Bibliographies from the Workshop Library

 

Institutional Analysis and Development Framework

(372 Citations)

Compiled by Charlotte Hess

February 2006

 

 

 

 

Agrawal, Arun. 2000.  "Shepherds and Their Leaders among the Raikas of India: A Principal-Agent Perspective." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Agrawal, Arun. 1998.  "Group Size and Successful Collective Action: A Case Study of Forest Management Institutions in the Indian Himalayas." In Forest Resources and Institutions. C. Gibson, M. A. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC), Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. (Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper no. 3).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Agrawal, Arun. 1991.  "Risks, Resources, and Politics: A Study of Institutions and Resource Use from India."

wsl  Books.

 

This work explores the role of institutions in influencing resource use in poor societies.  Forests and pastures, the locus of analysis, form the source of basic subsistence for millions of households in the world.  The specific focus in the study is on rural communities in two ecologically fragile regions in India: the Himalayas and Rajasthan.

 

Akinola, S. R. 2004.  "Coping with Infrastructural Deprivation Through Collective Action Among Rural People in Ife Region, Nigeria." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, May 1 and 3, 2004.

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     "The failure of the state to address the problems of rural infrastructure in Ife region led to the adoption of self-governing techniques by the people through collective action.  Using Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) framework the paper confirms the invaluable capabilities of human cooperation and collective action by exploring the conditions and how rural people can go beyond their own self-interests to cooperate with others for common good.

     "The study shows that rural people can organize and govern themselves based on appropriate institutional arrangements, mutual agreements and share understanding. In 24 rural communities, self-organized arrangements in the provision and maintenance of rural infrastructural facilities accounts for about $262,000.00 (93.0%) of the total figure thus constitute the prime mover for rural facilities development, while Local Governments spent about $13,000.00 (7.0%).  The communities, through self-organizing and self-governing capabilities, have planned and executed several public goods and services that directly touch the lives of their people.  The public goods are: roads, health, education, market, electricity, water, postal service, hall, and police post.

     "The lesson we can learn from these institutions is how they are able to mobilize and use the resources without any body embezzling or diverting them for private selfish ends.  The concern is that if these institutions are so accountable to their members we should begin to conceptualize how they can be used to re-constitute order from the bottom and to serve as alternatives to the state structure of governance."

 

Aligica, Paul Dragos. 2005.  "Institutional Analysis and Economic Development Policy: Notes on the Applied Agenda of the Bloomington School: Extending Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne's Outline of the Research Program of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 57(2):159-165.

wsl  Serials Shelves.

 

Part of special issue entitled "Polycentric Political Economy: A Festschrift for Elinor and Vincent Ostrom":

     "This paper takes as a starting point Boettke and Coyne's argument and uses it as a vehicle in order to focus on one aspect related to the Bloomington research program that was mentioned but not elaborated by them: the applied theory agenda that this program has been inspiring.  Specific concentration is placed on one particular facet of that agenda: the issue of economic development policies."

 

Aligica, Paul Dragos. 2003.  "Institutional Analysis and Economic Development Policy: Notes on the Applied Agenda of the Bloomington School: Extending Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne's Outline of the Research Program of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (forthcoming) Prepared for the Academic Conference in Honor of the Work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, Nov. 7, 2003.

wsl  Books (Shelved under Boettke, P.).

 

     "This paper takes as a starting point Boettke and Coyne's argument and uses it as a vehicle in order to focus on one aspect related to the Bloomington research program that was mentioned but not elaborated by them: the applied theory agenda that this program has been inspiring.  Specific concentration is placed on one particular facet of that agenda: the issue of economic development policies."

 

Allen, Barbara. 1996.  "Martin Luther King's Message on Civil Rights, Community, and Collective Action." Presented at "Voices from the Commons," the Sixth Annual Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Berkeley, CA, June 5-8, 1996.

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   "Scholars interested in collective action dilemmas have recently turned to the American Civil Rights Movement to explore social incentives, reputational concerns, and 'narrowly rational' expressive benefits as motivations for commitment to difficult and dangerous forms of political participation. Civil rights protests from 1954-1968 have been expressed in formal models as a case study assurance game, yielding not only valuable insights concerning rationality assumptions and coordination problems, but also have advanced out efforts to model the decline of public action in accommodating and unresponsive policy environments. As useful as these models have been, they have failed to incorporate a central feature of this case, its religious foundations and concern for the transcendent good as well as material benefit. This omission not only limits such models' effectiveness in explaining the case of civil rights protests, it allows us to misinterpret the ontology of much collective action. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s political thought and other historical documents reveal that the Civil Rights Movement must be viewed in a context of covenantal relations, a perception not captured by our usual presentations of a rational calculus and the coordination of interests. His message, delivered most often in the form of a jeremiad, demands a change in consciousness as a condition for common action directed at political transformation. Political transformation resulted not merely from individual expressions of rights, but also depended on beliefs according value to the community in which these rights gained much of their significance. These political sermons link common action to such beliefs -- a transcendent common purpose -- evoking the covenantal roots of the American polity. By examining the covenantal foundations of the Civil Rights Movement through King's voice, I present an alternative to models of collective action that focus solely on the rational calculus that prohibits our individual pursuit of common goods. More than broadening our definition of the 'rational,' I suggest an important role for community as a variable in our institutional analysis of commons dilemmas, emphasizing the significance of covenantal theory in addressing problems of collective action."

 

Allen, Barbara, and Edella Schlager 2000.  "Covenant Institutions and the Commons: Colorado Water Resource Management." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/01/99/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

       "Covenants represent a primary means for establishing polities and crafting voluntary or enforceable obligations within political systems.  Covenants differ from other consent-based institutional arrangements such as contracts in their origin, scope, and duration.  Covenants offer a means for integrating heterogeneous actors politically by permitting asymmetrical rights and obligations when such structures make sense.  Our paper details the principles of covenant relations and explores the affinity between a covenantal orientation and federal democratic institutions by analyzing Colorado's water resource management.  Colorado governs this resource through institutions that permit resource users to develop, modify, contest, and transfer their water rights.  As the Colorado case demonstrates, covenants offer scholars of commons governance an institution for creating flexible, stable agreements for sustainable resource allocation."

 

Allen, Linda J. 1999.  "Institutional Analysis of the Water Sector in Mexico: Existing Performance and Shortcomings." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, December 11-13, 1999.

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Anderies, John M., Marco A. Janssen, and Elinor Ostrom 2004.  "A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective." Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Global Transition: Challenges, Risks and Opportunities," the Tenth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Oaxaca, Mexico, August 9-13, 2004.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001325/

Digital Library of the Commons

 

     "What makes social-ecological systems robust?  In this paper we look at the institutional configurations that affect the interactions among resources, resource users, public infrastructure providers, and public infrastructures.  We propose a framework that helps to identify potential vulnerabilities of social-ecological systems to disturbances.  All of the linkages among the components of this framework can fail and thereby reduce the robustness of the system.  We posit that the link between resource users and public infrastructure providers are a key variable affecting the robustness of social-ecological systems that has frequently been ignored in the past.  We illustrate the problems caused by a disruption in this link.  We then briefly describe the design principles originally developed for robust common-pool resource institutions since they appear to be a good starting point for the development of design principles for more general social-ecological systems and do include the link between resource users and public infrastructure providers."

 

Andersson, Krister. 2002.  "Explaining the Mixed Success of Municipal Governance of Forest Resources in Bolivia: Overcoming Local Information Barriers." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference, May 3 and 5, 2003, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

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From the Introduction:

     "This paper argues that in order to be successful, a municipal government needs to be both motivated to provide public services in the forestry sector as well as capable of addressing a series of collective-action problems related to the effective provision and production of these services.  The first question; why municipal governments would be at all interested in doing something about the many problems in the forestry sector; has been analyzed empirically for Bolivia by Andersson (2001) and for Guatemala by (Gibson and Lehoucq, 2000).  The second question, however crucial as it might be for understanding successful municipal governance, has not been studied in great detail and rigor.

     "This paper proposes that the varying conditions for information-sharing between several key actors in the local governance system are strong determinants of the performance of municipal governments.  This theoretical proposition is tested using empirical evidence from 50 randomly selected municipalities in Bolivia's forestry sector where municipal governments are responsible for providing a series of forestry-related services.  The empirical analysis finds that the use of three distinct information-sharing mechanisms can dramatically change a municipality's prospects for achieving success as a public provider of forestry sector services."

 

Andersson, Krister P., and Marilyn W. Hoskins 2004.  "Information Use and Abuse in the Local Governance of Common-Pool Forest Resources." Forests, Trees and Livelihoods 14:295-312.

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     "Information can be used to control and to deceive but also to stimulate creativity and the ability to respond to new opportunities.  The role of information is especially crucial in the local governance of common pool forest resources because activities in this field involve a wide variety of actors in different roles, with different interests, and with varying levels of knowledge and skills.  In situations of open communication this diversity of actors can be a strength in finding solutions to complex problems.  However, the diverse actors often face difficulties communicating with each other and thus fail to capitalize on their diversity.  Unless actors are able to develop effective communication, local governance of forest resources is not likely to be successful.  Different strategies of finding, processing, and incorporating important information into community forestry decision making are presented and discussed in this article.  Traditional, top-down project decision making often induces information-for-control rather than information-for-learning.  Institutional analysis helps to identify sources of motivation (or lack thereof) for different actors to engage in community forestry learning activities.  The right information, flowing to all major actors and being used for decision making, can make a difference in the success of community forestry activities."

 

Apesteguia, Jose J. 1998.  "Institutions and Institutional Evolution." Presented at "Crossing Boundaries," the seventh annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10-14, 1998.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/00/07/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

   "There is a long and broad tradition in the institutional analysis. Scholars along all social sciences have devoted their research to the study of institutions. This interdisciplinarity provides an extremely rich quantitative and qualitative development in the topic. Nevertheless, the dominant contemporary economic theory ignores the institutional tradition. Institutions are relegated, if at all, to footnotes and are considered as a fixed, well-defined box. Within this box the neoclassical conceptualization develops a stylized model of individual behavior. However, as every student of institutions knows, this box has multiple forms that derive in multiple types of influences over the individual behavior. Moreover, the box changes and generates changes in its contents.

   "The present paper is focussed on the study of this box; it will be analyzed and defined. By so doing, it will be shown why the institutional analysis provides an ideal framework to deal with a critical review of the neoclassical model. Once the analyst takes the effort of looking at the institutional structure and its evolutionary processes, some of the assumptions made in the neoclassical model and widely accepted appear incoherent.

   "The organization of the paper is as follows. In section II the meaning of institutions will be explored. It will be argued about the necessity of delimiting the boundaries of institutions and a proposal will be developed. It will also be pursued in this section the problem of the institutional representation. The concept of evolution and its suitability for the study of institutional change will be analyzed in section III. Section IV deals with concluding remarks."

 

Aylward, Bruce, and Alvaro Fernandez Gonzalez 1998.  "Institutional Arrangements for Watershed Management: A Case Study of Arenal, Costa Rica." International Institute for Environmental Development (IIED), London. (CREED Working Paper, no. 21).

wsl  Books.

 

From p. 2:

     "The study employs three methodological approaches: (1) an institutional approach; (2) an environmental-economic approach; and (3) a participatory-stakeholder approach. In reality all three approaches are integrated with the institutional approach providing the theoretical umbrella. The institutional approach is based on an application of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework put forward by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Political Analysis (sic) of Indiana University, Bloomington. The framework has its roots in classical political economy, neoclassical microeconomic theory, institutional economics, public choice theory, transaction-cost economics and noncooperative game theory (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994). Key concepts from the field of economics are, thus, embedded in the IAD framework.

     "However, the advantage of the IAD framework, is that it spreads its web much wider. Considerable emphasis is placed on the issue of transaction costs. These costs are typically disregarded in standard (quantitative) economic analyses, as examplified by the evaluation of the market and policy incentives conducted in the other half of the CREED Costa Rica study. The IAD framework also incorporates non-economic and non-quantitative factors into the analysis. In particular, the institutional analysis feeds off qualitative information produced by local-level inquiry such as the participatory-stakeholder approach employed in this study. the latter therefore serves a dual function of informing the IAD analysis and of initiating an action process within the local context."

 

Baggetta, Maria. 2005.  "Elegy for the Salt River: Successional Tales of A Southwestern Social-Ecological System." (M. S. Thesis, Arizona State University, 2005).

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     "Desiccation of the Salt River is one local, yet fairly extreme example of human alteration to an ecological system.  Extreme, but unfortunately not unique.  On a world wide basis these alterations are 'substantial and growing.'  In order to understand how humans effect such profound changes in their environment, there has been a growing awareness of the need to study social and ecological processes as part of one large integrated social-ecological system (SES).  This thesis can be viewed as a first iteration in massive surface, and more recently subsurface, hydrological alterations in this southwestern urban region.

     "The current study, focusing on the early settlement of the Salt River Valley (1867-1902), integrates the social and ecological components using Holling's complex adaptive system metaphor in conjunction with Elinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, in order to analyze the interactions that occurred between the early inhabitants and the Salt River as they tried to govern their common pool resource situation at the turn of the century and to identify the feedbacks that had occurred between the social and ecological components of the system.  The study has found that the settlers were not able to restructure their institutional setting in order to avoid an open access situation.  Instead, extensive physical restructuring occurred as the CPR became crowded, demand for water increased, and users intensified efforts to capture and control increasingly scarce resource units."

 

Bahati, Joseph, and Esther Mwangi 2001.  "Institutions and the Structure of Tropical Moist Forests in Central Uganda." In 'Operationalization of Participatory Natural Forests Management in Kenya': Proceedings of the 2nd International Forestry Resources & Institution (IFRI) Regional Workshop. Jane W. Njuguna, Pauline Bwire, and Paul Ongugo, eds. Narobi, Kenya: Kenya Forestry Research Institute.

wsl  Books.

 

Bahati, Joseph, and Esther Mwangi 1999.  "Institutions and the Condition of Tropical Moist Forests of Central Uganda." (Working Paper)

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Ballesteros, Marta A. 2003.  "Short Memo about my Dissertation in Progress: 'The Impact of a New Institutional Framework: Las Cofradias de Pescadores de Galicia (Spain)'." (Working Paper)

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     "Cofradias are ancient institutions that have managed marine resources in Spain for centuries. This institution, that integrates fishermen and shipowner in one organization, was born as a kind of association among fishermen, to help each other..."

 

Banana, Abwoli Y., and William Gombya-Ssembajjwe 1998.  "Successful Forest Management: The Importance of Security of Tenure and Rule Enforcement in Ugandan Forests." In Forest Resources and Institutions. C. Gibson, M. A. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC), Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. (Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper no. 3).

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Becker, C. Dustin, and Clark C. Gibson 1998.  "The Lack of Institutional Supply: Why a Strong Local Community in Western Ecuador Fails to Protect its Forest." In Forest Resources and Institutions. C. Gibson, M. A. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC), Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. (Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper no. 3).

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Becker, C. Dustin, and Rosario Leon 1998.  "Indigenous Forest Management in the Bolivian Amazon: Lessons from the Yuracare People." In Forest Resources and Institutions. C. Gibson, M. A. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC), Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. (Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper no. 3).

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Bendor, Jonathan. 1995.  "Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources (Book Review)." American Political Science Review 89(1):188-189.

wsl  Reprint Files and Serials Shelves.

 

Benjamin, Charles. 2001.  "Biodiversity and Food Security." (Working Paper)

wsl  Oversized Books (shelved under IFRI Y773 Seminar Readings).

 

From the introduction:

     "This research examines the role of institutions in shaping biodiversity conservation and food security in Mali (West Africa).  It seeks to understand the manner in which socio-cultural diversity influences the effectiveness of natural resource management institutions.  Decentralization of natural resource management has been increasingly promoted around the world as a solution to the historically poor performance of centralized policy, based on the argument that the knowledge, abilities and incentives of local communities are more conducive to conservation.  Increasingly, however, decentralization has come under scrutiny for its potential to exacerbate local inequalities and environmental decline.  Using IFRI methods, complemented by ethnobotanical surveys of individual resource users, this project attempts to unpack some of the assumptions about communities and conservation, focussing on the distribution of knowledge, interests and behavior within communities and the influence of socio-cultural diversity on institutional development in the context of decentralization."

 

Berkes, Fikret, and Carl Folke 1995.  "A Framework for the Study of Indigenous Knowledge: Linking Social and Ecological Systems." Presented at "Reinventing the Commons," the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, May 24-28, 1995, Bodoe, Norway.

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   "A considerable amount of evidence has accumulated to indicate that ecological sensible indigenous practices have indeed existed in diverse ecosystems.  Based on these findings, there is potential for improvement of resource management in environments such as northern coastal ecosystems, arid and semi-arid land ecosystems, mountain ecosystems, tropical forest ecosystems, subarctic ecosystems and island ecosystems.  As compared to the rather narrow set of prescriptions of Western scientific resource management systems, some of which may inadvertently act to reduce ecosystem resilience, indigenous management is often associated with a diversity of property rights regimes and common property institutions and locally adapted practices, and it may operate under systems of knowledge substantially different from Western knowledge systems.

   The framework we propose distinguishes seven sets of variables which can be used to describe social and ecological system characteristics and linkages in any indigenous resource use case study: (1) ecosystem, (2) resource users and technology, (3) local knowledge, (4) property rights, (5) institutions, (6) pattern of interactions, and (7) outcomes.  Our framework borrows from Oakerson for the analysis of common property management, and that of Ostrom for institutional analysis.

   The key concept in our framework is resilience, to emphasize the importance of conditions in which disturbances (perturbations) can flip a system from one equilibrium state to another.  We use Holling's definition of resilience, the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behaviour.

We hypothesize that:

   -maintaining resilience is important for both resources and social institutions, and therefore the well-being of social and ecological systems is closely linked;

   -successful tradition knowledge systems will allow perturbations to enter an ecosystem on a scale which does not threaten its structure and functional performance, and the services it provides; and

   -there will be evidence of co-evolution in such traditional systems, making the local community and their institutions 'in tune' over time with the natural process of the particular ecosystem."

 

Blomquist, William A. 1991.  "They Prefer Chaos: Institutions for Governing Groundwater Systems in Southern California (manuscript draft)."

