Legal practice for many Chinese lawyers is fraught with difficulties and dangers. The challenges they routinely face include various forms of obstruction, harassment, intimidation, and even physical abuse, often at the hands of public security administration (the police system) personnel, the procuracy (the public prosecutor's office), and courts—lumped together in common parlance as the gongjianfa. Surviving and even thriving in this hostile institutional environment demands formal and informal ties to the state bureaucracy.

The story of Chinese lawyers is the story of barriers and bridges. Since the revival of the legal profession in 1979, Chinese lawyers have tried to surmount the meso- and macro-level institutional barriers stymieing their work by building micro-level bridges to the public actors who control the resources on which they depend. They have mobilized personal, particularistic relations, or guanxi, in their efforts to find refuge from the troubles that plague their work, and to gain access to public actors inside the judiciary and elsewhere in the state bureaucracy who can expedite, facilitate, and simplify their work. Guanxi comes in many forms. Public actors oblige overtures from needy lawyers owing to their preexisting affective relations, often to help out an old friend or colleague. They also oblige lawyers in exchange for rents, as part of their instrumental money-influence exchange relations with lawyers. But valuable ties to the state come in forms besides individual political connections. Lawyers affiliated with organizations embedded in the state bureaucracy, too, enjoy shelter from the predatory behavior of state actors while enjoying privileged access and support from them. In short, the guanxi on which lawyers rely in their everyday work includes a diverse portfolio of direct and indirect, individual and organizational ties to the state that must be conceptualized more generally as political embeddedness.

In a little over a decade (prior to 1999), the Chinese bar completed an about-face from a fully public profession to an almost fully private profession. In the process of “unhooking and privatizing,” as they lost their formal state-sector membership, lawyers' individual-level guanxi helped fill the void left in the wake of retreating organizational-level support. As they unhooked from the state at a macro level, lawyers found ways to stay hooked and to rehook by mobilizing micro-level political connections. Insofar as legal reform is commonly theorized
as eroding the value of ties to political officeholders, lawyers' mobilizations of political connections function as a theoretically important, albeit ironic, strategy for navigating their hostile institutional terrain.

**Theoretical issues and debates: decline or persistence of guanxi?**

Formal laws and regulations are at the center of the new institutional economics (see Carruthers [2006] for a review). In this theoretical framework which has also been labeled "rational choice institutionalism" (Campbell 2004), legal protections and legal constraints shape the micro-level incentives structuring social life. Grounded in this tradition, *market transition theory* predicts a decline in the relative value of political capital in the post-socialist context as markets with legally defined and legally protected property rights supply incentives stimulating investments in human capital and entrepreneurship. In short, know-how comes to eclipse know-who as regulatory institutions supporting and protecting know-how develop and mature in post-socialist market transitions (Nee 1989, 1991, 1992, 1996; Nee and Mathews 1996; Nee and Cao 1999; Cao and Nee 2000). Similarly, a theory of the *declining significance of guanxi* posits the diminishing importance of guanxi as a means of getting things done in the state bureaucracy. According to this complementary theory, over the course of institutional reform in China, universalistic and contractual relations have come to trump the mobilization of particularistic relations (Guthrie 1998, 1999, 2002; for a similar position, see Kennedy [2005]). Guthrie (1999:186) asserts that the development of a rational-legal system is obviating the need to pull strings to get things done: "the major force in the diminishing importance of guanxi practice is the rational-legal system that is being constructed at the state level" (emphasis in original; for similar statements, see Guthrie [1999:20, 177, 178, 185, 196]; Guthrie [2002:52]).

In this chapter I expand the analytical scope of guanxi beyond affective, emotive relations of reciprocal obligation (Guthrie 1998) to include a wider array of concrete strategies and resources individual and organizational actors develop and mobilize in response to contextually specific constraints and challenges posed by contextually specific institutions. Ties to the state include both *individual guanxi* and *organizational guanxi*. Individual guanxi includes friendships and other direct and indirect personal connections that may belong to the category of *emotive guanxi* of the narrow, cultural type or to the category of *instrumental guanxi* that includes money-influence exchange. Organizational guanxi includes *administrative guanxi* and other forms of formal institutional support. Not only are these multiple forms of guanxi overlapping and difficult to disentangle empirically (Walder 1986:179; Shi 1997:69; Gold et al. 2002; also see Karklins 2002), but one form of guanxi can be expressed idiomatically to obscure another form of guanxi (Wank 1999). At a more general level, the advantages that accrue from being embedded in social networks that bridge institutional outsiders (such as lawyers) to institutional insiders (such as members of the gongjianfa) can be conceptualized
as the benefits of political embeddedness. Political embeddedness here differs from earlier conceptualizations. Whereas in earlier research political embeddedness refers in general to the political forces and in particular to the legal constraints that shape economic institutions (Fligstein 1990; Zukin and DiMaggio 1990), in this chapter it refers to ongoing structural relations to the state and its actors—relations that are both formal and informal, and that are bureaucratic, instrumental, and affective.

A comparative look elsewhere in time and place shows that lawyers mobilize direct and indirect connections to judicial insiders not only in China (Cheng and Rosett 1991; Jones 1994; Winn 1994; Dezalay and Garth 1997; Appelbaum 1998; Wank 1999:115; Alford 2002:184; Potter 2002; Schramm and Taube 2003), but also in a diverse array of other contexts, including the United States (Galanter 1974:99; Black 1976:45; Black 1989:16–17; Sarat and Felstiner 1995:101–2; Kritzer 1998:16, 196; Parikh and Garth 2005:297), Mexico (Lomnitz and Salazar 2002), and India (Gandhi 1982). While it is the general case that lawyers everywhere depend to an important measure on social connections, this chapter attempts to identify contextually specific institutions and institutional logics giving value to contextually specific forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986; Friedland and Alford 1991), including guanxi.

Power-dependence (Emerson 1962; Blau 1964) is one concrete condition giving rise to the guanxi imperative. In the process of collecting evidence, Chinese lawyers depend on access to information and documents controlled by government agencies and other public organizations. Any lawyer who does any amount of trial work depends on resources controlled by the courts. Any lawyer with any volume of criminal defense work depends not only on the criminal courts, but also on cooperation from public security organs (which gather evidence and detain criminal suspects) and the procuracy (which prosecutes criminal suspects). Chinese lawyers who despair of the difficulties of working with the gongjianfa and exit criminal defense practice cannot avoid state agencies without exiting the system altogether and abandoning the practice of law. As we would expect anywhere in the world, the specter of state administration is inescapable in the practice of law in China. There is no viable substitute for the gongjianfa and other parts of the state bureaucracy. If lawyers have trouble getting in through the front door, they try the back door. But they must gain access somehow, “by hook or by crook.”

