, no. 117).
Schofield, Norman, and Itai Sened 1998. "Political Equilibrium in Multiparty Democracies." Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. (Political Economy Working Paper no. 202).
Scholz, R. W. 1977. "Sequential Two Person-Zero-Sum-Games with Incomplete Information and Incidental Sequence of Moves." Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Papers no. 54).
Schott, Stephan. 2001. "A Partnership Solution to the Tragedy of the Commons." Presented at "Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources," the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics: Toulouse, France, May 3-4, 2001.
From the Introduction:
"The fundamental result of the problem of the commons was identified by Dasgupta and Heal (1979) which demonstrated that the effort supplied in the extraction of a common property resource depends on the number of resource users. One user would supply the socially optimal effort level while a sufficiently large number of harvesters would supply effort until its average product rather than its marginal product would be equal to the opportunity cost of effort. This result suggests several management institutions that could generate the socially optimal outcome for a limited access common property resource."
Schotter, Andrew. 1998. "Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups." In Economics, Values, and Organization. A. Ben-Ner and L. Putterman, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Selten, Reinhard. 1999. Game Theory and Economic Behavior: Selected Essays. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Selten, Reinhard. 1999. "Response to Shepsle and Laitin." In Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science. J. E. Alt, M. Levi, and E. Ostrom, eds. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Selten, Reinhard. 1998. "Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule." Experimental Economics 1(1):43-62.
Selten, Reinhard. 1991. "Evolution, Learning and Economic Behavior." Games and Economic Behavior 3(1):3-24.
Selten, Reinhard, ed. 1991. Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics. Berlin: Springer- Verlag.
Selten, Reinhard, ed. 1991. Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets. Berlin: Springer- Verlag.
Selten, Reinhard, ed. 1991. Game Equilibrium Models III: Strategic Bargaining. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Selten, Reinhard, ed. 1991. Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction. Berlin: Springer- Verlag.
Selten, Reinhard. 1988. "Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games." Institut für Gesellschafts-und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Bielefeld, Germany. (Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences Paper, no. 4).
Selten, Reinhard. 1985. "Equity and Coalition Bargaining in Experimental 3-Person Games." Institut für Gesellschafts-und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Bonn, Bonn, Germany. (Working Papers, no. 154).
Selten, Reinhard. 1984. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Chapter 7: A Bargaining Problem with Transaction Costs on One Side." Institut für Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Bonn, Bonn, Germany. (No. 153).
Selten, Reinhard. 1983. "Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games." Mathematical Social Sciences 5:269-363.
Selten, Reinhard. 1982. "Einführung in die Theorie der Spiele mit unvollständiger Information."
Selten, Reinhard. 1978. "The Chain Store Paradox." Theory and Decision 9:127-159.
Selten, Reinhard. 1978. "Limited Rationality and Structural Uncertainty." Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Paper, no. 70).
Selten, Reinhard. 1978. "A Model of Oligopolistic Size Structure and Profitability." Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Paper Series no. 55).
Selten, Reinhard. 1977. "Coalition Probabilities in a Non-Cooperative Model of Three-Person Quota Game Bargaining." Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Paper, no. 61).
Selten, Reinhard. 1976. "A Simple Game Model of Kidnapping."
Selten, Reinhard. 1975. "Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive- Games." International Journal of Game Theory 4(1/2):25-55.
Selten, Reinhard. 1974. "Bargaining Under Incomplete Information: A Numerical Example." Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Papers no. 20).
Selten, Reinhard. 1973. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, Where 4 Are Few and 6 Are Many." International Journal of Game Theory 2:141-201.
Selten, Reinhard, and Werner Guth 1982. "Game Theoretical Analysis of Wage Bargaining in a Simple Business Cycle Model." Journal of Mathematical Economics 10:177-195.