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Blomquist, William, and Elinor Ostrom 1999.  "Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Blomquist, William, and Elinor Ostrom 1985.  "Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma." Policy Studies Review 5(2):383-393.

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Blomquist, William, and Roger B. Parks 1999.  "Fiscal, Service, and Political Impacts of Indianapolis-Marion County's Unigov." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Boettke, Peter J., and Christopher J. Coyne 2005.  "Methodological Individualism, Spontaneous Order and the Research Program of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 57(2):145-158.

wsl  Serials Shelves.

 

Part of special issue entitled "Polycentric Political Economy: A Festschrift for Elinor and Vincent Ostrom":

 

     "This paper is an exercise in the archeology of knowledge that seeks to understand the intellectual precursors to the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  This perspective reveals that the research agenda of the Ostroms draws significantly from the ideas and themes developed in the first half of the 20th century by Knight, Mises, and Hayek.  In so doing, we argue, they usefully deploy and expand the economic way of thinking beyond its traditional boundaries while avoiding most of the criticisms of economic imperialism."

From p. 147:

     "One of the best examples of the methodological individualist research program of the early 20th century being pushed in a new direction and developed further is the work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom and the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at the University of Indiana. The "Bloomington School" is recognized as one of the three main schools associated with the development of public choice theorythe other two are Rochester (Riker) and Virginia (Buchanan and Tullock). The workshop was founded in the 1970s and, as the name suggests, is grounded in the intellectual commitment to collaborative scholarship between faculty and graduate students and emphasizes the interconnection between problems in theory and the practical problems in public policy. Building on early work done by the Ostroms on the polycentric nature of municipalities and of public goods provision, the workshop has pursued research on federalism, common-pool resources, and the institutional analysis of development. In each of these endeavors, we will argue, the Ostroms research builds on and refines the approach to the social sciences laid out by Mises, Knight, and Hayek in terms of methodological individualism and spontaneous order.1 In so doing, they usefully deploy and expand the economic way of thinking beyond its traditional boundaries while avoiding most of the criticisms of economic imperialism."

 

Bogason, Peter. 1994.  "Nyinstitutionalisme, Public Choice og Bloomington-Skolen." Teori og Debat 44:83-100.

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From the Ostrom/Workshop correspondence archives

 

Bravo, Giangiacomo. 2002.  "Environment, Institutions and Society in the Management of Common-Pool Resources: Linking IAD Framework with the Concept of Social Capital." Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Globalisation," the Ninth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, June 17-21, 2002.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/97/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

     "Since using IAD framework significantly helped researchers in empirical analysis of common-pool resources ranging from local to global scale, it is not surprising that it is now widely appreciated as a major analytical tool.  A second fundamental concept rising in the last fifteen years is social capital.  Its application field seems also wide, and range from economic development analysis to comparative researches on institutional performance, to studies regarding collective action.  Social capital includes elements like internalized values, relations, trustworthiness of social environment, and local institutions.  My proposal is to range them in a scale of increasing collective action difficulty, i.e. the higher is the place held in the scale, the greater is the need of collective action both to create and maintain the element.

     "The paper inquires the possible links existing between the two schemes, starting from the analysis of factor of both social and institutional origin affecting actors interacting in the action arena.  My proposal is indeed to characterize those factors using the concept of social capital.  The main aim is to show that - considering social capital elements and the relations among them as factors affecting the action arena, and analyzing the feedback effects illustrated by the IAD framework - it is possible to reach a greater evidence in explaining performances in CPRs management situations.  Empirical examples are provided, showing the possibility of application of the new scheme."

 

Bromley, Daniel W. et al., eds. 1992. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy. San Francisco: ICS Press.

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Contents:

Bromley, Daniel W.

  The Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes

Runge, C. Ford

  Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development

Oakerson, Ronald J.

  Analyzing the Commons:  A Framework

McKean, Margaret A.

  Management of Traditional Common Lands (Iriaichi) in Japan

Campbell, Bruce M. S. and Godoy, Ricardo A.

  Commonfield Agriculture:  The Andes and Medieval England Compared

Thomson, James T., Feeney, David, and Oakerson, Ronald J.

  Institutional Dynamics:  The Evolution and Dissolution of Common-   Property Resource Management

Berkes, Fikret

  Success and Failure in Marine Coastal Fisheries of Turkey

Cordell, John and McKean, Margaret A.

  Sea Tenure in Bahian, Brazil

Wade, Robert

  Common-Property Resource Management in South Indian Villiages

Gilles, Jere L., Hammoudi, Abdellah, and Mahdi, Mohammed

Oukaimedene

  Morocco:  A High Mountain Agdal

Blaikie, Piers, Harriss, John, and Pain, Adam

  The Management and Use of Common-Property Resources in Tamil Nadu, India

Feeny, David

  Where Do We go From Here?  Implications for the Research Agenda

Ostrom, Elinor

  The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-Property Institutions

 

Buck, Susan. 1999.  "Multiple-Use Commons, Collective Action, and Platforms for Resource Use Negotiation." Agriculture and Human Values 16:237-239.

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Buck, Susan J. 1998.  The Global Commons: An Introduction. Covelo, CA: Island Press.

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Foreword by Elinor Ostrom

Abstract by C. Hess 4-2000:

    "Buck analyzes four types of global commons: Antarctica, the atmosphere, space, and the high seas.  These global domains are ones that have, until recently, remained unclaimed due to a lack of technology for extracting their value and for establishing and sustaining property rights. The technology for extracting value form these four domains have developed more rapidly that have the appropriate legal mechanisms for establishing effective property regimes.

     "Buck's purpose in writing the book is 'to examine how legal and political contexts have affected the evolution of management regimes for the global commons.'  Her approach is both narrative and analytic. She describes the historical development of each commons management regime, with particular attention given to the role of law. Historical events are then examined using the IAD Framework."

     Susan Hanna wrote of this book:  "[It} brings a new perspective to international environmental issues.  Sustan Buck has created a scholarly and readable book that richly illuminates the historical evolution, scientific uncertainty, and political complexity of sustaining shared resources in an increasingly integrated world."

 

Bushouse, Brenda. 1999.  "The Missing Link: Collective-Choice Policymaking in Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Public Child Care Centers." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the "Workshop on the Workshop 2," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, June 9-June 13, 1999. (J99-29).

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Bushouse, Brenda K. 1999.  "The Mixed Economy of Child Care: An Institutional Analysis of Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Public Enterprises." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1999).

wsl  Colloquium Room.

 

Bushouse, Brenda K. 1998.  "The Missing Link: Collective-Choice Policymaking in Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Public Child Care Centers." Presented at the Annual Conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, November 5-7, 1998, Seattle, WA.

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Carlsson, Lars. 2000.  "Policy Networks as Collective Action." Policy Studies Journal 28(3):502-520.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "An important contribution to the policy sciences, and to interorganizational research in particular, has been the introduction of the so-called policy network approach.  Despite the fact that this approach has produced a multitude of concepts, it still lacks a theoretical scaffold. In this article it is argued that simply to refer to something called 'network theory' is an unsatisfactory solution. It is suggested that one way of advancing the policy network approach is to apply collective action theory and explicitly regard different empirical appearances of network concepts as expressions of collective action.  Six tentative building blocks of such a theory are suggested.  It is further argued that the policy network approach would benefit from incorporation into a broader analytical framework such as the Institutional Analysis and Development framework.  Finally, it is concluded that such an incorporation would advance our ability to understand the processes of policymaking and thus to fulfill one of the old commitments of policy analysis, namely to contribute to the refinement of policy making processes in society."

 

Carlsson, Lars, and Fikret Berkes 2003.  "Co-Management Across Levels of Organization: Concepts and Methodological Implications." Presented at Politics of the Commons: Articulating Development and Strengthening Local Practices, Chiang Mai, Thailand, July 11-14, 2003.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001133/

Digital Library of the Commons

 

From Page 2:

     "There is a growing literature on social-ecological linkages and sustainable use of natural resources.  This research can be divided into two broad categories.  The first category consists basically of case studies that reveal the existence of an extremely rich variety of systems of management of common-pool resources.  The second type of research sets out to find empirical and theoretical support for the prospects of suggesting, and deliberately building management systems that fulfill well-known criteria for sustainable use (Burger et al., 2001; Berkes and Folke, 2002).  In both types of research, the concept and principles of co-management  have been an integral part.  This paper is based on the presumption that the two lines of research could be merged and synthesized.  The paper deals with three broad questions.

1. What is co-management and how should the phenomenon be understood?

2. What is co-management good for?

3. How can real-life instances of co-management be investigated and analyzed?"

 

Carlsson, Lars, Nils-Gustav Lundgren, and Mats-Olov Olsson 1996.  "Prerequisites for the Evolution of Markets: An Institutional Analysis of Russian Forestry: A Project Proposal and its Funding Needs." Division of Political Science, Department of Business Administration and Social Sciences, Lulea University of Technology, Lulea, Sweden.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Carr, Jered B. 2004.  "Perspectives on City-County Consolidation and Its Alternatives." In City-County Consolidation and Its Alternatives: Reshaping the Local Government Landscape. J. B. Carr and R. C. Feiock, eds. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

wsl  Urban Collection.

 

Carr, Jered B., and Richard C. Feiock, eds. 2004. City-County Consolidation and Its Alternatives: Reshaping the Local Government Landscape. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

wsl  Urban Collection.

 

Centonze, Roberta, and Roberta Spadoni 2004.  "Dialectical Institutions for Animal Genetic Resources Management." Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Global Transition: Challenges, Risks and Opportunities," the Tenth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Oaxaca, Mexico, August 9-13, 2004.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001356/

Digital Library of the Commons

 

     "The paper discusses the role of local institutions in defining how animal genetic resources are governed at the village level emphasising the interaction between private and common property regimes in rural areas of Rajasthan, India.  The legal pluralism approach has been applied and an institutional analysis has been carried out considering the rules in use at the local and global levels."

 

Centre de Cooperation Internationle en Recherche Agronomique pour le Developpement (CIRAD). 1994. "Workshop 'Renewable Resources and Appropriation Regimes,' Paris, February 22-26, 1994." CIRAD, Paris.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Chakravarty-Kaul, Minoti. 1996.  Common Lands and Customary Law: Institutional Change in North India over the Past Two Centuries. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

wsl  Reserves and Reprint Files.

 

   "This is an historical inquiry into common lands and institutions of communal control in north India from the early nineteenth centur to almost the end of the present one. The region more or less coincides with British Punjab -- a province encompassing Delhi until 1912. Common lands in this area, evolved and transformed, not as an isolated phenomenon, but as part of two major changes in the system of agriculture in the nineteenth and  early twentieth centuries. The first was a transition from a system utilizing cultivable 'waste,' banjar kadim or long fallow, for grazing, to one of intensive and irrigated land-use for arable, and short fallows for pastoral purposes. The second change was a decline in the joint control exercised by the village propriety body or malikan-deh over resource management in the course of the nineteenth century..."

   "...This study is a response to the rapidly growing literature on common property resources, and in particular, to the comparative institutional analysis which was emerged out of the writings of the so-called Property Rights School and the New Institutional and Public Choice Schools centered around the Ostroms' Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis in Bloomington..."

 

Choe, Jaesong. 1993.  "The Organization of Urban Common-Property Institutions: The Case of Apartment Communities in Seoul." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1993).

wsl  Colloquium Room.

 

Christensen, Robert K. 2004.  "Non-Sovereigns Formalizing the Potency of the Informal Sector? Institutional Analysis of Nongovernmental Organizations Prescribing, Invoking, Monitoring, Applying, and Enforcing Policy." Presented at the EGDI-WIDER Conference, "Unlocking Human Potential: Linking the Informal and Formal Sectors," Helsinki, Finland, 17-18 September 2004.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "The Westphalian paradigm suggests that sovereign nation-states formally constitute the only legitimate institutions of international policy creation, enactment, and enforcement.  This piece seeks to highlight the policy potency of nongovernmental organizations by turning to a debate that questions the relevancy of the Westphalian paradigm.  One of the most contentious points in this debate is the role and legitimacy of the various actors involved in globalization.  This piece discusses the mechanism of 'soft law,' which allows non-state actors to participate, in an increasingly formalized way, in policy processes traditionally and even exclusively populated by sovereign nation states.  The analysis utilizes Ostrom et al.'s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to clarify the institutional implications of non-sovereigns in policy formation.  Ultimately, the soft-law mechanism illustrates that the informal sector is gaining access, as and through NGOs, to powerful policy networks where formal sovereignty is decreasingly relevant."

 

Consejero, Fabiola Mota. 1998.  "How Citizens' Preferences Construct Institutions and How Institutions Model Citizens' Preferences: The Spanish Case of System of Autonomous Communities." Presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Bloomington, IN, December 12-14, 1998.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Costejá Florensa, Meritxell. 2004.  "Institutional Stability and Change: A Logic Sequence for Studying Instituitonal Dynamics." Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Global Transition: Challenges, Risks and Opportunities," the Tenth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Oaxaca, Mexico, August 9-13, 2004.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001365/

Digital Library of the Commons

 

From Pages 2-3:

     "This paper focuses on the dynamics of institutions in an attempt to identify some of the main variables that affect institutional stability and change.  I will begin by introducing some of the main processes contributing to institutional stability, opposed to the factors that can introduce change at a particular level of the institutional structure.  A description of the main patterns of change will follow.  I will then propose a framework to study institutional change which identifies a dynamic sequence of stages driven by multi-actor interaction processes.  The last section will conclude with some questions for future research."

 

Cousins, Ben. 1992.  "A Political Economy Model of Common Property Regimes and the Case of Grazing Management in Zimbabwe." Presented at "Inequality and the Commons," the third annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Conference, Washington DC, September 17-20, 1992.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

   "Conceptual framework for the analysis of common property regimes

are important because they allow for the comparison of individual cases and generalization across diversity. The framework proposed by Oakerson (1986) is critically examined and although many of its features are useful and worth retaining, it is found to be inadequate in its treatment of the key issues of power and authority, on the one hand, and of social and economic structure, on the other.  Struggles over access

to and control over common property resources often arise from structural inequalities which have to be made central to analysis.  It also tends to neglect the importance of ecological dynamics and does not make sufficient provision for disjunctions between technical and ecological aspects.  Modifications to the Oakerson model are suggested which allow for the analysis of these dimensions. This 'political economy' model of the commons is put to the test by applying it to the analysis of grazing management schemes in the communal lands of Zimbabwe.  Detailed ethnographic data on the complexities of intra-community power struggles in one such scheme are briefly summarized, and the model is used to diagnose the underlying reasons for problems which have emerged within this scheme."

 

Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom 2000.  "A Grammar of Institutions." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Davis, Gina, and Elinor Ostrom 1991.  "Choice and Co-Production: A Public Economy Approach to the Study and Reform of Institutions for the Provision and Production of Education." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Day, Shane. 2002.  "Linking Management of Private Resources to Protection of a Common-Pool Resource: An Institutional Analysis of the Washington State Forests and Fish Plan." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting, Humboldt University/Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, December 13-16, 2002.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

From page 3:

     "Institutional analysis is potentially useful in answering several questions pertaining to this unique case.  Using the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) developed by scholars at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis under the leadership of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, (particularly focusing on its examination of multiple levels of analysis and exogenous factors affecting the institutional environment) I hope to answer the question of why the Forests and Fish Plan, a 'voluntary' form of self-regulation, was established and what principles were most influential in forming its structure.  I will also provide a preliminary evaluation of the implications of the institution and the potential for actor compliance, which will include a discussion on the importance of third party monitors and how they are meant to ensure compliance with the rules-in-use.  Furthermore, I will examine existing literature pertaining to voluntary self regulation in environmental policy, and I will show that the institutional change towards voluntary agreements in environmental policy identified by John Maxwell and Thomas Lyon is similarly applicable to issues of natural resource management."

 

Deadman, Peter J., Edella Schlager, and Randy Gimblett 2000.  "Simulating Common Pool Resource Management Experiments with Adaptive Agents Employing Alternate Communication Routines." Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 3(2)

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "This paper describes the development of a series of intelligent agent simulations based on data from previously documented common pool resource (CPR) experiments. These simulations are employed to examine the effects of different institutional configurations and individual behavioral characteristics on group level performance in a commons dilemma. Intelligent agents were created to represent the actions of individuals in a CPR experiment. The agents possess a collection of heuristics and utilize a form of adaptation by credit assignment in which they select the heuristic that appears to yield the highest return under the current circumstances. These simulations allow the analyst to specify the precise initial configuration of an institution and an individual's behavioral characteristics, so as to observe the interaction of the two and the group level outcomes that emerge as a result. Simulations explore settings in which there is no communication between agents, as well as the relative effects on overall group behavior of two different communication routines. The behavior of these simulations is compared with documented CPR experiments. Future directions in the development of the technology are outlined for natural resource management modeling applications. "

 

Di Gregorio, Monica et al. 2004.  "Property Rights, Collective Action and Poverty: The Role of Institutions for Poverty Reduction." Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Global Transition: Challenges, Risks and Opportunities," the Tenth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Oaxaca, Mexico, August 9-13, 2004.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001549/

Digital Library of the Commons

 

Co-Authors:

Hagedorn, Konrad

Kirk, Michael

Korf, Benedikt

McCarthy, Nancy

Meinzen-Dick, Ruth

Swallow, Brent

From the Introduction:

     "...This paper presents a conceptual framework for examining how property rights and collective action can contribute to poverty reduction, including both external interventions and action by poor people themselves.  We begin with definitions of the key concepts--poverty, property rights, and collective action.  We then turn to an examination of how property rights and collective action are related to poverty outcomes, building upon the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework ( Ostrom 1991; Oakerson 1992).  This interdisciplinary framework allows analysis of a wide range of interactions, and is useful for eliciting relevant questions for examination in any particular case.  At the heart of this framework is the action arena, which is shaped by initial conditions and, in turn, determines a range of outcomes.  Applying this framework to poverty reduction, we present an analysis of the initial conditions of poverty, including the asset base, risks and vulnerability, legal structure and power relations.  We next look at the dynamics of actors both poor and non-poor and how they use the tangible and intangible resources they have to shape their livelihoods and the institutions in which they live.  We conclude with a discussion of how this framework can improve our understanding of the outcomes in terms of changes in poverty status.