In the Chinese context, two additional properties of lawyers’ institutional environment continue to valorize political connections above and beyond the general case. First, the judiciary remains fused to the state, embedded in and subordinated to the rest of the government bureaucracy (i.e., there is no meaningful separation of powers or judicial autonomy) (Cohen 1997; Lubman 1999; Potter 1999; Woo 1999; Cho 2003; Zhang 2003; Liu 2006). Second, as we will see in greater detail below, lawyers face enduring institutional discrimination that relegates them to the marginal status of outsiders or interlopers.

A consequence of institutional barriers to institutional outsiders such as lawyers is the development of micro-level bridging strategies that give enduring
value to political capital. They embed themselves deeply in clientelist networks bridging public and private spheres, connecting themselves directly and indirectly to government officials as a coping strategy, a means of gaining informal access and support. In what Solinger (1992) calls the “merger of state and society,” public and private spheres have become symbiotically linked through micro-level behavior (Wank 1999). Lawyers find patrons in the state to protect their interests. In return, these patron-guardians expect and receive financial rewards. This mutually beneficial coping strategy that has developed in a contextually specific institutional environment has been labeled \textit{symbiotic clientelism} (Wank 1999).

In addition to conceptualizing guanxi as a means of engaging in corrupt practices, of circumventing, bending, and breaking legal rules and procedures (Guthrie 1999:177), guanxi must also be understood as a means of fending off corrupt practices. To be sure, lawyers survive and thrive by developing relationships, often through bribes and kickbacks, with personnel in the gongjianfa and elsewhere in the state bureaucracy. But lawyers endowed with political connections are also better equipped than those without such social resources to avoid various forms of unlawful rent-seeking. Political connections improve the success of lawyers not only by enhancing their ability to secure preferential access to essential bureaucratically controlled resources, and not only by helping them sway and circumvent official procedures, but also by sheltering them from predatory state agents.\footnote{1}

In order to set the stage for the empirical analysis that follows, I will first provide some historical background on the meso- and macro-level institutions that shape the micro-level responses of lawyers. In the next two sections I draw on documentary sources as well as interviews I and my research assistants conducted almost entirely between 1999 and 2001.\footnote{2}

\textbf{Lawyers' difficulties}

Chinese lawyers' woes have been more thoroughly documented in the press than in scholarly literature (but see Yu 2002, Sheng 2003, 2004, and Cai and Yang 2005). For their reports published in \textit{The New York Times} on “ragged justice” in China, in which lawyers' abrasive relationship with the state is prominently featured, journalists Joseph Kahn and Jim Yardley won the 2006 Pulitzer Prize (Kahn 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d; Yardley 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). This particular series, however, is merely an extension of an established genre of English-language media reports on the challenges Chinese lawyers face in their day-to-day practice (e.g. Becker 2000; Rosenthal 2000; Eckholm 2001, 2002; Pomfret 2002a, 2002b; also see Human Rights Watch [2006]).

Chinese lawyers report a wide array of difficulties in their work. The so-called “three difficulties” include: (1) the difficulty of collecting evidence, (2) the difficulty of meeting with clients, and (3) the difficulty of reading and photocopying documents. Beyond these, their difficulties also include police evidence tampering,
police intimidation of witnesses, and outright police harassment and abuse, including beating, kidnapping, and illegal detention. Of all 79 cases regarding lawyers' rights investigated by the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA) between 1999 and 2001, 21 were related to the unlawful imprisonment, detention, or prosecution of lawyers or to the taking of lawyers as hostages, the kidnapping of lawyers, and the beating of lawyers, while 31 were related to the obstruction of lawyers' work. These cases represent only the relatively few cases reported to and investigated by the ACLA, and thus exclude an undoubtedly far greater volume of similar cases brought to local bar associations or not reported to or investigated by any organizational entity (Wang 2004).

Although similar difficulties in securing the assistance and cooperation of state actors afflict lawyers in business fields of practice (Li 2002), lawyers in the field of criminal defense are at particular risk (but see Fu [2006]). As one lawyer said to me, “When you go to the public security and ask to see the criminal suspect, it would be easier to climb up to the heavens. ... We simply can't get access to our clients” (E11). Criminal defense lawyers also face the threat of being criminally prosecuted themselves on (often trumped-up) charges of fabricating or concealing evidence (Michelson 2003:99–111). Not surprisingly, lawyers have expressed reluctance to perform criminal defense work (I4, I13, E11, and E33).

The difficulties faced by Chinese lawyers in general and Chinese criminal defense lawyers in particular reflect the marginal status of lawyers in the broader socialist context. “Socialist legality”—legal institutions governed by the principle that law is a political tool fundamentally serving the interests of the state (Markovitz 1996:2295; Petrova 1996:543; Potter 1999)—reduces lawyers to the status of outside annoyance, a thorn in the side of the gongjianfa. As a lawyer in Beijing put it, “In actuality, the gongjianfa are in opposition to lawyers” (I12). Another lawyer referred to the “antagonistic character of the relationship between lawyers and the gongjianfa” (I21).

In addition to the troubles the gongjianfa inflict on lawyers, officials in the judiciary have also developed an assortment of techniques for extracting rents from lawyers (Alford 1995:33; Ma 2001), rents on which the operation of gongjianfa are increasingly dependent. Pretenses or euphemisms for rents include “file retrieval fees” and “service fees” (Wang and Gao 2000:8). Rents are also exacted in the form of kickbacks from lawyer fees for referrals from judges (Wang and Gao 2000:7), sometimes called “cash cases” or “friendship cases” (Cai 2006). Lawyers tire of the heavy “extra-legal” investments demanded by trial work (E33). At the same time, however, ordinary people with legal needs often hire lawyers according to their stock of guanxi with judges and other important members of the gongjianfa (Xie 1994). As a consequence, lawyers interviewed in Wuhan “universally acknowledged the importance of connecting and cultivating guanxi with judges” (Wang and Gao 2000:10). Indeed, lawyers even used to advertise their special insider connections. In short, lawyers' guanxi imperative stems not only from the gongjianfa, but also from competitive market pressures and pressure from their clients and prospective clients.
**Political embeddedness as a source of protection**

Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader from the late 1970s until the early 1990s, proclaimed in 1980 that “the ranks of lawyers must expand, to fail to create this legal system is unacceptable” (Li 1997:467, 722). Given the precarious history of lawyers, however, few people were brave enough or desperate enough to enter the bar. The socialist history of lawyers did not inspire confidence among those who were called upon to staff the newly revived bar.