(Author Abstract)
We consider a simple business cycle model of the multiplier-accelerator type with an infinite time horizon. The result of the present wage bargaining influences not only present incomes, but also the future bargaining positions. Although the bargaining parties pursue long- run goals, they cannot commit themselves for more than one period. The solution concept combines the local application of Nash's bargaining theory with the idea of subgame consistency. It is shown that the game theoretic solution exists and is unique. There is a surprising similarity between extremely myopic and extremely far-sighted bargaining behavior.
Selten, Reinhard, and Werner Guth 1979. "Equilibrium Point Selection in a Class of Market Entry Games." Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, Germany. (Working Paper, no. 89).
Sened, Itai. 1994. "A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence." School of Business, Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis. (Political Economy Working Paper, no. 177).
Sened, Itai, Natalie L. Hansson, and Boaz Osniss 1999. "A Simple Model of the Origin of Social Contracts." In ISNIE 99 (CD-ROM). Washington, DC: International Society for the New Institutional Economics.
Presented at the third annual meeting of the International Society for the New Institutional Economics, Washington, DC, September 17-18, 1999.
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"Current investigations in the Prisoner's Dilemma kind of choice situations show that very often co-operation emerges as the rational decision of individuals if the pay-offs are iterative (supergame). Sustainability of resource use can be represented by iterative formulation of pay- offs. By such a formulation it can be shown that sustainable resource use is closely related with participation and co-operation of beneficiaries. Such a notion, though exists at present, is based on ethical or politico-economic justification. The advantage of the Game formulation is that a detailed analysis of why and how co-operation occurs may be investigated and may be related to designs and policies. It may help in containing the idealist view that peoples' participation is the remedy of all evils. Examples will be drawn from the case of water resources."
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"One approach to the modeling of bounded rationality in games is based on the dynamics of evolution and learning. An alternative static and equilibrium-based approach has been developed recently by Osborne and Rubinstein. This paper formalizes Osborne and Rubinstein's dynamic interpretation of their equilibrium concept, uses the criterion of dynamic stability as an equilibrium refinement, and shows that stable equilibria can involve the playing of strictly dominated actions while dominant strategy equilibria can be unstable. These effects cannot occur under standard evolutionary game dynamics. Sufficient conditions for the instability of equilibria are provided for symmetric and asymmetric games."
Sexton, Richard J. 1993. Noncooperative Game theory: A Review with Potential Applications to Agricultural Markets. Storrs, CT: University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. (Resource Report, no. 22).
Shapley, Lloyd S. 1962. "Simple Games: An Outline of the Descriptive Theory." Behavioral Science 7:59- 66.
In parliamentary bodies coalitions turn out to be either all-powerful or ineffectual. Conflicts which have such outcomes have been called simple games. This paper outlines their theoretical structure, sketching out their application to the United States Congress, the United Nations Security Council, or any other such body in which the acquisition of power is the payoff.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1999. "Game Theory, Structure, and Sequence: The Contributions of Reinhard Selten to Political Analysis." In Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science. J. E. Alt, M. Levi, and E. Ostrom, eds. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
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Shubik, Martin. 1982. Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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Shubik, Martin, and Nicolaas J. Vriend 1999. "A Behavioral Approach to a Strategic Market Game." Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, New Mexico. (SFI Working Papers Series 99-01-003).
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Siniscalchi, Marciano. 1998. "Interactive Epistemology in Game Theory and Applications." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1998).