     "Discussing such complex and dynamic processes in one paper requires generalization, yet we know that both the material and institutional conditions of the poor vary from place to place, and change over time.  Recognizing the importance of local circumstances, we have phrased many of the key points as propositions, to be considered for different situations, but not necessarily applying to all.  We hope that this will provide a basis for further thinking and discussion; and in particular, for further empirical analysis, which can advance our understanding of the role collective action and property rights can play in poverty reduction."

 

Dietz, Thomas. 2003.  "The Darwinian Trope in the Drama of the Commons: Variations on Some Themes by the Ostroms." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (forthcoming) Prepared for the Academic Conference in Honor of the Work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, 7 Nov. 2003.

wsl  Books (Shelved under Boettke, P.).

 

     "This paper focuses on several of the major themes and strategies from the work of the Ostroms on the topic of the commons.  In particular I want to decant some concepts and approaches that foreshadow how we might best build upon the foundations they have established.  I hope to prompt a discussion that will suggest both the challenges for the next decade and how we might address them."

 

Dolsak, Nives. 2000.  "Marketable Permits:  Managing Local, Regional, and Global Commons." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 2000).

wsl  Colloquium Room.

 

Donnelly, Shanon. 2002.  "'Disposing of Lands': The Importance of the Land Ordinance of 1785 to Current Forest Fragmentation." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting, Humboldt University/Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, December 13-16, 2002.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

From the introduction:

     "This paper aims to lay the foundation for future work towards an understanding of the complex set of influences on land ownership and parcelization through an analysis of the Land Ordinance of 1785.  To accomplish this goal, the paper will begin with a description of the importance of forest fragmentation and its relationship to land ownership patterns.  Where a concrete example is helpful, the case of Indiana will be used.  This will be followed by a discussion of the nature of forest as a complex good and the ways in which this can and has been misunderstood.  An institutional analysis of the action arena delineated by the Land Ordinance of 1785 will then be undertaken using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework.  The paper will conclude with a discussion of how those rules laid out (and those not laid out) by the Ordinance have given rise to current forest fragmentation issues."

 

Dorji, Lam, Edward L. Webb, and Ganesh P. Shivakoti 2002.  "Incentives, Disincentives and the Concept of Forest Management in Bhutan." In Institutions for Sustainable Development: Proceedings of the 2nd Biennial Meeting of the International Forestry & Institutions (IFRI) Research Network. P. O. Ongugo, J. W. Njuguna, and S. W. Mwanyiky, eds. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI).

wsl  Books (Shelved under Ongugo, Paul).

 

     "Since the enactment of the Forestry Act of 1969, Bhutan has had a nationalized forest management policy with the objective of maintaining forests.  National forest policies in many countries emphasize state ownership and control of forests upon which rural livelihoods are based.  Blamed for taking ownership away from people and limiting their use rights, nationalized forest management policies are often seen as contributors to deforestation through the removal of long-term local incentives.  However, under the nationalized forest management, Bhutan currently maintains 72% forest cover.  While acknowledging that low population density and general forest inaccessibility are contributing factors to this achievement, we propose that there are two additional vectors contributing to forest conservation in Bhutan.  First, the government has set up line agencies at the national, district and local levels to implement programs and activities that facilitate adherence to forest rules and regulations.  There is provision of local forest product requirements, conservation programs, and integrated conservation and development programs that directly or indirectly contribute to forest conservation.  Second, the history of sokshing (leaf litter forest) management at the community level counteracts the disincentives resulting from the loss of property rights via the nationalized forest policy.  Indigenous institutions that regulate sokshing within communities reintroduce incentives at the local level by creating a sense of household ownership-that is recognized by the local community and the government during conflict resolution exercises.  Sokshing are 'keystone' elements of the overall stability of forest management in Bhutan.  Given its importance in forest management for Bhutan, we used the IAD/IFRI framework to uncover the management practices, institutions and biological condition of sokshing forest, relative to non-sokshing forest.  Moreover, we discuss the mechanisms of incentives that contribute to the positive outcome of forest conservation in Bhutan.

 

Downs, Michael. 1994.  "Learning through Monitors?  Information Technology and Self-Governing Societies." Presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Bloomington, IN, April 30 - May 2, 1994.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Edwards, Victoria M., and Nathalie A. Steins 1998.  "Developing an Analytical Framework for Multiple-Use Commons." Journal of Theoretical Politics 10(3):347-383.

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Edwards, Victoria M., and Nathalie A. Steins 1996.  "Developing an Analytical Framework for Multiple-Use Commons." Presented at "Voices from the Commons," the Sixth Annual Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Berkeley, CA, June 5-8, 1996.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

   "Much of the work conducted on common property resources has tended to focus on relatively undeveloped commons, where the imperative is to establish coordinated action between a single type of user of the resource. There are some exceptions to this. For example, Gupta (1986) examined the stratified social structure in Rajasthan and explained how it affected commons in terms of the different expectations of the different classes of users and the different animals that they depastured (sheep, goats, cattle, buffalo and other). Nevertheless, whilst his work covered different classes of commoners with different animals, it focused on a single use: that of grazing. As traditional commons in developing countries evolve, research which explains the persistence of commons with multiple ownership, use and management structures will become increasingly relevant as a foundation for the theory of complex common property regimes.

   "This paper attempts to extend the analytical frameworks developed by Oakerson (1986) and Ostrom (1990) for application in more complex multiple-use common property resource situations in developed countries. As such, the framework must be capable of facilitating analysis of 'communities/groups.' Initial research suggests that four essential components must be involved in the appropriation and management of common pool resources. Second, the framework must comprise a multiple-level analytical tool in order to further understanding of institutional arrangements (Kiser & Ostrom 1982). Third, the framework must be capable of repetition through a succession of chosen time periods. Finally, the framework should incorporate different rule categories, in a generic fashion, at different levels of analysis."

 

Feeny, David. 1994.  "Frameworks for Understanding Resource Management on the Commons." In Community Management and Common Property of Coastal Fisheries in Asia and the Pacific: Concepts, Methods and Experiences.  R. S. Pomeroy, ed. Manila, Philippines: International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM). (ICLARM Conference Proceedings, no. 45).

wsl  Books.

 

Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn. 1999.  "The Concentration of Authority: Constitutional Creation in the Gold Coast, 1950." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Fischer, Anke, and Lorenz Petersen 2004.  "Managing the Commons: A Conceptual Framework for Natural Resource Governance in Development Projects." Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Global Transition: Challenges, Risks and Opportunities," the Tenth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Oaxaca, Mexico, August 9-13, 2004.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001387/

Digital Library of the Commons

 

     "Many problems of unsustainable management of natural resources worldwide are due to a limited number of basic governance shortcomings such as lack of property rights definitions leading to open access, or insufficient enforcement of existing rules.  Often however, researchers and to an even greater extent practitioners in development cooperation focus on one single natural resource and tend to ignore the analogy of problems in related fields.  This practice is also endemic in the German Agency for Development Cooperation (GTZ).  As a consequence, many insights gained in one field, e. g., with regard to irrigation or community forestry, are not shared with experts from related areas or discussed within a wider scope.

     "In this paper, a conceptual framework for analysing the governance problems behind unsustainable management of natural resources is proposed.  It is applicable to all kinds of natural resources, regardless of their physical properties. The framework serves as a common theoretical background on which to analyse management problems, their causes, and possible interventions.  The core of the framework draws on the Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD; e. g., Ostrom 1990, Thomson 1992).  In addition, the proposed framework accounts for the peculiarities of development cooperation projects.  Several modules are integrated which proved useful (i) to capture multi-actor relationships in resource management and (ii) to design and describe actual GTZ activities, interventions and the implementation of measures.   Thus, a basis is provided to compare development cooperation projects and to draw conclusions on explicit and implicit goals of development policy and its shortcomings.

    "The second, empirical part of the paper illustrates the potential and the application of the framework and presents a survey of case studies on resource management in developing countries.  Based on this analysis, actual interventions and consulting activities with regard to common property issues are compared to the overarching objectives of development policy."

 

Florensa, Meritxell Costeja. 2002.  "Inquiring about the Dynamics of Institutional Change: Some Lessons from the Modernisation of the Mula huerta in Murcia, Spain." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting, Humboldt University/Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, December 13-16, 2002.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "Institutions are dynamic entities.  This paper focuses on the dynamics of institutional change in an attempt to identify some of the main variables that can affect change.  On the one hand, it argues that in the study of these dynamics, both formal and informal institutions do matter.  On the other hand, it suggests that multiple factors, having both an endogenous and an exogenous, origin can be identified when trying to explain processes of institutional change, and that such factors can account for changes at various levels and scales of the institutional structure.  This paper also provides some empirical evidence from the study of the transformation of the Mula huerta in Murcia, Spain to illustrate how institutional changes do operate in practice.  In this case, the changes introduced to the existing institutions that regulated the property and use of water have led to a deep transformation of the management practices of irrigations and improved the conditions for the sustainability of a common pool resource."

 

Futemma, Celia. 1996.  "Land Ownership and Communal Forest Management." Presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Bloomington, IN, December 14, 1996.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

From page 3:

     "In this paper I will not focus in depth on strategies of sustainable management with regard to ecological, social and economic aspects rather I will address questions on various types of incentives behind people participation in forest management at community level paying special attention to land ownership issues.  To do so, the analytical model proposed by Thomson (1992) and Ostrom (1992) will be used.  Cases from the Ituqui Region, Santarem-Para state, Brazil and some other places from Amazonia will be brought up in order to illustrate/exemplify some of the arguments."

 

Gardner, Roy, Michael R. Moore, and James M. Walker 2000.  "Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratroy Analysis of Western Water Law." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Gellar, Sheldon. 1983.  "Circulaire 32 Revisited: The Senegalese Cooperative Experience, 1960-1983." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Gellar, Sheldon, Ronald Oakerson, and Susan Wynne 1990.  "An Institutional Analysis of the Production, Processing, and Marketing of Arabica Coffee in the West and North West Provinces of Cameroon." Associates in Rural Development, Burlington, VT, for U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. (DFM: Decentralization: Finance & Management Project).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Gerrity, Jessica C. 2002.  "Microenterprise Assistance Programs in the United States and the Pivotal Role of Social Capital." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting, Humboldt University/Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, December 13-16, 2002.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "This paper uses the institutional analysis and development framework (IAD) developed by Ostrom and others (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994; Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), to reveal how community attributes, such as social and economic factors influence the viability of solidarity lending group programs in the United States.  Modeled after the highly successful Grameen Bank model used in developing countries, solidarity group lending programs provide small short-term loans at market interest rates to poor people who are ineligible for commercial loans.  The main attribute of these programs is the use of social collateral in place of the physical collateral that is normally required by commercial banks.  The overriding goals of microenterprise assistance programs are to alleviate poverty, provide economic development, and graduate the poor to commercial sources of credit.

     "Attempts to replicate the Grameen model of microenterprise assistance programs in the United States have been met with mixed reviews.  One reason for this may be that the social and economic context for microenterprise assistance programs differs dramatically form that of developing countries and hence significantly affects the level and potential of social capital formation.  While the literature identifies the important role that social capital plays in the successful maintenance of these groups, the institutional analysis framework provides a fine tuning instrument with which to reveal how community attributes, such as social and economic factors, influence group formation and maintenance."

 

Ghate, Rucha. 2002.  "Global Gains at Local Costs: Imposing Protected Areas: A Case Study From India." Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Globalisation," the Ninth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, June 17-21, 2002.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/08/24/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

From Page 2:

     "With the ever-increasing understanding about the earth as a living network of interdependent ecosystems, there seems to be a growing consensus that the whole planet is a global common.  This feeling, however, is not bereft of severe complications arising from conflicting interests of different nations placed at varying levels of development.  In this paper the main issue I wish to raise is regarding the price the locals have to pay for conservation-related global concerns because the area-specific local collective choice is weaker than the global collective choice.  While global concerns can influence the construction of constitutional choices, through various means both coercive and persuasive, local concerns rarely find expression.  I have discussed this with the help of a case study of six villages located within the Taboba-Andhari Tiger Reserve (TATR) in central India to show how the decisions of creating protected areas made at the national level, in keeping with the global concerns of biodiversity conservation, lead to marginalization of the poor.  For understanding this complex situation this paper is developed on the lines of the Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) framework, which incorporates multiple levels of analysis and multiple arenas of decision-making.  In this paper I first briefly discuss definition of Protected Area, then explain the approach towards PAs in India in short, then present results of a study of Tadoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve, and finally present institutional analysis as well as economic analysis using utility-possibility frontier to test Pareto optimality conditions."

 

Gibson, Clark C. 1994.  "Defying a Dictator: Wildlife Policy in Zambia's Second Republic, 1972-1982." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the mini-conference on Institutional Analysis and Development, Bloomington, IN, December 10 and 12, 1994.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Gibson, Clark C., and Stuart A. Marks 2000.  "Transforming Rural Hunters into Conservationists: An Assessment of Community-Based Wildlife Management Programs in Africa." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Gibson, Clark C., Margaret A. McKean, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 2000. People and Forests: Communities, Institutions, and Governance. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Politics, Science, and the Enviroment).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Gibson, Clark C., Margaret A. McKean, and Elinor Ostrom 1998.  "Explaining Deforestation: The Role of Local Institutions." In Forest Resources and Institutions. C. Gibson, M. A. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC) and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. (Forest, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper, no. 3).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Gibson, Clark, Margaret A. McKean, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. 1998. Forest Resources and Institutions. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program et al. (FAO Forest, Trees and People Programme, Working Paper no. 3).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Gimblett, Randy, and Edella Schlager 1998.  "Rehabilitation and Protection of Watershed Ecosystems Using Institutions and Intelligent Agent Simulations." (Grant Proposal)

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Gombya-Ssembajjwe, William S. 2000.  "Basic Concepts for Successful Community Participation in Forest Management." In Community-Based Forest Resource Management in East Africa. W. S. Gombya-Ssembajjwe and A. Y. Banana, eds. Kampala, Uganda: Uganda Forestry Resources and Institutions Centre (UFRIC).

wsl  Books.

 

From page 9:

     "The empirical studies in this volume seek to fill at least three critical gaps.  Firstly, the lack of a policy framework to create an enabling environment for the creation, adoption, and implementation of community forestry.  Secondly, the shortage of information on the socio-economic impact of community forestry on both the community as a whole and individual households; the sharing of costs and benefits of community forestry; the mechanisms for resolving forest resource-based conflicts; and the costs and benefits of creating alternative sources of wood stocks.  Thirdly, the role of local institutions in forest resource management which is hitherto unfamiliar to many stakeholders."

 

Heikkila, Tanya. 2001.  "Managing Common-Pool Resources in a Public Service Industry: The Case of Conjunctive Water Management." (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2001).

 

     "Water providers, public administrators, and policy-makers in the Western United States face consequential decisions regarding the use and management of limited water supplies for growing populations.  A tool that water providers have employed to address this issue is conjunctive water management, or the coordinated use of ground and surface water supplies.  Using the natural capacity of groundwater basins for storage of surface supplies, this method aims to enhance overall supplies and guard against drought.  Implementing conjunctive water management, however, is not simple.  Water providers operate under a complex array of institutional settings that affect conjunctive water management.  This dissertation explains the development and implementation of conjunctive water management in the western United States in relation to the institutional arrangements that govern water resources.  This dissertation looks to two literatures from a common research framework to evaluate conjunctive water management: the literature on public service industries and common-pool resource management theory.  This dissertation identifies where the two literatures are weak and shows how the two theories can complement each other, helping resolve their respective weaknesses.  Common-pool resource theory sets up criteria for sustainable resource management that requires matching institutional boundaries to natural resource boundaries.  This dissertation explains how the criteria limit the theory's generalizability to large, complex systems.  To resolve this weakness, the theory development section of this dissertation uses insights from public service industry theory on inter jurisdictional coordination.  Second, this dissertation considers the weakness of public service industry theory in explaining coordination across jurisdictions.  It borrows from common-pool resource literature to resolve this deficiency.  The theory development section then derives hypotheses from the two literatures to explain how institutional arrangements affect conjunctive water management.  The empirical section of this dissertation tests these hypotheses.  In addition to testing the inferences from the theory development, the empirical analyses illustrate the different ways in which water providers coordinate the management of groundwater and surface water supplies in the West.  Understanding these management outcomes in relation to their institutional settings has important policy implications for natural resource management in general."

 

Heikkila, Tanya, and Kimberley R. Isett 2004.  "Modeling Operational Decision Making in Public Organizations: An Integration of Two Institutional Theories." American Review of Public Administration 34(1):3-19.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "Institutional Theories, which explain how rules, norms, and shared strategies shape human behavior have been used to examine why public and private organizations look different structurally, why actors decide to coordinate the provision of goods and services, or how characteristics of a political system shape public management strategies.  Many institutional scholars have recognized the importance of developing accurate institutional theories and models to explain policy and management decision making, yet the authors find that few scholars have attempted to bridge institutional theories coming from the political science and organization theory disciplines.  In this article, they present a model of operational decision making in public organizations that integrates concepts from these two institutional schools of thought.  The authors then apply this model to two distinct cases-one in the field of water resource management and the other in the field of mental health provision-to demonstrate the usefulness of this integrated approach to institutional analysis."

 

Herzberg, Roberta. 2005.  "Commentary on Richard Wagner's 'Self-Governance, Polycentrism, and Federalism: Recurring Themes in Vincent Ostrom's Scholarly Oeuvre'." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 57(2):189-197.

wsl  Serials Shelves.

 

Part of special issue entitled "Polycentric Political Economy: A Festschrift for Elinor and Vincent Ostrom":

 

     "The Ostroms are true artisans of political economy, and they have woven a rich tapestry of scholarship and theory through their distinguished careers.  My specific charge in this essay is to respond to Richard Wagner's analysis of three important themes in Vincent Ostrom's work-self-governance, polycentricity and federalism.  Wagner identifies the most critical aspects of these important contributions in his thorough essay. In this essay, I will add my own perspective on these contributions and suggest a couple of places where Wagner and I might disagree on the interpretation."