After the system of lawyers that prevailed during the Republican period (1911-49) was formally abolished in September 1949, Republican lawyers were labeled “black lawyers” and purged in 1949-50 (Cui et al. 1999:219; Guo 2000:99). In 1954 a new system of lawyers modeled after the Soviet system was developed on an experimental basis in several cities including Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Shenyang. The new system was formally established in 1955, the same year in which the Beijing Bureau of Justice was established. Following the 1956 Hundred Flowers Campaign in which many lawyers participated alongside intellectuals who harshly criticized the new government, lawyers who sympathized with the campaign were branded “Rightists” and purged in 1957 (Lubman 1999:77–78; Guo 2000:99–100). In 1957, 30% of lawyers in Beijing were classified as “Rightists” (Cui et al. 1999:223).

In light of this history, the people who were called upon to serve as lawyers in the late 1970s and early 1980s were understandably skittish. Part of the official strategy to attract and retain lawyers included giving them civil service slots in the state personnel system. This was an official status bestowed upon lawyers expressly to offset their socialist marginalization, to provide a real measure of protection against official harassment, and to assuage fears of political persecution (Guo 2000:101). For the first decade following their revival in 1979, lawyers remained “hooked” to the state; they remained embedded in and an inextricable part of the state bureaucracy. Without such an institutionalized safeguard against persecution, lawyering was widely perceived as little less than suicidal:

> At the time a lot of people were scared by all the earlier political campaigns. As a result, in 1979 and 1980 no one dared work as a lawyer. They were under the pressure of political fear because they had to sing opposing melodies with the courts, sing opposing melodies with the government, and defend people arrested by the government. So various measures were adopted. The Organization Department of the Party Central Committee issued a directive in 1979 stating that lawyers must be respected as civil servants, that they were government officials.

(E28)

Guo (2000:101) reaffirms the institutional logic behind lawyers’ official status:

> To enable lawyers to perform their work without the threat of being accused as “accomplices” of the suspects, it was necessary to make them
State legal workers, which was at a similar level to judges and public prosecutors. At a certain moment, the Supreme People’s Court even issued circulars to criticize certain judges for their critical attitude towards lawyers. In order to make lawyers look like part of the government establishment, China went so far as to create a police-style uniform clothing for lawyers.

From the time of their revival in 1979 until the end of 1986, lawyers were treated as “administrative cadres” and assigned administrative ranks according to the complex nomenklatura system of civil service grades (Luo 1998:2). The first sentence of the 1980 Provisional Regulations on Lawyers defined lawyers as “state legal workers” (Article 1). Like other state cadres, lawyers “ate imperial grain” (Dai and Zhu 1994). A lawyer I interviewed said that lawyers at the time “were allocated slots as state civil servants, as state employees” (E16).

**The political embeddedness of specially appointed lawyers**

An additional measure adopted to satisfy the needs of the expanding legal system and to enhance lawyers’ safety in the process of carrying out their work was the active recruitment of lawyers from organizations that were the very sources of the profession’s plight: “Lawyers came primarily from personnel in government agencies and public organizations, especially from cadres carefully selected from central and regional party and government organs; some were selected from the ranks of decommissioned military officers” (Li 1997:471). Such politically connected lawyers who had already retired from their former posts were given a new official label in 1984: “specially appointed lawyer” (têyao lùshì). In response to a local government request for guidance, the Supreme People’s Court, in its 1984 Written Reply Regarding Permission to Take in as Specially Appointed Lawyers Retired Personnel Who Meet the Standards of Lawyers, stated that retired personnel from judicial and other government organs were qualified to work as specially appointed lawyers if they were in good health and met conditions stipulated by the Provisional Regulations on Lawyers and other requirements set by Ministry of Justice documents (BBJ 2001:103–4).

Specially appointed lawyers were described as “... expert legal personnel who, after retiring from judicial agencies, legal teaching, or scientific or other units, bring into play their post-retirement energies by becoming lawyers” (Zhu 1988:E28). Together with other lawyers who had prior careers, they were sometimes called lawyers who “become monks in mid-life,” an expression that refers to people who switch careers in their 40s or 50s. Specially appointed lawyers were “old cadres” (BBJ 2001:101), likened to “old doctors” for the wealth of experience and comfort they brought to people who relied on their expertise (Zhu 1988). They were “old comrades who have been retired for at least two years after working as judges in the People’s Court, as procurators in the People’s Procuracy, as preadjudication personnel in a public security organ, or
after performing some other kind of judicial work for at least 10 years” (BBJ 2001:105).

Entry from the gongjianfa did not require formal educational certification or passing the bar examination.3 Eligibility for admission to the bar was extended to anyone with at least a junior college degree in law and at least two years of law-related work experience such as law school teaching experience; anyone with legal training and work experience in the courts or procuracy; or anyone with a university degree in any subject who underwent legal training and was able to demonstrate legal ability (Article 8 of the Provisional Regulations on Lawyers). Only with the enactment of the 1996 Law on Lawyers did passing the national lawyers examination become a licensing requirement (Article 6).4

Specially appointed lawyers’ special insider connections to their old friends in the gongjianfa—their political embeddedness—shielded them from the kinds of problems routinely suffered by lawyers at the hands of gongjianfa personnel. To be sure, it is the general case that political officeholders and other government employees everywhere, including the United States, often put their accumulated connections to good use in private practice. But the special case of institutionalized discrimination against lawyers and the institutional fusion of the legal system to the state bureaucracy gives particular value to political connections above and beyond the general case. In the words of one lawyer I interviewed, “Lawyers who used to work in the gongjianfa have an absolute advantage. There’s no comparison. That they use their prior guanxi in their current practice is a one hundred percent certainty” (E13). Because of their insider advantages, specially appointed lawyers—who might also be labeled “specially advantaged lawyers”—were particularly well suited to lawyers’ hostile institutional environment: “...they had personally weathered the storms of China’s many political struggles” (Zhu 1988).