"The analysis of strategic interaction should ideally be based on explicit assumptions about each agent's behavior and her beliefs concerning the opponents' intended choices, their beliefs, their beliefs about other players' beliefs, etc. My thesis focuses on the implications of this view for extensive--form games. The key technical contribution is a family of characterization theorems (hereinafter referred to as 'the toolbox') which take as input largely arbitrary sets of assumptions about the players' behavior and their beliefs, and generate specific solution procedures with the following property: a strategy profile will be selected by the generated procedure if and only if, for each player, there exist (hierarchical) beliefs which satisfy all the given assumptions. The generality of the 'toolbox' makes it possible to address several important issues concerning strategic rationality, emphasizing substance rather than technicalities. I introduce the key notion of strong belief, which corresponds to the idea that players may wish to formulate certain working hypotheses at the beginning of the game, and continue to adopt beliefs consistent with these hypotheses until the latter are explicitly falsified by the evidence. This notion is shown to be crucial in extending the conventional assumptions of 'mutual' and 'common certainty of rationality' from the usual normal-form setup to dynamic games. The resulting axioms, corresponding to progressively higher-order 'mutual strong belief in rationality' (MSR), are shown to characterize a well-defined iterative procedure. In the course of the game, players may receive information which contradicts the assumed degree of MSR. If one wishes to make definite predictions in such games, MSR must be complemented with auxiliary assumptions about the way players revise their beliefs in such circumstances. I show that one such auxiliary assumption, the best rationalization principle, leads to a characterization of extensive-form rationalizability, a solution concept introduced by David Pearce. I also investigate alternative auxiliary assumptions and the corresponding solution concepts. The characterizations apply to incomplete-information games as well, and allow for arbitrary exogenous restrictions on beliefs. I conclude with applications of these solution concepts to limit pricing and dynamic auctions."
Skaperdas, Stergios. 1995. "On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests." Irvine Department of Economics, University of California, CA. (Irvine Economic Paper no. 94-95-20).
Skaperdas, Stergios. 1992. "Coalition Formation and Contests." Irvine Research Unit in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA. (Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, Technical Report Series, MBS 92-21).
Skaperdas, Stergios, and Constantinos Syropoulos 1996. "Can the Shadow of the Future Harm Cooperation?" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 29(3):335-372.
Skaperdas, Stergios, and Constantinos Syropoulos 1996? "On the Effects of Insecure Property."
Skaperdas, Stergios, and Constantinos Syropoulos 1992. "The Shadow of the Future: Can it Harm Cooperation?" (Working Paper)
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Smith, Alastair, and Federico Varese 2001. "Payment, Protection and Punishment: The Role of Information and Reputation in the Mafia." Rationality and Society 13(3):349-393.
"A game theoretic model is used to examine the dynamics governing repeated interaction between Mafiosi running extortion rackets and entrepreneurs operating fixed establishments. We characterize the conditions under which violence occurs. Entrepreneurs pay protection money to the Mafia because they fear the Mafia's ability to punish. However, the entrepreneurs' willingness to pay encourages opportunistic criminals (fakers) to use the Mafia's reputation and also demand money. We show that two phenomena drive the repeated interaction between criminals and entrepreneurs: reputation-building and readiness to use violence on the part of the Mafiosi, and attempts to filter out fakers on the part of entrepreneurs. These two phenomena lead to turbulence: as entrepreneurs filter out fakers by not paying some of the times, some real Mafiosi are not paid and punish non-payment to establish their reputation. As Mafia reputation is re-established, fakers have again an incentive to emerge, setting in motion a spiral of never-ending filtering and violence. We also show how external shocks to this relationship, such as changes in policing practices, succession disputes within the Mafia or inflation, often lead to violence until beliefs are re-established. We conclude that a world where mafias operate is inherently turbulent. This conclusion goes against the widespread perception that racketeers are able to perfectly enforce territorial monopolies."
Smith, J. Maynard. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Snidal, Duncan. 1996. "Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes." In The International Political Economy and International Institutions; Vol. 1. O. R. Young, ed. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar. (The Library of International Political Economy, no. 10).
Snidal, Duncan. 1986. "The Game Theory of International Politics." In Cooperation Under Anarchy. K. A. Oye, ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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Southgate, Douglas, and Hugo Ramos 2000. "Subverting Local Institutions: Arresting Social Capital Formation and Environmental Conservation in Latin America." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eight Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"In various settings around the world, local communities have responded to mounting demands for environmental services by instituting cooperative arrangements for resolving trade-offs and fostering conservation. The value and viability of these arrangements are addressed in a large and growing literature. Game theory has been used to identify the circumstances under which individual people find it worthwhile to cooperate with one another. In addition, there have been multiple case studies documenting actual instances of resources managed (reasonably well) by groups. The traditional institutions that villages in Southeast and East Asia have employed to deal with the local spillovers inherent in irrigated rice production are a case in point.