 

Herzberg, Roberta, and Vincent Ostrom 2000.  "Votes and Vetoes." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Hess, Charlotte. 2002.  "The Information Commons: A Framework for Analysis." (Power Point Presentation) Presented at the Information Commons Task Force Meeting during the Midwinter Conference of the American Library Association, Philadelphia, PA, January, 2002.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Hess, Charlotte, and Elinor Ostrom 2004.  "A Framework for Analyzing Scholarly Communication as a Commons." Presented at the Workshop on Scholarly Communication as a Commons, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, March 31-April 2, 2004.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001244/

Digital Library of the Commons and wsl  Oversized Books.

 

     "In this paper, we extend our previous work, 'Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource' that was presented at the Conference on the Public Domain at Duke University Law School in November 2001 and published in Law & Contemporary Problems (2003) 66 (1-2):111-146, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.  The Duke paper argues that the dilemmas associated with managing information in the public domain are quite similar to those associated with managing natural resource common-pool resources (CPRs), where we can observe how the development of new technologies changes the structure and processes involved in managing these types of resources over time.  We conclude that collective action and institutional design play key roles in shaping economic and social aspects of information.

     "This paper broadens the scope and presents a methodological tool for analyzing scholarly communication as a commons.  The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework can be a useful instrument to better understand this complex resource.  Scholarly communication is a much larger and more complex resource than the intellectual public domain.  It includes all kinds of scholarly information, with varying types of property rights regimes.  It encompasses both the products, as well as the processes of teaching, research, creativity and other types of academic scholarship.

     "Conceptualizing scholarly communication as a commons has the advantage of putting focus on the need for collective action, self-governance, and evolving rules that are required for the successful management and sustainability of all shared resources.  Applying institutional analysis enables a clearer understanding of the various human-technology-resource relationships, and how new technologies change the nature of the commons.  As with the 'environment,' this knowledge commons holds within it an entire ecosystem that reflects complex interactions between humans and the resources.

     "Understanding this new type of commons and applying an institutional analysis framework may facilitate a new, interdisciplinary, research agenda.  This is a particularly difficult area to study and get ones hands around.  And, as with all shared resources, management issues can be complex, conflicts can develop, and outcomes are uncertain.  The research agenda we propose would bring to the fore the most basic and fundamental questions in society: Is the scholarly communication system, as it is developing, sustainable?  Are we making wise and informed decisions as we rapidly change our universities?  Do universities have increased or decreased responsibilities to society?  Is the relationship between knowledge and democracy still understood in the academic mission?"

 

Hess, Charlotte, and Elinor Ostrom 2004.  "Studying Scholarly Communication: Can Commons Research and the IAD Framework Help Illuminate Complex Dilemmas?" Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Global Transition: Challenges, Risks and Opportunities," the Tenth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Oaxaca, Mexico, August 9-13, 2004.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001411/

Digital Library of the Commons

 

     "This paper presents a framework for analyzing the complex resource of scholarly communication as a commons.  Previously we have argued that the dilemmas associated with managing shared information are quite similar to those associated with managing natural and human-constructed common-pool resources (CPRs), where we can observe how the development of new technologies has changed the structure and processes involved in managing these types of resources over time.  We concluded that collective action and institutional design play key roles in shaping economic and social aspects of information.

     "However, applying insights from the CPR literature on physical resource management to information management highlights the complexity of the issues involved in managing these particular processes and outcomes: there are many, diverse participants in producing and consuming information who often have conflicting interests; the nature of production and provision is often difficult to analyze and describe with the kind of specificity that is required to manage these processes effectively; digital technologies continue to evolve and are not always well-understood; production and consumption occurs in local and global arenas.

     "Whereas earlier we focused on applying the language, definitions, methodology, and outcomes of research on common-pool resources to understanding information management, in this paper we will extend and refine this analysis to develop a framework for analyzing the governance issues that arise from scholarly communication and the implications for further research."

 

Hess, Charlotte, and Elinor Ostrom 2003.  "Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource." Law and Contemporary Problems 66(1-2):111-146.

http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/66LCPHess

wsl  Reprints Files.

 

     "The goal of this paper is to summarize the lessons learned from a large body of  international, interdisciplinary research on common-pool resources (CPRs) in the past 25 years and consider its usefulness in the analysis of scholarly information as a resource. We will suggest ways in which the study of the governance and management of common-pool resources can be applied to the analysis of information and 'the intellectual public domain.'  The complexity of the issues is enormous for many reasons: the vast number of players, multiple conflicting interests, rapid changes of technology, the general lack of understanding of digital technologies, local versus global arenas, and a chronic lack of precision about the information resource at hand. We suggest, in the tradition of Hayek, that the combination of time and place analysis with general scientific knowledge is necessary for sufficient understanding of policy and action.  In addition, the careful development of an unambiguous language and agreed-upon definitions is imperative.

     "As one of the framing papers for the Conference on the Public Domain, we focus on the language, the methodology, and outcomes of research on common-pool resources in order to better understand how various types of property regimes affect the provision, production, distribution, appropriation, and consumption of scholarly information. Our analysis will suggest that collective action and new institutional design play as large a part in the shaping of scholarly information as do legal restrictions and market forces.

 

Hoskins, Marilyn W. 2004.  "Who's on First? Leadership and Institutions in FAO's Community Forestry Program." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, May 1 and 3, 2004.

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Hoskins, Marilyn W. 2003.  "Culture in a Box." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference, May 3 and 5, 2003, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

From Page 3:

     "This paper is presented in all humility; it offers no answers, only an initial glance at some of the questions and at some of the new literature on the subject.  As an initial attempt, it draws from a limited number of sources and does not claim to have represented all the theory or tools being used in any discipline.  Some of the literature and authors were selected as they are part of ongoing working groups with a relevant focus.  What this paper is, is a plea for us to keep bringing in and examining the relevance of new theories and to keep examining the changing approaches to community based natural resource management (CBNRM) to identify what elements of culture can strengthen local resource management.  Beyond the very popular usage of the word culture, such as a country having a culture of consumerism or a sports team having a culture of sportsmanship, various disciplines are opening new ways to deepen our understanding of culture, its origins and transmission and its resilience to adaptations or modifications."

 

Imperial, Mark T. 1999.  "Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework." Environmental Management 24(4):449-465.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "Scholars, government practitioners, and environmentalists are increasingly supportive of collaborative, ecosystem-based approaches to natural resource management. However, few researchers have focused their attention on examining the important administrative and institutional challenges surrounding ecosystem-based management. This paper describes how the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework can be used to better understand the institutional arrangements used to implement ecosystem-based management programs. Some of the observations emanating from previous research on institutional design and performance are also discussed. The paper's central argument is that if this new resource management paradigm is to take hold and flourish, researchers and practitioners must pay closer attention to the questions surrounding institutional design and performance. This should help improve our understanding of the relationship between science and human values in decision making. It should also help researchers avoid making faulty policy recommendations and improve the implementation of ecosystem-based management programs."

 

Imperial, Mark T., and Tracy Yandle 1998.  "Marching Towards Leviathan, Embracing the Market, or Romancing the Commons: An Examination of Three Approaches to Fisheries Management." Presented at the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM) Twentieth Annual Research Conference, New York, New York, October 29-31, 1998.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Imperial, Mark, and Tracy Yandle 2005.  "Taking Institutions Seriously: Using the IAD Framework to Analyze Fisheries Policy." Society and Natural Resources 18(6):493-509.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "We argue that the fisheries management literature often does a poor job of analyzing issues related to institutional design and performance.  The article begins by examining four competing institutional arrangements used to manage fisheries: bureaucracy, markets, community, and comanagement.  The differences are used to highlight the importance of understanding critical issues related to institutional analysis. The article then examines some of the common problems or pitfalls that analysts fall victim to when examining institutional design and performance.  We conclude by summarizing the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, one approach to institutional analysis that avoids these common pitfalls."

 

Jerrells, Joby, and Elinor Ostrom 1995.  "Current Developments in a Relational Database for Biological and Social Science Research." Presented at the IUFRO World Congress Conference, Tampere, Finland, Aug. 8-11, 1995.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Jillson, Calvin, and Rick K. Wilson 1994.  Congressional Dynamics: Structure, Coordination, and Choice in the First American Congress, 1774-1789. Standford, CA: Standford University Press.

wsl  Books.

 

From book jacket:

     "This book focuses on the origins, evolution, and demise of the Continental Congress, reinterpreting its successes and failures from the perspective of the 'new institutionalism.'

     "...Drawing on the historical record, the authors reconstruct the institutional design of the Continental Congress.  They focus on the behavioral record of the delegates--their votes, voting coalitions, work loads, committee assignments, and a variety of other recorded activities--and they reinterpret the delegates' behavior in the light of the constraints and limitations on their actions.  The authors conclude that the norms, rules, and institutional structures of the Continental Congress were as much to blame for the Congress's eventual failure as the reluctance of the states to support the new government or the propensity of delegates to divide along sectional lines."

 

Johnson, Janet E. 1997.  "Institutional Gender Analysis: Running for the Russian Duma." Presented at the Mini-Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, May 3-5, 1997.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Joshi, Neeraj N., Elinor Ostrom, Ganesh Shivakoti, and Wai Fung Lam 1998.  "An Institutional Analysis of the Effects of Different Modes of Assistance on the Performance of Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems in Nepal." Presented at "Crossing Boundaries," the seventh annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, June 10-14, 1998, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/00/68/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

(Authors' Introduction)

   "Thousands of irrigation systems in Nepal are managed by farmers themselves. Some of these farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMIS) have been in operation for centuries. It has long been accepted by policy makers and donors that FMIS in Nepal would benefit greatly from the availability of financial capital in order to construct permanent diversion structures to line key parts of a canal, and to undertake other capital intensive work that would improve the technical efficiency of the systems. Consequently, a number of different policy interventions have been undertaken in Nepal that are intended to enhance irrigation performance by improving physical infrastructures of FMIS. Despite the similar objectives of the intervening agencies, however, the consequences of the process of intervention have varied substantially. Given the increasing emphasis on the importance of interventions to improve irrigation performance, it is of great concern to assess why there is a difference in the performance of diverse types of interventions.

   "In this paper, we first briefly overview the history of irrigation development in Nepal. Then, we describe the institutions involved with the interventions in the irrigation sector development along with the processes of intervention. In the third section, we discuss the rationale of the study and some methodological procedures employed in the study. In the fourth section, we discuss the findings of the study focusing on the factors affecting the performance of irrigation systems in relation to interventions. In the final section, we address the issues that need action by intervening agencies in order to enhance irrigation performance."

 

Kakujaha Matundu, Omu. 2002.  "Self-Management of Common Pool Resources Among Pastoral Ovaherero in Semi-Arid Eastern Namibia." Presented at "The Commons in an Age of Globalisation," the Ninth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, June 17-21, 2002.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/08/40/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

     "The main objective of this paper is to explore the feasibility of range management among the ovaHerero pastoralists of semi-arid eastern Namibia.  It intentionally focuses on the devolution of authority over communally held resources to pastoral communities in the eastern communal areas.  The paper uses historical analysis to highlight the role of marginalization (in political ecology sense) in resource (mis) management, and how it subsequently affects the proposed community based natural resource management (CBNRM) program pursued by the Namibian government.  Government attempts to enlist community participation has so far yielded dismal results."

From p. 7:

     "Despite the acceptance of the Oakerson framework as an analytical tool for systematic analysis of common property management problems, it has been critiqued for adopting the customary two-party framework i.e., the framework does not explicitly introduce government intervention as a "third party" in what it sees as "private ordering" under legal pluralism, as opposed to legal centralism in modern states (Van de Laar, 1990).

In addition, Cousins (1993) noted that it is also important to contextualise the analysis and one of the contextualising variables is the larger socio-economic and political system. Further, Cousins noted that analyses of socio-economic structures and power relations must be informed by an understanding of the complex processes through which identities, institutions and ideologies are constructed and constituted, and how these are mediated by cultural forms and practices (1993:13)."

 

Katula, Michael C. 2000.  "Local Government Reform in Poland: Legacies and Challenges." Presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Bloomington, IN, April 28-May 1, 2000.

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Katula, Michael C. 1999.  "The Development of International Norms and the Future of Whaling." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, December 11-13, 1999.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Kaufmann, F. X., G. Majone, and V. Ostrom, eds. 1986. Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector; The

Bielefeld Interdisciplinary Project. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. (de Gruyter Studies in Organization, 4).

wsl  Reserves and Books.

 

Kenney, Douglas S., and William B. Lord 1999.  Analysis of Institutional Innovation in the Natural Resources and Environmental Realm: The Emergence of Alternative Problem-Solving Strategies in the American West. Boulder, CO: Natural Resources Law Center.

wsl  Books.

 

Khamaganova, Erjen et al. 2001.  "Revisiting the Elf Lore Family and The Lothlorien Forest." International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN. (W01I-28).

wsl  Oversized Books (shelved under IFRI Y773 Seminar Readings).

 

Co-authors:

Ludewigs, Thomas

Namubiru, Evelyn L.

Singh, Neera M.

Stock, Carol

Svendsen, Sean

York, Abigail

 

From the introduction:

     "This paper is organized into six distinct sections.  We start with an overview of the IFRI Research Program, and then go on to describe the Lothlorien Forest and the community that owns and governs it.  We then discuss the institutional arrangements that mediate the forest-users relationship.  After that, we present the findings from our detailed ecological study of Lothlorien forest.  Finally, we discuss some of the future challenges that lie ahead for the Elf Lore Family community."

 

Kim, In. 1992.  "A Framework for Institutional Analysis of Urban Service Delivery Performance: The Case of Police Service." Journal of Local Government and Administration 4(1):47-80.

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Kim, Kwanbo. 2003.  "Governing the Korean Irrigation Institutions: Evaluation of the Farmers' Self-Governing Model District Program." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference, May 3 and 5, 2003, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

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From Page 2:

     "In 2001, the Korean Farmers' Self-governing Model District Program (FSMDP) was initiated by the KARICO to increase the efficiency of water management through the role division of irrigators and the water manager (agency: KARICO).  It is a kind of Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM).  For the special irrigation districts which can be easily managed by farmers themselves based on the geographically conditions, the FSMDP intends to minimize the indirect cost (personnel and materials) of O&M and utilize effectively the direct cost (water supply cost), which would improve the service quality for farmers.  In the meanwhile, special technical labor forces have conducted even simple works and managed directly the small size irrigation facilities located far away from the production resources (headworks).  Such traditional governing mechanism has decreased the efficiency of water management and facilities maintenance.  Ultimately, the FSMDP is designed to establish the foundations of agricultural productivity development and is being operated based on the formal rules such as the Article 17 of KARICO Establishment Law and Farmland Management Fund Act (Self-governance of the irrigated water users)."

 

Kiser, Larry L. 1994.  "Deep in Sin." Presented at the Workshop on the Workshop Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, June 16-18, 1994.

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Kiser, Larry L. 1980.  "A Conceptual Apparatus for Institutional Analysis." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, no. W80-4).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/08/99/index.html

wsl  & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

   "The relationship between social structure and individual decision making is attracting increasing attention among social scientists.  Their work to date, however, has proceeded without the aid of a fully developed theoretical framework.  Significant progress in constructing such a framework appears in Ostrom (1967) and Hurwicz (1973).  This paper attempts to advance that work."

 

Kiser, Larry L., and Elinor Ostrom 2000.  "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Kiser, Larry L., and Elinor Ostrom 1982.  "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches." In Strategies of Political Inquiry.  E. Ostrom, ed. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

wsl  Books.

 

Kiser, Larry L., and Elinor Ostrom 1979.  "A Political Economy Approach to the Analysis of Institutional Behavior and Consequences." (Working Paper) Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper, no. W79-32).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/00/72/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

(From p. 1):

     "Undertaking a synthesis of work in political economy for a Handbook of Political Behavior is a massive task.  The potential literature for such a review is far too extensive for the limitations of a single chapter.  Moreover, the term political economy  is used to characterize such a wide variety of academic work that no single chapter could provide a coherent synthesis of all the different perspectives.  A chapter-length discussion must be more selective.

     "This chapter focuses entirely on the political economy literature which starts with the individual as a basic unit of analysis and which conceptualizes collectives of individuals as artifacts crafted to increase individuals access to available outcomes.  Literature examining the effects of different institutional arrangements on the conduct and behavior of individuals and literature evaluation consequences is emphasized."

 

Koontz, Thomas, Laura Carlson, and Charles Schweik 1997.  "The Role of Institutions in Shaping Land Use: An Exploratory Study of Southern Indiana Non-Industrial Private Forests." Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC). (CW97-TK1).

wsl  Oversized Books (Shelved under CIPEC "A Summer Institute on Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Applications in the Americas; Week 1").

 

Koontz, Tomas M. 1997.  "Federalism and Natural Resource Policy: Comparing State and National Management of Public Forests." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1997).

wsl  Colloquium Room & Books.

 

    "The question of different jurisdictions for various government responsibilities is a fundamental issue in American politics and policy. This research compares national and state policy in the context of public forest management. It examines policy processes and outcomes, to address the following questions: To what extent do state and national public forest policy processes differ? What effects do these differences have on policy outcomes? Data come from two matched forest pairs in each of two different regions of the United States, a total of four pairs (eight forests). Forests in each pair are chosen on the basis of similar physical characteristics but different governmental jurisdictions (state versus national). For each of the eight forests, data gathering and analysis involve several techniques, including interviews, questionnaires, observations, and analyses of written documents. Policy process

analysis is undertaken within the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which focuses the researcher's attention on the interaction of actors in action situations pertaining to forest management decisions and activities. Results indicate important differences between state and national policy processes and outcomes. National policy makers face greater statutory, regulatory, and planning constraints affecting their activities than do state policy makers. These constraints require more public input and higher levels of environmental protection. Outcomes reflect these differences. State officials provide more timber, at higher net profit, than do national officials, and they transfer more revenue to local governments.  Concurrently, national officials undertake greater efforts to provide non-timber environmental benefits than do state officials."

 

Kumar, Kundan. 2002.  "Development Related Displacement in India: An Institutional Analysis." Presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Bloomington, IN, April 27-29, 2002.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Lam, Wai Fung. 2001.  "Coping with Change: A Study of Local Irrigation Institutions in Taiwan." World Development 29(9):1569-1592.