Although in Beijing the last “specially appointed law firms” were established in 1986, and although in 1988 they were forced to drop “specially appointed” from the names of their firms (BBJ 2001:103–4; Luo 2004:35), the ranks of specially appointed lawyers continued to grow. At their peak, in 1996, there were over 15,000 specially appointed lawyers nationwide (18% of all lawyers). In Beijing their peak came in 1997 at about 1,300 (12% of all lawyers, although in 1989 and 1990, at about half their 1997 population, they represented 23% of all lawyers in Beijing). Only a few years later this official category suddenly disappeared. In accordance with the 1999 Ministry of Justice Notice Regarding the Issue of Registering Specially Appointed Lawyers, starting in 2001, specially appointed lawyers were required either to pass the bar examination or to abandon practice (E8). Those who had acquired their lawyers’ licenses prior to the 1997 passage of the Law on Lawyers were simply to be relabeled “full-time lawyers” (zhuanzhi liushi). In 2000, after this directive was issued, the China Law Yearbook (ZFN) suddenly stopped reporting specially appointed lawyers. Likewise, in 2000 the Beijing Statistical Yearbook stopped reporting specially appointed lawyers.
The political embeddedness of part-time lawyers

In addition to specially appointed lawyers, the position of part-time lawyers (jianzhi lüshi) was also developed to help meet the growing demand for lawyers. Part-time lawyers are formally based at other work organizations (excluding the gongjianfa) and, from an official standpoint, only moonlight as lawyers. After 1989, only teaching and research personnel of law schools and other legal research units could work as part-time lawyers (E28). The formal institutional affiliation of a part-time lawyer is her or his law school or research unit, not a law firm. Beijing's first “part-time law firm” was established in 1984 by the China University of Political Science and Law (BBJ 2001:101). Part-time lawyers are thus, in most instances, teachers at educational institutions. Their firms are typically operated by their universities. For example, the Kehua Law Firm was established by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Dishi Law Firm was established by Renmin University of China. Because they are already members of prominent public organizations, part-time lawyers' state political embeddedness is self-evident. Moreover, as members of often prestigious institutions of higher learning, and in contrast to the status of "full-time lawyers," the high and unambiguously official status of part-time lawyers shields them from many of the difficulties that plague lawyers without this official status.

Three patterns emerge from an analysis of the changing population and composition of lawyers in China. First, until recently, specially appointed and part-time lawyers accounted for a substantial portion of all lawyers: “China's system of lawyers possessing special Chinese characteristics has been formed with full-time lawyers as the backbone and with specially appointed and part-time lawyers as the two wings” (Zhu 1988). Second, full-time lawyers have always accounted for a smaller proportion of the lawyer population in Beijing than in China as a whole, undoubtedly because Beijing has the greatest concentration of universities and research institutes and the greatest concentration of government officials in China. Third, by 2004 the official category of full-time lawyers had come to account for almost all lawyers.

The political embeddedness of state-owned law firms

Much of the protection enjoyed by specially appointed lawyers and part-time lawyers against the predatory behavior of people in the gongjianfa and elsewhere in the state derived from their personal connections to friends in high places, resulting from their personal career backgrounds. However, they also derived protection from their law firms. That is, it is important conceptually and analytically to separate individual political embeddedness from organizational political embeddedness. The advantages of state-sector membership in the bar are no different from the advantages of "wearing a red hat" in private business: registering as a state-owned business in order to minimize the uncertainty and vulnerability associated with private-sector membership (Solinger 1992:126–28; Wank 1999). A lawyer's
organizational affiliation is of enormous consequence to her ability to avoid problems in legal practice. For this reason, when the names of legal advisory offices were changed to law firms, lawyers voiced intense opposition for fear it would erode what limited support they had from public officials. When the bar was first revived, lawyers worked in "legal advisory offices" (fali gawen chu) modeled after Soviet law offices (see Feinerman 1987:120; Zheng 1988:490; Gelatt 1990–91:761; Zhang 1999:63). By 1984 the name "legal advisory office" had already been changed to "law firm" (lishi shiwusuo), although in reality the name "law firm" had already been adopted in parts of China by 1983 (Zhang 1999:63; BBJ 2001:91, 94). In a 1983 meeting in Wuhan on legal reform, the majority of comrades were opposed to the idea of changing the names of legal advisory offices to "law firms" for the following reasons: (1) "Advisory office" implies "official," whereas "law firm" smells like "private" [min ban]. Changing the name would lower the status of lawyers’ work in the eyes of people. (2) Changing their name so soon after their establishment might mislead some people into believing the state’s policy and attitude toward lawyers have changed.

(Li 1997:459)

For the very same reasons, meeting participants were equally opposed to changing the official status of lawyers from "state legal workers" and to making the budgetary transition to a system of "assuming sole responsibility for profits and loses" (Li 1997:459–60). Such opinions notwithstanding, this is precisely the direction in which law firm reform unfolded.

In the past the Chinese government gave money to law firms according to the number of slots they had in the state personnel allocation system. If there were thirty people in the firm, then the government allocated a budget according to thirty personnel. The money lawyers billed was first given to the government. The firm’s income had to be given to the government to guarantee the salaries of the firm’s personnel. Later it was realized that this was too bureaucratic and an obstacle to the development of the system of lawyers.

(E28)

The process of "unhooking and privatizing" law firms began in the late 1980s. In 1988 the first private law firm was unveiled under the label "cooperative" (hezuo) law firm. In contrast to state-owned firms, cooperative firms were self-accounting and could hire and fire lawyers freely; they were not part of the state personnel allocation system. But in name their assets remained owned by the state. Insofar as the state relinquished control of the day-to-day management of operations but retained formal ownership, cooperative firms were analogous to "collective enterprises": for most practical purposes they were private, but they
possessed “socialist characteristics” in terms of property rights. The unhooking and expansion of the bar accelerated in 1992 following Deng Xiaoping’s call in his Southern Tour speeches for greater economic reform, accelerated privatization, greater openness to the outside world, and the deepening of the legal reforms (Dai and Zhu 1994; Zhang 1999:64; BBJ 2001:95). In the spirit of Deng’s exhortations for greater and faster reform, in 1993 the Ministry of Justice circulated a directive (Plan Regarding Deepening the Reform of Lawyers’ Work) ratified by the State Council in the same year that effectively stripped the bar of its former civil service character. The politically embedded status of law firms and lawyers as state personnel with administrative ranks was formally abolished (Zhang 1999:72). Even most state-owned law firms were on the road to operational and fiscal autonomy. The 1993 directive also formally sanctioned partnership law firms. In contrast to cooperative firms, which ultimately remain state property and whose liabilities are limited to its assets, partners of partnership firms bear unlimited liability jointly and severally (Zhang 1999:62–93; Law on Lawyers, Articles 17 and 18). After 1993, from both fiscal and organizational standpoints, state-owned law firms became virtually indistinguishable from their private-sector counterparts.