"To be sure, traditional cooperative arrangements are not a panacea for all environmental problems. It is unrealistic, for example, to scale up village-level water management institutions to a large river basin occupied by millions of people. However, local responses to local environmental problems can also prove inadequate. Sometimes the problem has to do with turnover among the actors involved. For example, rapid migration to agricultural frontiers militates against voluntary bargains being struck to contain deforestation in areas where legal claims are ambiguous or do not exist.
"In other settings, the collapse of local institutions has little or nothing to do with their intrinsic characteristics. Quite often, the problem is one of subversion. This is obvious when the state, not distinguishing between common properties and open access resources, nationalizes village or tribal holdings. But subversion can also take less obvious forms. In particular, laws and regulations can be applied that interfere with the adaptation of community- level institutions to local realities. When and where this occurs, those institutions may be weakened irretrievably and the opportunity lost for collective environmental action at the community level.
"This paper addresses the subtle subversion of local institutions for natural resource management in Ecuador, where indigenous comunas possess extensive forested tracts, and El Salvador, where agrarian reform cooperatives own a large share of the country's best farmland. In both places, national laws and regulations prevent these local entities from acting effectively on behalf of their members interests. This institutional subversion also causes natural resources to be wasted and misused on a grand scale.
"A fundamental conclusion of the paper is that local institutions need to be given much more freedom to decide among modes of governance. For instance, management of group- owned forests could be improved if comunas were to begin functioning like sociedades anónimas (corporations)."
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"The author argues that the theory of moves, which has gained popularity in recent years as an alternative to game-theoretic analysis of strategic interaction, is fundamentally flawed. The theory's adherents argue that it makes theoretical progress by endogenizing the structure of games and introducing new ways of analyzing repeated interactions. The author analyzes the theory of moves from a game-theoretic perspective and challenges its theoretical claims. The author then reanalyzes several recent articles that have used the theory of moves, showing that its application to empirical cases is strained and that game
theory can provide models that do a better job of fitting the stories the authors tell about them."
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Suleiman, Ramzi, David V. Budescu, and Amnon Rapoport 1994. "The Position Effect: The Role of Player's Serial Position in a Resource Dilemma Game." In Social Dilemmas. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Suleiman, Ramzi, and Amnon Rapoport 1991. "Provision of Step-Level Public Goods with Continuous Contribution." Institute of Information Processing and Decision Making, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel. (IPDM Report no. 95).
Suleiman, Ramzi, Amnon Rapoport, and David V. Budescu 1998. "Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Testing Nash Behavior." In Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management. E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour, eds. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. (New Horizons in Environmental Economics).
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Swistak, Piotr. 1992. "What Games? Why Equilibria? Which Equilibria? Three Problems with Game Theory." Rationality and Society 4(1):103-116.
"This article focuses on selected claims made by three authors about game theory: 'What games?' (Aaron Wildavsky), 'Why equilibria?" (Gordon Tullock) and 'Which equilibria?' (Michael Hechter). The intention is to bring some balance to the debate by pointing to the fact that most of the arguments discussed are conditional; they are true under some assumptions but false under others. The power of game theory stems from the fact that it enables us to seek solutions no matter what assumptions we believe to be true about the modeled phenomenon."
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Taylor, Michael. 1987. "The N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Supergame." In The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Studies in Rationality and Social Science).
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Ternström, Ingela. 1999. "Cooperation or Conflict in Common Pools." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the "Workshop on the Workshop 2," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, June 9-13, 1999. (J99-2).