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     "This paper examines how Taiwan's local irrigation institutions have evolved and changed amid rapid political-economic development in the last decade.  Based upon the literatures of institutional analysis and common-pool resource management, I discuss and compare how local irrigation institutions in three areas in the country have responded, or failed to respond, to the changing environment.  A major finding is that local self-governing irrigation institutions are not doomed to fail amid economic development.  Several variables affect the incentives and capacity of farmers to redesign their local institutions to cope with the changes in the macro setting.  Particularly, flexible status-quo institutions and a conductive governance regime can better facilitate farmers' rule-crafting efforts."

 

Lam, Wai Fung. 1999.  "Improving the Performance of Small-Scale Irrigation Systems: The Effects of Technological Investments and Governance Structure on Irrigation Performance in Nepal." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Lam, Wai Fung. 1999.  "Institutional Design of Public Agencies and Coproduction: A Study of Irrigation Associations in Taiwan." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Lam, Wai Fung. 1994.  "Institutions, Engineering Infrastructure, and Performance in the Governance and Management of Irrigation Systems: The Case of Nepal." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1994).

wsl  Colloquium Room & Books.

 

Lam, Wai Fung. 1993.  "The Governanace and Management of Irrigation in Taiwan: An Institutional Analysis: A Research Proposal." (Working Paper)

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Lam, Wai Fung, Myungsuk Lee, and Elinor Ostrom 1997.  "The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework: Application to Irrigation Policy in Nepal." In Policy Analysis Concepts and Methods: An Institutional and Implementation Focus.  D. Brinkerhoff, ed. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. (Policy Studies and Developing Nations: A Multi-Volume Treatise, vol. 5).

wsl  Books.

 

Lam, Wai Fung, Myungsuk Lee, and Elinor Ostrom 1993.  "An Institutional Analysis Approach: Findings from the NIIS on Irrigation Performance." In From Farmers' Fields to Data Fields and Back: A Synthesis of Participatory Information Systems for Irrigation and Other Resources.  J. Sowerwine et al., eds. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management Institute.

wsl  Books & Reprint Files.

 

Langill, Steve, ed. 1999. Institutional Analysis: Readings and Resources for Researchers, Volume 5. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Lee, Myungsuk. 1994.  "Institutional Analysis, Public Policy, and the Possibility of Collective Action in Common Pool Resources: A Dynamic Game Theoretic Approach." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University-Bloomington, 1994).

wsl  Colloquium Room & Books.

 

Lee, Myungsuk. 1991.  "The Evolution of Institution: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach." Presented at the Mini-Conference, Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, Spring, 1991.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/31/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

     "For these reasons, it becomes interesting to ask how cooperation can emerge in Prisoners' Dilemma situation without using a super-game approach. One possible candidate for overcoming this anomaly is the evolution of institutions for resolving collective action problem. Contrary to the theoretical predictions based on "Free-Rider hypothesis" (for example, Taylor 1987, 158), there are many instances of social life governed by unwritten laws and customs where the 'Leviathan' plays little or no role (see E. Ostrom 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1991; Ostrom et. al. 1990, 1991; Feeny et al. 1990; Rowe 1990; Snidal 1985; Sened 1991; Tang 1991). This implies that, cooperative solution can emerge in Prisoners' Dilemma situation through self-governing institutions."

 

Lyon, Thomas P., and Steven C. Hackett 2000.  "Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long-term Contracting in Natural Gas." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Marx, Axel. 2003.  "Social Networks and Institutions: Why is Network Analysis Important for Institutional Analysis?" Presented at Joining the Northern Commons: Lessons for the World, Lessons from the World, Anchorage, August 17-21, 2003.

withdrawn by author

Digital Library of the Commons & wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "Social network analysis and research has shown that social networks constitute structures of opportunity and constraint for individuals as well as corporate actors.  Whether they will be enabling or constraining depends on the nature of the network (structure and types of ties) and the governance of the network.  The importance of social networks for institutional analysis has also been recognised by different institutional scholars in the commons-field (see for example the contributions of Bonnie McCay and Paul Stern et. al. in The Drama of the Commons.)

     "This paper aims to further explore and discuss the relevance of a network approach for institutional analysis (IAD-framework) especially in relation to the question of institutional performance (achieving objectives or not).  The paper will draw on recent insights from research within the fields of economic sociology, organizational sociology and organizational behaviour.

     "The paper argues that it is important to complement an institutional perspective with a broader network perspective by focusing on information processing and transmission, strategies vis-à-vis network partners and liabilities for the functioning of institutions related to social networks.  In relation to information-processing the paper discusses differences in the amount and nature of information processed, information asymetries and the possibilities of knowledge creation in network ties.  In relation to strategies vis-à-vis network partners the paper focuses on the use of voice-strategies versus exit-strategies (cfr. Hirschman) and differences in bargaining power, commitment, co-ordination and technological change.  Finally in relation to liabilities the paper discusses the liabilities of overembeddedness versus underembeddednes and liabilities and risks related to loyalty versus opportunism.

     "The paper will end with hypotheses on the relation between network characteristics and the performance of institutions."

 

McGinnis, Michael. 2003.  "Identifying Research Questions for Institutional Analysis: The DECIDER Classification Scheme." (Working Paper)

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

McGinnis, Michael, ed. 2000. Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

From the Series foreword:

     "Workshop scholars use game theory and laboratory experiments to understand how individuals behave in the context of diverse political and economic institutions.  Results from laboratory experiments and field settings show that individuals draw upon an extensive repoertoire of rules or strategies from which they select different strategies, given their understanding of the nature of the situation at hand."

 

McGinnis, Michael. 1998.  "Polycentric Development and Resource Management and Polycentric Games and Institutional Analysis." (Working Paper) Presented at the Workshop Colloquium, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, April 20, 1998.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

McGinnis, Michael. 1996.  "Elinor Ostrom: A Career in Institutional Analysis." PS: Political Science and Politics:737-741.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

McGinnis, Michael D., ed. 1999. Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

From the Introduction by M. McGinnis:

     "Governance is the way society as a whole manages the full array of its political, economic, and social affairs. By shaping the incentives facing individuals and local commnities, governance either facilitates or hinders economic development. It the overall governance structure reinforces the capability of local groups to deal with their own problems, then user groups have an incentive to manage their own common-pool resources wisely. Under these circumstances development is likely to be sustainable. Conversely, if local rules are routinely superseded by the policies of higher authorities, then it will be muchmore difficult to restrain individual appropriators from engaging in opportunisitc behavior. In those circumstances any effort to develop the national economy as a whole will rest on shaky foundations at the local level.

    "Over the past few decades scholars associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy analysis at Indiana University have studies how CPR user groups in many parts of the world have managed a diverse aray of common pool resources. This volume includes several of these empirical studies, supplemented by a few essays on alternative forms of constitutional order. In this introduction i explain why analyses for local patterns of resource management can have profound implications for broader issues of development and governance."

     "The basic lesson of the interrelated research programs conducted by Workshop scholars is that community efforts to manage cp,,pm-pool resources work best in the context of polycentric governance. A political order is polycentric when there exist many overlapping arenas (or centers) of authority and responsibility. These arenas exist at all scales, from local community groups to national governments to the informal arrangements for governance at the global level."

...

     "Development must occur at all scales simultaneously, with input from individuals and local communities welcomed at all levels of political interaction. This concern for the 'nesting' of local arrangements within the  overarching political, economic, and cultural order is distinctive. Many development policy analysts focus on what happens at the national level, especially political developments in national capitals. Workshop scholars agreee that these activities are important but primarily for their effects on shaping or constraining the ability of local communities to address their own problems..."

 

McGinnis, Michael D., ed. 1999. Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

From the Introduction:

     "One basic presumption shared by the organizers of the Workshop is that theory has important ramifications for understanding practical  policy problems. This close interaction between theoretical and empirical concerns is reflected in the basic organization of this book, which includes two distinctly different types of chaapters: (1) conceptual discussions of federalism and other ofrms of constitutional order; and (2) empirical analyses of specific aspects of policing and other public services. Within the context of the conceptual framework developed here, even narrow analyses of seemingly mundane events can shed important new light on enduring dilemmas of governance."

 

McGinnis, Michael D., and Elinor Ostrom 1992.  "Design Principles for Local and Global Commons." Presented at a Conference on "Linking Local and Global Commons,"Harvard Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, MA, April 23-25, 1992. (Workshop Working Paper, no. D92-6).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

McGinnis, Michael D., and Elinor Ostrom 1992.  "Institutional Analysis and Global Climate Change: Design Principles for Robust International Regimes." In Global Climate Change: Social and Economic Research Issues; Proceedings of a Conference Held at Argonne National Laboratory on February 11-13, 1992. M. Rice, J. Snow, and H. Jacobson, eds. Chicago: Argonne National Laboratory.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Includes comments by:

Schrodt, Philip A.

Feeny, David

Hurwicz, Leonid

 

McGinnis, Michael D., and Vincent Ostrom 1999.  "Democratic Transformations: From the Struggle for Democracy to Self-Governance?" Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the "Workshop on the Workshop 2," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, June 9-13, 1999. (W98-7).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

McGinnis, Michael D., and John T. Williams 2000.  "Policy Uncertainty in Two-Level Games: Examples of Correlated Equilibria." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

McKean, Margaret A. 1998.  "Common Property: What is it, What is it Good for, and What Makes it Work?" In Forest Resources and Institutions. C. Gibson, M. A. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC), and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. (Forest, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper no. 3).

wsl  Reserves.

 

McKean, Margaret A., and Elinor Ostrom 2001.  "Regimes de Propriedade Comum em Florestats: Somente uma Relíquia do Passado?" In Espaços e Recursos Naturais de Uso Comum. A. C. Diegues and A. D. C. Moreira, eds. Sao Paulo: Nucleo de Apoio à Pesquisa sobre Populaçoes Humanas e Areas Umidas Brasileiras (NUPAUB).

wsl  Books.

 

McKean, Margaret A., and Elinor Ostrom 1994.  "Common-Property Regimes in the Forest: Just a Relic from the Past?" (Workshop Working Paper, W94-8).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Mercatus Center. 2003. "Rethinking Institutional Analysis: Interviews with Vincent and Elinor Ostrom." Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Introductory Notes by Vernon Smith and Gordon Tullock. Interview by Paul Dragos Aligica.

 

Metzo, Katherine R. 1997.  "Political Ecology and Institutional Analysis: Incorporating the IAD Framework into an Anthropological Research Design." Presented at the Mini-Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, May 3-5, 1997.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Monbiot, George. 1994.  "The Tragedy of Enclosure." Scientific American 270(1):159.

wsl  Serials Shelves.

 

Monroe, Burt L. 1994.  "The Analysis and Design of Collective Choice Institutions." Presented at the Workshop on the Workshop Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, June 16-18, 1994.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Morris, Mary Hallock. 2000.  "Dealing with Dead Zones: An Institutional Analysis of the Gulf of Mexico and Chesapeake Bay." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, December 14 and 16, 2002.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Myint, Tun. 2005.  "Strength of 'Weak' Forces in Multilayer Environmental Governance: Cases from the Mekong and Rhine River Basins." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 2005).

wsl  Colloquium Room.

 

     "Studies of the international relations have focused mainly on states and their relations as the center of governance processes in the international affairs.  Consequently, the dominant theories lack insights to explain the role of non-state actors in practices of international environmental affairs.  The emerging power of non-state actors is a challenge for scholars and practitioners in the field.  The central puzzles this dissertation addresses are: What is the origin of the power of non-state actors?  How and why do they influence institutional transformation of transnational environmental regimes in some cases?

     "To explain this puzzle, I develop the Issues, Interests, and Actors Network (IAN) framework using theoretical insights from the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and the Policy Sciences (PS) approaches.  Through IAD and PS lens, I view issues, interests, and actors as institutional drivers as they interdependently shape each other in governance processes.  Using IAN framework, I unpack and explain governance processes of the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand in the Mekong River Basin and four cases of pollution cleanup in the Rhine River Basin.

     "The theoretical insights that I learned from my dissertation research are: (1) the origin of power of non-state actors can be explained by analyzing actors' knowledge, their assets, and the degree of political freedom they have; (2) institutional adaptation can be explained by analyzing evolution of actors' preferences which are shaped by the three above clusters of variables; and (3) greater focus for further research has to be on actors' worlds of value production and utilization to understand multilayer governance.  Concerning policy, I learned that (1) capacity building of actors has to pay attention to whether the capacity being built will be applied due to lack of assets or lack of political freedom; (2) linkages between issues, interests, and actors at a local layer and issues, interests, and actors at a transnational layer are crucial linkages to achieve objectives of transnational regimes; and (3) successful institutional transformation of transnational regimes is likely to occur when relevant issues, interests, and actors are linked across multiple layers."

 

Nahrath, Stéphane. 2000.  "'Governing Wildlife Resources'? L'organisation de la Chasse en Suisse comme Exemple de Régimes Institutionnels de Gestion d'une Ressource Naturelle." Swiss Political Science Review 6(1):123-158.

wsl  Books (filed under Gabriel, Jürg Martin and D. Ruloff).

 

Namubiru, Evelyn Lwanga. 2002.  "Conflicts in Forests Use: The Role of Institutions." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting, Humboldt University/Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, December 13-16, 2002.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

From the introduction:

     "The paper is organised in this manner.  The first part of the paper lays out the theoretical background to conflict, its management and resolution.  Within this section a brief description of rules and how they are related to conflict is given.  This is followed by brief background to the study.  Next, the IAD framework is presented and used as a tool to identify relevant issues to explore, particularly those related to rights, rules and their influence on conflicts in the use of Namungo and Lwamunda forest.  This in turn is followed by a discussion of the types of conflict prevalent in these forests.  Finally, a section on issues and impolications is given followed by the conclusion."

 

Nijwening, Stefan. 1997.  "Institutional Development in the Palestinian Water Sector: Specificity, Competition, and Rules of Engagement." (M.A. Thesis, Erasmus University, 1997).

wsl  Books.

 

Njuguna, Jane W., Pauline Bwire, and Paul Ongugo, eds. 2001. 'Operationalization of Participatory Natural Forests Management in Kenya': Proceedings of the 2nd International Forestry Resources & Institution (IFRI) Regional Workshop. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Forestry Research Institute.

wsl  Books.

 

From preface:

     "...the information gathered [for these proceedings is] from the entire East Africa region [about] issues pertinent to the successful implementation of participatory forest management in the region.  In doing this, the presenters have drawn on the experiences from other tropical countries which are also important in the building of a sold base to address the need for better managed natural resources.

     "The material gathered in these proceedings will contribute invaluably towards addressing knowledge gaps needed to enhance the implementation of participatory forest management in the Eastern African region."

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1994.  "The Logic of Multi-Level Institutional Analysis." Presented at the Workshop on the Workshop Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, June 16-18, 1994.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1992.  "Analyzing the Commons: A Framework." In Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy.  D. Bromley et al., eds. San Francisco: ICS Press.

wsl  Reserves.

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1992.  "Democracy, Governance, and Institutional Analysis." In Workshop on Democracy and Governance: Proceedings.  Associates in Rural Development, ed. Burlington, VT: Associates in Rural Development. (Decentralization: Finance and Management Project (DFM)).

wsl  Books--Series.

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1990.  "Analyzing the Commons: A Framework." Presented at "Designing Sustainability on the Commons," the first annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Durham, NC, September 27-30, 1990. (Workshop Working Paper, no. W90-9).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/09/73/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

   "The paper sets forth an institutional framework for analyzing the commons, one used by the National Academy of Science's Panel on Common Property Resource Management to collect case studies from around the world. The framework distinguishes four types of attributes: (1) the physical features of a resource or facility and the technology used to appropriate its yield; (2) decision-making arrangements (organization and rules) that govern relationships among users and others; (3) mutual choice of strategies and patterns of interaction among decision makers; and (4) outcomes or consequences. Both the physical and technological attributes of the commons and decision-making arrangements affect patterns of interaction, which combine with physical and technological attributes to produce outcomes. Outcomes disclose the effect of a difficulty, but the source of difficulty lies in a lack of congruence between the technical and physical nature of a commons and the decision-making arrangements used to govern its use. The lack of good institutional 'fit' potentially creates a perverse structure of incentives leading individuals into counterproductive patterns of interaction that generates undesirable outcomes. Use of the framework permits systematic comparison of cases, including both institutional successes and failures, and facilitates both knowledge-building and diagnostic analysis problems."

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1990.  "Institutional Diversity and Rural Development in America: An Institutionalist's Approach to Rural Analysis." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W90-5).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1986.  "A Model for the Analysis of Common Property Problems." In Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, April 21-26, 1985.  National Research Council, ed. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

wsl  Reserves & Reprint Files.

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1984.  "A Model for the Analysis of Common Property Problems." (Working Paper) Prepared for the Common Property Steering Committee, Board on Science and Technology for International Development (BOSTID), National Research Council.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "The subject of this paper could be stated as a riddle: how are forests, fishing grounds, pastures, parks, ground water supplies, and public highways all alike? Answer: each one is often--even typically-- a 'common,' a resource or facility shared by a community of producers or consumers..."

     "The purpose of this paper is to present a model that can be used to analyze common property problems whatever the specific resource or facility. Such a model must be specific enough to offer guidance in the field, yet general enought to permit application to widely variable situations. The trick is to develop concepts which identify key attributes shared broadly by common property problems and which can be treated as vaiables that take on different values from one circumstance to another..."

     "All common property problems are rooted in some set of constraints either given in nature or inherent in available technology. The technicalphysical contraints can be analyzed usefully in terms of three concepts drawn from economics literature: (a) jointness of consumption or supply, (b) exclusion, and (c) indivisibility..."

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1980.  "The Anatomy of Public Problems: Building a Methodology of Policy Analysis." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W80-21).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

From p. 1:

   "Public policy analysis is rich in methods and poor in methodology. As the number and sophistication of methods continue to increase, the failure to build an integral mode of analysis becomes the more apparent.  A wealth of technique does not yield a systematic way of proceeding with the analysis of a problem--a theory of how to proceed and why.  the missing ingredient is methodological; a logic-of doing policy analysis..."