By 1993 the significance of membership in the state sector had become less about property ownership by and fiscal dependence on the state, and more about less tangible forms of support from and access to other state organizations that reduce the likelihood of encountering trouble in the course of legal practice. Members of state-owned firms remained “inside the system” (tīzhì neǐ), part of the state bureaucracy, whereas their private-sector counterparts were situated “outside the system” (tīzhì wài). Bureaucratic rules of access to other state organizations in general privilege people within the state bureaucracy and in particular people in more highly ranked state organizations. According to the prevailing institutional norms and rules of China’s socialist bureaucracy, gaining access to a given state organization typically required making contact through a higher-level overseeing unit that considered requests only from units of the same rank (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988:143). Thus, in the words of a research informant, “In the 1980s a lot of importance was attached to rank and level [of law firms], which unit was of a higher rank than other units” (E8). The following is an extreme case of political embeddedness: before it merged with the Jiawei Law Firm in 2001, the Landun (“Blue Shield”) Law Firm, which had been established and operated by the China People’s Public Security University, itself under the authority of the Ministry of Public Security, would have offered to its lawyers unparalleled access to and protection against the police and other criminal justice personnel.

No different from the population of lawyers, the population of law firms experienced rapid growth beginning only in 1992. In 2000 a major drive to unhook and privatize all remaining state-owned law firms was mandated by the State Council and carried out by the Ministry of Justice and local bureaus of justice. Whereas in China as a whole 15% of law firms remained state-owned in 2004, in Beijing the process of unhooking was already complete in 2001.
Data and methods

Data from two surveys of lawyers I carried out in the summer of 2000 in Beijing (N = 462) and 24 small and mid-sized cities in 16 provinces outside Beijing (N = 518) confirm the general patterns described in the foregoing. I cannot overstate the fortuitousness of my timing. As we saw, between 1999 and 2002 almost all state-owned firms shut down or privatized and specially appointed lawyers, as an official registration status, entirely disappeared. Had I conducted the surveys any later I would have missed most if not all state-owned firms and specially appointed lawyers. In Beijing I collected data from lawyers in 131 identifiable firms, representing 38% of all law firms in the city in 2000. The proportion of all firms accounted for by the 185 identifiable firms in my multi-city sample is impossible to estimate given the absence of a comprehensive national law firm directory. However, in the 10 cities with available local law firm directories, I surveyed an average of 34% of all firms.

Because cities were not randomly sampled, and because we cannot be certain about the quality of the sampling either of firms or of lawyers within firms, we must treat the findings I present in this chapter as more suggestive than conclusive. This caveat notwithstanding, I hasten to add that, at the time of this chapter’s publication, no comprehensive sampling frame of Chinese lawyers can be constructed from publicly available information.

The next section contains findings from my analysis of lawyers’ answers to questions about the nature and extent of—and the means by which they alleviate—their difficulties. I construct my dependent variables from information about: the marginal status of lawyers, support and cooperation from government agencies, obstructionism and other difficulties in criminal defense work, and the importance of guanxi in legal practice. In my effort to explain variation in the severity of the plight of lawyers, I focus my analysis on the effects of exposure to hotbeds of trouble (criminal defense specialization) as well as individual-level and organizational-level measures of political embeddedness: career history information (prior work in the gongjianfa), lawyer registration status (specially appointed, part-time, or full-time), and law firm ownership (state-owned).

Findings

Political embeddedness became a dominant theme early in the course of my field research. One of the first lawyers I interviewed explained that many lawyers first pay their dues for a few years to a government bureau for the sole purpose of accumulating the social capital necessary for subsequent legal practice. He specialized in tax work after working in the Ministry of Taxation (E24). My survey data showed this to be a widespread pattern. Lawyers in my survey samples who formerly worked in banks reported a dramatically greater percentage of billings from “finance and banking” than did lawyers without this background. Former government officials were dramatically more likely than lawyers without this
background to cite “administrative law” and “government counsel” as their specializations. Almost half of all lawyers who reported real estate as their primary specialty also reported emerging from government bureaus including the State Land Management Bureau, the Construction Commission, and the Environmental Resources Bureau. To be sure, it is the general case that people everywhere choose their vocations, and specific fields of practice within their vocations, in no small part according to the social resources upon which they can draw for support. However, the fusion of China’s legal system to the rest of the state bureaucracy and the marginal status of Chinese lawyers valorize political connections above and beyond the general case.

The distribution of lawyers among firms of different types of ownership reflects the unequal distribution of links to the state. While the overall distribution of all lawyers reported by all respondents was 70% full-time, 24% part-time, and 6% specially appointed, in state-owned firms the distribution was 56% full-time, 33% part-time, and 11% specially appointed. Although 27% of all lawyers and 22% of all full-time lawyers belonged to state-owned firms, a disproportionately high 39% and 51% of all part-time lawyers and specially appointed lawyers, respectively, belonged to state-owned firms. Among respondents, specially appointed lawyers were over 60% more likely than average to belong to state-owned law firms (0.47 vs. 0.29) and two-thirds as likely to belong to partnerships (0.43 vs. 0.66). Although they were disproportionately represented in state-owned firms, specially appointed lawyers and part-time lawyers were also recruited into partnership firms, undoubtedly for the advantages they brought to firms lacking formal institutionalized support. At the same time, specially appointed and part-time lawyers remained in state-owned firms that privatized and registered as partnerships.

Specially appointed and part-time lawyers were embedded in the state bureaucracy not only by virtue of their membership in state-owned law firms, but also by virtue of their personal backgrounds: the proportion of specially appointed lawyers who were CCP members (0.81) is more than double the overall average (0.39), and part-time lawyers were over 50% more likely than full-time lawyers to be CCP members (0.56 vs. 0.36). Almost 90% of specially appointed lawyers were either CCP members or Communist Youth League members. Career background data also reveal the political embeddedness of specially appointed and part-time lawyers. Specially appointed lawyers were far more likely than lawyers in the other two registration categories to have worked either in the courts or in the procuracy. However, specially appointed lawyers were not significantly more likely than average (0.07 vs. 0.05, respectively) to have emerged from the public security administration (the “gong” in the gongjianfa). Compared with only 29% of all lawyers, 72% of specially appointed lawyers reported prior careers in the government, gongjianfa, or military. Also consistent with expectations, part-time lawyers, compared with the average lawyer, were almost four times more likely to report prior work as teaching faculty in institutions of higher learning (0.50 vs. 0.14, respectively) and less than
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half as likely to spend more than 40 hours per week working as a lawyer (0.18 vs. 0.45, respectively). One informant underscored the enduring importance in the private bar of former public-sector membership:

Behind some successful law firm partners are their "bosses," the ones who in actuality take the firm's profits. They aren't even lawyers, but people who wield guanxi resources. But on their business cards they print "high-level lawyer" because no one ever bothers to verify. ... What is this thing called "high-level lawyer"? Sometimes they are former bureau chiefs from the Bureau of Justice, or former deputy bureau chiefs, and after they retire they give themselves the "high-level lawyer" title.