Tesfatsion, Leigh. 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game." Iowa State University, Ames, IA. (ISU Economic Report 43).
Tesfatsion, Leigh. 1998. "How Economists Can Get Alife: Abbreviated Version."
From Concluding Remarks:
"The hallmark of the ACE (agent-based computational economics) approach to the study of economic processes is a bottom up perspective, in the sense that global behavior is grounded in local agent interactions. The agent-based trade netwrok game briefly outlined in the previous section illustrated how the ACE approach might be specialized to the study of the formation and evolution of trade networks."
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"Tsebelis joins his theoretical contribution with a series of enlightening case studies of seemingly irrational political behavior. In one, he examines the movement by English Labour party activists who, taking their standing M.P. to be too moderate, seek to replace her even though such a choice might lead to the loss of a seat for the Party. In another he looks at Belgian elites who are taken by standard theories to be accommodating and compromising but who in some cases initiate political conflict. Finally, he analyzes the intricacies underlying the decisions by some French political parties not to support their coalition partner and thereby leading the coalition to defeat."
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"Game theory has had a considerable impact on the way we talk about problems and on our reasoning. But this has been more or less a philosophical effect. When it comes to formal reasoning, the calculation of a mixed strategy is characteristically either impossible or misleading."
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Co-authors:
Liebrand, Wim B. G.
Messick, David M.
Wilke, Henk A. M.
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"This paper is a contribution to solving the problem of whether reciprocal altruism can emerge and maintain itself in a population of selfish individuals. We use an evolutionary game theoretic simulation model (the Social Evolution Model) to investigate the relative fitness of two versions of a reciprocal altruistic trait competing with a defecting trait. One main difference between the Social Evolution Model and most of the models that are known in this field is that partner selection is straightforwardly built into the strategies of the players. In most of the models in the literature, partner selection is not an option in the game. Because of this element of forced play, much attention is given to the ability of strategies to detect cheaters and to retaliate. We show that modeling partner selection points to disadvantages of a preoccupation with cheater-detection and to the importance of committing oneself to a partner."
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"Social orientations open up niches for voluntary cooperation. This hypothesis is examined with respect to actors in social dilemmas who have internalized the norm of reciprocity. If the intensity of the social motivation stays within certain limits, efficiency enhancing cooperation evolves. In the ultimatum game and in the battle of the sexes, reciprocity brings about an Equal Split of the social surplus and the behavior pattern known as Turn Taking where the actors alternately win and lose. Moreover, as the battle of the sexes demonstrates, strong social motivations create new predicaments and material inefficiencies unknown in a society of egotistical actors. The reciprocity norm is embedded in a social psychological process called relationship accounting. Relationship accounting transforms repeated games into state-space games, such that, e.g. in a finitely repeated state-space prisoners' dilemma players first cooperate and then switch to noncooperation in the endgame."
Walker, James et al. 1997. "Voting on Allocation Rules in a Commons: Predictive Theories and Experimental Results." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 13-15 March 1997, Tucson, AZ.
Walker, James M., and Roy Gardner 1991. "Probabilistic Destruction of Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, and Resource and Technology Division, Economic Research Service, USDA. Presented at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Session of the Annual Meetings of the Allied Social Science Association, New York, December 1989.
(Abstract by Paul Turner)
This paper uses a game theoretic model of a common pool resources to investigate whether the possibility of destroying the resource significantly affects choice behavior in the laboratory.
When subgame perfection involves a significant probability of destruction, the common pool resource is in every case destroyed and in most cases, rather quickly. Even when there is a subgame perfect equilibrium which is completely safe and yields near optimal rents, subjects do not stabilize at this equilibrium. The consequence of this desturction is in every case a significant loss in efficiency.
Walker, James M., and Roy Gardner 1990. "Rent Dissipation and Probabilistic Destruction of Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence." Presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 26-29, 1991. (Working Paper, no. W90-13).