From pp. 3-5:

   "Ostrom challenged the preoccupation of scholarship in American public administration with (1) descriptive work focused upon singular 'organizations' based on hierarchical principles and (2) prescriptive work advocating the perfection of hierarchy as a universal approach to solving public problems.  Drawing upon both modern political economists and classic political theorists, he went on to sketch an alternative paradigm of publica administration, taking account of the limits and possibilities of various organizational arrangements.  Rather than dichotomizing policy and administration, as in the orthodox view, Ostrom treats various forms of organization as alternative instruments of public policy. In this context the essential problem of organization theory, he writes (1974:55) is to:

     1)anticipate the consequences which follow when

     2)self-interested individuals choose maximizing strategies within

     3)particular organization arrangements when applied to

     4) particular structures of events.

These are the basic elements and relationships involved in the use of organization as an instrument of policy. Ostrom's principal concerns in this piece of work are to demonstrate both the potential variety of organization arrangements and the necessary conditions of general democratic organization to realize the full advantage of that potential variety.  This leads to a reconsideration of the principles of constitutionalism and federalism, as developed both by Madison and Hamilton and by Tocqueville, viewed now as a theory of 'democratic administration,' in contrast to the tenets of 'bureaucratic administration' which have come to dominate American administrative thought in this century..."

   "Methodologically, applied policy analysis is a problem of selecting, collecting, sorting, sifting, and otherwise organizing bits and pieces of information in order to reconstruct the logic of a situation. Public problems, like all genuine problems, are surrounded by confusion.  To develop an understanding of a problem--to make sense out of it--requires that one deal with a situation on its own terms.  Thus information, as the empirical component of analysis, is essential.  Yet information is more than data.  As Wildavsky (1974:231) has made the distinction, information is 'data collected according to a theory. . .'  The emprical component depends upon a theoretical component.  'Analysis' denotes the use of theory to interpret data in order to produce information.

   "The basic tool, therefore, in a methodology of policy analysis is a model which facilitates this information-building process.  Ostrom identified the four basic elements of such a model: (1) the structure of events, (2) decision making (or organization) arrangements, (3) individual choice of strategies, and (4) outcomes or consequences."

 

Oakerson, Ronald J. 1978.  "The Erosion of Public Highways: A Policy Analysis of the Eastern Kentucky Coal-Haul Road Problem." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Political Science, Indiana University, 1978).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/33/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Colloquium Room & Books.

 

   "[This dissertation] extends work initially undertaken for a Master's essay on the subject of unlawful coal hauling on the highways of Eastern Kentucky. The analysis builds upon the theory of public goods and considers the impacts of common property relationships on public goods in order to pose the general problem of joint and alternative uses. The object of the research is to explore the limiting factors in present institutional arrangements and the possibilities of different institutions. The methodology includes the use of personal interviews to reconstruct the strategies and claims of different participants and the conduct of legal research to determine the relative availability of different remedies. "

 

Oakerson, Ronald J., and Roger B. Parks 1999.  "Citizen Voice and Public Entrepreneurship: The Organizational Dynamic of a Complex Metropolitan County." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Oakerson, Ronald J., and S. Tjip Walker 1995.  "Analyzing Policy Reform and Reforming Policy Analysis: An Institutionalist Approach." In Policy Analysis Concepts and Methods: An Institutional and Implementation Focus.  D. Brinkerhoff, ed. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. (Policy Studies and Developing Nations, vol. 5).

wsl  Books & Reprint Files.

 

Olowu, Dele. 1999.  "Local Organizations and Development: The African Experience." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Olowu, Dele. 1985.  "Perspectives on Improving Institutional Capacities of Third World Administrative Systems with Special Reference to Africa." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W85-34).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/09/57/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

Onnen, Shelia. 1997.  "Common-Pool Resource and Institutional Analysis and Development: The International Joint Commission and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement." (Working Paper)

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2005.  Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

wsl  Reserves.

 

Publisher's blurb:

     "The analysis of how institutions are formed, how they operate and change, and how they influence behavior in society has become a major subject of inquiry in politics, sociology, and economics. A leader in applying game theory to the understanding of institutional analysis, Elinor Ostrom provides in this book a coherent method for undertaking the analysis of diverse economic, political, and social institutions.

     "Understanding Institutional Diversity explains the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which enables a scholar to choose the most relevant level of interaction for a particular question. This framework examines the arena within which interactions occur, the rules employed by participants to order relationships, the attributes of a biophysical world that structures and is structured by interactions, and the attributes of a community in which a particular arena is placed.

     "The book explains and illustrates how to use the IAD in the context of both field and experimental studies. Concentrating primarily on the rules aspect of the IAD framework, it provides empirical evidence about the diversity of rules, the calculation process used by participants in changing rules, and the design principles that characterize robust, self-organized resource governance institutions."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2005.  Understanding Institutional Diversity (Manuscript copy). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

wsl  Reserves.

 

From the introduction:

     "To understand institutions one needs to know what they are, how and why they are crafted and sustained, and what consequences they generate in diverse settings.  Understanding anything is a process of learning what it does, how and why it works, how to create or modify it, and eventually how to convey that knowledge to others.  Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and government at all scales.  Individuals interacting within rule-structured situations face choices regarding the actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences for themselves and others.

     "...Consider this a progress report on a long-term project that will be continued, I hope, by many others into the future."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2004.  "The Working Parts of Rules and How They May Evolve over Time." Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, Germany. (Papers on Economics and Evolution, no. 0404).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "Drawing on extensive research related to successful and unsuccessful efforts to govern common-pool resources, I wish to address what I consider to be the next important step in our theoretical understanding of complex settings.  I address how we can identify the working parts of rules.  It is difficult to study the evolution of institutions without a clear language for describing and analyzing the underlying working parts creating markets, governments at all levels, private property, and structures inside individual firms.  Thus, this paper identifies the rules underlying institutional games so that we can study their evolution."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2003.  "Institutions as Rules-in-Use." In Foundations of Social Capital. E. Ostrom and T. K. Ahn, eds. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. (Critical Studies in Economic Institutions 2).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Reprinted of a chapter published in Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, Chapter Two, San Francisco: ICS, pages 19-39, 1992.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2002.  "Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory." In Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 2A: Agriculture and Its External Linkages. B. L. Gardner and G. C. Rausser, eds. New York: Elsevier. (Handbooks in Economics, no. 18).

wsl  Books & Reprint Files.

 

     "In the conventional theory of common-pool resources, participants do not undertake efforts to design their own governance arrangements.  Substantial empirical evidence exists, however, that many common-pool resources are self-governed.  Thus, in this chapter, I briefly review the conventional theory of common-pool resources.  Then, I provide an overview of the empirical studies that test this theory in experimental laboratories.  In the third section, I provide an overview of the empirical studies of this theory conducted in field settings.  Since research in the lab and in the field both provide evidence that appropriators from common-pool resources do self-organize, the fourth section is devoted to the presentation of an initial theory of self-organization focusing on the benefit-cost calculus of individual appropriators.  Two major theoretical puzzles remain, having to do with the effect of the size of a group and its heterogeneity."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2002.  "People and Trees: An Institutional Analysis." College of Forestry, Oregon State University. (Starker Lecture Series, 2002 Lecture Transcripts).

http://www.cof.orst.edu/starkerlectures/transcripts/2002/ostrom.php

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "...In this talk I will summarize some of the recent work on the human causes of deforestation.  Then I will describe the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program and summarize some of the initial findings from studies in Nepal and Ecuador.  The IFRI research program is a micro-level, multi-year, multi-country study that combines careful measures derived from a random sample of plots from forests about which a substantial, systematic social science data set is also collected.  In addition to forest mensuration conducted in a sample of plots, data are obtained about the population making use of a forest, its socioeconomic and political organization, the market forces affecting local use patterns, and the rules-in-use related to investment in and harvesting of timber and nontimber forest products.  The IFRI research methodology is designed to fill the substantial knowledge gaps about the impact of human choice on forest conditions, while also integrating biophysical measures of forest conditions (extent, fragmentation, biomass, etc)."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2002.  "Understanding the Diversity of Structured Human Interactions." (Working Paper)

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Draft of Chapter 1 in Understanding Institutional Diversity in Open Societies (Forthcoming)

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2000.  "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2000.  "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 2000.  El Gobierno de los Bienes Comunes: La Evolucion de las Instituciones de Acción Colectiva. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

wsl  Books.

 

Translation of Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999.  "Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction: Synergy, and Development." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999.  "Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999.  "The Institutional Analysis and Development Approach." In Institutional Analysis: Readings and Resources for Researchers, Volume 5.  S. Langill, ed. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre.

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999.  "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework." In Theories of the Policy Process.  P. A. Sabatier, ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy).

wsl  Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999.  "Size and Performance in a Federal System." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999.  "Why Do We Need Multiple Indicators of Public Service Outputs." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1998.  "The Institutional Analysis and Development Approach." In Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management. E. T. Loehman and D. M. Kilgour, eds. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. (New Horizons in Environmental Economics).

wsl  Reserves & Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1998.  "Institutional Analysis, Design Principles, and Threats to Sustainable Community Governance and Management of Commons." In Law and the Governance of Renewable Resources: Studies from Northern Europe and Africa. E. Berge and N. C. Stenseth, eds. Oakland, CA: ICS Press.

wsl  Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1998.  "The International Forestry Resources and Institutions Research Program: A Methodology for Relating Human Incentives and Actions on Forest Cover and Biodiversity." In Forest Biodiversity in North, Central and South America and the Caribbean: Research and Monitoring. F. Dallmeier and J. A. Comiskey, eds. New York: Parthenon. (Man and the Biosphere Series, v. 21).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1996.  "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the IAD Framework." Presented at the 1996 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 29-September 1, 1996.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

   "Two important aspects of the IAD framework were developed in the initial article (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). One aspect is the distinction among three tiers of decision making and the relations among them: constitutional, collective choice, and operational decisions. The second major aspect is the elucidation of the fundamental elements which can be used for analysis of outcomes and their evaluation at any of the three tiers of decision making. In this paper, I will present an updated version of the framework in light of the additional work undertaken since 1982 and an assessment of the utility of this tool for institutional analysis..."

   "Because institutions are fundamentally shared concepts, they exist in the minds of participants and sometimes are shared as implicit knowledge rather than in an explicit and written form."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1996.  "The International Forestry Resources and Institutions Research Program: A Methodology for Relating Human Incentives and Actions on Forest Cover and Biodiversity." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University-Bloomington. (W95I-12).

wsl  Books (Shelved under ¤African Studies Program--1997).

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1996.  "Investing in Capital, Institutions and Incentives." In Institutions and Economic Development: Implications of a New-Institutional Economics Approach for Growth, Poverty Reduction, Democracy, and External Assistance.  C. Clague, ed. College Park, MD: University of Maryland, IRIS.

wsl  Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1995.  "Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity." In Property Rights and the Environment: Social and Ecological Issues. S. Hanna and M. Munasinghe, eds. Washington, DC: The Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics and the World Bank.

wsl  Reserves and Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1995.  "Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development." Presented at the World Bank's Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, May 1-2, 1995.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Author's Abstract:

  "This paper presents some paradoxical findings from a recent study of irrigation systems in Nepal and describes past efforts made to improve the physical infrastructure of irrigation systems in Nepal.  incentives facing officials on government irrigation systems, staff in donor agencies, and farmers on self-organized systems are discussed to explain these empirical findings. A game-theoretical analysis of institutional choice on self-organized systems illustrates the variety of factors that affect the adoption of any particular rule configuration.  After a brief analysis of why external assistance does not always improve performance, the paper describes one externally funded intervention that has been evaluated as highly successful.  The last section focuses on the policy significance of these findings.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1995.  "The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework: An Application to the Study of Common-Pool Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at EDI, Curriculum Development Workshop, Washington, DC, December 6-7, 1995. (Workshop Working Paper, W95-28).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1994.  "Institutional Analysis, Design Principles and Threats to Sustainable Community Governance and Management of Commons." In Community Management and Common Property of Coastal Fisheries in Asia and the Pacific: Concepts, Methods and Experiences.  R. S. Pomeroy, ed. Manila, Philippines: International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management. (Workshop Reprint Series, R94-11).

wsl  Reprint Files & Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1994.  "Neither Market nor State: Governance of Common-Pool Resources in the Twenty-First Century." Presented at the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, June 2, 1994. (IFPRI Lecture Series, no. 2).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1993.  "Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action." Presented at the conference on "Heterogeneity and Collective Action," Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, October 14-17, 1993.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

      "Ignoring the impact on a form of social capital--the rules used in farmer-organized irrigation systems--of changes in physical capital can lead to the unintended consequences that the physical capital is not as productive as intended.  Analysis focuses on the choice of rules made by farmers in symmetric and asymmetric situations.  using this analysis, it is possible to illustrate why many donor-funded improvements in physical capital have had counterproductive impacts."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1993.  "Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions." Water Resources Research 29(7):1, 907-912.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1993.  "Institutional Arrangements and Coordination: An Application of Institutional Analysis." In Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternative, and Choices. V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and H. Picht, eds. San Francisco: ICS Press.

wsl  Books and Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1992.  Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems. San Francisco: ICS Press. (A Publication of the Center for Self-Governance).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1992.  "A Framework for Institutional Analysis." In Workshop on Democracy and Governance: Proceedings.  Associates in Rural Development, ed. Burlington, VT: Associates in Rural Development. (Decentralization: Finance and Management Project (DFM)).

wsl  Books--Series.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1991.  "A Framework for Institutional Analysis." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, no. W91-14).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1991.  "A Method of Institutional Analysis and an Application to Multiorganizational Arrangements." In The Public Sector -- Challenge for Coordination and Learning.  F. Kaufmann, ed. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Workshop Reprint, No. R91-19

 

     "This chapter provides an initial framework for analyzing all types of institutional arrangements.  A key conceptual unit is identified -- called an antion arena.  Action arenas includes a model of an action situation and a model of the actors in that situation..."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1991.  "Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Towards Complementarity (book review)." American Political Science Review 85(1):237-243.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990.  "Design Principles of Long-Enduring Self-Governing Institutions." Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, April 7, 1990. (D90-3).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990.  Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. (The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions).

wsl  Reserves & Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990.  "A Method of Institutional Analysis and an Application to Multiorganizational Arrangements." (Workshop Working Papers, W90-2).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990.  "Rational-Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Towards Complementarity (Book Review)." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W90-8).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990.  "The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common Property Institutions." Presented at "Designing Sustainability on the Commons," the first annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Duke University, September 28-30, 1990. (Workshop Working Paper, no. W89-6).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/43/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

   "In the light of the case studies prepared by the National Academy of Sciences and other recent books (McCay and Acheson, Berkes, Pinkerton) on common-property institutions, are there any general principles that can be learned from those institutions that have succeeded in enabling users to govern and manage common property  resources successfully versus those that have not? This paper will address a series of such proposed design principles and their implications for further research and policy."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1989.  "Institutionelle Arrangements und das Dilemma der Allmende." In Gesellschaftliche Steuerungsrationalität und partikulare Handlungstrategien.  Herbolzheim, Germany: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

German translation of: Ostrom, Elinor. 1988.  "Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma" which was published in Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices.  1988. V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and Hartmut Picht, eds. San Francisco: ICS Press.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1989.  "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems." Rationality and Society 1(1):11-50.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1988.  "Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma." In Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices. V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and Hartmut Picht, eds. San Francisco: ICS Press. (Workshop Reprint, No. R88-2).

wsl  Books, Reprint Files and Reserves.

 

An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Distinguished Faculty Research Lecture, Indiana University, April 3, 1986.

From pp. 102-3:

    "If the only 'commons' of importance were a few grazing areas or fisheries, the 'tragedy of the commons' would be of little general interest. This is not the case. Hardin himself used the grazing commons as a metaphor for the general problem of overpopulation. The tragedy of the commons has been used to describe such diverse problems as the Sahelian famine of the 1970s (Picardi and Seifert, 1977), the problem of acid rain (R. Wilson, 1985), the organization of the Mormon Church (Bullock and Baden, 1977) the inability of the U.S. Congress to limit its own capacities to overspend (Shepsle and Weingast, 1984, urban crime (Neher, 1978), public sector-private sector relationships in modern  economies (Scharph, 1985), the problems of international cooperation (Snidal, 1985) and communal conflict in Cyprus (Lumsden, 1973).

     "Analytically, Hardin's theory has been formalized as an N-Person, Commons Dilemma Game (Dawes, 1973, 1975).When the stark features of  the formal representation are examined, the decision facing the herdsman in an open-access commons has the same underlying structure as the decision facing each prisoner in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game..."

 

Ostrom, Elinor, comp. 1987. Collected Papers on Institutional Analysis and Development 1986-1987: Papers Prepared by Participants in the Advanced Studies Seminar on Patterns of Order and Development in Human Societies. Bloomington, IN: Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis.

wsl  Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1987.  "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems." Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at "Advances in Comparative Institutional Analysis", Inter-University Center of Postgraduate Studies, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, October 19-23, 1987, and "Constitutional Design, Constitutional Reform, and Liberty in Canada", The Prince of Wales, Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, November 6-7, 1987. (W87-18).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/75/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

From Page 1:

     "The American and Canadian systems of governance are characterized by many constitutions rather than one constitution. A necessary condition of a federal system is the existence of more than one constitution.  In the United States, it is difficult to estimate how many governmental constitutions actually exist.  One national and fifty state constitutions head the list.  Within most states, numerous constitutions are embedded in organic legislation authorizing the establishment of counties, cities, and special districts and specifying the set of decision rules to be used in establishing, operating, and terminating these units of government.   In home rule states, many localities devise their own constitutions (charters) in addition to those that have used pre-designed constitutions available through organic legislation.  Special districts have been established with their own charters defining the limited rights and duties of citizens and officials included within those jurisdictions.  The number of independent, actively used, public-sector constitutions in the United States today is in the thousands."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1986.  "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions." Public Choice 48:3-25.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1986.  "How Inexorable is the 'Tragedy of the Commons?' Institutional Arrangements for Changing the Social Structure of Social Dilemmas." Presented as a Distinguished Faculty Research Lecture, Office of Research and Graduate Development, Indiana University, April 3, 1986.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/41/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

An earlier version of:  Ostrom, Elinor. 1988.  "Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma." In Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices. V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and Hartmut Picht, eds. San Francisco: ICS Press.

From pp. 40-42:

     "There are several lessons that I hope you carry away from this lexture. First, the usefulness of an analytical device such as the Commons dilemma should be apparent..."