Because of their prior careers in the courts and the procuracy, specially appointed lawyers were far more likely than average to specialize in criminal defense work. Another indication of membership in and ties to the state is housing benefits, the socialist privilege of obtaining a state housing allocation. The proportion of specially appointed lawyers with state housing (0.56) was almost double the overall average (0.31), and part-time lawyers were almost 30% more likely than full-time lawyers to have state housing (0.37 vs. 0.29).

Because most specially appointed lawyers were retired officials from the gongjianfa, specially appointed lawyers were almost 20 years older than average (54 years vs. 35 years old, respectively). Whereas only 14% of all lawyers in the samples were over 45 years of age, 72% of all specially appointed lawyers were in this age category. Even more striking, whereas only 3% of all lawyers in the samples were 60 years of age or older, half of all specially appointed lawyers were in this age category. Because lawyering is not their first career, their average tenure as lawyers is only 1.5 years longer than the overall average and they have been licensed as lawyers for only about a year longer than average.

Lawyers' responses to seven statements on the survey questionnaire reflect their overwhelmingly negative assessments of their status, the level of support (or the lack thereof) extended to them by government agencies, their troubles in criminal defense, and the importance of guanxi in legal practice. Only 6% of respondents indicated any degree of agreement with a statement that lawyers' rights were sufficiently strong ("Currently the laws concerning the rights of lawyers are sufficient to guarantee that lawyers' functions are brought into full play."). Respondents supplied similarly negative assessments of the amount of support they received in the process of gathering evidence. With respect to the second and third statements provided on the survey questionnaire, lawyers complained more intensely about weak support from government agencies than they did about weak support from civil organizations (jituan) and individuals. Whereas 32% said it was "rare" to receive the full cooperation of civil organizations and individuals ("In general, in the process of gathering evidence, lawyers get the full cooperation of the related individuals and civil organizations."), 42%
said it was "rare" to receive the full cooperation of government offices ("In general, in the process of gathering evidence, lawyers get the full cooperation of the related government offices."). As much as the surveyed lawyers complained about the foregoing problems, they complained even more vehemently about their criminal defense woes; in response to the fourth statement of the survey, 66% of the respondents indicated that it was "prevalent" and only 8% that it was "rare" for police to obstruct lawyers’ criminal defense investigations ("In criminal cases, public security organs always find ways to obstruct lawyers’ investigation work."). At the same time, in response to the fifth statement, exactly half of the respondents said it was "prevalent" and 14% that it was "rare" for lawyers to face discrimination vis-à-vis procurators ("In criminal cases, the prosecution has an advantage over the defense; there is no equality to speak of between the prosecution and the defense.").

Survey respondents also reported the remarkable prevalence and disheartening consequences of guanxi in the legal system. In response to the sixth statement, exactly half indicated observing that it was "prevalent," and only 11% said it was "rare" for lawyers to build relationships with judges ("Lawyers I know about spend a lot of time fostering personal relationships [gao hao geren guanxi] with judges."). At the same time, in response to the seventh statement, 44% said it was "prevalent" and only 17% said it was "rare" for the quality of a lawyer’s relations with a judge to affect case dispositions ("The quality of a relationship [geren guanxi] between a lawyer and a judge will not influence how a court case is tried.").

I combine these seven items in three ways both to render more parsimonious the analyses that follow and to ensure the robustness of the empirical patterns that emerge. First, I analyze the average score of all seven items. In order to make the responses comparable across items worded in both positive and negative directions, I calculated the mean score after reversing the order of the response categories of negatively worded questions. Thus, higher mean scores reflect more positive assessments of lawyers’ institutional environment, and lower scores reflect greater despair of their woes. Cronbach’s alpha for all seven items is 0.65, meaning they can be meaningfully combined into an aggregate scale of vexation with their institutional environment. This measure ranges from 0 to 5. Second, I analyze counts of negative responses and counts of positive responses. Third, I analyze the proportion of respondents who, in response to the seven questions, chose any positive response and the proportion of those who chose any negative response. These measures range from 0 to 1.

If lawyers’ opinions about their institutional environment were equally distributed, the average score of all seven items would be 2.5, the midpoint on the 0–5 scale of responses. In fact the average score is almost a full point lower. After reversing the response categories of negatively worded items, the mean and median scores are 1.712 and 1.714, respectively, and the mode is 1.286. While not a single respondent chose the most positive response category for all seven items, eight respondents chose the most negative response category for all seven
items. Likewise, whereas only one respondent chose one of the two most positive response categories for all seven items, 48 respondents (or 5%) chose one of the two most negative response categories for all seven items. The average number of negative responses was over four times greater than the average number of positive responses (3.4 vs. 0.8). Whereas 48% of respondents supplied at least one positive response, 92% of respondents supplied at least one negative response. Finally, whereas only 8% of respondents supplied at least three positive responses, 66% of respondents supplied at least three negative responses. Differences between the Beijing and multi-city samples are not statistically significant.

Not only were lawyers on the whole remarkably acerbic, but the extent of their acerbity varied according both to their exposure to risk and to the strength of their political ties to the state. Lawyers specializing in criminal defense took greater umbrage at their institutional environment than did their non-specialist counterparts. Lawyers who reported prior careers in the court system expressed more positive assessments of their institutional environment. Because of the advantages they derived from their special backgrounds in the gongjianfa, specially appointed lawyers, compared with their full-time counterparts, were far more sanguine and far less cynical about their institutional environment. Specially appointed lawyers were almost 75% more likely than full-time lawyers to supply at least one positive response (0.78 vs. 0.45).