"Using experimental methods to test a game theoretical model of destruction in a common pool resource environment, this paper investigates whether the possibility of destruction will significantly alter choice behavior in the resulting game. When there is a non-neglible probability of destruction at the subgame perfect equilibrium which is completely safe and yields near optimal rents, subjects do not stabilize at this significant loss in rents."
Walker, James M., Roy Gardner, and Elinor Ostrom 1990. "Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 19:203-211.
Walker, James M., Roy Gardner, Elinor Ostrom, and Andrew Herr 1995. "Voting on Allocation Rules in a Commons Without Face-to-Face Communication: Theoretical Issues and Experimental Results." Presented at the conference on "Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences," Tuscon, AZ, October 11-12, 1995.
Walker, James M., Elinor Ostrom, and Roy Gardner 1988. "Rent-Dissipation in Common-Pool Resource Environments: Experimental Evidence." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (W88-7).
"This paper examines the resource environment classified as a common-pool resource. The intent is to highlight more carefully classify the specific forms of behavioral problems encountered in this resource allocation environment, with an emphasis on the particular allocation problem known commonly as 'rent dissipation.' We present evidence from laboratory experiments designed to investigate the robustness of theoretical models of rent dissipation in such environments.
"Following the theoretical work of such authors as Scott Gordone (1954), we investigate the strength of theoretical models which predict that users of common pool resources will appropriate units from the resource at a rate which exceeds the point at which marginal returns equal marginal extraction costs. The logic of such models argues that appropriators will ignore the production externalities of their own appropriation and focus only on average returns from the resource. Following this argument, appropriation will take place at a level in which all rents are dissipated.
"Our experimental results present evidence from a behavioral investment environment designed to capture key theoretical assumptions of the rent dissipation models. We offer evidence related to the extent of rent dissipation as related to subject experience in the environment, the form of the production technology of the common-pool resource, and the size of the appropriation group."
Walker, James, and Roy Gardner 1992. "Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence." Economic Journal 102(414):1149-1161.
Walker, James, Roy Gardner, and Elinor Ostrom 1997. "Instructions for Common Pool Resource Game Used by the World Bank EDI/ISSER Regional TOT Workshop, Akosombo, Ghana, February 25 to March 1, 1997." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper W97-31).
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Water Resources Research Center. n.d. "Efficient and Equitable Solution of Indian Reserved Water Rights Conflicts." (Working Paper).
An Extensive literature exists on the topic on Indian water rights. Much of it has been written by lawyers, resource economists, and other social scientists. But rarely has an inter disciplinary approach, utilizing both qualitative and quantitative reseach techniques, been applied to this subject. The research we propose will draw from the extensive literature available on Indian water rights, and also from quantitative research by employing game theory, metagames, and hypergame analysis (p. 3-4).
Weber, Roberto, Colin Camerer, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Marc Knez 2001. "The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games." Organization Science 12(5):582-598.
"This paper reports the results of experiments which examine attributions of leadership quality. Subjects played an abstract coordination game which is like many organizational problems. Previous research showed that when larger groups play the game, they rarely coordinate on the Pareto-optimal (efficient) outcome, but small groups almost always coordinate on the efficient outcome. After two or three periods of playing the game, one subject who was randomly selected from among the participants to be the 'leader' for the experiment was instructed to make a speech exhorting others to choose the efficient action. Based on previous studies, we predicted that small groups would succeed in achieving efficiency but that large groups would fail. Based on social psychological studies of the fundamental attribution error, we predicted that the subjects would underestimate the strength of the situational effect (group size) and attribute cause to personal traits of the leaders instead leaders would be credited for the success of the small groups, and blamed for the failure of the large groups. This hypothesis proved true: Subjects attributed differences in outcomes between conditions to differences in the effectiveness of leaders. In a second experiment, subjects voted to replace the leaders more frequently in the large-group condition (at a small cost to themselves), showing that misattributions of leadership ability also affect actual behavior by subjects. Previous research has demonstrated a tendency to credit or blame leaders for unusual performance. The difference in our study is that subjects should be blaming a structural condition-the size of the group -but they blame the leaders instead. Thus, our experiment is the first to establish a mistaken illusion of leadership."