     "Second, I hope that we have dispelled a commonly held presumption that whenever individuals find themselves in a Commons Dilemma they are forever trapped in a tragedy of the commons..."

     "Third, I hope we have dismantled another popular myth that there is only one way to solve a Commons Dilemma."

     "This paper discusses 'the important methodological lesson' that we cannot make much progress in the social sciences so long as we presume that most phenomena of interest occur at a single level. We need self-consciously to examine the different levels of analysis and develop technical languages for work at these different levels. The relationships among  levels must then be examined, but with a full recognition that there are different types of phenomena to be explained at each level. By understanding how rules can be used to restructure such nasty social traps as Commons Dilemmas, we may come to appreciate that alternatives are available for resolving other social dilemmas. Human  beings not only face choices about how to act in given situations, but they have the capacity to think about, formulate, and select different ways of structuring choice situations. Choices occur in different contexts and at different levels. When people learn not only how to use a commons but how to govern a commons, they are laying the foundation for developing and maintaining self-governing, democratic societies."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1986.  "A Method of Institutional Analysis." In Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector: The Bielefeld Interdisciplinary Project. F. X. Kaufmann, G. Majone, and V. Ostrom, eds. New York: Walter de Gruyter. (de Gruyter Studies in Organization 4).

wsl  Reserves & Reprint Files.

 

Author's abstract:

     "This chapter provides an initial framework for analyzing all types of institutional arrangements. A key conceptual unit is identified -- called an action arena. Action arenas include a model of an action situation and a model of the actors in that situation. A model of the action situation can be characterized using eight clusters of variables: (1) participants, (2) positions, (3) outcomes, (4) action-outcome linkages, (5) information, (6) control excercised by participants, (7) costs and benefits assigned to outcomes and action, and (8) the number of iterations of the situation itself. A model of the actor must include assumtions about the resources that an actor brings to a situation; the evaluation actors assigned to states of the world and to actions; the  way actors acquire, possess, retain and use information, and the process the actors use for selecting particular course of action. Analysts predict and explain behavior using the working parts of these two component models of an action arena.

     "Underlying the way analysts model action arenas are implicit assumptions about the rules indiviiduals use to order relationships, about attributes of the states of the world and their transformations, and about the nature of the community within which the arena occurs. Rules are viewed as contextual, prescriptive, and followable linguistic entities. A primary focus is placed on working rules in use by participants in action arenas. A method for developing a meaningful classification of a set of rules affecting action arenas is presented and then iillustrated in Chapter 24."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1986.  "Multiorganizational Arrangements and Coordination: An Application of Institutional Analysis." In Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector. F.-X. Kaufmann, G. Majone, and V. Ostrom, eds. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. (Workshop Reprint, No. R86-2).

wsl  Reserves & Reprint Files.

 

Author's Abstract:

     "Two linked action situations are examined in this chapter using the method of institutional analysis previously described in Chapter 22. The first arena is the one in which public officials are elected. The most influential model of this arena was developed by Anthony Downs. The second arena is the one in which elected officials bargain with the heads of administrative agencies (sponsors) over the amount of the budget to be allocated and the amount and type of goods or services to be produced. William Niskanen developed an important model of this process. The central question addressed in this chapter is how multiple organizations, competing according to sets of rules, tend to enhance the responsiveness of public officials and bureau chiefs to the preferences of the citizens they serve in both of these arenas. Empirical evidence supporting the proposition that competition among the potential producers of a public good will enhance performance is presented related to the provision of solid waste removal services in American cities."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1985.  "Formulating the Elements of Institutional Analysis." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, no. W85-15).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/38/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1985.  "Formulating the Elements of Institutional Analysis." In Studies in Institutional Analysis and Development;: Papers Prepared by Participants in the Seminar on Patterns of Order and Development in Human Societies. E. Ostrom and V. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.

wsl  Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1985.  "A Method of Institutional Analysis." In Pathologies of Urban Processes. K. E. Haynes, A. Kuklinski, and O. Kultalahti Helsinki: Finnpulishers.

wsl  Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1985.  "The Rudiments of a Revised Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Institutions for Collective Action." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Prepared for the the Panel on Common Property Resource Management, Board on Science and Technology for International Development (BOSTID), National Academy of Sciences / National Resource Council, Annapolis, MD, April 1985. (Working Paper, no. W85-32).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "The apprent contradiction between some of our cases and the current interpretation given to major theories of collective action led me to re-examine the theories of Garrett Hardin and Mancur Olson to ascertain if these theories had been adequately understood. Given space constraints, I can only summarize my conclusions here. Garrett Hardin's theory is generally well-understood and the empirical evidence presented in some of the case studies represents a challenge to his theory. On the other hand, Mancur Olson's theory is not well-understood due in part to a lack of consistency and clarity in his original presentation."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1983.  "Analyzing Institutions for the Delivery of Local Collective Goods." Presented at the American Society for Public Administration Meetings, New York, NY, April 16-19, 1983. (W83-9).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/01/09/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

Author's abstract:

    "Public choice theory has proved particularly fruitful when applied to the analysis of institutional arrangements for providing and producing public services in metropolitan areas.  Scholars working within traditional disciplines of political science and public administration had reached a theoretical impasse in understanding the complexity of the existing delivery arrangements.  By identifying the key attributes of collective goods and the difference between organizing for the provision and for the production of collective goods, scholars working in this interdisciplinary area brought comprehensibility to the study of complex service delivery arrangements. Further, empirical research now supports several counter-intuitive propositions derived from this approach about the effects of institutional arrangements on the effectiveness and efficiency of police agencies serving metropolitan areas."

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1983.  "The Elements of an Action Situation." (Working Paper, W83-23).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/40/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor. 1983.  "An Overview of Rule Configurations." (Working Paper)

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/07/74/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

     "In an earlier paper entitled 'The Elements of an Action Situation,' I identified the generic elements of action situations used by analysts to construct a wide variety of important types of analytical models including market, hierarchical, and bargaining models and formal games of all types..."

     :"The purpose of this paper is to develop the rudiments of such a language drawing heavily on the work of many other scholars who have addressed various aspects of this task. To simplify the study of rules, I will cluster specific types of rules according to which aspects of an action situation they affect. Six broad classes of rules will be discussed: position, authority, scope, information, payoff, and aggregation rules.  Position rules are that set of rules which affect the creation of positions and of assigning individuals to positions. Authority rules affect the assignment of particular action sets to positions. Scope rules affect which outcomes will be affected and the range of the effect. Information rules affect the level of information available in a situation about action/outcome linkages. Payoff rules affect the benefits and costs assigned to particular actions and outcomes. Aggregration rules affect the level of control that individual participants excercise at a linkage. The relationships among rules and elements of an action situation is shown in Figure 1.

     "In this paper I will try to define each type of rule and array some of the major variants of each rules type. Some of the sections of this paper are relatively fully worked out. Others are only a brief sketch. Read this version as an initial draft of a paper rather than as a completed paper."

 

Ostrom, Elinor et al. 1993.  "A Relational Archive for Natural Resources Governance and Management." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the "Conference on Applications of Advanced Information Technologies for the Management of Natural Resources," Spokane, WA, June 17-19, 1993, and the "International Workshop on Developing Large Environmental Databases for Sustainable Development," Nairobi, Kenya, August, 1993. (Reprint Series R93-14).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Co-authors:

Huckfeldt, Sharon K.

Schweik, Charles M.

Wertime, Mary Beth

 

Ostrom, Elinor, Paul Benjamin, and Ganesh P. Shivakoti 1994.  "Use of Case Studies and Structural Coding in a Relational Database for Storage and Analysis of Irrigation Institutions and Systems in Nepal." In From Farmers' Fields to Data Fields and Back: A Synthesis of Participatory Information Systems for Irrigation and Other Resources.  J. Sowerwine et al., eds. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management Institute.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Roy Gardner 2000.  "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker 1994.  "Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool Resources." In Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

wsl  Reserves and Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker 1992.  Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (draft). Bloomington, IN: Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker 1991.  Rules and Games: Institutions and Common Pool Resources. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, Clark Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar, and Krister Andersson 2002.  Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation (Main Report). Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). (Sida Studies in Evaluation 02/01).

http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=1265&a=11710

wsl  Books.

 

     "Despite tremendous efforts and good intentions, aid often produces disappointing results. Sida, along with other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, has indicated that the lack of proper incentives generated by aid itself may be an important factor undermining its sustainability (Sida, 1999g).

This study explores how the incentives that arise in the system of development assistance affect the goal of sustainable development."

 

Ostrom, Elinor, Clark Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar, and Krister Andersson 2002.  Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation (Summary Report). Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). (Sida Studies in Evaluation 02/01:1).

wsl  Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, Clark Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar, and Krister Andersson 2001.  "Final Report: Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation for the Department of Evaluation and Internal Audit (UTV) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN.

wsl  Books.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Vincent Ostrom 2004.  "The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 63(1):105-147.

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0254/is_1_63/ai_114091070

wsl  Serials Shelves.

 

     "The logical foundations of constitutional government are of basic importance if people are to be self-governing.  All forms of political order are Faustian bargains subject to numerous risks.  If constitutional choice applies to all patterns of human association, the complexity of associated relationships and the potential threats to the viability of associated relationships in the aggregate exceed the limits of human cognition.  The development of analytical capabilities depends on using frameworks, theories, and models for formulating hypotheses about conditions and consequences, undertaking diagnostic assessments, and conceptualizing and designing alternative possibilities.  The relationship of ideas to deeds in an experimental epistemology is necessary to achieve a warrantable art and science of association."

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Vincent Ostrom 2004.  "The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice." In The Production and Diffusion of Public Choice Political Economy: Reflections on the VPI Center. J. C. Pitt, D. Salehi-Isfahani, and D. W. Eckel, eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

wsl  Books.

 

     "The logical foundations of constitutional government are of basic importance if people are to be self-governing.  All forms of political order are Faustian bargains subject to numerous risks.  If constitutional choice applies to all patterns of human association, the complexity of associated relationships and the potential threats to the viability of associated relationships in the aggregate exceed the limits of human cognition.  The development of analytical capabilities depends on using frameworks, theories, and models for formulating hypotheses about conditions and consequences, undertaking diagnostic assessments, and conceptualizing and designing alternative possibilities.  The relationship of ideas to deeds in an experimental epistemology is necessary to achieve a warrantable art and science of association."

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Vincent Ostrom 2001.  "The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice." Zbornik 51(1):119-152.

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

     "The logical foundations of constitutional government are of basic importance if people are to be self-governing.  All forms of political order are Faustian bargains subject to numerous risks.  If constitutional choice applies to all patterns of human association, the complexity of associated relationships and the potential threats to the viability of associated relationships in the aggregate exceed the limits of human cognition.  The development of analytical capabilities depends on using frameworks, theories, and models for formulating hypotheses about conditions and consequences, undertaking diagnostic assessments, and in conceptualizing and designing alternative possibilities.  The relationship of ideas to deeds in an experimental epistemology is necessary to achieve a warrantable art and science of association."

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Vincent Ostrom 1986.  "Analytical Tools for Institutional Design." In Institutional Development: Improving Management in Developing Countries: Reports on a Seminar Series.  Washington, DC: American Consortium For International Public Administration. (Workshop Reprint Series R84-11).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Vincent Ostrom, eds. 1985. Research Program: An Intellectual Adventure. Bloomington, IN: Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis.

wsl  Books.

 

This collection of papers, originally prepared in 1984 to assist internal and external boards of review in evaluating the research efforts of the workshop, has proved to be of interest to others who wish to know more about the intellectual enterprise...

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Vincent Ostrom, comp. 1985. Studies in Institutional Analysis and Development; Papers Prepared by Participants in the Seminar on Patterns of Order and Development in Human Societies. Bloomington, IN: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.

wsl  Books.

 

The ... collection of papers was prepared by participants in the Seminar on Patterns of Order and Development in Human Societies which was offered as the core of the Workshop Program for Advanced Study in Institutional Analysis and Development.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Vincent Ostrom 1971.  "A Theory for Institutional Analysis of Common Pool Problems." In Managing the Commons. G. Hardin and J. Baden, eds. San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman.

wsl  Reserves.

 

Ostrom, Elinor, Vincent Ostrom, Michael McGinnis, and John Williams 1996.  "A Course of Study in Institutional Analysis 1996-97." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.

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     "This seminar is an effort to build a multidisciplinary approach to Institutional Analysis and Development that draws heavily upon work in anthropology, economics, law, political science, public administration, and sociology.  The effort is to develop a coherent theoretical approach that is consistent with work in public choice theory and the new institutional economics but focusing upon institutional analysis more generally.  We proceed upon a presupposition that alternative institutional arrangements are available for those types of problems that are common to all human societies.  Choice is possible; and choice of institutional arrangements is grounded in informed calculations that take account of both positive and normative considerations.  The focus in institutional analysis is upon rule-ordered relationships and the way that these affect structures of incentives that facilitate or impede developmental opportunities.  This seminar constitutes the theoretical core for the more general intellectual exchange among scholars participating in the Workshop's program for advanced study in comparative Institutional Analysis and Development.  The approach is intended to offer a mode of inquiry concerned with the nature and constitution of order in human societies."

 

Ostrom, Elinor, and Roger B. Parks 1999.  "Neither Gargantua nor the Land of Lilliputs: Conjectures on Mixed Systems of Metropolitan Organization." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Elinor, Roger B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitaker 1999.  "Defining and Measuring Structural Variations in Interorganizational Arrangements." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Elinor, Larry Schroeder, and James T. Thomson 1988.  "Proposal for Decentralization Program Support in Nepal." U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC. (Decentralization: Finance and Management Project).

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Ostrom, Elinor, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne 1993.  "Analyzing the Performance of Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Sustaining Rural Infrastructure in Developing Countries." Journal of Public Administration Research Theory 3(1):11-45.

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Ostrom, Elinor, Larry Schroeder, and Susan Wynne 1993.  Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development:  Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. P. Sabatier, ed.  Boulder, CO: Westview. (Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy).

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Ostrom, Elinor, and James M. Walker 2000.  "Neither Markets Nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective-Action Arenas." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Elinor, and Mary Beth Wertime 1998.  "IFRI Research Strategy." In Forest Resources and Institutions. C. Gibson, M. A. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University, International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC), Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. (Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper no. 3).

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Ostrom, Elinor, and Mary Beth Wertime 1995.  "International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Strategy." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (P94I-3).

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Ostrom, Elinor, and Gordon P. Whitaker 1999.  "Community Control and Governmental Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black Communities." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Elinor, and Gordon P. Whitaker 1999.  "Does Local Community Control of Police Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1999.  "Artisanship and Artifact." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1999.  "Cryptoimperialism, Predatory States, and Self-Governance." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1999.  "A Forgotten Tradition: The Constitutional Level of Analysis." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1999.  "Polycentricity (Part 1)." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1999.  "Polycentricty (Part 2)." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1999.  "Problems of Cognition as a Challenge to Policy Analysts and Democratic Societies." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1999.  "Water and Politics California Style." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1991.  "Some Puzzles in Using Knowledge to Inform Choices About Public Affairs." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W91-4).

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In this paper, I shall first address a variety of problems that create serious ambiguities about the use of knowledge to inform choices about public affaris.  These problems are sufficiently serious to require a deep reconsideration of how to think about policy analysis... In the last portion of the paper, I indicate some intitial steps to be taken in reconceptualizing policy analysis more broadly to have reference to institutional analysis and development

 

Ostrom, Vincent. 1988.  "The Foundations of Institutional Analysis and Development." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, no. W88-3).

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Ostrom, Vincent, ed. 1985. Background Materials for a Conference on Getting the Prices Right; Bloomington, IN; September 17-20, 1985. Bloomington, IN: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.

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Contents:

Session I: The Poverty and Wealth of Nations: Institutions, Prices, and Development

Brunner, Karl

 The Poverty of Nations

Kirzner, Israel M.

 Market Process Versus Market Equilibrium

Bauer, P.T.

 Market Order and State Planning in Economic Development

Alchian, Armen

 How Should Prices Be Set?

Session II: The Challenge: Governmental Monopoly in the Political and Economic Dimensions

Ostrom, Vincent

 Cryptoimperialism

Chantornvong, Sombat

  Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America : An Asian Perspective

Wall Street Journal

  Mr. Marcos's `Capitalism'

Session III: Variable Open Market Structures

Popkin, Samuel L.

  Public Choice and Rural Development--Free Riders, Lemons,    and Institutional Design

House, William J.

  Nairobi's Informal Sector; An Exploratory Study

Gellar, Sheldon

  Pitfalls of Top-Down Development Planning and Macro-Economic    Analyses; Senegalese Grain Pricing Policies in the Post-Berg Era

Picht, Hartmut

  Monetary Arrangements for Economic Development

Session IV: Variable Monopoly Structures

De Alessi, Louis

 The Economics of Property Rights; A Review of the Evidence

Denning, Michael

 The Public Ownership of Productive Resources; An Economic Analysis of Public Enterprise

Session V: Variable Political Structures

Ostrom, Vincent

  Constitutional Considerations with Particular Reference to Federal     Systems

Bates, Robert

  The Centralization of African Societies

Ostrom, Vincent and Ostrom, Elinor

  Public Goods and Public Choices

Runge, Carlisle Ford

  Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action

Session VI: How Do We Know When Things Go Wrong?

Oakerson, Ronald J.

  Reciprocity, Its General Relevance to Politics

Taylor, John F. A.

  The Ethical Foundations of the Market

Session VII: Comparative Institutional Analysis: How Do We Proceed?

Feeny, David

  The Development of Property Rights in Land: A Comparative Study

Ruttan, Vernon W.

  Social Science Knowledge and Institutional Change

Ostrom, Elinor

  Formulating the Elements of Institutional Analysis

Ostrom, Vincent

  Opportunity, Diversity, and Complexity

 

Ostrom, Vincent. 1985.  "The Constitution of Order in Human Societies: Conceptualizing the Nature and Magnitude of the Task in Institutional Analysis and Development." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W85-10).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1985.  "Cryptoimperialism." In Studies in Institutional Analysis and Development;: Papers Prepared by Participants in the Seminar on Patterns of Order and Development in Human Societies. E. Ostrom and V. Ostrom, eds. Bloomington, IN: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1985.  "Institutional Analysis and Development: The Nature and Magnitude of the Task." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper, W85-9).