The effects of firm ownership are similarly strong. Compared with their counterparts in partnership firms, lawyers in state-owned firms averaged more positive responses and fewer negative responses. At the same time, lawyers in state-owned firms were 30% more likely than their counterparts in partnership firms to supply at least one positive response (0.58 vs. 0.44, respectively). Compared with their full-time counterparts, part-time lawyers, who as teaching and research faculty of universities and research institutes enjoyed formal membership in the state bureaucracy, were far more sanguine and supplied far fewer negative responses about their institutional environment.

The foregoing relationships are robust to controls in multivariate regression analysis (details not presented). In short, saturated regression models confirm that, whereas politically unembedded lawyers were far more negative than they were positive, politically embedded lawyers were about as positive as they were negative.

**Conclusions and implications**

It has become a banal truism in law and society scholarship that the law on the books tells us little about the law in action. The formal appearance of the law often reveals little about its substance. Yet the new institutional economics tends to treat law as a transparently and predictably enforceable set of rules to which all parties are equally constrained. Through empirical scrutiny of on-the-ground legal processes, this chapter builds on Suchman and Edelman’s (1996) critique of such “naive Legal Formalism.” It supports an alternative scholarly tradition in
which institutional form and institutional substance are loosely coupled or altogether decoupled, and in which ritualistic and ceremonial conformity to standardized models belies and obscures enormous local variation in on-the-ground behaviors and meanings within organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

In this chapter we have seen the enduring salience of the institutional legacy of socialist legality, the remarkable resilience of an institutional logic antithetical to the interests of lawyers. In response to the wide array of troubles they report, including obstruction, harassment, threats, violence, and rent-seeking, lawyers have learned to cope by relying on formal and informal bridges to state bureaucracy. Formal bridges include organizational ties through membership in law firms politically embedded in the state and through affiliations with public-sector universities and research institutes. Informal bridges include personal connections to old friends from prior careers in the judiciary.

My findings reflect both a general case and a special case of the value of political embeddedness. It is the general case that, *ipso facto*, direct and indirect connections to government bureaucrats facilitate access to government bureaucracy. But the special case of China's institutionally undifferentiated character of law, the legal system's fusion to the state and to the CCP's political apparatus, enhances their gatekeeping capacity and gives special advantages to bureaucratic insiders above and beyond the general case. While it is undoubtedly true that the institutionalization of judicial autonomy and the separation of powers would erode some of the political advantages I have documented in this chapter, there is no necessary reason to believe China is on a track of teleological institutional convergence with liberal democratic settings. Indeed, my findings are consistent with existing research concluding that actors more deeply embedded in the state bureaucracy have less need to resort to guanxi practices (and thus report less of it) because they already enjoy routinized, institutionalized access (Guthrie 1999:191; Guthrie 2002:53–54). Chinese lawyers appear to tell us at least as much about the institutional logics of socialism and their continuity as they do about the incipient institutional logics of capitalism and the rule of law. Lawyers reveal at least as much about institutional marginalization, patronage, formal institutional support, and administrative rules of access in the socialist state bureaucracy as they do about incipient capitalist and rule of law institutions.

But the story of Chinese lawyers is not only a story of institutional continuity. The unhooking of lawyers from the state reflects fundamental changes in institutional form consistent with neoinstitutionalist expectations of global isomorphic convergence. Specially appointed lawyers, who best exemplify individual political embeddedness, have been purged from the bar, at least in name. To be sure, some former specially appointed lawyers, by passing the judicial examination and obtaining lawyer licenses, remain in the bar under a different name. However, many have been forced out. Indeed, some specially appointed lawyers have sued the Beijing Bureau of Justice (unsuccessfully) for the right to renew their licenses to practice as lawyers (Sun 2003; Yang 2003). Following the Ministry of
Justice’s circulation in 2003 of official directives on “cleaning up and consolidating” (qingli zhengdun) the bar, the population of part-time lawyers has been roughly halved, accelerating a more gradual decline in their numbers which had been underway for a decade. Finally, amendments made in 2001 to both the Law on Judges and the Law on Procurators include two provisions limiting the kinds of relational practices I have documented in this chapter: a provision banning former judges and procurators from doing civil litigation or criminal defense work as a lawyer until two years after resigning or retiring and a provision prohibiting judges and procurators from handling cases represented by their spouses and children.\(^6\)

However, these formal institutional changes obscure the deeper continuity of socialist institutional logics and the enduring importance of informal micro-level bridges to the state bureaucracy. Even following lawyers’ unhooking from the state, the public-private divide remains of fundamental salience. So long as the official status of lawyers, and of the private sector more generally, remains poorly defined and weakly protected, access to the state will remain a highly prized and unequally distributed resource. The disappearance of specially appointed lawyers and the decline of part-time lawyers as formal categories does not imply the diminishing significance of the functions of these defunct and soon-to-be-defunct formal categories. Likewise, the premium attached to informal ties to the legal system has not diminished simply because it is now forbidden to advertise them.

Political connections are not diminishing in significance as much as they are becoming more opaque. Political connections in the Chinese bar are now obscured by the labels “full-time lawyer” and “partnership firm” that make it easier “to see lawyers in the PRC as, in effect junior colleagues—cut from the same cloth as their American brethren” (Alford 2002:189). The methodological implications of this conclusion include the need to develop more sensitive and creative measures of political embeddedness. We must consider not only a lawyer’s current position but also former positions. We must consider not only the current ownership form of a law firm but also its former ownership form. It is likely that former state-owned law firms, even after they privatize, will continue to enjoy preferential access to and support from important public actors.

At the same time, instead of purging politically embedded lawyers from the practice of law, recent reforms may have done more to push them into the realm of unauthorized legal practice. As they “clean up” the official, primary market for legal services, recent reforms may also be fueling the secondary, shadow market for legal services containing “black lawyers” (hei liushi), “fake lawyers” (jia liushi), and “underground lawyers” (dixia liushi) (Liu and Michelson 2004). By serving to expand the ranks of their unauthorized, unregulated competition, lawyers’ unhooking from the state may be more of a shot in the foot than a shot in the arm with respect to efforts to advance their professional rights and status. Other post-socialist contexts in which official enforcement institutions are weak and unresponsive to people with legal needs and to the practitioners who staff them
have witnessed the rise of private, unauthorized enforcement institutions containing and utilizing collusive ties to the state bureaucracy (e.g. Varese 2001).