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Weissing, Franz, and Elinor Ostrom 1993. "Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement on Government - and Farmer-Managed Systems." In Games in Hierarchies and Networks: Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Study of Governance Institutions. F. Scharpf, ed. Frankfurt, Germany and Boulder, CO: Campus Verlag and Westview Press.
Weissing, Franz, and Elinor Ostrom 1991. "Crime and Punishment: Further Reflections on the Counterintuitive Results of Mixed Equilibria Games." Journal of Theoretical Politics 3(3):343-50.
"In a series of related articles, George Tsbellis challenges political theorists to rethink the foundations of policy analysis. His major critique of policy analyses, based on decision theory (where one individual decides in an inanimate but not certain environment) rather than on game theory (where one individual decides in an environment with other strategic individuals) has weathered the storm of commentaries made on his work..."
Weissing, Franz, and Elinor Ostrom 1991. "Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play; Rule Enforcement Without Guards." In Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals and Markets. R. Selten, ed. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
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"Is Prisoner's Dilemma a natural framework for understanding human interaction? The author's view is that the rationality of the prisoner's dilemma, like rationality in general, is context dependent; without a supportive cultural context, no strategy makes sense. Different strategies will be rational for prisoners within different cultural contexts. The solution most favored by game players, silence, for instance, would be anathema in a hierarchical culture that seeks to inculcate respect for authority. But silence would make sense for egalitarians who wish to undermine authority as inegalitarian on its face. 'Distrust everybody' is a strategy that is supported only by people who adhere to fatalistic cultures. Thus, the cultural context through which preferences are formed and reformed is central to who will place which values on diverse strategies. It is not rationality per se, as if one form of rationality was reason itself, but diverse rationalities that vary with the objective of their adherents that should be the mainstay of game theory."
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Wilson, Rick K. 1981. "Institutional Effects on Committee Behavior: Or, You Can't Stop to Smell the Roses When Playing a 5-Person Game." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Memphis, TN; November 5-7, 1981. (Working Paper, no. W81-35).
Wilson, Rick K., Roberta Herzberg, and Mark Elliot 1993. "Costly Voting: Theoretical and Experimental Results on Commons Dilemmas in Spatial Committee Games." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Economic Science Association, October 22-23, 1993.
Our focus in this paper is with the transaction costs inherent in most decision making settings. We specifically investigate an "institute free" collective choice mechanism that includes costs to calling votes. A set of models show that under low costs (i.e. where no cost-induced equilibrium exists), actors have dominant strategies to continue to call votes. When those costs are collectively borne, a commons problem arises in which everyone is left worse off. A series of experimental manipulations are implemented to test various aspects of this model. These experiments use five-person committees with a forward moving agenda. Our results show that subject behavior is consistent with our theoretical predictions. We speculate about how differing institutional mechanism may be developed and retained precisely to offset these kinds of collective costs.
Wilson, Rick K., and Carl M. Rhodes 1997. "Leadership and Credibility in N-Person Coordination Games." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(6):767-.
Wilson, Rick K., and Jane Sell 1997. "'Liar, Liar ...' Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Public Goods Settings." Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(5):695-717.
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Witt, Ulrich, ed. 1992. Explaining Process and Change: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Economics, Cognition and Society).
Witt, Ulrich. 1988. "The Evolution of Economic Institutions as a Propagation Process." Presented at the European Public Choice Society Meeting, Bergen, Norway, May 18-21, 1988.
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Yamagishi, Toshio. 1997. "Trust and Gullibility." Presented at the Workshop Colloquium, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, March 4, 1997.
Yamagishi, Toshio. 1996. "In-Group Favoritism and Culture of Collectivism." Presented at the Workshop Colloquium, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, October 14, 1996.