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Ostrom, Vincent. 1982.  "Institutional Analysis, Policy Analysis, and Performance Evaluation." Presented at the Workshop on the Study of Interorganizational Arrangements in the Public Sector, International Institute of Management, Berlin, July 26-28, 1982. (Workshop Working Paper, no. W82-39).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/01/16/index.html

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(From p. 3):

     "In this paper I shall focus upon some basic cognitive distinctions that scholars make when they engage in the study of political phenomena.  The distinctions I want to make pertain to what I shall refer to as policy analysis, institutional analysis and operational analysis.  First, I wish to show how these different modes of analysis are related to one another and show some of the difficulties that are likely to occur when studies are conducted without an awareness of the essential complementarity of these different modes of analysis. I shall turn first to policy analysis, to operational analysis and then to institutional analysis.  Finally, I shall indicate how the focus upon implementation structures and upon public-service industries to study patterns of interorganizational relationships are essentially complementary to one another.  The tasks confronting us, then, is to develop a conscious awareness of the importance of making proper linkages in scholarship drawing upon these different ways of conceptualizing patters of interorganizational relationships."

 

Ostrom, Vincent. 1972.  "Some Problems of Institutional Analysis." In Institutions for Urban-Metropolitan Water Management: Essays in Social Theory.  N. Wengert, ed. Fort Collins, CO: Colorado State University. (Environmental Resources Center, Completion Report Series no. 39).

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In exploring the relationship of "institutions" to urban water management with special reference to metropolitan areas, I propose to examine, first, some of the theoretical issues inherent in institutional analysis and, second, some practical issues which are raised in applying institutional analysis to problems of water resource management in metropolitan areas.

 

Ostrom, Vincent. 1967.  "Institutional Failure and Reform: A Problem in Economic and Political Analysis of Water Resource Development." Presented at the Conference on Political Science and the Study of Public Policy, Cape Newagen, MN, August 28-30, 1967. (W67-7).

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/01/21/index.html

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(From pp. 1, 2, & 8):

     "The purpose of this conference is to consider the question of what special contribution, if any, can political scientists make to the analysis and formulation of public policy?  At an earlier time, essentially the same question might have been posed by inquiring about What special contribution can political scientists make to political reform?  More recently, the reform motif has become something of an anathema to the more scientifically rigorous political scientists.  Yet, we keep returning to the problems of reform like moths drawn to a candle flame.  Perhaps we will be able to make a special contribution as political scientists to the analysis and formulation of public policy only when we develop the capability for analyzing the issue of reform with some measure of professional competence.

     "My invitation to participate in this meeting was to direct attention to the tangible and practical problems of public policy associated with water resource development and not to discourse about political reform as such.  Yet, contemporary studies of water resource development persistently turn to allegations of institutional failure among resource development and management agencies and conclude by either explicitly or implicitly proposing a program of reform.  Most of these studies have been made by economists, those done by political scientists have a similar, albeit, variant approach to institutional failure and reform.  The studies by economists are both more systematic and more consistent in their critique, and I shall use their work as the principal point of departure.

     "There are quite tangible and practical reasons, unrelated to the wiles of politicians, for problems of water resource development to become deeply involved in the political process.  The water problem is, in fact, a multitude of problems, but most of these are problems of fluidity.  Whenever water behaves as a liquid, it has the characteristics of 1) a common pool, flow resource involving; 2) a complex bundle of potential goods and bads which sustain; 3) a high level of interaction or interdependency among the various joint and alternative uses.  The interrelationships among all three of these characteristics of a water resource situation simply compounds the difficulties in settling upon stable, long-term institutional arrangements for the economics development of water resources."

 

Ostrom, Vincent, David Feeny, and Hartmut Picht, eds. 1992. Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices (Chinese translation).

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Ostrom, Vincent, David Feeny, and Hartmut Picht 1988.  "Institutional Analysis and Development: Rethinking the Terms of Choice." In Rethinking Institutional Analysis and Development: Issues, Alternatives, and Choices. V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and H. Picht, eds. San Francisco: ICS.

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Ostrom, Vincent, and Timothy Hennessey 1972?  "Institutional Analysis and Design." (Working Paper)

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/09/78/index.html

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Note to the Reader:

     "This is a preliminary and incomplete draft of a manuscript that attempts to provide theoretical foundations for institutional analysis and design. We conceive of institutions to be nothing more nor less than decision-making arrangements. Institutional analysis is concerned with the effect of different decision-making arrangements upon human conduct and upon the well-being of the individuals who are involved. Institutional design is concerned with the choice of decision-making arrangements that will provide the means that are appropriate to the realization [of] specifiable objectives, consequences or ends in view. Any practical man of action who is concerned with organizing the efforts of many individuals in a joint enterprise is necessarily involved in problems of institutional analysis and design..."

 

Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom 2000.  "Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom 1999.  "A Behavioral Approach to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom 1999.  "Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development." In Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom 1999.  "Public Goods and Public Choices." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom 1977.  "A Theory for Institutional Analysis of Common Pool Problems." In Managing the Commons. G. Hardin and J. Baden, eds. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.

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Workshop Reprint, No. R77-4a

 

Ostrom, Vincent, Elinor Ostrom, and Roberta Herzberg 1989.  "A Course of Study in Institutional Analysis and Development." In Comparative Politics III: Development, Political Participation, Ethnicity.  A. Kornberg, ed. Durham, NC: Eno River Press. (Political Science Reading Lists and Course Outlines; Vol. 10).

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Ostrom, Vincent, Elinor Ostrom, and Roberta Herzberg 1988-1989.  "A Course of Study in Institutional Analysis and Development." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN.

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This seminar is an effort to build a multidisciplinary approach to institutional analysis an development that draws heavily upon work in anthropology, economics, law, political science, public administration, and sociology.

 

Ostrom, Vincent, Elinor Ostrom, and Ira L. Whitman 1970.  "Problems for Institutional Analysis of the Great Lakes Basin." In Proceedings: Thirteenth Conference on Great Lakes Research.  Toronto, Ontario: International Association for Great Lakes Research.

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Ostrom, Vincent, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren 1999.  "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Painter, Martin. 1991.  "Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: An Institutional Analysis." Canadian Journal of Political Science XXIV(2):269-288.

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Park, Hye Yun. 2004.  "Emerging Civil Society and Its Institutional Impact in Korea: Locating a Nuclear Waste Repository Case." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, May 1 and 3, 2004.

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Parks, Roger B. 1999.  "Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Areas (It's Like Deja Vu All over Again)." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Parks, Roger B. et al. 1999.  "Consumers as Coproducers of Public Services: Some Economic and Institutional Considerations." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Co-authors:

Baker, Paula C.

Kiser, Larry L.

Oakerson, Ronald

Ostrom, Elinor

Ostrom, Vincent

Percy, Stephen L.

Vandivort, Martha B.

Whitaker, Gordon P.

Wilson, Rick

 

Parks, Roger B., and Elinor Ostrom 1999.  "Complex Models of Urban Service Systems." In Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Petak, Zdravko. 2002.  "Political Economy of the Croatian De-Evolution." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference and TransCoop Meeting, Humboldt University/Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, December 13-16, 2002.

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From page 1:

     "The methodological approach that has been following in the paper stemming from political economy of government areas, developed particularly by authors connected with the IAD framework developed within the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis in Bloomington.  Starting with famous papers by Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout and Robert Warren (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom V., Tiebout and Warren, 1961) appeared a vast series of literature in which has been trying to prove the efficiency of polycentric order.  By enabling to citizens to choose among different public goods at different scales of organization it is possible to achieve efficient system of local self-governance.  Following that conclusion, appropriate devolution policy should be designed in such manner to be capable to envisage institutional arrangements that could match free citizens choice in the provision of public goods."

 

Pido, Michael D., Robert S. Pomeroy, and Melvin B. Carlos 1995.  "Initiatives Towards Co-Management of Marine Fisheries and Other Coastal Resources in an Island Environment: The Case of Palawan, Philippines." Presented at "Reinventing the Commons," the fifth annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, May 24-28, 1995, Bodoe, Norway.

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   "The island-province of Palawan has the richest fishing grounds and possess the largest intact assemblage of coral reefs, sea grass beds and mangroves in the Philippines. However, these resources are under threat from population pressure and various illegal or destructive fishing practices. Further, despite the rich coastal resource base, the small-scale fishers are among the poorest population.

   "Using an institutional analysis research framework, a forum was organized to discuss with fisheries resource managers and decision makers the various management systems of fisheries and other coastal resources in Palawan. The various experiences suggest that the management system is determined by several contextual factors such as the biophysical and technological attributes, the market structure and the local institutional arrangement.

   "Within the island-province, several management systems have been identified. Some are spearheaded by national government agencies while others are administered by the local government units. Still, others are initiated by nongovernmental organizations or facilitated through the assistance of a research institution. A common approach among these management systems is some form of co-management or sharing of authority between government and community."

 

Pinhey, Nicholas Alan. 2003.  "Banking on the Commons: An Institutional Analysis of Groundwater Banking Programs in California's Central Valley." (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2003).

UMI

 

     "This dissertation investigates groundwater banking programs in the Central Valley of California where imported surface-water is mixed with native groundwater, a common-pool-resource.  The research seeks to determine how the introduction of imported surface-water into a groundwater basin influences the institutions governing the use of the groundwater basin in question.  The dissertation also investigates the factors that influence the completion of groundwater banking programs in California's Central Valley.  Groundwater banking is proposed as a potential component for addressing California's water needs, while avoiding a 'tragedy of the commons' by sustaining groundwater resources.  The Central Valley of California is identified as offering an opportunity for groundwater banking due to its geology and water conveyance systems.  The dissertation uses a modified version of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD framework) to accomplish the research and specifically address groundwater banking.  The physical uncertainties of groundwater basins, coupled with uncertainties related to California water rights and access, are proposed as significant driving forces in the development of institutions for groundwater banking.  These uncertainties can be the driving forces for creating the institutional arrangements needed to implement a groundwater banking program.  The case studies review two operating groundwater banks, the Kern Water Bank, and the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District groundwater banking program.  The case studies also review one failed attempt to establish a groundwater bank, the Madera Ranch Groundwater Bank and the Eastern San Joaquin Parties Water Authority Groundwater Bank #1, a delayed attempt to implement groundwater banking.  The case studies indicate that institutional arrangements that facilitate the mix of imported surface-water and the native groundwater in a groundwater basin are those that reduce uncertainty by protecting the water rights of overlying users, providing comprehensive monitoring, and providing local control of the groundwater basin.  The case studies also indicate that the design principles for long-enduring common-pool-resource regimes also apply to groundwater banks.  Trust and the local control of groundwater banking programs appear to be necessary precursors to a groundwater banking program in California's Central Valley.  The findings have relevance for policy makers seeking solutions to California's water problems."

 

Poloni-Staudinger, Lori. 2000.  "The Greening of Free Trade? An Institutional Analysis of Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations' Participation in the NAFTA Negotiations." Presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Bloomington, IN, April 19-21, 2000.

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Poloni-Staudinger, Lori. 1999.  "Do Institutions Effect Policy Outputs?: An Examination of the Relationship between Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies and the Environment." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, December 11-13, 1999.

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Polski, Margaret. 1999.  "The Political Economy of Commercial Banking and Interstate Banking Reform." Presented at the Workshop Colloquium, Workshop in Political theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, February 15, 1999.

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Polski, Margaret M. 1999.  "The Political Economy of Commercial Banking and Interstate Banking Reform." (Working Paper)

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Polski, Margaret M., and Elinor Ostrom 1998.  "An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Workshop Working Paper Series no. W98-27).

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Pomeroy, Caroline. 1994.  "Linking Local and Global Orderings?: The Skagit System Cooperative (A Research Proposal)." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Development, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. Presented at the mini-conference on Institutional Analysis and Development, Bloomington, IN, December 10 and 12, 1994.

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Pomeroy, Caroline. 1994.  "Social Identity and Cooperation in the Commons: Evidence and Reflections from a Field Study." Presented at the "Workshop on the Workshop" Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, June 16-18, 1994.

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Pomeroy, Robert S. et al. 1999.  "Analysis of Fisheries Co-management Arrangements: A Research Framework." In Institutional Analysis: Readings and Resources for Researchers, Volume 5.  S. Langill, ed. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre.

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Pradham, Prachanda. 2003.  "Eroding Social Capital through Incompatible Legal and Institutional Regime: Experiences from Irrigation Systems in Nepal." Presented at the Institutional Analysis and Development Mini-Conference, May 3 and 5, 2003, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

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From the Introduction:

     "Social capital refers to those stocks of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon to solve the common problems.  The irrigation organization that the farmers establish for managing their irrigation systems constitutes a form of social capital.  The irrigation organizations have evolved over period of time for mutually beneficial collective action through the trust and norms of behavior and reciprocity among the members of the organization."

 

Rana-Sinclair, Shamsa Q. 1996.  "Labor's Propensity to Engage in Strike Activity: A Result of Institutionalized Incentives." Presented at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Mini-Conference, Bloomington, IN, April 24-29, 1996.

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Rasmusen, Eric. 2000.  "Heterogeneous Players and Specialized Models." In Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.  M. D. McGinnis, ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Institutional Analysis).

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Regmi, Ashok. 1999.  "An Institutional Analysis of Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems." Presented at the Y673 Miniconference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, Indiana, December 11-13, 1999.

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Richardson, Richard C. 2004.  "A Conceptual Framework for Comparative Studies of Higher Education Policy." The Alliance for International Higher Education Policy Studies (AIHEPS), New York, NY. (AIHEPS Working Paper).

http://www.nyu.edu/iesp/aiheps/drafts/092004Draft.pdf

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From the Introduction:

     "The purpose of this paper is to refine the conceptual outcomes from the first phase of the AIHEPS project into a framework useful for guiding higher education policy studies that cross international boundaries and to propose the revised framework as a design for developing and testing hypotheses in each national setting about the linkages between policy and system performance.  The intent is to assess available evidence in each national setting about the degree to which hypotheses generated in one are applicable to explaining performance in another.

     "To accomplish this purpose, the paper integrates work from the first phase of the AIHEPS research project with insights from the current studies in Canada, Mexico and the U.S.  This version of the working paper has benefited from suggestions based on an earlier draft reviewed at the January 2004 AIHEPS meeting in Puebla, Mexico, suggestions from members of the U.S.  team who reviewed several iterations, and an intensive working session among senior researchers at the University of Twente, the Netherlands in September 2004.  The paper draws upon the institutional rational choice model proposed by Ostrom (E.  Ostrom, 1999a; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999)to address questions raised by the earlier AIHEPS framework.

     "The paper begins with an overview of the framework that guided national work during the last two years, compares this framework to the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework devised by Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, (E.  Ostrom, Gardner, R., Walker, J.,, 1994) and explains the reasons for incorporating the IAD work within a revised AIHEPS framework.  Finally, the paper suggests a strategy for conducting the international comparison and provides a timeline for completing the project."

 

Rieser, Alison. 1999.  "Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate." Harvard Environmental Law Review 23(2):393-421.

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From p. 9:

     "Recent studies of multiple-use commons present a refinement on the IAD framework particularly relevant to ocean fisheries.This approach considers resources in the context of their 'resource domain.'  A resource domain is a set of fixed spatial dimensions within which one or more resources is located. Sometimes a resource and the domain it occupies are coterminous; other times they are not. For example ocean space is both the resource and the resource domain when used for navigation. The fish stocks are the resource and the ocean the resource domain when the same ocean space is used for fishing."

 

From the conclusion:

     "The social science literature published both before and after Garrett Hardin's essay on the tragedy of the commons has had an enormous impact on the trend toward property approaches in environmental policy. Legal scholarship that now seeks to reform environmental law should be careful to consider the full implications of the commons story in light of the need for strategies that can address the many complex and dynamic features of ecosystems. Advocates of property approaches should consider the reconception of property rights that is a part of the new ecosystems approach, a rethinking that has been shaped in part by eorts to retain a denition of property rights from an earlier time in our history, when we needed individual rights to transform the environment into goods and services. Marine sheries, the last great commons in the American economy, and the traditional description of that resource, the tragedy of the commons, are in serious trouble. Property rights approaches may be the answer to this tragedy, but they must be fashioned to reect the new conceptions of property that our time and

circumstances require and build on the experience of communities that long ago learned to cooperate in managing their renewable resources."

 

Riseth, Jan Åge. 2000.  "Sámi Reindeer Management under Technological Change 1960-1990: Implications for Common-Pool Resource Use under Various Natural and Institutional Conditions: A Comparative Analysis of Regional Development Paths in West Finnmark, North Trondelag and South Trondelag / Hedmark, Norway: Vols. 1-2." (Doctor Scientarium Thesis, Agricultural University of Norway, 2000).

wsl  Reprint Files.

 

Riseth, Jan Åge, and Arild Vatn 2000.  "A Perspective at the Saami-Norwegian Case of Co-Management in the Reindeer Industry: Regional Failure and Success at the End of the Old Millenium." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium," the Eighth Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4, 2000.

http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir0/00/00/01/43/index.html

wsl & Digital Library of the Commons  Reprint Files.

 

       "The Sámi is recognized as the indigenous people of Northern and Middle Fennoscandia and the Kola Peninsula.  The reindeer has been an important source of living since prehistoric times, and currently the reindeer industry is still an important resource for the sustenance of Sámi culture and identity.  It has a mixed management regime where the pasture resource regulated by common property produces inputs to the production functions of individual owners.  Through the old Millenium Saami (Sámiland) have been gradually been colonized by the nation-states of the current Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia, and finally incorporated with the state borders established in the 18th and the 19th centuries.

       "The experiences from the Sámi-Norwegian case should be viewed in a particular perspective.  In 1976 the Norwegian government and the Association of Norwegian Reindeer Herding Sámi (NRL) signed a Main Agreement for the Reindeer Industry establishing the basis for a new co-management system which still is at work parallel with regulation by law.  The intentions included promoting good resource utilization and sustaining the industry as a part of Sámi culture.  What is striking, is the variation in the achievements of the Sámi-Norwegian system.  To a considerable extent the outcome follows a regional pattern.  During the 1980s the southernmost regions experienced a prosperity without overgrazin