In sum, although China’s legal reforms are entirely consistent with neoinstitutionalist expectations of global convergence—the isomorphic adoption of the formal trappings of standardized global legal models (Boyle and Meyer 1998; Frank and McEneaney 1999; Boyle 2003), this is merely one of many—often contradictory—institutional logics at play. To use superficial changes in institutional appearance as evidence of the rise of American-style adversarial legalism, including institutionalized limits on state authority (Kelemen and Sibbitt 2004; Gilley 2004:76), or of the rise of a “rational-legal system at the state level” (Guthrie 1999:183), is to succumb to what Alford (1995) calls the “tasseled loafers” syndrome: “the tendency of some observers to mistake appearances for substance” (Alford 2002:200n31). Just as a dragon sporting a three-piece suit may still feel and act like—and be perceived locally as—a dragon, a Leninist state sporting a legal system may still behave like and be understood locally as a Leninist state. Over four decades ago it was observed, “Law can be—and in recent decades frequently has been—made by political commanders neither trained in nor concerned with law as a disciplined science or ideology. Political dictators, social revolutionaries, technocrats, all these may make the laws by political fiat” (Friedmann 1963/64:181).

There is no theoretical reason why formal adherence to the global institutional logic of “rule of law” must necessarily supplant contradictory institutional logics including the logic of authoritarian control and the logic of guanxi as a means of bridging and reconciling the needs of the market with the needs of political control. In this chapter I have made no such assumptions of teleological convergence. Insofar as “rule of law” institutions are only loosely coupled with contradictory institutional logics and practices, they can buttress and reproduce as well as erode existing power structures. The power of law includes the power to obscure the persistence of contradictory institutional logics (e.g. Bourdieu 1987; Nader 1990; Santos 2000; Dezalay and Garth 2002). As we will see, Chinese lawyers tell us at least as much about the enduring legacy of socialist institutions as they do about the incipient institutions of capitalism.

It is perversely paradoxical that adherence to neoliberal models of privatization and standardized global rule of law models may have done as much to dash as to advance lawyers’ political and professional aspirations for political reform. The lawyers with the fewest troubles and the greatest capacity to navigate their hostile institutional terrain are precisely the lawyers most folded into the state and the party. Insofar as they benefit from their privileged ties to bureaucratic insiders, the lawyers most adept at avoiding the sorts of troubles I have documented in this chapter are precisely the ones with the greatest vested interest in the institutional status quo. Moreover, the Chinese pattern of career mobility from the state into the bar, while not historically and comparatively unprecedented, runs counter to the more commonly observed pattern to the contrary in other contexts (Miller 1995). The case of Chinese lawyers thus contributes to scholarly efforts to remedy earlier approaches to the study of lawyers that ignore
the centrality of politics and the state (see Halliday and Karpik [1997] and Halliday [1998] for reviews). But whereas research in the “political lawyering” tradition (Halliday and Karpik 2001) highlights lawyers’ efforts to advance political change (Abel 1995; Sarat and Scheingold 1998, 2001; Scheingold and Sarat 2004), the case of China identifies conditions under which lawyers also, wittingly or unwittingly, stymie political change (Dezalay and Garth 1996, 2002). While under many circumstances they are a politically liberal force, under other circumstances they are a politically conservative force. Although their political subordination is exacerbated by socialist legality, it is by no means limited to the socialist context. In the civil law world more generally, lawyers in private practice are distinguished from and have lower levels of status and prestige than legal practitioners employed by the state (Abel 1988).

By recognizing institutional change at the level of form and structure and institutional continuity at the level of norms, meaning, and practices, we can recognize the concrete conditions under which legal institutions that, at one level appear to conform to standardized global models, function at another level as “anti-politics machines” (Ferguson 1994; Jones 1999) by reproducing local institutional logics incongruous with the institutional logic of political liberalism.

Notes

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1 Of course China enjoys a monopoly neither on aggrieved lawyers nor on lawyers’ mobilization of political connections as shelter from their grievances and as a source of professional advantage. Power-dependence characterizes lawyers’ relationship with the state and the judiciary in many other contexts, including the United States (Carlin 1962; Blumberg 1973; Harrell 1986) and Indonesia (Lev 2000; Kadafi 2002).

2 Basic descriptive information about interviews cited in this chapter is presented in the Appendix.

3 From a comparative standpoint, the formal privileging of practical experience over education and examinations was not unprecedented, but was also the case, for example, in Japan (Rabinowitz 1956:80; Sun 1988) and in the Republican bar (Conner 1994:219), which had been modeled after the Japanese bar.

4 The informal path of mobility from the judiciary into private practice also replicates a Republican-era pattern: “Not a few lawyers left judgeships or other official positions to enter practice, citing their past experience as a valuable qualification” (Conner 1994:234).

5 In 2002 the three-in-one judicial examination (sifa kaoshi) for lawyers, judges, and procurators replaced the national lawyers examination established in 1986.

6 These amendments (Article 17 in the 2001 revised Law on Judges and Article 20 in the 2001 revised Law on Procurators) replicate a pattern from the Republican period. The common path of mobility from the bench to the bar “was obviously open to abuse, and this avenue was cut off or delayed for many when the Ministry of Justice issued an order barring judges or other court officials (including procurators and court clerks) from entering law practice in their former jurisdiction for three years after their resignation or retirement” (Conner 1994:234-35).
Table 3.1 Appendix. Sources of qualitative interview data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview code</th>
<th>Interview dates</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Position at time of interview</th>
<th>Prior work experience</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E08</td>
<td>July 31, 2001</td>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>Bureau of Justice official</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E11</td>
<td>August 7, 2001</td>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>Lawyer in partnership firm with 11 lawyers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E13</td>
<td>September 16, 1996</td>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>Lawyer in partnership firm with 17 lawyers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E16</td>
<td>August 28, 2001</td>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>Law school professor, part-time lawyer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E22</td>
<td>July 27, 2001</td>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E24</td>
<td>November 8, 1999</td>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>Partner of firm with 13 lawyers, Ph.D. in law</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E28</td>
<td>September 1, 2001</td>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>Former ACLA leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E33</td>
<td>November 5, 1999</td>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>Director of state-owned firm with 17 lawyers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I04</td>
<td>August 5, 2001</td>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>Lawyer in partnership firm with 50 lawyers</td>
<td>Factory manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I12</td>
<td>August 2, 2001</td>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>Lawyer in partnership firm with 50 lawyers</td>
<td>Military; government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I13</td>
<td>August 2 and 7, 2001</td>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>Lawyer in partnership firm with 50 lawyers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I21</td>
<td>July 24 and 13, August 2001</td>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>Intern at BD Law Firm</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

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