Yamagishi, Toshio. 1986. "The Structural Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas." Advances in Group Processes 3:51-87.
Yamagishi, Toshio. 1985. "The Structural Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas." Presented at the Pacific Sociological Association annual meeting, Albuquerque, NM, April 1985.
Yamagishi, Toshio, and Nahoko Hayashi 1997. "Selective Play: Social Embeddedness of Social Dilemmas." Presented at the Workshop Colloquium, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, February 17, 1997.
Yamagishi, Toshio, Nahoko Hayashi, and Nobuhito Jin 1994. "Prisoner's Dilemma Networks: Selection Strategy Versus Action Strategy." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Yamagishi, Toshio, and Riki Kakiuchi 2000. "It Takes Venturing into a Tiger's Cave to Steal a Baby Tiger: Experiments on the Development of Trust Relationships." (Working Paper)
Yamagishi, Toshio, and Nobuyuki Takahashi 1994. "Evolution of Norms without Metanorms." In Social Dilemmas and Cooperation. U. Schulz, W. Albers, and U. Meuller, eds. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Yamagishi, Tosio, and Riki Kakiuchi 2000. "It Takes Venturing into a Tiger's Cave to Steal a Baby Tiger: Experiments on the Development of Trust Relationships." In The Management of Durable Relations: Theoretical and Empirical Models for Households and Organizations (forthcoming). J. Weesie and W. Raub, eds. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.
Yarbrough, Beth V., and Robert M. Yarbrough 1998. "Unification and Secession: Group Size and 'Escape from Lock-In"." Kyklos 51(2):171-195.
Yavas, Abdullah. 2002. "Endogenous Outside Options in Coordination Games: Experimental Evidence." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 47(2):221-236.
"In this experiment, traders choose between an outside option offered by an intermediary and playing a coordination game with each other. The intermediary is either a broker or a dealer. We find that intermediaries manage to attract traders, even to offer levels lower than the payoff that traders could have obtained had they rejected the intermediary's offer. For any given offer, traders are more likely to accept a dealer's offer than a broker's offer. The introduction of either intermediary type reduces average trader's earnings. On the other hand, intermediaries have a coordination role. As predicted by the forward induction argument, when traders reject the intermediary's offer and play the coordination sub-game, they achieve a significantly greater level of coordination."
Young, H. Peyton. 1998. Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Young, Oran R. 2000. "Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-Scale Interactions." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.
"The boundaries separating social institutions from one another are sometimes hard to delimit with precision. Nonetheless, discrete institutions interact continually both horizontally or at the same level of social organization (e.g. interactions between trade regimes and environmental regimes at the international level) and vertically or across levels of social organization (e.g. interactions between national regulatory arrangements dealing with land use and local systems of land tenure). Focusing on issues of land use and sea use, this essay explores the consequences of vertical interplay in two distinct settings. The first setting features issues arising from the interplay between modern systems of public property articulated primarily at the national level and traditional, largely local systems rooted in practices involving common property. The second setting takes the analysis of institutional interplay to a higher level; it directs attention to regulatory regimes and examines interactions between international arrangements pertaining to the harvesting of natural resources and the management systems dealing with the same resources that operate within individual member states. The principal conclusion of the paper is that cross-scale interactions generate an inescapable tension between (1) the benefits of higher level arrangements measured in terms of opportunities to consider biophysical interdependencies and to engage in ecosystems management and (2) the costs of operating at higher levels calculated in terms of an inability to come to terms with local variations in biophysical conditions and a lack of sensitivity to the rights and interests of local stakeholders. The vigor of the debate regarding the subsidiarity principle testifies to the importance of this tension. But this debate also suggests that there is no simple criterion or formula that can be brought to bear in efforts to manage or regulate vertical interplay in these settings. Ideal responses to this institutional tension generally turn on a variety of situational factors; actual outcomes are typically products of complex political processes."
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